Evanston Insurance Company v. Jasmine Company, Inc. , 702 F.3d 68 ( 2012 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 12-1139
    LUCIANO MANGANELLA,
    Plaintiff,
    v.
    EVANSTON INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    JASMINE COMPANY, INC.,
    Third-Party Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Richard G. Stearns, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Selya and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
    Harvey Nosowitz, with whom Anderson & Kreiger LLP was on
    brief, for appellant.
    Anthony R. Zelle, with whom Thomas W. Evans and Zelle
    McDonough & Cohen, LLP were on brief, for appellee.
    December 14, 2012
    STAHL, Circuit Judge.        This is the second appeal we have
    heard regarding an insurance coverage dispute arising from charges
    of sexual harassment brought by a former employee against Luciano
    Manganella, the one-time president of Jasmine Company, Inc.                See
    Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 
    2012 WL 5907466
     (1st
    Cir. Nov. 27, 2012).           After Manganella filed an action against
    Jasmine's liability insurance provider, Evanston Insurance Co.,
    seeking defense and indemnification for the harassment charges,
    Evanston filed a third-party complaint against Jasmine itself,
    requesting a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or
    indemnify Jasmine for the harassment claims.             The district court
    granted summary judgment on the third-party claims for Jasmine,
    holding that Evanston had to both defend and indemnify Jasmine.
    Evanston now appeals part of that ruling.                As framed by the
    parties, the dispute on appeal is whether a finder of fact must
    conclude that the conduct underlying the sexual harassment charges
    did or     did   not   begin   before    Jasmine's   insurance    policy   took
    effect.1    Accordingly, our opinion is limited to that question and
    does not discuss arguments not made by the parties.              After careful
    consideration, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to
    the district court.
    1
    The parties did not make certain arguments on appeal that
    were available to them under Massachusetts law. We consider the
    issues as the parties have presented them. See United States v.
    Perazza-Mercado, 
    553 F.3d 65
    , 69 n.8 (1st Cir. 2009); Thomas v.
    Eastman Kodak Co., 
    183 F.3d 38
    , 62 n.15 (1st Cir. 1999).
    -2-
    I.   Facts & Background
    Before the events giving rise to this action, Manganella
    was the president and sole shareholder of Jasmine, a clothing
    retailer that he founded in the 1970s. Donna Burgess, whose sexual
    harassment    allegations    form    the    underlying   claims   here,   was
    Jasmine's human resources manager from 1997 to 2006.
    In 1998, a former Jasmine employee, Sonia Bawa, filed
    claims of sexual harassment against Jasmine based on Manganella's
    conduct.     Soon thereafter, Jasmine purchased from Evanston the
    Employment Practices Liability Insurance Policy at issue here ("the
    Policy").     Jasmine's coverage from Evanston under the Policy
    consisted of a series of annually renewed one-year installments
    running from April 1999 through April 2006.              The Policy covers
    damages (including monetary settlements) "which [Jasmine] shall
    become legally obligated to pay as a result of [timely made
    claims], by reason of any Wrongful Employment Practice."             A claim
    is a "written charge or lawsuit . . . seeking Damages or other
    relief for a Wrongful Employment Practice."          A Wrongful Employment
    Practice includes, as relevant here, "conduct of an Insured with
    respect to . . . [an] employee that allegedly culminated in . . .
    violation of any state, federal or local civil rights or anti-
    discrimination    law   and/or      fair    employment   practices   law."
    Importantly, for a resulting claim to be covered, a Wrongful
    Employment Practice must have "happened" in its "entirety" during
    -3-
    the policy period or after the retroactive date (here, April 28,
    1999).
    In July 2005, Manganella sold Jasmine to Lerner New York,
    Inc. for approximately $30 million. Manganella and Lerner executed
    a stock purchase agreement to effectuate the sale and an employment
    agreement under which Manganella would remain Jasmine's president
    for three years. Under the stock purchase agreement, $7 million of
    the purchase price was placed in escrow, "as security . . . in the
    event of" certain types of misconduct by Manganella.               A few months
    after    the     sale   was    completed,    Jasmine   cancelled    the   final
    installment of the Policy but purchased an extended reporting
    period, which allowed for coverage of claims made and reported
    during the thirty-six months following the cancellation.
    In May 2006, further allegations of sexual harassment by
    Manganella prompted Jasmine to hire an outside investigator, Stier
    Anderson   LLC,     which      interviewed   several   employees,    including
    Burgess; she recounted inappropriate comments that Manganella had
    made in the past.             On June 22, 2006, as a result of conduct
    revealed by the investigation, Manganella was fired.               In a letter
    to Manganella, Lerner accused him of sexually harassing four female
    employees and downloading sexually explicit images on company
    computers, all in violation of Lerner's corporate Code of Conduct.
    A subsequent arbitration between Lerner and Manganella confirmed
    that he had violated the Code of Conduct by harassing several
    -4-
    female   employees.      See   Manganella,     
    2012 WL 5907466
    ,    at   *2
    (describing the arbitration).
    On   March   19,   2007,     Burgess      filed    a   charge      of
    discrimination against Manganella, Lerner, and Jasmine with the
    Massachusetts     Commission    Against      Discrimination        ("MCAD").
    Burgess's MCAD charge alleged that, "[t]hroughout her employment
    with Jasmine[], Manganella subjected Ms. Burgess to nearly constant
    physical and verbal sexual harassment," including "inappropriate
    comments about Ms. Burgess' body, inappropriate touching," and,
    eventually, coerced sexual activity on five separate occasions.
    Manganella also threatened Burgess (and others) with physical
    violence.
    Ten days after Burgess filed the MCAD charge, Manganella
    notified Evanston of her claims and requested coverage.              Less than
    two weeks    later,   Evanston sent      a   letter   to    Jasmine,     denying
    coverage for Burgess's claims on the ground that it was "apparent"
    that the harassment alleged by Burgess in the MCAD charge "did not
    happen in its entirety subsequent to the Retroactive Date, which is
    April 28, 1999," as required for coverage.
    In April 2008, Jasmine settled the MCAD charge with
    Burgess for $300,000.    As part of the settlement, Burgess provided
    Jasmine with an affidavit      (the "2008 Affidavit") stating that the
    "conduct and actions by Mr. Manganella that formed the basis of my
    allegations of sexual harassment did not begin until in or about
    -5-
    October 1999, and then continued throughout my employment."
    Burgess's claims against Manganella were settled separately at a
    later date.
    Manganella filed this action against Evanston in July
    2009, seeking (among other things) a ruling that Evanston was
    required under the Policy to defend and indemnify Manganella
    against Burgess's MCAD charge. Two months later, Evanston filed an
    answer and a third-party complaint against Manganella and Jasmine,
    asserting that it had no duty to defend or indemnify either
    Manganella or Jasmine for Burgess's claims.2
    After discovery, Manganella and Evanston cross-moved for
    summary judgment on Manganella's coverage claims.              The district
    court held that Evanston should have at least investigated the MCAD
    charge before denying coverage, given that it was aware of certain
    facts       (including   an   affidavit   that   Burgess   filed   in   Bawa's
    harassment case) suggesting that Manganella's unlawful conduct may
    not have begun prior to the Policy's retroactive date.             Manganella
    v. Evanston Ins. Co., 
    746 F. Supp. 2d 338
    , 346 (D. Mass. 2010).
    The court also concluded, however, that the arbitration between
    Lerner and Manganella had conclusively established that Burgess's
    MCAD charge fell within the Policy's exclusion of claims based on
    conduct "committed with wanton, willful, reckless or intentional
    2
    Evanston initially named Burgess as a defendant in its
    third-party complaint, but later voluntarily dismissed its claims
    against her.
    -6-
    disregard" for the laws underlying those claims.          See 
    id. at 348
    .
    The district court thus found that the doctrine of issue preclusion
    barred Manganella from relitigating that question, and granted
    summary judgment for Evanston.      
    Id. at 349
    .       We recently affirmed
    that ruling.    See Manganella, 
    2012 WL 5907466
    , at *8.
    In a subsequent summary judgment opinion, the district
    court addressed Evanston's third-party claims against Jasmine.
    Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., No. 09-cv-11264-RGS, 
    2011 WL 5118898
     (D. Mass. Oct. 28, 2011). The court reiterated its earlier
    holding that Evanston had a duty to at least investigate the MCAD
    charge before denying coverage. Id. at *6-7. Because Evanston had
    breached the duty to defend, it had "the burden of proving that
    [Burgess's] claim was not within its policy's coverage." Id. at *7
    (quoting Polaroid Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 
    610 N.E.2d 912
    ,
    922 (Mass. 1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted).              Evanston
    failed to carry that burden.       Addressing the issues as framed by
    the parties,    the    district court    found   no   genuine   dispute   of
    material fact as to whether the conduct underlying Burgess's MCAD
    charge had begun prior to the Policy's retroactive date of April
    28, 1999.   See id. at *5-6.    In the district court's view, Evanston
    had at most produced a "shard of allegedly contradictory evidence"
    in the form of an interview memorandum and interrogatory answers
    filed in connection with the MCAD proceeding, in which Burgess
    characterized   some    of   Manganella's   pre-April    1999   remarks   as
    -7-
    offensive in hindsight.      Id. at *5.      The district court did not
    consider these statements sufficient to create a factual dispute as
    to the scope of Burgess's harassment claims.                 The court thus
    "determined that Evanston is liable under the Policy for the costs
    of defending and settling the Burgess claim," and granted summary
    judgment for Jasmine.     Id. at *8.3     Evanston now appeals the ruling
    that summary judgment was properly entered against it, and that in
    consequence it must reimburse Jasmine for the settlement with
    Burgess (but not the holding that it must cover Jasmine's defense
    costs).
    II.    Analysis
    We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, Baker v.
    St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 
    670 F.3d 119
    , 125 (1st Cir. 2012), and
    will affirm if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
    and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, see Fed.
    R.   Civ.   P.   56(a).   "Where,   as    here,   we   are   presented   with
    cross-motions for summary judgment, we 'must view each motion,
    3
    In summarizing its findings, the district court suggested
    that the evidence as to whether Burgess's claims were covered was
    "in equipoise." 
    2011 WL 5118898
    , at *7. Seizing on this phrase,
    and other ostensible errors in the district court opinion, Evanston
    moved for reconsideration, asserting that the court's language
    showed that it had improperly weighed the evidence and failed to
    draw inferences in Evanston's favor. The district court denied
    that motion, explaining that, although "the word 'equipoise' was
    not well chosen," the evidence "provides no basis on which a
    'fair-minded jury' could return a verdict for [Evanston] on the
    coverage issue."       Manganella v. Evanston Ins. Co., No.
    09-cv-11264-RGS (D. Mass. Nov. 22, 2011) (electronic order).
    -8-
    separately,' in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
    and draw all      reasonable   inferences   in   that   party's   favor."
    OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. of Can., 
    684 F.3d 237
    , 241 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Estate of Hevia v. Portrio
    Corp., 
    602 F.3d 34
    , 40 (1st Cir. 2010)).            Because the parties
    reasonably agree that Massachusetts law governs the Policy, we
    apply that law.    See Bird v. Centennial Ins. Co., 
    11 F.3d 228
    , 231
    n.5 (1st Cir. 1993); cf. Saint Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Endurance
    Am. Specialty Ins. Co., Inc., 
    699 F.3d 544
    , 550 (1st Cir. 2012)
    (applying Massachusetts law to an insurance policy where all
    parties assumed that it applied and the insured corporation was
    based in Massachusetts).
    The dispositive question here, as presented to us, is
    whether there is any material issue of fact as to whether the
    conduct giving rise to Burgess's MCAD charge began after the
    Policy's retroactive date of April 28, 1999.            Because the Policy
    covers only damages (including settlement payments) paid on claims
    "by reason of" any Wrongful Employment Practice that "happened" in
    its "entirety" after the retroactive date, the parties agree that
    Evanston must reimburse Jasmine for its settlement with Burgess
    only if the course of harassing conduct from which her claims arose
    began after that date.     As the district court concluded (and as
    Evanston does not dispute on appeal), Evanston's initial failure to
    investigate and defend the MCAD charge means that it now bears the
    -9-
    burden   of    proving   that    the    charge   lies   beyond      the    Policy's
    coverage.      See Polaroid Corp., 610 N.E.2d at 922.
    We begin with Burgess's MCAD charge, which describes in
    general terms the progression of Manganella's harassing conduct
    from offensive remarks and unwelcome touching to coerced sexual
    activity. As to when the harassment began, the charge reports only
    that Burgess began working at Jasmine in 1997 and that Manganella
    harassed Burgess "[t]hroughout her employment" there.                     Thus, the
    charge lends some support to Evanston's theory that the Wrongful
    Employment Practice from which Burgess's claims arose included pre-
    April 1999 conduct; taken literally, the word "throughout" would
    mean   that    Burgess   was    harassed    beginning   on    day    one    of   her
    employment, i.e., in 1997.           That said, the word could also be read
    to indicate simply that the harassment was pervasive.                 Indeed, we
    note that the charge, even when describing particular instances of
    harassment, is simply not specific as to dates.               Thus, we turn to
    the other evidence to shed more light on the conduct that gave rise
    to Burgess's claims.
    The   parties    vigorously     dispute   the   significance       of
    various statements in which Burgess has described certain pre-April
    1999 sexual comments by Manganella as offensive or unwelcome, or as
    intended to soften her up for later, more egregious conduct.                     For
    example,      during   her    2006   interview   with   Stier    Anderson,       she
    reported that Manganella had made unwelcome sexual advances toward
    -10-
    her "since early in her employment" and explained that she felt
    that he had "tried to manipulate her from the beginning." In March
    2009, in response to an interrogatory in the MCAD action that asked
    her to identify each instance of harassment that she experienced,
    Burgess related, among other things, that "[w]hen [she] first began
    working for Jasmine[], Mr. Manganella would make off-color comments
    on taking Viagra and about his sexual relations with his wife."
    She explained that these comments made her "uncomfortable" but that
    she "did not feel personally threatened by them."   Similarly, at a
    2011 deposition in this action, Burgess testified that Manganella
    had made sexual comments in 1997; at the time, they made her
    uncomfortable but she did not find them threatening.      By 1999,
    however, she viewed the comments as threatening in hindsight and
    felt that they had been intended to set her up.
    Considered in the light most favorable to Jasmine, none
    of these statements necessarily shows that the conduct giving rise
    to Burgess's MCAD charge began before April 28, 1999.          That
    Manganella's early comments made Burgess "uncomfortable" does not,
    without more, establish that they contributed to the hostile
    environment that resulted in the MCAD charge.       This conclusion
    would be consistent with Burgess's statement, in a November 1998
    affidavit she submitted in Bawa's discrimination case, that "at no
    time" had Burgess "ever witnessed or heard from anyone associated
    with the company . . . that Mr. Manganella committed any acts of
    -11-
    sexual harassment directed towards Ms. Bawa or others."             Likewise,
    that Burgess offered Manganella's comments as part of her answer to
    an interrogatory asking her to list instances of sexual harassment
    does not necessarily show that her claims arose in part from these
    comments, given that she went on to clarify that she did not find
    the comments threatening, which could suggest that they did not
    contribute to the hostile environment that gave rise to her claims.
    Conversely, when viewed in the light most favorable to
    Evanston, these statements could support the inference that the
    harassing conduct giving rise to Burgess's claims did include
    Manganella's pre-April 1999 remarks.          That Burgess did not feel
    "threatened" by Manganella's comments at the time they were made --
    or did not believe that she was aware of sexual harassment on his
    part at the time, as stated in the 1998 affidavit -- does not
    necessarily mean that those remarks did not ultimately contribute
    to a hostile, sexually harassing work environment.            "Incidents of
    sexual harassment serious enough to create a work environment
    permeated   by   abuse    typically    accumulate   over    time,   and   many
    incidents in isolation may not be serious enough for complaint."
    Cuddyer v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., 
    750 N.E.2d 928
    , 937 (Mass.
    2001).      Thus,   a    reasonable    factfinder   could    conclude     that
    Manganella's offensive sexual comments, while perhaps "not . . .
    serious enough for complaint" when made, were ultimately part of
    the broader pattern of harassing, unlawful conduct that gave rise
    -12-
    to Burgess's claims.       See id. at 941 ("A hostile work environment
    constitutes a pattern of sexual harassment . . . that, by its very
    nature, often is apparent only in hindsight.").               That conclusion
    would    find   support    in   the    fact   that   Burgess    answered    an
    interrogatory    asking    about   instances    of   sexual    harassment   by
    identifying these comments (albeit with the clarification discussed
    above), and in her statements that Manganella had set her up and
    "tried to manipulate her from the beginning."4
    So far, then, we have a stalemate.         Considering the two
    motions separately and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
    of the non-movant, see OneBeacon, 684 F.3d at 241, we do not
    believe that the undisputed facts entitle either party to judgment
    as a matter of law.       Rather, the MCAD charge and Burgess's various
    descriptions of Manganella's sexual comments support the sort of
    "conflicting yet plausible inferences" that make summary judgment
    improper.    See Desmond v. Varrasso (In re Varrasso), 
    37 F.3d 760
    ,
    764 (1st Cir. 1994); see also Coyne v. Taber Partners I, 
    53 F.3d 454
    , 457 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that "when the facts support
    plausible but conflicting inferences on a pivotal issue in the
    case, the judge may not choose between those inferences at the
    summary judgment stage").
    4
    We note these descriptions by Burgess not because her
    subjective understanding of the scope of her claims controls the
    question before us, but rather because the effect of Manganella's
    remarks on Burgess may be relevant to whether those remarks
    contributed to the hostile environment from which her claims arose.
    -13-
    Nor do we believe that this stalemate is broken by
    Burgess's 2008 Affidavit, which states that the "conduct and
    actions by Mr. Manganella that formed the basis of [Burgess's]
    allegations of sexual harassment did not begin until in or about
    October 1999, and then continued throughout [her] employment."
    Although we do not agree with Evanston that Preferred Mutual
    Insurance Co. v. Gamache, 
    675 N.E.2d 438
     (Mass. App. Ct.), aff'd,
    
    686 N.E.2d 989
     (Mass. 1997), requires us to entirely disregard the
    affidavit,5 we do understand Evanston's concern over the prospect
    of claimants and insureds colluding against insurers by swapping
    such statements for settlement money.             More importantly, the
    affidavit is not admissible because it is not relevant to any issue
    before   us    on   this   appeal.   The    affidavit   goes   to   Burgess's
    subjective intent, but her subjective intent is not relevant.
    Further, even if the 2008 Affidavit were relevant here,
    it could not provide a basis for summary judgment in Jasmine's
    5
    Evanston argues that Gamache stands for the proposition
    that "characterizations of the underlying claim agreed to by the
    insured and the claimant in settling the underlying claim have no
    weight in subsequent coverage litigation." That case, however,
    simply declined to give preclusive effect to a stipulation between
    a claimant and an insured in a subsequent action between the
    insured and the insurer. See 675 N.E.2d at 444 n.10. Because the
    stipulation was not material to the underlying judgment, it lay
    outside the long-standing Massachusetts rule that "[w]here an
    action against the insured is ostensibly within the terms of the
    policy, the insurer . . . is bound by the result of that action as
    to all matters therein decided which are material to recovery by
    the insured in an action on the policy." Miller v. U.S. Fid. &
    Cas. Co., 
    197 N.E. 75
    , 77 (Mass. 1935); accord Lodge v. Bern, 
    101 N.E.2d 748
    , 749 (Mass. 1951); see Gamache, 675 N.E.2d at 444 n.10.
    -14-
    favor because a reasonable factfinder could disbelieve it.                 Our
    decision      in   another   insurance   coverage   dispute,   Blanchard   v.
    Peerless Insurance Co., 
    958 F.2d 483
     (1st Cir. 1992), illustrates
    why.       There, the crucial question was whether Paul, who shot the
    claimant, Blanchard, with a pellet gun, intended to reside in his
    parents' home in the future (which would make him a "resident" for
    the purposes of their homeowners' insurance policy).             See 
    id. at 484, 486
    .      This court reversed a grant of summary judgment for the
    insurer that was based in part on Paul's deposition testimony that
    he had no intention of returning to his parents' home, explaining:
    "State of mind" testimony from the putative
    "covered    person"    may   raise    inherent
    credibility concerns insofar as it supports
    limitations    on   third-party    beneficiary
    coverage in the somewhat unusual circumstances
    where the financial interests of an insurer
    and its insured are aligned. Blanchard
    specifically points to undisputed evidence
    from which a jury might reasonably infer that
    Paul's statements as to his subjective intent
    were motivated by self-interest. Were a jury
    to credit Blanchard's evidence, it would be
    entitled to infer that Paul did not harbor the
    intent to which he testified on deposition.
    
    Id. at 490-91
    .6      Here, of course, it is not the insured and insurer
    whose financial interests are aligned, but rather the claimant and
    the insured.         Nevertheless, the same credibility concerns are
    6
    The relevant evidence in Blanchard suggested that Paul
    had a motive to dissemble about his intention to return to his
    parents' home because their insurance premiums would increase if
    the claimant prevailed against the insurer in the action on the
    parents' policy. See 
    958 F.2d at
    490 n.10.
    -15-
    present here; Burgess provided Jasmine with the 2008 Affidavit as
    a condition of the settlement in which she received $300,000.
    Moreover, as explained above (and as was true in Blanchard, see 
    id.
    at 490 n.10), there is other evidence in the record that, when
    construed   in   Evanston's   favor,   would   suggest   that   Burgess's
    subjective intent was not as she subsequently described it in the
    2008 Affidavit. Thus, even if the affidavit were relevant here, we
    would set it aside for the purposes of resolving Jasmine's motion
    because a reasonable factfinder could refuse to credit it. See 
    id. at 491
     (giving the disputed statements "no weight" in resolving the
    summary judgment motion of the party relying on them).7
    In sum, we hold that neither party is entitled to summary
    judgment. As described above, the remaining evidence before us can
    support the sort of divergent but plausible inferences as to a key
    issue that make summary judgment unavailable. See Desmond, 
    37 F.3d at 764
    .   Indeed, we believe that, on this record and as the issues
    have been framed, the question of when the harassing conduct that
    gave rise to Burgess's claims began is a quintessential question
    for a factfinder.
    One final point warrants brief mention: our conclusion
    that neither party is entitled to summary judgment is not affected
    7
    The same would not be true, of course, for the purposes
    of resolving Evanston's motion, because the "evidence of the
    non-movant is to be believed."    See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
    Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986). Here, though, the 2008 Affidavit
    is not relevant and thus does not impact our decision anyway.
    -16-
    by the fact -- emphasized by Evanston -- that the Policy defines
    "Wrongful Employment Practice" to mean conduct that "allegedly
    culminated   in"   a   violation     of     law.    Certainly,      drawing   all
    inferences    in   Evanston's      favor,    one   could    see   the    evidence
    discussed above as establishing that Manganella's pre-April 1999
    remarks were part of a single course of sexually harassing conduct
    that   "culminated     in"   the   events     at   the    heart   of    Burgess's
    harassment claims.      But, as we have already explained, when all
    inferences are drawn in Jasmine's favor, it is possible to see
    these comments as simply separate from the Wrongful Employment
    Practice that gave rise to Burgess's MCAD charge. And Evanston has
    not attempted to show that "an objectively reasonable insured,
    reading the relevant policy language," Finn v. Nat'l Union Fire
    Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
    896 N.E.2d 1272
    , 1277 (Mass. 2008)
    (citation omitted), would expect the phrase "allegedly culminated
    in" to bar coverage of Burgess's claims even if those claims arose
    from   a   Wrongful    Employment    Practice      that    did    not   encompass
    Manganella's early comments.          Further, to the extent that this
    phrase is ambiguous, we construe that ambiguity "against the
    insurer . . . and in favor of the insured."                 GRE Ins. Grp. v.
    Metro. Bos. Hous. P'ship, Inc., 
    61 F.3d 79
    , 81 (1st Cir. 1995)
    (citing Hazen Paper Co. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 
    555 N.E.2d 576
    ,
    583 (Mass. 1990)).      Thus, the Policy's use of "culminated in" does
    not entitle Evanston to summary judgment.
    -17-
    III.   Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment below
    and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    No costs are awarded.
    -18-