Lopez v. Mukasey , 269 F. App'x 8 ( 2008 )


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  •                Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 07-1515
    MARIA A. LOPEZ, ET AL.,
    Petitioners,
    v.
    MICHAEL MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF
    THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Lynch, Circuit Judge,
    Campbell and Selya, Senior Circuit Judges.
    William E. Graves, Jr. and Graves & Doyle on brief for
    petitioners.
    Robbin K. Blaya, Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation,
    United States Department of Justice, Peter Keisler, Assistant
    Attorney General, Civil Division, and Anthony W. Norwood, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, on brief for respondent.
    March 14, 2008
    CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge.        Petitioners Maria Adela
    Lopez1 and her daughters Flor Katherin Roman-Nunez and Karen Roman-
    Nunez, natives and citizens of Peru, petition for review of a final
    order of removal issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"
    or "Board") on February 28, 2007.            They contend that the Board
    abused its discretion when it denied their motion for a continuance
    and that denial of the continuance violated their due process
    rights.    We deny the petition for review.
    The petitioners were admitted to the United States in
    Miami, Florida, on or about July 31, 2001 as nonimmigrant visitors
    with permission to stay in the United States for a temporary period
    not   to   exceed   January   30,    2002.    On   January   30,   2004,   the
    Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") issued Notices to Appear
    charging petitioners with removal because they had overstayed their
    time in the United States.          Petitioners admitted the charges and
    conceded removability.        Peru was designated as the country of
    removal.
    Maria Lopez appeared before the immigration judge ("IJ")
    with counsel on April 28, 2005 (her daughters were excused from
    coming to the hearing).             Their counsel informed the IJ that
    petitioners' visa applications had been denied but that they
    planned to appeal from the denial.            They, therefore, sought a
    1
    Lopez is referred to as "lead petitioner" unless otherwise
    noted, to avoid confusion with her claimed husband, Jorge Lopez.
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    continuance of the removal proceedings in order to pursue their
    appeal from the visa denials.   Petitioners had contended in their
    visa applications that because the lead petitioner (Maria Lopez)
    had married an American citizen, Jorge Lopez, before her daughters
    reached the age of 18, all three petitioners were entitled to an
    adjustment of status.
    The government opposed the continuance, noting that this
    was the second denial of a visa petition ("I-130") in the case.
    The government asserted that because the lead petitioner had
    engaged in marriage fraud she was barred from receiving a visa by
    
    8 U.S.C. § 1154
    (c) (prohibiting the granting of immigrant status to
    those involved with marriage fraud). In connection with the motion
    to continue, however, the government had no objection to allowing
    petitioners to file a full copy of their visa petition and the
    evidence submitted in connection with it, along with the DHS's
    decision and the appeal notice.    Petitioners' counsel was ordered
    to submit these materials to the immigration court by May 31, 2005.
    At the next hearing, on June 23, 2005, petitioners'
    counsel admitted he had not submitted the ordered materials by the
    prescribed date but said he had appealed from the visa denial and
    had with him evidence of having done so.   The IJ responded that she
    had given the May 31, 2005 date for submission of the visa petition
    proceedings so that she could review the application and supporting
    documentation to see if there was any merit to the continuance
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    request. Petitioners' counsel indicated that "my sense is that the
    Government has some--some evidence that, in fact, the marriage was
    not entered into in good faith."
    The IJ noted that petitioners' counsel had yet to submit
    an actual motion for continuance.              In response, petitioners'
    counsel stated he believed the "best way to proceed" was to have a
    hearing on the issue of voluntary departure and handle the visa
    issue on appeal to the Board.            He said that he had missed the
    filing deadline due to the "press of business."               The IJ granted
    petitioners' counsel another continuance of more than two months to
    submit the relevant information.             A hearing was scheduled for
    October 3, 2005 to decide whether a further continuance should be
    granted and to rule on the application for voluntary departure.
    The IJ informed counsel that any motion for a continuance was due
    on or before September 21, 2005, and that the voluntary departure
    issue would be waived if he missed the date.
    At a subsequent hearing held on November 9, 2005, the IJ
    noted   that   DHS   had   submitted    as   evidence   an   I-130   filed   in
    September 30, 2002, the notice of intent to deny, and the denial.
    Additionally, DHS submitted a copy of the I-130 that had been
    resubmitted on November 23, 2004 and notice of denial of the second
    petition on April 18, 2005.      DHS opposed any further continuances.
    The court pointed out there had been two denials of what was
    essentially the same visa petition and that apparently the second
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    denial, dated April 18, 2005, was on appeal.        Petitioners' counsel
    indicated that he was attempting to gather evidence to address some
    of the DHS's concerns on appeal and offered some of that evidence
    at the instant hearing.    Counsel indicated he had copies for the
    DHS and the immigration court and that he would be seeking another
    continuance.
    DHS stated it was opposed to any further continuances
    based on petitioners' purported appeal from denial of the visa
    petition.    DHS counsel said there was a "history of fraud and
    shammed marriage" in the case and little prospect for success on
    the appeal from the second denial.        The IJ agreed with DHS that a
    continuance was unwarranted.
    Petitioners' counsel argued that medical evidence he
    presented concerning Jorge Lopez addressed some of the issues
    related to the denial of the I-130.          The IJ responded that the
    medical evidence did not establish the existence of a marriage.
    The IJ denied the motion for a continuance and then recessed to
    allow petitioners to speak to their attorney about applying for
    voluntary   departure.    When    the    hearing   resumed,   petitioners'
    counsel stated petitioners would not seek voluntary departure.
    The IJ then denied the motion to continue in an opinion
    issued on November 9, 2005.      She found that the evidence submitted
    did not establish any exceptional or actual hardship to Lopez.
    Further, she found that the documentation did not compel a finding
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    different from that arrived at by DHS.   She said the Board should
    decide the I-130 appeal as quickly as possible. As petitioners did
    not seek voluntary departure, she ordered them removed to Peru.
    On February 28, 2007, the Board dismissed petitioners'
    appeal from the denial of the continuance.     The Board explained
    that an IJ may grant a motion for continuance only for good cause
    shown and that a denial of such a motion will not be reversed
    "unless the alien establishes that the denial caused her actual
    prejudice and harm and materially affected the outcome of her
    case."   In re Perez-Andrade, 
    19 I&N Dec. 433
     (BIA 1987).
    The Board found that a review of the record showed that
    on two occasions, Jorge Lopez filed an I-130 on behalf of Maria
    Lopez and her children.   On November 21, 2003, in response to the
    first I-130, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS")
    issued a Notice of Intent to Deny detailing allegations of a sham
    marriage between Maria and Jorge Lopez.      The Notice of Intent
    stated that the lead petitioner (Maria Lopez) was in fact married
    to Luis Roman, a Peruvian national and the father of her two
    children, with whom she resided in Cranston, Rhode Island.     The
    Notice went on to say she had previously provided sworn testimony
    to CIS that she had not been married and that the father of her
    children resided in Peru.   Her request to withdraw this petition
    was rejected by CIS, and a final decision issued finding petitioner
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    had entered into a sham marriage for the purpose of evading the
    immigration laws.
    The Board's decision went on to note that Jorge Lopez had
    refiled the I-130 on behalf of the petitioners.                Supplemental
    information submitted by the lead petitioner acknowledged she was
    in fact married to Luis Roman when the original petition was filed
    but said she had divorced him on May 6, 2004 and married Jorge
    Lopez the next day.     Maria and Jorge Lopez were called to the local
    CIS office to provide testimony regarding the petition. CIS issued
    a final decision on April 18, 2005, upholding its previous finding
    of marriage fraud. The decision contained a thorough review of the
    wholly   inconsistent    testimony    given   by   the   two   during   their
    separate interviews with CIS.
    The Board agreed with the IJ that petitioners had not
    shown good cause for a continuance.        The Board also questioned the
    truth of petitioners' representation to the IJ that a valid appeal
    from the I-130 was pending before the Board.         The only evidence of
    such an appeal, the Board said, was a photocopy of an appeal and
    fee receipt dated May 5, 2005, but stamped by the immigration court
    on September 21, 2005, well after the period for a timely appeal
    had expired. Petitioners have submitted no evidence beyond the fee
    receipt in support of their claim to have appealed.
    On October 1, 2007, the Board denied the petitioners'
    motion to reopen proceedings for adjustment of status.              In that
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    decision, as to which no review action is pending, the Board
    observed in a footnote that:
    It is noted that the lead respondent [Maria Lopez]
    asserts that she is the beneficiary of a Form I-130,
    which was twice denied by the United States Citizenship
    and Immigration Services (CIS). She further claims that
    she appealed from the CIS denial to this Board. However,
    the Board's electronic system does not confirm the filing
    of the appeal, nor has the respondent provided a copy of
    such.
    Discussion
    Petitioners argue that the BIA abused its discretion in
    denying their request for a continuance to pursue their adjustment
    claim.   They further argue that their due process rights were
    violated.       We   find   a   conspicuous    absence   of   merit   in   both
    contentions and deny the petition for review.
    The Attorney General's regulations authorize immigration
    judges in their discretion to grant or deny continuances. 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.29
         ("The    immigration   judge    may   grant   a   motion   for
    continuance on good cause shown."); Alsamhouri v. Gonzales, 
    484 F.3d 117
    , 122 (1st Cir. 2007); see also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1240.6
     ("the
    immigration judge may grant a reasonable adjournment . . . for good
    cause shown.").         The decision whether to continue a hearing is
    committed to the immigration judge's sound discretion, see In re
    Sibrun, 
    18 I&N Dec. 354
    , 356-57 (BIA 1983).              Thus, on a petition
    for review, we review an IJ's denial of a continuance only for an
    abuse of discretion.        Feliz v. Gonzales, 
    487 F.3d 71
    , 73 (1st Cir.
    2007).   We have said that we will reverse only if the IJ "made an
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    error of law or acted in a manner that is arbitrary or capricious."
    Cruz-Bucheli v. Gonzales, 
    463 F.3d 105
    , 107 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Nothing of the sort appears here.
    As the Board found, the IJ did not abuse her discretion
    when she denied petitioners' motion for continuance.              There was
    strong, indeed overwhelming, evidence in the record of the visa
    petition proceedings supporting the DHS's determination of marriage
    fraud and its recorded denial of the I-130.
    The     Board,   in   its    review,   examined   the    evidence
    carefully, as have we.      Petitioners' testimony was studded with
    inconsistencies, and the record plainly justified the finding of
    marriage fraud.     There was little reason to believe that finding
    would be overturned on appeal.
    Additionally, the Board determined that while petitioners
    argued, in justification of a continuance, that they had appealed
    to the Board from the second I-130 denial, the only evidence of an
    appeal was a fee receipt dated May 5, 2005 and a copy of a notice
    of appeal stamped on September 21, 2005, well after expiration of
    the period allowed for filing an appeal.          
    8 U.S.C. § 1003.38
    (b).
    In its October 1, 2007 denial of the petitioners' motion to reopen,
    the Board once again noted that there was no record of the filing
    of an appeal and that the petitioners had not provided a copy of
    one.   Moreover, even if a valid appeal were pending, the Board
    reasonably found that "good cause is not shown by requesting a
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    continuance to await the results of a collateral event, which may
    occur at some indefinite time in the future, and the outcome of
    which, may or may not be favorable" to petitioners.                There was no
    abuse of discretion in the denial of the motion for a continuance.
    Petitioners also argue they were not provided with due
    process because CIS "appeared gratuitously harsh" to the family and
    because   they    were   not   represented    by   counsel    in   their    I-130
    application.      We review constitutional claims de novo.                 Ibe v.
    Gonzales, 
    415 F.3d 142
    , 144 (1st Cir. 2005).                 An alien may not
    predicate a due process claim on a denial of adjustment of status
    because it is a discretionary form of relief in which the alien has
    no cognizable liberty interest.           Naeem v. Gonzales, 
    469 F.3d 33
    ,
    38-39 (1st Cir. 2007).         Moreover, there is no evidence here of
    undue harshness by anyone.
    Further, petitioners have failed to show any prejudice.
    "[B]efore   a    petitioner    in   an   immigration   case    may   advance    a
    procedural due process claim, he must allege some cognizable
    prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process."                  Lattab
    v. Ashcroft, 
    384 F.3d 8
    , 20 (1st Cir. 2004).           Petitioners contend
    they had no opportunity to rebut the claims against them, but they
    could have responded to the Notice of Intent to Deny and attempted
    to explain why the DHS's evidence of marriage fraud was incorrect
    or insufficient.     Petitioners had their petitions reviewed twice,
    and they have yet to show that the proceedings were "fundamentally
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    unfair."   Jobe v. INS, 
    238 F.3d 97
    , 98 n.3 (1st Cir. 2001) (en
    banc) (quoting Bernal-Vallejo v. INS, 
    195 F.3d 56
    , 63 (1st Cir.
    1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Petition for review is denied.
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