Somascan, Inc. v. Philips Medical Systems Nederland, B.V. , 714 F.3d 62 ( 2013 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1634
SOMASCAN, INC.; SOMASCAN PLAZA, INC.; CENTRO TOMOGRÁFICO
DE PUERTO RICO, INC.; and INSTITUTO CENTRAL DE DIAGNÓSTICO, INC.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
PHILIPS MEDICAL SYSTEMS NEDERLAND, B.V.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
Wilbert Méndez-Marrero, for appellants.
Eric Pérez-Ochoa, with whom Adsuar Muñiz Goyco Seda & Pérez-
Ochoa, P.S.C., was on brief for appellee.
April 22, 2013
Per Curiam. This case comes before us after the District
Court of Puerto Rico denied a motion for leave to amend a
complaint. The motion was filed more than a year and a half after
the deadline set in the scheduling order for such amendments and
without a showing of good cause for delay. Because we find that
the district court acted within its discretion in denying the
request, we affirm.
The pertinent facts are as follows. On February 13,
2009, Somascan, Inc., Somascan Plaza, Inc., Instituto Central de
Diagnóstico, Inc. and Centro Tomográfico de Puerto Rico, Inc.
(collectively, "Somascan") filed suit against Philips Medical
Systems Nederland, B.V. ("Philips"). In the complaint, Somascan
alleged, in essence, that Philips had misrepresented the
capabilities of the medical equipment it sold to Somascan and that
the medical equipment did not meet the appropriate standards of
quality. It alleged diversity of citizenship as the basis for the
court's jurisdiction.
On December 7, 2009, the district court entered a Case
Management Order setting December 30, 2009, as the deadline to
amend the pleadings. On July 11, 2011, a magistrate judge held a
status conference and warned Somascan that "leave to amend would be
granted for good cause shown as to why amendment could not have
been requested at an earlier time." Several days later, Philips
filed a motion for summary judgment. The day after Philips filed
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said motion, on July 30, 2011, Somascan filed a motion for leave to
amend the complaint along with a proposed amended complaint. The
amended complaint purported to significantly change Somascan's case
against Philips by introducing new claims under international and
local law, introducing a new defendant to the suit, and changing
the jurisdictional basis from diversity to "arising under"
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Despite the late stage
of the proceedings, Somascan failed to explain its reasons for not
requesting leave to amend earlier. The motion was promptly denied,
as was Somascan's subsequent motion for reconsideration. The court
later granted Philips' motion for summary judgment, and judgment
was entered dismissing the case on March 26, 2012.
When a district court has put in place a scheduling order
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, stating that amendments will only
be permitted for "good cause shown," this Court reviews a district
court's finding of "the existence or absence of good cause . . .
for abuse of discretion." Flores-Silva v. McClintock-Hernández,
No. 11-2495, slip op. at 5 (1st Cir. Mar. 11, 2013) (citing
O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels, 357 F.3d 152, 155 (1st Cir. 2004)). We
will "affirm if any adequate reason for the denial is apparent from
the record." Id. (quoting Hatch v. Dep't for Children, Youth &
Their Families, 274 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir 2001)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Rule 16(b) requires that the district court enter a
scheduling order setting certain deadlines, including a deadline
for the parties to amend the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(1). Those deadlines may be modified "only for good cause and
with the judge's consent." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). "[O]ur case
law clearly establishes that Rule 16(b)'s 'good cause' standard,
rather than Rule 15(a)'s 'freely give[n]' standard, governs motions
to amend filed after scheduling order deadlines" have passed.
Flores-Silva, No. 11-2495, slip op. at 5 (quoting Trans-Spec Truck
Serv. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 327 (1st Cir. 2008))
(internal quotation marks omitted). We have also noted that Rule
16's "good cause" standard "focuses on the diligence (or lack
thereof) of the moving party more than it does on any prejudice to
the party-opponent." Id. at 6 (citing Steir v. Girl Scouts of the
USA, 383 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2004)).
As if the accumulation of these standards did not present
a high enough hurdle for Somascan to overcome on appeal, an
additional burden is imposed when leave to amend is sought after
discovery has been completed and a motion for summary judgment has
been filed by a defendant. In such cases, it is clearly
established that "the proposed amendment must be not only
theoretically viable but also solidly grounded in the record."
Hatch, 274 F.3d at 19 (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Gold, 30
F.3d 251, 253 (1st Cir. 1994)). Therefore, "an amendment is
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properly classified as futile unless the allegations of the
proposed amended complaint are supported by substantial evidence."
Id. (citing Resolution Trust Corp., 30 F.3d at 253). It is settled
that, "[r]egardless of the context, the longer a plaintiff delays,
the more likely the motion to amend will be denied, as protracted
delay, with its attendant burdens on the opponent and the court, is
itself a sufficient reason for the court to withhold permission to
amend." Steir, 383 F.3d at 12 (citing Acosta-Mestre v. Hilton
Int'l of P.R., Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 52-53 (1st Cir. 1998)).
In the case at bar, Somascan moved to amend seventeen
months after the deadline set in the scheduling order had passed
and presented no persuasive argument to justify a finding that the
delay was for "good cause." No new evidence was alleged to have
been uncovered and no excuse was offered. These factors are, by
themselves, enough to conclude that the district court acted
correctly in denying leave to amend.
Moreover, as if requesting an amendment at such a late
stage were not enough, Somascan moved to amend the day after the
motion for summary judgment was filed. It thus had the additional
burden of proving that the proposed amendment was theoretically
viable and supported by substantial evidence. See Hatch, 274 F.3d
at 19. The motion for leave to amend did not include such
evidentiary support.
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Any further discussion is pointless. The denial of the
motion for leave to amend is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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