Watson v. Trans Union LLC , 223 F. App'x 5 ( 2007 )


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  •                   Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter.
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    Nos. 05-2289
    05-2360
    CHARLES N. WATSON, JR.,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    TRANS UNION LLC; NEW CINGULAR WIRELESS SERVICES, INC.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Gene Carter, Senior U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lipez, Circuit Judge,
    Campbell and Selya, Senior Circuit Judges.
    Charles N. Watson, Jr., on brief pro se.
    Mark E. Kogan and Kogan, Trichon & Wertheimer, P.C., on brief
    for appellee Trans Union LLC.
    Peter D. Klein and Eaton Peabody, on brief for appellee New
    Cingular Wireless Services, Inc.
    March 1, 2007
    Per Curiam. Plaintiff Charles N. Watson, Jr. is a federal
    prisoner who claims to be a victim of identity theft.             Invoking the
    Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1681
     - 1681x, as
    well as state law, he brought this pro se action against a credit
    reporting agency and a telephone company.              He there complained,
    inter alia, that credit had been extended in his name to an
    imposter   and   that,   as   a   result,   his    credit   report   contained
    unfavorable, inaccurate information.             The district court, finding
    plaintiff's jumbled claims difficult to follow, ordered him to file
    an amended complaint within 20 days setting forth his allegations
    in intelligible fashion.          When plaintiff appeared to miss that
    deadline, the court dismissed the state claims (for a separate
    reason cited by a magistrate judge), but gave plaintiff one more
    opportunity to delineate his FCRA claims.             The amended complaint
    that was subsequently proffered, however, was also deemed to lack
    the requisite clarity. The court accordingly dismissed the federal
    claims as a sanction for noncompliance with its earlier order.
    Plaintiff now appeals.
    The challenge to the dismissal of the FCRA claims fails
    for lack of any sustained argument.         Plaintiff's entire discussion
    on appeal boils down to the following two assertions: (1) in
    response   to    the   court's    order,    he    submitted   a   "clear"   and
    "comprehensible" and "concise" amended complaint that set forth
    "valid arguments" in "chronological order" stating "cognizable
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    claims" that "warrant relief"; and (2) such a pro se filing
    deserved liberal construction.       Plaintiff offers no description of
    his claims and no analysis of why dismissal was an inappropriate
    sanction.     Instead, he has "merely ... mention[ed] a possible
    argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do [his]
    work."     United States v. Zannino, 
    895 F.2d 1
    , 17 (1st Cir. 1990).
    As we have repeatedly held, "issues adverted to in a perfunctory
    fashion, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,
    are deemed waived."      
    Id.
     (quoted in United States v. Casas, 
    425 F.3d 23
    , 30 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 1397
    (2006)).    And while pro se litigants are held to a less stringent
    standard, see, e.g., Ahmed v. Rosenblatt, 
    118 F.3d 886
    , 890 (1st
    Cir. 1997), they are not immune from these requirements, see, e.g.,
    United States v. Nishnianidze, 
    342 F.3d 6
    , 18 (1st Cir. 2003);
    Strahan v. Coxe, 
    127 F.3d 155
    , 172 (1st Cir. 1997).
    Plaintiff's challenge to the dismissal of his state
    claims fails for the same reason. The magistrate judge recommended
    that these claims be dismissed on preemption grounds, see 15 U.S.C.
    § 1681h(e); the district judge held that recommendation in abeyance
    pending the filing of an amended complaint within 20 days; when no
    complaint    was   received   by   that    deadline,    the   district   judge
    dismissed these claims as recommended; and the amended complaint
    arrived in the mail shortly thereafter.                On appeal, plaintiff
    protests that the court acted prematurely, inasmuch as application
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    of the "mailbox rule" rendered his submission timely. Cf. Casanova
    v. Dubois, 
    304 F.3d 75
    , 78-80 (1st Cir. 2002) (applying mailbox rule
    in § 1983 context).       Whatever the merit of that argument, his brief
    presents no substantive challenge to the preemption ruling itself.
    This matter too has thus been forfeited.
    We add that no reason exists to afford plaintiff any
    special solicitude in this regard.                Given his failure fully to
    comply with the court's June 17, 2005 order, it is not immediately
    apparent that the sanction of dismissal was an abuse of discretion.
    But   even     if   it   were,      plaintiff's    prospects    of     ultimately
    establishing injury would have been minimal.                   For example, he
    admits that he has not applied for credit during the relevant
    period   and    will     not   do    so   during    his   remaining     years   of
    incarceration.       His principal grievance involves an inaccurate
    listing that has been removed from his credit report.                 None of his
    claims consists of an allegation that creditors are seeking to hold
    him   personally     liable    for    the   fraudulent    charges.       And    his
    reference to "mental duress" is entirely conclusory.
    In No. 05-2360, the judgment is affirmed.               No. 05-2289,
    an earlier interlocutory appeal, is dismissed for lack of appellate
    jurisdiction.
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