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USCA1 Opinion
April 25, 1995 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
____________________
No. 94-1923
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MOISES REYES-MEDINA,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge] __________________________
____________________
Before
Torruella, Chief Judge, ___________
Aldrich, Senior Circuit Judge, ____________________
and Stahl, Circuit Judge. _____________
_____________________
Carlos A. V zquez-Alvarez, Assistant Federal Public _____________________________
Defender, with whom Benicio S nchez-Rivera, Federal Public _______________________
Defender, was on brief for appellant.
Juan A. Pedrosa, Assistant U.S. Attorney, with whom __________________
Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, was on brief for appellee. _____________
____________________
____________________
Per Curiam. Appellant Mois s Reyes-Medina ("Reyes") Per Curiam. ___________
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
conviction of attempted reentry into the United States after
deportation subsequent to conviction for an aggravated felony, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND BACKGROUND
We view and present the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government. United States v. Abreu, 952 F.2d _____________ _____
1458, 1460 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1695 (1992). On ____ ______
February 15, 1994, Reyes, a native citizen of the Dominican
Republic, arrived from the Dominican Republic at the Luis Mu oz
Mar n International Airport in Puerto Rico. While applying for
entry at the United States immigration inspection area, Reyes
presented his Dominican passport, an alien Registration Receipt
Card, his Social Security card, and his completed customs
declaration form. Immigration officials inspecting these
documents discovered that Reyes had been previously deported from
the United States on August 18, 1993, after having been convicted
of an aggravated felony. Reyes had previously lived in the
United States for approximately ten years. Officials also
ascertained that he had not obtained the express consent and
permission of the Attorney General of the United States to
reenter the country. Reyes was then arrested and later charged
with violation of 8 U.S.C. 1326.
ANALYSIS ANALYSIS
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Reyes argues that the evidence presented at trial is
insufficient to sustain his conviction, because the government
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt two of the elements of
the crime charged. First, he contends, the government failed to
affirmatively prove the legality of Reyes' prior deportation.
Second, Reyes claims that the government did not prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he intended to enter the United States.
Because he did not realize that entering Puerto Rico is
tantamount to entering the United States, Reyes argues, he lacked
the necessary criminal intent, and his conviction must therefore
be reversed.
When reviewing sufficiency of the evidence challenges,
we assess the sufficiency of the evidence as a whole in the light
most favorable to the verdict, with a view to whether a rational
trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. We do not weigh witness credibility, but
resolve all credibility issues in favor of the verdict. United ______
States v. Hahn, 17 F.3d 502, 506 (1st Cir. 1994). The evidence ______ ____
may be entirely circumstantial, and need not exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. In other words, the
factfinder may decide among reasonable interpretations of the
evidence. Id. __
Sections 1326(a) and (b)(2) provide in relevant part
that: 1) any alien; 2) whose deportation was subsequent to a
conviction for commission of an aggravated felony; 3) who enters
or attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United
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States; 4) without the express consent from the Attorney General
for such reentry; 5) shall be fined and/or imprisoned. 8 U.S.C.
1326. Proving a lawful prior deportation is part of the
government's burden in establishing a 1326 violation. United ______
States v. Galicia-Gonz lez, 997 F.2d 602, 603 (9th Cir. 1993). ______ ________________
An overwhelming majority of other circuits to decide this issue
have held that the government need not prove that a defendant had
specific intent to violate the statute; all that is required is
that a defendant enter or attempt to enter the United States
voluntarily. United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 426 (9th Cir. ______________ _____
1994) (citing United States v. Ramos-Quirarte, 935 F.2d 162, 163 _____________ ______________
(9th Cir. 1991)). See also United States v. Espinoza-Le n, 873 ________ _____________ _____________
F.2d 743, 746 (4th Cir.)(citing cases), cert. denied, 492 U.S. ____ ______
924 (1989); United States v. Newton, 677 F.2d 16, 17 (2d ______________ ______
Cir.)(per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982); United ____ ______ ______
States v. Hussein, 675 F.2d 114, 115-116 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), ______ _______
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 869 (1982); but see United States v. ____ ______ ___ ___ ______________
Anton, 683 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1982)(requiring specific intent). _____
Applying these principles to Reyes' first argument
regarding the government's alleged failure to prove that his
deportation was lawful, we find his claim to be meritless. It
appears from the record that Reyes did not collaterally attack
the validity of his deportation either before or at trial, but
simply comes before us now and contends that the government did
not adduce sufficient evidence of the legality of his
deportation. The government, however, submitted at trial Reyes'
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warrant of deportation, which certified that his deportation
orders were issued and carried out after due hearing before an
authorized officer. We think that this evidence suffices to make
out a prima facie case that Reyes was legally deported, and the
jury was entitled to find, in light of this evidence and nothing
on record to contradict it, that the government met its burden of
proof as to this element.
Reyes' second argument, that he did not intend to enter
the United States because he believed that Puerto Rico was not
part of the United States, must also fail. Although it is true
that many people do not realize that Puerto Rico is a U.S.
possession, the sincerity or reasonableness of Reyes' beliefs are
irrelevant. Even assuming that such a defense were available,
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Reyes
knew that he was entering the United States. During cross-
examination, the government coaxed an admission from Reyes that
he had visited Puerto Rico before, at some point while he was
residing in the United States. On that visit, he had had to go
through the United States immigration and customs point in order
to enter Puerto Rico. The jury was entitled to infer, based on
this admission, that Reyes must have known that he would face the
same United States immigration and customs point, and that he
therefore must have also known that entering Puerto Rico was
tantamount to entering the United States. The jury was also
entitled to disbelieve Reyes. We therefore find that this
circumstantial evidence of his intent is sufficient to support
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the jury's guilty verdict.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Reyes' conviction. ______
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Document Info
Docket Number： 94-1923
Filed Date： 4/25/1995
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 3/3/2016