Jeremiah v. Richardson ( 1998 )


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  •      United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 98-1081
    BRUCE JEREMIAH, ANDREW JEREMIAH,
    AS GENERAL PARTNERS OF SILVER SPRING CENTER,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    ANDREW RICHARDSON,
    R.S.S. REALTY TRUST, INC., ETC., ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. Ronald R. Lagueux, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Chief Judge,
    Rosenn, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    Edward G. Lawson for appellants.
    Andrew S. Richardson, with whom Boyajian, Harrington &
    Richardson was on brief, for appellee Trustee, Andrew Richardson.
    July 2, 1998
    ROSENN, Circuit Judge.  This appeal, arising out of a
    unique set of facts, raises an important question pertaining to a
    bankruptcy court's discretion in authorizing a trustee in a Chapter
    11 reorganization to sell the primary asset of the debtor without
    first resolving allegations of fraud committed by the prospective
    purchaser and its principals. The fraud is alleged to have been
    committed by the purchaser and the debtor's former counsel in the
    acquisition of a mortgage against the asset. The debtor's asset
    comprised a group of old mill buildings which the debtor leased to
    retail, commercial, and light industrial tenants. Because the
    principals of the debtor, a partnership that filed the petition for
    Chapter 11 reorganization, were in prison, the bankruptcy court
    appointed a trustee for the estate.
    The Trustee, who had brought an adversary proceeding with
    the approval of the debtor, to set aside the mortgage on the
    property acquired by assignment from the original mortgagee
    allegedly by prepetition fraud, concluded that it would be in the
    best interests of the bankrupt estate to accept an offer to
    purchase the property from the mortgagee and settle the adversary
    proceeding to set aside the mortgage on it. The bankruptcy court,
    over the vigorous objection of the debtor, approved the sale and
    settlement. The debtor timely appealed to the district court which
    affirmed. The debtor thereupon appealed to this court. We also
    affirm.                                I.
    Bruce and Andrew Jeremiah are the partners of the debtor,
    the Silver Spring Center, a Rhode Island general partnership. The
    Silver Spring Center (the "Center"), owned a 500,000-square-foot
    former textile factory complex consisting of approximately 18
    buildings located in Providence, Rhode Island. Its business
    essentially was to lease space in this complex to retail,
    commercial, and light industrial tenants. The Jeremiahs previously
    had been tenants in the Center for 30 years and had owned it for
    approximately the past 14 years.
    In 1988, the Jeremiahs engaged attorney Z. Hershel Smith
    to represent them in a dispute they were having with the Center's
    prior mortgagee, the New Bedford Institution for Savings ("The
    Bank"). Upon Smith's recommendation, the Center filed a Chapter 11
    bankruptcy petition. While Smith was representing the Center in the
    bankruptcy proceedings, it developed that he also was representing
    some of its creditors. Due to this conflict of interests, his
    mismanagement of the Center's funds, and a request of the then-
    Chapter 11 trustee, the Jeremiahs discharged Smith. With the
    assistance of new counsel, they negotiated the dismissal of the
    reorganization petition in June 1991. Smith has since been
    disbarred, convicted of fraud and embezzlement of clients' funds,
    and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.
    In early 1993, the Jeremiahs began to renegotiate the
    $2.1 million mortgage on the Center with the mortgagee. At the same
    time, Smith, without the consent or knowledge of the Jeremiahs,
    allegedly also entered into negotiations with their mortgagee on
    behalf of himself and the R.S.S. Realty Trust ("RSS"), a Rhode
    Island Corporation, to purchase the mortgage, using confidential
    information gained during his three-year prior representation of
    the Center. As a result, The Bank ceased negotiations with the
    Jeremiahs and instead sold the $2.1 million mortgage to RSS for
    $200,000. RSS's principals are William Ricci and the Smith Family
    Trust, of which attorney Smith's children are the beneficiaries.
    Ricci, like Smith, also is a convicted felon, having been convicted
    of various fraud and other charges.
    Shortly thereafter, RSS filed an ex parte petition in a
    Rhode Island state court alleging waste on the part of the Center,
    seeking to have the Center placed in receivership, and seeking to
    foreclose its recently acquired mortgage. Because of RSS's actions,
    in December 1994, the Center once again sought Chapter 11
    protection in the bankruptcy court. Because the Jeremiahs, at the
    time, were in jail for allegedly dealing drugs out of the Center,
    the court appointed the appellee, Andrew S. Richardson, Trustee to
    operate the Center.
    The Jeremiahs vehemently contested the validity, extent,
    and priority of the mortgage RSS had acquired from the New Bedford
    Bank. Therefore, the Trustee commenced an adversary proceeding
    against RSS and Smith in the bankruptcy court. Specifically, the
    Trustee sought to have the mortgage declared null and void, or
    alternatively, conveyed to the Chapter 11 Trustee, or, as a further
    alternative, held in constructive trust for the Jeremiahs. The
    Trustee based his complaint primarily upon Smith's prior
    representation of the Jeremiahs and the alleged breach of his
    fiduciary duties to his former clients.
    In addition to the disputed $2.1 million dollar RSS
    mortgage, the Center was subject to (1) liens for $850,000 in
    unpaid real estate taxes in favor of the City of Providence for the
    period 1989 to 1996; (2) a $30,000 lien held by the Providence
    Water Supply Board; and (3) a $16,000 lien held by the Narragansett
    Bay Commission. The property also has significant environmental
    problems which would cost anywhere from $850,000 to at least $1.5
    million to remedy. Furthermore, the Center is in deteriorating
    condition, particularly the roofs, which need at least a half
    million to $1 million of repairs. Finally, pre-petition, unsecured
    creditors hold claims for approximately another $75,000, including
    $16,000 owed to the United States Coast Guard.
    The Jeremiahs, on the other hand, contend that the
    Center's financial picture is not quite so grim. For instance, they
    allege that the real estate taxes can be cut by as much as one-half
    because the property is significantly overvalued. They also believe
    that the $30,000 Providence Water Supply Board and $16,000
    Narragansett Bay Commission liens can be reduced due to errors in
    the meter readings and billings. As is common in a Chapter 11
    proceeding, the Jeremiahs have no real financial equity in the
    Center.
    During the period the Trustee operated the Center, he
    earned approximately $5,000 per month "profit."  He achieved this
    "profit," however, only by not paying any debt service (i.e., the
    mortgage), any real estate taxes, or any payments on the Center's
    prepetition outstanding obligations. The Jeremiahs dispute the
    Trustee's characterization of the poor financial health of the
    Center, and raise questions about the Trustee's rent collection and
    accounts receivable figures, which they contend would show that the
    Center was in better condition than that painted by the Trustee.
    While the adversary proceeding against RSS and Smith was
    pending, Ricci submitted a proposal to the Trustee in December
    1996, offering to resolve the adversary proceeding and to purchase
    the Center. Ricci's offer consisted of a lump-sum cash payment of
    $150,000 to the Trustee in exchange for conveyance of the title to
    the property and dismissal of the adversary proceeding. This
    $150,000 would cover all claims held by unsecured creditors and all
    administrative costs of the bankruptcy estate. Ricci's offer to
    purchase the Center was subject to all existing liens against the
    property (except for the $16,000 lien held by the United States
    Coast Guard). To assure the purchase, Ricci placed the full
    $150,000 purchase price in escrow pending approval of his offer by
    the bankruptcy court.
    Although the Trustee previously had characterized the
    adversary proceeding as a "good claim" and thought his chances of
    winning it were favorable, he accepted Ricci's offer. He concluded
    that it was the only credible plan on the horizon;  the Jeremiahs
    had not submitted a viable alternative. Thus, the Trustee filed a
    Notice of Intended Sale and Application to Compromise with the
    bankruptcy court. He sent a copy of this notice to all creditors
    and interested parties. The notice required that any party
    objecting to the proposed sale and compromise file an objection
    with the court by February 7, 1997, and that any higher bids be
    submitted by that same date along with a 5% deposit.
    No creditors objected to the Trustee's proposed sale and
    compromise, nor did anyone, including the Jeremiahs, submit a
    competing offer. On the last day permitted, February 7, 1997,
    however, the Jeremiahs filed an objection and sought additional
    time to make a counteroffer. The basis for their objection was that
    the Ricci proposal would deprive them of their property and that
    "the alleged wrongdoers[- Smith and Ricci -]would be rewarded for
    their acts." The Jeremiahs repeatedly assert or imply throughout
    their brief that Smith is involved in the purchase of the Center
    along with Ricci. The record, however, contains no evidence to
    support this assertion. In their objection, the Jeremiahs merely
    stated that they would "arrange to secure payment of 100% of the
    outstanding debt to unsecured creditors, and arrange payment of any
    and all administrative costs of this bankruptcy, and will presentthis [hypothetical plan]  formally to the court [either] [when
    ordered by the court or after] the adversary proceeding has been
    heard and determined by [the court]." (emphasis added).
    Six days later, on February 13, 1997, the bankruptcy
    court held a hearing on the proposal. At that time, the Jeremiahs
    objected and again requested additional time to present a
    counteroffer to the court. For their accommodation and as an
    additional opportunity to purchase the property, the court, over
    the Trustee's objections, continued the hearing for six weeks until
    March 31, 1997. As a condition of the continuance, the court
    required the Jeremiahs to provide the Trustee with sufficient
    collateral to fund an alternative proposal. Although the Trustee
    questioned the value of the collateral offered, the Jeremiahs
    tendered, and the Trustee ultimately accepted, a $175,000 mortgage
    on the residence of Andrew and Faith Jeremiah.
    During the six week extension, the Jeremiahs did not come
    up with a counteroffer. Not until after the six weeks had expired,
    on the morning of the March 31, 1997 hearing, did the Jeremiahs
    submit for the first time their "proposal." Undated, unfiled, and
    incomplete, the document, entitled "Debtor's Proposal to Purchase
    Assets," stated that the Jeremiahs would pay to the Trustee
    sufficient funds to pay (1) all pre- and post-petition creditors
    excepting those from which they had obtained waivers and made
    alternative arrangements and (2) all administrative costs, in
    exchange for (1) the Trustee's assignment to them of all assets of
    the Silver Spring Center subject to all existing liens, (2) the
    court's dismissal of the Chapter 11 petition, and (3) the court
    retaining jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding. The proposal,
    however, lacked necessary specifics; it had no purchase price, no
    time frame for completion, or any statement as to how the proposed
    payments would be funded. During this hearing, however, the
    Jeremiahs' attorney stated that he possessed a $20,000 bank check;
    that he had unspecified, undocumented, "written agreements" that
    $50,000 would be wired to his account before noon that day; that he
    could sell within two weeks an undocumented and unsubstantiated
    Rolls Royce for $40,000; and that he had signed waivers from
    several unsecured creditors totaling almost $70,000.
    The Trustee recommended that the court reject this last-
    minute proposal as inadequate. The court agreed with the Trustee's
    assessment, concluding that the Jeremiahs' "constant last-minute
    efforts . . . just d[id]n't cut it." The court then accepted the
    Trustee's business judgment, and "reluctantly" approved the sale
    and compromise. In its brief, two-page order that followed, the
    court explained that its approval was based on the reasons argued
    by the Trustee, the United States Trustee, and counsel representing
    Ricci, and that the proposed compromise and sale were in the best
    interest of the estate. The court concluded that the Trustee's
    proposal constituted a reasonable exercise of his business
    judgment.
    The Jeremiahs appealed to the district court and obtained
    a stay. Subsequently, the district court duly entered a judgment
    and order vacating the stay, and affirming the bankruptcy court's
    approval of the sale and compromise. The Jeremiahs again appealed
    and moved that this court waive the requirement of a supersedeas
    bond to stay the proposed sale. This court denied their motion. On
    March 5, 1998, the Trustee conveyed all his right, title, and
    interest in the Silver Spring Center to S.S.C. Realty Associates,
    as the nominee of William Ricci.
    II.
    Although both parties raise several issues on appeal, the
    dispositive issue is whether, in light of the credible allegations
    of fraud surrounding the Center's mortgage, the bankruptcy court's
    approval of the Trustee's proposed sale and compromise to Ricci
    constituted an abuse of the court's discretion. We discuss the
    subordinate issues briefly before addressing the abuse of
    discretion question.
    A.   Jurisdiction
    The Jeremiahs' first argument is that the bankruptcy
    court lacked jurisdiction because it had not yet determined the
    status of the adversary proceeding pending against Smith and RSS.
    This is so, they contend, because a bankruptcy court, as a court of
    equity, lacks jurisdiction to further a fraudulent purpose.
    Although this court's opinion in In re Coastal Cable T.V., Inc.,
    
    709 F.2d 762
    , 764 (1st Cir. 1983), seems to lend some credence for
    that premise, as will be discussed more fully when resolving the
    abuse of discretion issue, the bankruptcy court's order did not
    result in "injustice or unfairness . . . in the administration of
    the bankruptcy estate."  See 
    id.
     The Trustee and the court both
    were fully aware of all of the allegations of fraud surrounding
    RSS's acquisition of the Center's mortgage and Smith's alleged
    unethical involvement. Unlike the situation in Coastal Cable, the
    bankruptcy court here held several hearings on the record during
    which the issue was discussed extensively and during which the
    court even assumed the Jeremiahs' success in the adversary
    proceeding against RSS and Smith. Nonetheless, after hearing
    testimony and evaluating all the facts, the court reached the
    considered conclusion that Ricci's proposal was in the best
    interests of the estate. Thus, only then did the court
    "reluctantly" approve the sale and the compromise of the adversary
    proceeding.
    Moreover, although Coastal Cable requires that "there
    must be some relation--at least an arguable relation--between the
    Chapter 11 plan and the reorganization-related purposes that the
    Chapter was designed to serve," see 
    id. at 764
    , here the Jeremiahs
    presented neither a live plan of reorganization nor a comparable
    purchase offer for the property. As the bankruptcy court found, the
    Jeremiahs' last-minute efforts and proposal were without merit;
    they just did not "cut it."  No one used the court to further
    fraudulent conduct; every effort was exerted to achieve the best
    interests of the estate. Thus, the issue here is not whether the
    court was being used to further a fraudulent purpose, and thus
    potentially lacked jurisdiction, but did the court abuse its
    discretion in concluding that the sale and compromise--the only
    credible proposal on the table--were in the best interests of the
    estate.
    B.  Sufficiency of the Record
    The Jeremiahs' second argument is that the record is
    insufficient to demonstrate that the bankruptcy court made a
    thorough analysis of all the relevant factors and an informed,
    independent judgment. The record, however, is replete with evidence
    that the court made a thorough analysis, fully and patiently
    informed itself of the relevant facts, and carefully exercised
    independent judgment. It held at least five on-the-record hearings
    over many months, during which both parties repeatedly presented
    their respective positions to the court in detail. The court also
    provided the Jeremiahs, over the objections of the Trustee,  with
    an extension of six weeks to give them an opportunity to present a
    workable solution before approving the sale and compromise.
    Moreover, the requirement that the court's judgment be
    independent does not necessarily mean that it cannot match the
    judgment of the Trustee. We do not agree with the Jeremiahs that
    the judgment of the court cannot be independent unless it differs
    from the Trustee's. Although the court accepted the proposal and
    reasoning of the Trustee, it did so only after searching hearings
    involving all parties and its independent conclusion that the
    proposal was in the best interest of the estate.
    Finally, though the court adopted the reasons proffered
    by the Trustee and even "welcome[d]" his business judgment, the
    court did summarize on the record its reasons. During the March
    31st hearing, the court stated its conclusions in over one and one-
    half pages of recorded transcript which unmistakably demonstrated
    that it was exercising its own judgment, even though identical to
    the Trustee's.
    We believe that the bankruptcy court informed itself of
    the relevant factors and established a sufficient basis on which it
    exercised its own independent judgment.
    C.  Good Faith Purchaser Under Section 363(m)
    The Trustee correctly argues that under section 363(m) of
    the Bankruptcy Code this court cannot invalidate the Trustee's sale
    to Ricci/SSC Realty if Ricci qualifies as a good faith purchaser.
    Although the Trustee argues that this is the case here, section
    363(m) is not applicable to the facts of this case.  "A 'good
    faith' purchaser is one who buys property in good faith and for
    value, without knowledge of adverse claims."  In re Mark Bell
    Furniture Warehouse, Inc., 
    992 F.2d 7
    , 8 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis
    added) (citations omitted). Here, it is unquestionable that Ricci
    had knowledge of the adverse claim--i.e., the adversary proceeding-
    -instituted by the Trustee against him. The Trustee cannot defeat
    the Jeremiahs' claim by draping Ricci in the garment of a good
    faith purchaser when he clearly had notice and knowledge of the
    very same claim which lies at the heart of the disputed compromise
    before us. Notwithstanding that Ricci/SSC Realty is not a good
    faith purchaser under  363(m), we believe that this conclusion
    does not affect our analysis.
    D.  Did the Bankruptcy Court Abuse Its Discretion?
    On appeal from the district court, we independently
    review the bankruptcy court's decision. The approval of a sale of
    a bankruptcy estate's assets or a compromise of an adversary claim
    is within the sound discretion of the bankruptcy judge, and we will
    not upset it absent a clear showing that the bankruptcy judge
    abused his discretion. See Jeffrey v. Desmond, 
    70 F.3d 183
    , 185
    (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted) (citing In re Anolik,
    
    107 B.R. 426
    , 429 (D. Mass. 1989) (collecting cases)); see also  In
    re Thrifty Liquors, Inc., 
    26 B.R. 26
    , 28 (D. Mass. 1982) ("The
    Court is loath to interfere with the Trustee's business decision in
    regard to . . . the propriety of the proposed sale.").
    In deciding whether to approve a compromise of a lawsuit,
    the specific factors a bankruptcy court should consider include:
    "(i) the probability of success in the litigation being
    compromised; (ii) the difficulties, if any, to be encountered in
    the matter of collection; (iii) the complexity of the litigation
    involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay attending it;
    and, (iv) the paramount interest of the creditors and a proper
    deference to their reasonable views in the premise." See Jeffrey,
    
    70 F.3d at 185
    . The court's consideration of these factors should
    demonstrate whether the compromise is fair and equitable, and
    whether the claim the debtor is giving up is outweighed by the
    advantage to the debtor's estate. Although Jeffrey involved a
    Chapter 7 petition, courts routinely use these same principles in
    the Chapter 11 context. See, e.g., In re Pennsylvania Truck Lines,
    Inc., 
    150 B.R. 595
    , (E.D. Pa. 1992).
    In the instant case, the record amply demonstrates that
    the court carefully weighed these factors in deciding to approve
    the sale and compromise. The court did not act mechanistically or
    impulsively. It realized that the Trustee assumed that the
    adversary litigation would not be complex and that he probably
    would triumph. However, even if the Trustee were successful in the
    adversary proceeding, there was a substantial risk that RSS would
    retain a claim for "at least $200,000 against the estate," the
    amount it had paid the New Bedford Bank for an assignment of the
    original mortgage. The Jeremiahs, by contrast, did not address this
    concern. Thus, because the Jeremiahs had no financial equity in the
    property and did not put forward a credible plan or offer, the
    dispositive issue for the court ultimately was whether the
    compromise and sale were in the best interests of the estate. The
    court reasonably concluded that they were.
    Although the bankruptcy court was faced with some
    unsavory and troublesome circumstances, in reality, it had no
    choice but to approve the proposal. Regardless of the court's
    reluctance to approve a sale of the property to a purchaser of
    questionable repute and allegedly unethical conduct in the
    acquisition of the mortgage, any other decision might have been
    costly to the estate and an abuse of the court's discretion. The
    Center had been in and out of Chapter 11 bankruptcy for
    approximately nine years. A trustee had been appointed and was
    running the Center--extraordinary in a Chapter 11 proceeding, seeDavid G. Epstein, et al., Bankruptcy,  10.8, at 745 (1993)--
    because the Jeremiahs were in prison for dealing drugs out of the
    Center and unavailable to run it themselves. There appeared to be
    no end in sight.
    The Center also was woefully behind in its tax and
    utility payments. It had not made a real estate tax payment to the
    City of Providence since 1989 and was subject to  real estate tax
    liens that were rapidly approaching $1 million. In addition, the
    Providence Water Supply Board and the Narragansett Bay Commission
    held $30,000 and $16,000 liens, respectively, on the property. The
    Center also has at least $850,000 to $1.5 million worth of
    environmental problems, is in deteriorating condition, with the
    roof alone needing between a half million and $1 million worth of
    repairs. In addition, prepetition, unsecured creditors held claims
    for approximately another $75,000. Although the Trustee, in
    operating the Center, had an illusory "profit" of $5,000 per month,
    this was achieved only by not making payments on the mortgage, and
    by withholding payment of real estate taxes and any payments
    towards any of the Center's prepetition outstanding obligations.
    Furthermore, it appears that much-needed repairs and capital
    improvements were ignored.
    Since the time the Jeremiahs sought Chapter 11 protection
    in 1994, they unfortunately never once put forward a credible
    proposal to reorganize the Center's debts and to resume its
    operation. Even their so-called "proposal" submitted at the March
    31st hearing lacked specific information regarding the value of the
    proposal, how it would be funded, or even the time frame during
    which it would be implemented. Furthermore, even the
    representations of the Jeremiahs' counsel were lacking in
    specifics, referring mostly to undocumented and unverifiable monies
    and assets to be pledged in the future. Moreover, after notice by
    the Trustee of the proposed sale and compromise, no creditor
    objected. In the end, after marketing efforts, the targeting of
    other potential buyers, and the holding of discussions with others,
    Ricci made the only credible proposal. Faced with these facts,
    which are fully documented on the record, the court appears to have
    made the only reasonable choice available in approving the proposed
    sale and compromise.
    Finally, although the court fully adopted the reasoning
    of the Trustee in its final order and judgment, it articulated some
    of its own reasons for approving the plan during the March 31st
    hearing.
    In this case I welcome the Trustee's
    business judgment test. I think I've heard
    about as much as can be said in behalf of the
    Jeremiahs and the debtor in this case. This is
    a situation that no one in their right mind
    could possibly like if they're looking at it
    from an objective position. It's been--it's
    been unpleasant. It's been questionable.
    Ethics are totally missing--I don't know when
    this--the whole thing originated, but it's
    just a [sic] unsavory situation that has come
    down to the place where it is. [The debtor's
    attorney's] efforts to--in his client's
    behalf--and nobody questions his right or his
    obligation to do that--would merely place us
    back where we were, moving along with the
    litigation, before the Trustee comes up with
    this offer. It's the only show in town. It's
    the only viable show in town.
    (App. 141-42).
    In sum, the court made an informed, reasoned, and
    independent decision to approve, albeit reluctantly,  the
    Trustee'application to compromise and sale. We cannot conclude that
    it amounted to an abuse of the court's discretion.
    III.
    Accordingly, we hold that despite the debtor's
    allegations of fraud and unethical behavior leveled at the
    purchaser, the bankruptcy court's approval of the Trustee's sale
    and compromise did not amount to an abuse of the court's
    discretion. The court regrettably lacked a realistic alternative
    proposal and it fairly considered the merits of the proposal put
    forward by the Trustee and the realities of the estate's desperate
    situation. The district court's judgment affirming the judgment of
    the bankruptcy court is affirmed. Each side to bear its own costs.