Grassia v. Piers , 427 F. App'x 18 ( 2011 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 10-2046
THOMAS GRASSIA,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DETECTIVE THEODORE L. PIERS, Individually and as a Police
Officer of the Town of Framingham; DETECTIVE WILLIAM F. DELANEY,
individually and as a Police Officer of the Town of Framingham;
JOHN DOE, Supervisor, individually and as a Police Officer of the
Town of Framingham; TOWN OF FRAMINGHAM,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Boudin and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Lizabel M. Negron-Vargas on brief for appellant.
Leonard H. Kesten, Deidre Brennan Regan and Brody, Hardoon,
Perkins & Kesten, LLP on brief for appellants.
June 24, 2011
Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Thomas Grassia brought
this action against Theodore Piers and William Delaney, detectives
in Framingham, Massachusetts ("Town"), their "John Doe" supervisor
and the Town itself, contending that he had been arrested and
prosecuted without probable cause. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity, finding no supported claims of constitutional or state
law violations. We affirm.
The case arises out of an ill-fated romance between
Grassia and Maureen Crocker. For two years following Crocker's
break-up with Grassia, she was allegedly victimized both by
threatening vandalism to her home and car and by inappropriate
overtures from Grassia in a vain attempt to continue some semblance
of a relationship with her. Crocker hired a lawyer to help keep
Grassia -- also a lawyer -- at bay and reported the vandalism to
the Town's police department. Piers was the detective assigned to
her case, and he spent more than eighteen months tracking Crocker's
reports of both anonymous harassment and known contact by Grassia.
While the evidence was circumstantial, based on the coincidental
timing of events Crocker suspected that Grassia was to blame for
the intimidation she was enduring. She obtained a temporary
restraining order against him, although two subsequent attempts
were denied. The anonymous threats and vandalism culminated in the
summer of 2004 when a brick was thrown through Crocker's office
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window and a firebomb was placed in the driveway just beneath that
window.
Throughout this time period, Grassia developed a strange
relationship with the police. He suggested early on that they
consider charging Crocker with making false reports. When
questioned about his relationship with Crocker, Grassia said that
he knew her only casually and denied any involvement with her, but
he later admitted that he had lied and, in fact, had a "domestic
situation" with her. He sought information from the police about
Crocker, regularly reported her activities to them and complained
that she had ruined his life, but he never reported that Crocker
had harmed or threatened to harm him. Yet, in a final, ironic
twist, Grassia obtained a restraining order against Crocker from
the district court in Natick -- not Framingham -- based on his fear
of "imminent serious physical harm" from her. He arranged for the
Framingham police to effect service on Crocker.
After being served and on the advice of law enforcement
officials, Crocker fled to her parents' home in Connecticut.
Grassia, claiming that he did not know that process had been
served, yet choosing not to verify with the police whether it had
been, decided to make additional arrangements for Crocker to be
served. He tracked her down in Connecticut and arranged for a
local officer to serve her again there. Crocker, scared by Grassia
having found her, contacted Piers. Piers consulted with other law
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enforcement officials and concluded that probable cause existed to
arrest Grassia for witness intimidation, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch.
268, § 13B (West 2008) (prohibiting the willful attempt to
interfere with a criminal investigation either directly or
indirectly by bribing or intimidating a person providing
information) and for criminal harassment, id. ch. 265, § 43A
(prohibiting willful, malicious conduct intended to seriously alarm
a specific person that objectively would cause substantial
emotional distress). Piers filed an application for a complaint
and an arrest warrant with the assistant clerk-magistrate of the
Framingham District Court, in which he stated that Grassia "did on
diverse dates between February 2003 and August 12, 2004 intimidate
or otherwise interfere with a witness, . . . did willfully and
maliciously engage in a series of acts over a period of time
directed toward the victim," which created "an imminent threat of
the commission of a crime by the defendant." The warrant issued,
and Grassia was arrested.
Grassia succeeded in having the charges dismissed: the
state district court dismissed the felony witness intimidation
charge without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, and, after a
hearing, a state magistrate concluded "[i]nsufficient evidence
presented -- no probable cause found" and dismissed the misdemeanor
harassment charge. Grassia then brought this action claiming that
the arrest and subsequent prosecution were accomplished without
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probable cause or due process, in violation of his Fourth, Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as several state laws. In
due course, the defendants successfully moved for summary judgment
on the ground that there was probable cause to arrest and prosecute
Grassia, which both entitled Piers and Delaney to qualified
immunity and eliminated any basis for the municipal liability and
multiple state law claims.
On appeal, Grassia argues that the district court erred
in entering summary judgment because the arrest warrant allegedly
was based on untrustworthy information from Piers. He contends
that if the district court had applied the summary judgment
standard correctly and construed the evidence in his favor as it
was required to do, it would have recognized a genuine dispute of
material fact about whether Piers had fabricated the evidence
proffered in his affidavit.
Grassia has failed to support his position by proffering
evidence that casts doubt on the veracity or reliability of the
lengthy, detailed police log on which Piers relied in applying for
the warrant. See Acosta v. Ames Dept. Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 8
(1st Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 247-48 (1986)). His objection admitted most of the
defendants' statement of uncontested facts, and the few challenges
Grassia has asserted are conclusory and fail to create the genuine
issue of material fact needed to overcome summary judgment. See
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Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49 (explaining that Rule 56(e) prohibits
"mere allegations or denials" and requires "specific facts showing
there is a genuine issue for trial"); see also Martínez-Rodríguez
v. Guevara, 597 F.3d 414, 419 (1st Cir. 2010) (requiring party who
bears the burden of proof at trial to "present definite, competent
evidence to rebut the motion" (internal quotation omitted));
Acosta, 386 F.3d at 8-9 (explaining how competing inferences can
still be resolved on summary judgment when the underlying facts are
not disputed and opposing party's proffer was merely colorable).
Grassia builds his entire lack of probable cause argument
on two isolated incidents -- the service of process in Connecticut
and the videotaping of a car that resembled his -- which he says,
when construed in his favor, demonstrate that there was no good-
faith basis to believe that he was about to commit either witness
intimidation or criminal harassment. Plucking two single events
out of nearly two years of malicious destruction of property
reports by Crocker and investigative work by Piers and Delaney,
however, reflects a severe misapprehension of the law governing
probable cause. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983)
(deciding probable cause based on the "totality of the
circumstances" considering the veracity and reliability of all
known information). Probable cause assesses "the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act," id. at 231 (quoting
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Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)), to see
whether a reasonable ground exists for believing a particular
person to be seized is guilty. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366,
370 (2003) (explaining probable cause protects "citizens from rash
and . . . unfounded charges of crime" while giving "fair leeway for
enforcing the law" (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 176)); see also
Acosta, 386 F.3d at 8-9; United States v. Brunette, 256 F.3d 14,
16 (1st Cir. 2001). We review a probable cause finding by looking
at the events leading up to the arrest to determine whether an
objectively reasonable police officer would believe it was likely
a crime had been or was about to be committed. See Pringle, 540
U.S. at 370; Acosta, 386 F.3d at 9.
Perhaps recognizing that the warrant served as an
imprimatur on the existence of probable cause, see United States v.
Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (weighing heavily the detached
scrutiny of a neutral magistrate)1, Grassia's principal claim is
that Piers framed him by concealing the "crucial fact" that the
threatening contact that prompted the charges and arrest warrant
was the legitimate service of process in Connecticut. After
1
The warrant provides substantial evidence of probable cause
because it was based on a two-page summary of the police log, plus
a thirteen page police report that included more than seventy
incidents over the span of eighteen months, and it was reviewed by
two neutral and detached court officers. See Gates, 462 U.S. at
236-37 n.10 (upholding warrant when all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit show a "fair probability" of criminal activity);
cf. Brunette, 256 F.3d at 18 (declining to find probable cause on
bare legal conclusions restating the elements of the crime).
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summarizing the police log, the warrant application concluded:
On August 13, 2004[,] Detective Piers received
information that defendant has obtained the
out of state whereabouts of the victim, where
she had fled for her safety. Defendant did
cause contact to be made after learning the
whereabouts of the victim.
Grassia argues that Piers fabricated evidence in his warrant
application because he omitted that Grassia did not know that
service had been completed, that Grassia's contact was legal, and
that the contact in Connecticut was outside the jurisdiction of the
Framingham district court.
Had service in Connecticut occurred in the vacuum Grassia
suggests, Piers may have understood it to have been a good-faith
effort by Grassia to comport with the law; but even when viewed as
an isolated event, Piers knew that Crocker was frightened by
Grassia having found her in another state where she had fled to
escape him, and Piers knew that the Town had told Grassia that it
would effect service, and already had done so. See Forest v.
Pawtucket Police Dept., 377 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 2004) (allowing
police to rely on a credible complaint by a victim to find probable
cause). Additionally, in his deposition Piers testified that it
was irrelevant to him whether or not Grassia knew that Crocker had
been served, because a victim, who theoretically is afraid of the
person against whom a restraining order has been obtained,
typically wants to avoid contact with that person and, therefore,
would not attempt to effect service. The fact that Grassia sought
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Crocker out led Piers to conclude that he was attempting to
intimidate her, not protect himself. See United States v. Ramos,
629 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2010) (considering police officer's
subjective inferences that reflect his experience and expertise in
evaluating probable cause determination).
Grassia also contends that it was purely speculative to
assume that he was at the gas station from where three harassing
phone calls were made simply because a car that resembled his was
captured on surveillance film. That film was probative, however,
because the undisputed record showed that Grassia owned an almost
unique automobile, one of only sixteen such cars in the entire
state of Massachusetts. Grassia argues that had the district court
properly construed the evidence in his favor, it would have found
that the car on the video could have belonged to anyone, and so its
location could not have provided any probable cause for the charged
crimes. Whether an inference could have been drawn that someone
else owned the car, however, was irrelevant to the probable cause
determination, which depended on what the facts in context
objectively suggested about the likelihood of criminal activity.
See Acosta, 386 F.3d at 9 (discounting competing inferences where
the undisputed facts objectively gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion). In the context of the ongoing investigation, it was
objectively reasonable for Piers to view the video image as
suggesting that Grassia made the phone calls from the filling
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station. See id.; see also Ramos, 629 F.3d at 65-66 (explaining
how an individual circumstance might be innocently explained but
when combined with other circumstances can give rise to a
reasonable suspicion).
These two incidents objectively support a reasonable
belief that Grassia was attempting to harass or intimidate Crocker.
See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 43A; id. ch. 268, § 13B.
Nothing about either incident supports Grassia's bald allegations
that Piers was recklessly disregarding the truth or that he
otherwise seriously doubted the facts outlined in his affidavit.
See Martínez-Rodríguez, 597 F.3d at 420 (citing cases for the
proposition that a warrant based on a false affidavit violates the
Fourth Amendment). When these events are put into context -- the
pattern of Grassia's unusual and erratic behavior, both towards
Crocker and the police, and the multiple malicious destruction of
property reports filed by Crocker -- the existence of probable
cause is obvious. See id. at 421 (affirming probable cause finding
based on investigation); Pringle, 540 U.S. at 370-71 (emphasizing
that probable cause is a fluid concept that assesses probabilities
in particular factual contexts); Estrada v. Rhode Island, 594 F.3d
56, 65 (1st Cir. 2010) (allowing police to draw from their
experience and training in assessing probable cause).
The facts that Piers knew and understood when he applied
for the arrest warrant only needed to convey that "the charges
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[were] not capricious and [were] sufficiently supported to justify
bringing into play the further steps of the criminal process."
Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6 (quoting Jaben v. United States, 381
U.S. 214, 224-25 (1965) (emphasis omitted)). This reasonable,
practical approach to a finding of probable cause has long been the
standard, and it was readily met here. See id. at 235 (citing
Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch. 339, 348 (1813), and Brinegar,
338 U.S. at 173).
Because the finding of probable cause was justified, the
arrest and prosecution based on that probable cause violated
neither the Constitution nor state law, entitling the individual
defendants to qualified immunity. See Martínez Rodríguez, 597 F.3d
at 419 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
And, absent any misconduct by Piers or Delaney, the claims against
the Town for direct supervisory liability under § 1983 and for
vicarious liability under Massachusetts law, based on the police
department's training and investigation of Piers and Delaney, also
dissolve. See Kennedy v. Town of Billerica, 617 F.3d 520, 531-32
(1st Cir. 2010) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658, 691 (1978)); see also Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 258, § 2. The
judgment of the district court is affirmed.
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