O'Connor v. Northshore Internati ( 2001 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to lst Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 01-1547
CAROLYN E. O'CONNOR,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
NORTHSHORE INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE SERVICES,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. George A. O'Toole, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Boudin, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Carolyn E. O'Connor on brief pro se.
Mary P. Harrington, Kathleen M. O'Hagan and Ronan, Segal &
Harrington on brief for appellee.
April 11, 2003
Per Curiam. This court previously affirmed the lower
court's judgment dismissing the instant employment
discrimination suit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
After this court affirmed, appellant Carolyn E. O'Connor
("O'Connor") filed a timely petition for a writ of certiorari
with the United States Supreme Court. On June 17, 2002, the
Supreme Court issued a summary order granting O'Connor's
petition and remanding the matter to this court for further
review in light of that Court's recent decision in Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002). Accordingly, we directed
the parties to submit supplemental briefing on the issue of
whether Swierkiewicz required a different result here. The
parties have briefed the issue, and the matter is now ready for
decision.
After a thorough review of the submissions, the
record and the Supreme Court's decision in Swierkiewicz, we
again affirm the district court's dismissal of the Complaint.
Swierkiewicz held that a Complaint in an employment
discrimination lawsuit need not set out the elements of a prima
facie case as spelled out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973), in order to survive a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). This court did not hold
O'Connor's Complaint to that heightened pleading standard when
it affirmed the dismissal of her lawsuit. Rather, this court
concluded that the Complaint failed to state a valid claim for
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religious discrimination because it did not allege that she was
fired for a reason prohibited by Title VII, i.e., that she was
fired because of her religion. Indeed, the Complaint seems to
admit that no one with decision-making authority had any
knowledge of O'Connor's religious affiliation. The fact that
one who lacked authority to fire her may have -- unbeknownst to
management -- harbored animosity toward her because of her
religion is insufficient to state a claim that she was fired in
violation of Title VII. See Shorette v. Rite Aid of Maine,
Inc., 155 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1998) (motivations or remarks of
those who lack hiring and firing authority over the plaintiff
cannot form the basis for an employment discrimination claim
absent a hostile work environment claim); see also Weston-Smith
v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir.
2002) (post-Swierkiewicz; approving rule from Shorette). Thus,
O'Connor's Complaint failed to satisfy the requirement of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8 and of Swierkiewicz that it include "a short and
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief." For this reason, it was properly
dismissed.
Likewise, nothing in Swierkiewicz alters this court's
conclusion that to the extent O'Connor attempted to state a
claim that she was subjected to a hostile work environment, her
claim was legally insufficient. See O'Rourke v. City of
Providence, 235 F.3d 713, 728 (1st Cir. 2001). Finally, it
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remains true that her age and sex discrimination claims were
properly dismissed for failure to include them in her
administrative charge. See 29 U.S.C. § 636(d); 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f); Lattimore v. Polaroid Corp., 99 F.3d 456, 464 (1st
Cir. 1996).
The judgment of the lower court is affirmed.
Appellant's motion to go forward with discovery is denied.
Appellant's motion for reimbursement of filing fee is denied,
as not properly directed to this court.
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