Local 14 v. NLRB ( 1993 )


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  •                     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 92-2236
    LOCAL 14 UNITED PAPERWORKERS INTERNATIONAL
    UNION, AFL-CIO AND INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
    OF FIREMEN AND OILERS, LOCAL 246, AFL-CIO,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
    Respondent.
    No. 92-2346
    NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
    Petitioner,
    v.
    INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY,
    Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
    Before
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    Jeffrey Neil  Young with whom  McTeague, Higbee, Libner,  MacAdam,
    Case   &  Watson  was  on  brief  for  Local  14  United  Paperworkers
    International Union, etc.
    Vincent J. Falvo,  with whom Linda Dreeben, Supervisory  Attorney,
    Julie B.  Broido, Senior Attorney,  Jerry M. Hunter,  General Counsel,
    Yvonne T. Dixon, Acting Deputy General Counsel, Nicholas E. Karatinos,
    Acting  Associate General  Counsel,  and Aileen  A. Armstrong,  Deputy
    Associate  General Counsel, were on brief for National Labor Relations
    Board.
    Jane B.  Jacobs with whom Nancy  B. Schess, Lee  R. A. Seham,  and
    Seham, Klein & Zelman  were on brief for International  Paper Company,
    amicus curiae.
    August 19, 1993
    STAHL,   Circuit   Judge.      Local   14,   United
    Paperworkers International Union,  AFL-CIO and  International
    Brotherhood  of  Fireman  and  Oilers,  Local  246,   AFL-CIO
    (referred to collectively as "the Union") petition this court
    to review  and set  aside that  portion of  an  order of  the
    National  Labor  Relations   Board  ("the  Board")  affirming
    International   Paper  Company's  ("IP")  discharge  of  four
    striking   employees  for  strike-related   misconduct.    IP
    intervenes  on the  side  of the  Board.   The  Board  cross-
    petitions for enforcement of that part of its order requiring
    IP  to offer a fifth  striker reinstatement.   In the Board's
    cross-petition,  the  Union intervenes  on  the  side of  the
    Board.  For the reasons set forth below, we grant enforcement
    of the Board's order in its entirety.
    I.
    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    IP operates the Androscoggin Paper Mill in Jay,
    Maine.  Approximately 1200 members of the Union are among the
    employees at the Jay facility.  In June 1987, the collective
    bargaining agreement between IP and the Union expired, and
    Union workers went on strike.  Nevertheless, IP maintained
    operations at the mill throughout the strike, employing non-
    striking union members and non-union replacement workers.
    The walkout was marked by periodic outbreaks of violence,
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    threats, and general strike-related misconduct.  In October,
    1988, after the strike ended, IP discharged eleven strikers.
    The discharges prompted the Union to file an unfair
    labor practice charge alleging that IP violated sections
    8(a)(3) and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
    U.S.C.   158(a)(3) and (1) ("the Act").  The Union maintained
    that IP discriminated against striking employees by
    dismissing strikers for strike-related misconduct while
    failing to dismiss non-strikers who had engaged in equally
    serious or more serious misconduct.  In a hearing before an
    Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), the Union's discrimination
    challenge was limited to the discharge of the following five
    strikers:  Lawrence Bilodeau, Lawrence Chicoine, Forrest
    Flagg, Thomas Hamlin, and Arthur Storer.  The ALJ compared
    their respective acts of misconduct with that of non-striker
    Andrew Barclay and found that all five strikers had engaged
    in strike-related misconduct which warranted their discharge,
    but that IP's dismissal of strikers Bilodeau and Flagg
    constituted unlawful disparate treatment.  The ALJ's finding
    was predicated on his determination that non-striker Barclay,
    who retained his job but received a warning, had engaged in
    strike-related misconduct at least as serious as the
    misconduct of Bilodeau and Flagg.  The ALJ found no disparate
    treatment, however, in IP's discharge of Chicoine, Hamlin and
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    Storer.  Both IP and the Union filed exceptions to the ALJ's
    decision.
    On September 20, 1992, the Board issued a final
    decision and order.  The Board affirmed the ALJ's finding
    that IP had not engaged in disparate treatment in dismissing
    Chicoine, Hamlin and Storer.  The Board also sustained the
    ALJ's holding that IP had wrongfully discharged Bilodeau and
    ordered his reinstatement.  However, the Board reversed the
    ALJ's decision as to Flagg, finding his misconduct more
    serious than that committed by any of the non-strikers.  This
    petition for review and cross-petition for enforcement
    followed.
    II.
    Standard of Review
    This court must enforce the Board's order if its
    findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record
    considered as a whole and if it correctly applied the law.
    NLRB v. Acme Tile & Terrazzo Co., 
    984 F.2d 555
    , 556 (1st Cir.
    1993).  Substantial evidence "means such relevant evidence as
    a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
    conclusion."  NLRB v. Auciello Iron Works, Inc., 
    980 F.2d 804
    , 807 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotations
    omitted).  We are compelled to review the Board's order with
    considerable deference and "may not substitute [our] own
    judgment for that of the Board when the choice is between two
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    fairly conflicting views, even though the court would
    justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been
    before it de novo."  Destileria Serrales, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    882 F.2d 19
    , 21 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations and internal
    quotations omitted).  Moreover, when this court reviews an
    agency's credibility finding, "we must accept the finding
    unless it exceeds `the bounds of reason.'"  Boston Mut. Life
    Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 
    692 F.2d 169
    , 170 (1st Cir. 1982) (quoting
    P.S.C. Resources, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    576 F.2d 380
    , 382 (1st Cir.
    1978)).  Finally, "we need not limit ourselves to the exact
    grounds for decision utilized below.  We are free, on appeal,
    to affirm a judgment on any independently sufficient ground."
    Aunyx Corp. v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., 
    978 F.2d 3
    , 6 (1st Cir.
    1992) (quoting Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 
    827 F.2d 859
    , 860-61 (1st Cir. 1987)), cert. denied, 
    113 S. Ct. 1416
     (1993).
    III.
    Conduct of Five Strikers and Non-Striker Barclay
    Having carefully reviewed the ALJ's factual
    findings, which were adopted by the Board, we find them
    eminently supportable and therefore accept the ALJ's version
    of the events.  We summarize them as follows:
    Non-striker Andrew Barclay:  On July 30, 1987, Barclay
    Non-striker Andrew Barclay
    and his son, carrying baseball bats, confronted a group
    of strikers who were attending a party near Barclay's
    lakefront home.  Barclay complained to the strikers
    about being harassed and constantly called a "scab", and
    told them that he and his son were there to "clean [the
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    strikers] all out."1  The strikers asked Barclay to
    leave, but he did not.  In an attempt to wrest the bat
    from Barclay, striker Charles Fullerton received a cut
    that required minor medical attention.
    Striker Lawrence Bilodeau:  On October 28, 1987,
    Striker Lawrence Bilodeau
    Bilodeau, returning home from work, passed the home of a
    replacement worker.  At the time, the worker was
    standing in front of his house with his family.
    Bilodeau then turned his truck around and stopped in
    front of the worker's home.  Bilodeau noticed that the
    worker was writing down his license plate number, and
    yelled "I've worked at the mill for twenty years, and
    you ain't gonna be living here long you [expletive
    deleted].  Go ahead and write down my license.  I live
    right around the corner."
    Striker Lawrence Chicoine:  On June 27, 1987, Chicoine
    Striker Lawrence Chicoine
    was picketing outside of the mill when he accosted one
    non-striker and told her that he would kill her for
    crossing the picket line.  On July 1, 1987, Chicoine was
    again picketing outside of the mill when he used a
    megaphone to threaten a number of replacement workers as
    they arrived for work that "he had a .44" and "would
    blow [their] heads off."
    Striker Forrest Flagg:  On December 8, 1987, a
    Striker Forrest Flagg
    replacement worker drove by Flagg as Flagg picketed
    outside of the mill.  Flagg opened the passenger door of
    the replacement worker's car, reached into the car, and
    shouted "I'll kill you."
    Striker Thomas Hamlin:  On August 7, 1987, after
    Striker Thomas Hamlin
    consuming a large quantity of beer and smoking numerous
    marijuana cigarettes, Hamlin got into a truck and
    followed two groups of replacement workers as they
    returned home from work.  Hamlin harassed them and
    attempted to run them off the road with his truck.
    Striker Arthur Storer:  On August 6, 1987, as a
    Striker Arthur Storer
    replacement worker exited the mill, Storer threw a
    1.  Barclay later  told an  IP employee who  investigated the
    incident  that prior to this incident, a number of boats full
    of strikers had pulled up in front of his home, and had blown
    air  horns,  cursed,  and  threatened  him  and  his  family.
    Barclay  also claimed that the boats fired a projectile which
    broke a window in his home, spraying glass over his son.
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    rock at her car, kicked the car, and then jumped on
    the car's bumper.
    IV.
    Discussion
    A.  Disparate Treatment
    The Union's principal contention is that IP engaged
    in unlawful disparate treatment by discharging the five strikers
    listed above for engaging in strike-related misconduct which was
    less serious than misconduct committed by non-striker Barclay,
    who was merely warned.2  The Board agreed with the Union as to
    Bilodeau, but not as to the other four strikers.  We agree with
    the Board's conclusions.
    Pursuant to   7 of the Act, "employees are granted
    the right to peacefully strike, picket and engage in other
    concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining."
    NLRB v. Preterm, Inc., 
    784 F.2d 426
    , 429 (1st Cir. 1986).
    Section 7 also allows employees the right to refrain from these
    activities if they so desire.  
    Id.
    "At the end of an economic strike, an employer,
    unless otherwise justified, must reinstate striking employees,
    lest their discharge penalize the employees for exercising their
    2.  To prove  disparate treatment, a  discharged striker need
    only show that his/her misconduct was less  serious than that
    of one non-striker  who was  not discharged.   Here, the  ALJ
    deemed  the conduct of Barclay to be  the most serious of the
    non-strikers  who retained  their  jobs.    Having  carefully
    reviewed the record,  we agree with  the ALJ's conclusion  on
    this question.  Accordingly, we use Barclay's conduct  as the
    benchmark  against which  to  measure the  Union's  disparate
    treatment claims.
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    right to strike under   7 of the Act."  Associated Grocers of New
    England, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    562 F.2d 1333
    , 1335 (1st Cir. 1977).  It
    is well established that an employer is justified in discharging
    a striking employee who engages in serious strike-related
    misconduct.  Preterm, 
    784 F.2d at 429
    ; Associated Grocers, 
    562 F.2d at 1335
    .  Behavior that "reasonably tend[s] to coerce or
    intimidate non-striking employees in the exercise of their right
    to refrain from strike activities" constitutes serious strike-
    related misconduct and is cause for discharge as a matter of law.
    Preterm, 
    784 F.2d at 429
     (quoting Clear Pine Mouldings, 
    268 N.L.R.B. 1044
    , 1047 (1984), enforced mem., 
    765 F.2d 148
     (9th Cir.
    1985)).  See also General Indus. Employees Union, Local 42 v.
    NLRB, 
    951 F.2d 1308
    , 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (similar); Newport
    News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 
    738 F.2d 1404
    , 1408
    (4th Cir. 1984) (similar); Associated Grocers, 
    562 F.2d at 1336
    (stressing the objective nature of the test).
    Importantly, however, an employer may not knowingly
    tolerate misconduct by non-strikers that is at least as serious
    as, or more serious than, the misconduct of strikers whom the
    employer has discharged.  See Garrett R.R. Car & Equip. v. NLRB,
    
    683 F.2d 731
    , 740 (3rd Cir. 1982) (holding that an employer
    committed an unfair labor practice where it knew non-striking
    employees were equally culpable of misconduct but chose to
    discipline only strikers).  In determining whether an employer
    has discriminated against striking employees, a one-on-one
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    comparison between the acts of misconduct committed by the
    strikers and those committed by non-strikers is appropriate.  See
    generally 
    id.
     (comparing behavior of strikers with that of
    employees who were not discharged).3
    1.  Strikers Chicoine, Flagg, Hamlin and Storer
    The Board determined that, because the misconduct of
    strikers Chicoine, Hamlin, Flagg and Storer was more serious than
    the misconduct of non-striker Barclay, IP's decision to discharge
    the four strikers did not constitute disparate treatment.
    Essentially, the Board found that Barclay's behavior was
    provoked, and hence less serious than the strikers' misconduct,
    which, in each instance, was instigated by the striker.
    We think that substantial evidence exists in the
    record to support the Board's finding that Barclay was provoked.
    Before confronting the strikers, Barclay had been harassed at his
    home by a group of strikers.  As we have observed, there was
    evidence suggesting that strikers had blown air horns from their
    boats in front of his house, shouted obscenities, threatened him,
    and fired a projectile through his window, showering his son with
    3.  IP  insists that  because  Barclay's  misconduct was  not
    similar to any of the acts committed by the five strikers, it
    is  not  appropriate  for  disparate  treatment  purposes  to
    compare their behavior with his.  However, only the rarest of
    disparate treatment cases would involve identical allegations
    of misconduct.   Adoption of IP's  position would, therefore,
    effectively  foreclose  disparate treatment  analysis  in the
    vast majority of these kinds of cases.  Because we  find such
    a  requirement  to  be   unduly  stringent,  we  reject  IP's
    argument.
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    glass.  It was only after these violent threats and acts that
    Barclay confronted a group of strikers with a baseball bat and
    angrily threatened them.
    In contrast, the record is devoid of evidence
    suggesting that the actions of strikers Chicoine, Flagg, Hamlin
    and Storer had been provoked in any way.  Although we do not
    condone Barclay's conduct, we think the Board's conclusion that
    his provoked behavior was less egregious than the unprovoked
    actions of the four strikers was a reasonable one under the
    circumstances.  Accordingly, we uphold the Board's decision
    rejecting the disparate treatment claims of Chicoine, Flagg,
    Hamlin, and Storer.
    2.  Striker Bilodeau
    The Board also adopted the ALJ's conclusion that the
    misconduct of Barclay was more flagrant than that of Bilodeau,
    and that IP therefore acted unlawfully by discharging Bilodeau
    but merely issuing a warning to Barclay.  The ALJ's conclusion
    was based on his finding that (a) Barclay's threat was one of
    physical injury and was therefore more serious than Bilodeau's
    threat to property, and (b) Bilodeau's threat was "less than
    explicit."
    The major difference between the conduct of Bilodeau
    and Barclay, in our view, is that Barclay made his threat with a
    baseball bat in hand, and thus possessed an immediate ability to
    act on the threat.  Bilodeau, on the other hand, made his threat
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    while standing in the road in front of the replacement worker's
    house, with no apparent ability or intent to immediately carry
    out his threat.  Record evidence, therefore, supports the ALJ's
    conclusion that Barclay's behavior was more egregious than that
    of Bilodeau.  See Associated Grocers, 
    562 F.2d at 1336
    (explaining that courts should evaluate threats in light of all
    the surrounding circumstances).
    B.  Miscellaneous
    The Union raises two subsidiary arguments, each of
    which we find unpersuasive.  First, the Union argues that,
    because IP failed to obtain the strikers' first-hand accounts of
    the incidents, it could not, as a matter of law, have fashioned
    an honest belief that the strikers committed the misconduct for
    which they were discharged.  As the record reveals, however, a
    number of eye-witnesses were present at each of the incidents.
    In fact, two of the episodes were captured on videotape.
    Further, evidence in the record supports a finding that IP relied
    on these eye-witness accounts and the videotape.  Thus, although
    IP's understanding of the events would undoubtedly have been
    fortified by interviews with each striker, we cannot say that the
    failure to conduct striker interviews, given this direct
    evidence, rendered their decision to discharge those strikers
    unlawful.
    The Union also argues that IP condoned the strikers'
    conduct when it sent each striker a form letter on February 1,
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    March 24, and September 23, 1988, outlining the reinstatement
    rights of striking employees.  Condonation exists only when clear
    and convincing evidence is present showing an employer's desire
    "to forgive" the guilty employee for the misconduct.  See Jones &
    McKnight, Inc. v. NLRB, 
    445 F.2d 97
    , 103 (7th Cir. 1971). See
    also Woodlawn Hosp. v. NLRB, 
    596 F.2d 1330
    , 1341 (7th Cir. 1979)
    (holding that condonation exists only "where the employer has
    clearly indicated forgiveness").  We agree with the ALJ's
    conclusion, adopted by the Board, that a form letter sent to
    approximately 1250 workers, informing the striking employees of
    their statutory right to reinstatement under certain
    circumstances, falls well short of clear and convincing evidence
    that IP condoned the misconduct of the five strikers.4
    Accordingly, the Union's condonation argument is unavailing.5
    V.
    Conclusion
    Because we find that the Board correctly applied the
    law and that substantial evidence in the record supports all of
    the Board's findings, we grant enforcement of the Board's order
    in its entirety.
    4.  Because we  agree with  the Board's conclusion  that IP's
    decision to  discharge strikers  Chicoine, Flagg,  Hamlin and
    Storer  was  not  discriminatory,  we  need  not  reach  IP's
    alternative  argument that  the  Union's claims  as to  those
    strikers are time-barred  under section 10(b) of  the Act, 29
    U.S.C.   160(b).
    5.  We  have reviewed the  remainder of IP's  and the Union's
    arguments and find them to be without merit.
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    Affirmed.  No costs.
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