United States v. Lopez Cosme ( 1999 )


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  •      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 98-1827
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    RAUL ANTONIO LOPEZ-COSME, a/k/a EL MEJICANO,
    a/k/a LUIS-RAUL ANTONIO LOPEZ,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 98-1828
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    ANDRES CAPELLAN-PEREZ, a/k/a "EL MAYOR"
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Stahl and Lipez,
    Circuit Judges.
    Salvador Perez Mayol on brief for appellant Raul Antonio
    Lopez-Cosme.
    Ignacio Fernandez de Lahongrais on brief for appellant Andres
    Capellan-Perez.
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jorge E. Vega-Pacheco,
    Assistant United States Attorney, and Nelson Perez-Sosa, Assistant
    United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    September 10, 1999
    Per Curiam. In these two companion cases, appellants
    challenge their convictions and/or sentences imposed following
    their guilty pleas to conspiracy to distribute cocaine.  See 21
    U.S.C.  846.  We affirm.
    I.  Appeal No. 98-1827.
    Raul Antonio Lopez-Cosme challenges his sentence.
    Contrary to his suggestion, the court's imposition of the five-
    year statutory mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
    841(b)(1)(B) did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
    or violate a right to individualized sentencing under the
    Eighth Amendment.  See Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    (1991) (holding that sentence of life imprisonment without
    parole for possessing 672 grams of cocaine did not violate the
    Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause); United
    States v. Campusano, 
    947 F.2d 1
    , 3 (1st Cir. 1991) ("There is
    no constitutional right, in non-capital cases, to
    individualized sentencing.").  Lopez-Cosme has failed to
    demonstrate that the district court erred in holding him
    responsible for the amount of cocaine stipulated to in the plea
    agreement.  See generally United States v. Marrero-Rivera, 
    124 F.3d 342
    , 354 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Sanchez-Barreto,
    
    93 F.3d 17
    , 25 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 
    519 U.S. 1068
    (1997).  Finally, he concedes, and we agree, that he is
    ineligible for relief under the "safety valve" provision of 18
    U.S.C.  3553(f) because of his criminal record.
    Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.  See  Loc. R.
    27.1.
    II.  Appeal No. 98-1828.
    Counsel for Andres Capellan-Perez has submitted an
    Anders brief and motion to withdraw representation, asserting
    that there are no meritorious issues to be raised on appeal.
    See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967); Loc. R.
    46.4(a)(4).  Counsel also moves to withdraw his statement of
    issues.  Capellan-Perez has filed an "opposition" to the Anders
    brief in which he argues ineffective assistance of trial
    counsel.
    We agree with counsel that there was no plain error
    in failing to apply the "safety valve" provision in 18 U.S.C.
    3553(f).  We have carefully reviewed the record and have
    found no non-frivolous issue.  Capellan-Perez's ineffective
    assistance of counsel argument is not properly raised on direct
    appeal.  See United States v. Mala, 
    7 F.3d 1058
    , 1063 (1st Cir.
    1993).
    Accordingly, the motion to withdraw representation is
    granted, and the judgment is affirmed.  Counsel's motion to
    withdraw his statement of issues is denied since we have
    considered the issue raised therein.  Our disposition of this
    appeal is without prejudice to Capellan-Perez raising his
    ineffective assistance of counsel argument in a 28 U.S.C.
    2255 petition.  We express no opinion on the merits of any such
    argument should a timely  2255 petition be filed.
    Affirmed.