Veale v. Griffin ( 2000 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 99-1231
SCOTT W. VEALE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
DAVID A. GRIFFIN, Individually and as a State Police Trooper,
for the State of New Hampshire;
STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Scott W. Veale on brief pro se.
Philip T. McLaughlin, Attorney General, and Daniel J.
Mullen, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief for
appellees.
JUNE 6, 2000
Per Curiam. Appellant Scott W. Veale brought a
civil rights action, based on 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3),
against the state of New Hampshire and David A. Griffin, a
New Hampshire state trooper. Appellant also listed claims
under state law. The district court dismissed the action on
the grounds that it had no jurisdiction over the § 1985(3)
claim and that the claims under § 1983 and state law were
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The court
also determined that appellant's claims against the state of
New Hampshire and against Trooper Griffin in his official
capacity were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Appellant
contests only the dismissal of his §§ 1983 and 1985(3)
claims. For the following reasons, we affirm the district
court judgment.
1. The § 1985(3) Claim. Even assuming that the
amended complaint stated sufficient allegations of a
conspiracy, it is obvious that appellant cannot show that
defendants' acts were "propelled by some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus."
See Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is,
although appellant uses the phrase "class-based," it seems
plain that he is claiming that the defendants' alleged
discrimination was premised on the activities he has
undertaken in an effort to obtain title to the land in
Marlborough. However, "a class, to be cognizable, must be
identifiable by reference to something more than the
members' desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3)
defendant disfavors." Id. at 5 (internal punctuation and
citation omitted).
In other words, the line drawn by the
substantive characteristic must divide
individuals into distinct, separate, and
identifiable groups. This means, for
example, "white" as opposed to "non-
white," "female" as opposed to "male,"
or, if political classes are includable
-- a matter on which we do not opine --
"registered Republicans" as opposed to
other voters.
Id. at 5-6 (citations omitted). Plainly, the class
described by appellant does not meet this requirement.
Further, to the extent that appellant is claiming
that he belongs to some kind of economic class of persons
who own land, this claim also is unavailing. The Supreme
Court has made clear that § 1985(3) does not reach
“conspiracies motivated by bias towards others on account of
their economic views, status, or activities.” See United
Bhd. Of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 837-38 (1983)
(emphasis added). Since appellant plainly cannot make out
-3-
a § 1985(3) claim, and amendment would be futile, the
dismissal of this claim is affirmed. See Smith v. Boyd, 945
F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991); Baker v. Director, U.S.
Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per
curiam); Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1072-73 (7th Cir.
1987).
2. The § 1983 Claim. As the district court found,
appellant, in his original complaint and throughout the
district court proceedings, focused on a claim of false
arrest. The court held that this claim was untimely. We
agree.
A claim under § 1983 accrues "when the plaintiff
knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis
of the action." Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d
1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Appellant's arrest in this case was warrantless.
Thus, his claim, in relation to the lack of probable cause
to arrest, is akin to one for false arrest. See id. at 4("wrongful warrantless arrests typically resemble the tort
of false arrest"). Because the allegedly illegal search was
a part of appellant's arrest, we consider the search claim
as a component of the false arrest claim. See Beck v. City
of Muskogee Police Dep't, 195 F.3d 553, 557-59 (10th Cir.
-4-
1999) (where the search and the arrest occurred during the
same time period, the court treated plaintiff's illegal
search and seizure claim and false arrest claim as one cause
of action for the purpose of determining the timeliness of
plaintiff's § 1983 action).
A claim for false arrest usually begins to run at
the time of arrest. Calero-Colon, 68 F.3d at 4 (Lynch, J.,
concurring). See also Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 (3d
Cir. 1989) (a § 1983 claim based on false arrest accrues on
the date of the arrest). If the usual rule applies, then,
appellant's cause of action for illegal search and false
arrest accrued on October 23, 1994 – the date of the search
and the arrest. Thus, appellant's complaint, filed over
three years later on March 13, 1998, would be time-barred.
We see no reason why the usual rule should not
apply in this case. Although appellant attempts to argue
that his arrest and the search were part of an ongoing
conspiracy – the last act of which was the allegedly
malicious prosecution – there is no support in the record
for such a finding. Specifically, appellant does not
allege, and there is no evidence, that Trooper Griffin went
looking for appellant with the already-formed purpose of
causing appellant to be arrested and prosecuted for drug
-5-
possession. Thus, this is a case where the arrest was a
discrete occurrence, rather than a part of a continuing
conspiracy, and the false arrest claim, as the district
court found, is time-barred. Compare Robinson v. Maruffi,
895 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1990).
Finding no merit in the remaining arguments
appellant raises on appeal, the judgment of the district
court is affirmed.
-6-