MaHan v. United States ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •      [NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 98-2155
    EDWARD L. MAHAN, III,
    Petitioner, Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES,
    Respondent, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
    [Hon. Ernest C. Torres, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    Edward L. Mahan, III on brief pro se.
    Margaret E. Curran, United States Attorney, and Donald C.
    Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
    October 7, 1999
    Per Curiam.    Petitioner Edward L. Mahan, III,
    appeals pro se from the denial of a 28 U.S.C.  2255 petition.
    The district court granted a certificate of appealability
    limited to the issue
    whether a criminal defendant who
    was advised of his right to
    appeal, afforded an opportunity
    to exercise that right, and
    still failed to affirmatively
    exercise that right has in fact
    waived his right to appeal.
    Upon review, we affirm.
    As an initial matter, the district court's factual
    finding that Mahan failed to ask his attorney to file a notice
    of appeal is not clearly erroneous.  See Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 698 (1984) ("district court findings
    [made in the course of deciding an ineffective assistance
    claim] are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 52(a)"); Lema v. United States, 
    987 F.2d 48
    , 53 (1st
    Cir. 1993) (applying clearly erroneous standard to factual
    findings underpinning ineffective assistance claim).  The
    evidence, which included counsel's testimony as to his
    customary practice, supported competing inferences.  The
    district court rejected the credibility of Mahan's testimony,
    and Mahan provides insufficient reason to second-guess this
    judgment.
    Moreover, without deciding whether a request to
    appeal is always required, compare Ludwig v. United States, 
    162 F.3d 456
    , 459 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[T]he constitution is only
    implicated when a defendant actually requests an appeal, and
    his counsel disregards that request.") with White v. Johnson,
    
    180 F.3d 648
    , 656 (5th Cir. 1999) (granting habeas relief where
    counsel's failure to fully inform petitioner of his appellate
    rights caused him to lose the opportunity to appeal), we think
    that the district court appropriately found waiver based on the
    absence of an affirmative request where, as here: petitioner
    was twice advised of his right to appeal by the sentencing
    court; petitioner pled guilty and his claim is limited to the
    loss of a sentencing appeal; petitioner conceded that counsel
    advised him that the case law is against him on the sole
    sentencing issue preserved by counsel; and petitioner was in
    contact with counsel's office after sentencing, and he could
    have solicited further advice regarding the merits of an
    appeal, if necessary to a decision.
    Affirmed.