Faria v. Commissioner of ( 1998 )


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  •   [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 97-2421
    JORGE FARIA,
    Plaintiff, Appellant,
    v.
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant, Appellee.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Jose Antonio Fuste, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Chief Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    Stahl, Circuit Judge.
    Fabio A. Roman Garcia on brief for appellant.
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Lilliam Mendoza-Torro,
    Assistant U.S. Attorney, and Wayne G. Lewis, Assistant Regional
    Counsel, on brief for appellee.
    October 2, 1998
    Per Curiam.  Claimant Jorge Faria appeals a district
    court order that upheld the denial of his claim for Social
    Security disability benefits.  Claimant maintains that he
    suffers from a schizoaffective disorder that disabled him
    before his insured status expired in 1992.
    Having thoroughly reviewed the record and the
    parties' briefs on appeal, we conclude that the Commissioner's
    decision should be affirmed.  We reject claimant's contention
    that the administrative law judge (ALJ) breached his duty to
    develop the record.  Claimant was represented by counsel.  When
    a claimant is represented, the ALJ, "should ordinarily be
    entitled to rely on claimant's counsel to structure and present
    the claimant's case in a way that claimant's claims are
    adequately explored."  See Hawkins v. Chater, 
    113 F.3d 1162
    ,
    1167 (10th Cir. 1997).  See also Sears v. Bowen, 
    840 F.2d 394
    ,
    402 (7th Cir. 1988)("an ALJ is entitled to presume that
    claimant represented by counsel in the administrative hearings
    has made his best case").  We will not fault the ALJ for
    failing to secure Dr. Jimenez's treatment notes or ask further
    questions, particularly where claimant has not shown how he was
    prejudiced by the ALJ's alleged shortcomings.  See, e.g.,
    Nelson v. Apfel, 
    131 F.3d 1228
    , 1234 (7th Cir. 1998)("'Mere
    conjecture or speculation that additional evidence may be
    obtained ... is insufficient to warrant a remand.'"(citation
    omitted)); Shannon v. Chater, 
    54 F.3d 484
    , 488 (8th Cir.
    1995)("Reversal due to [an ALJ's alleged] failure to develop
    the record is only warranted where such failure is unfair or
    prejudicial.").
    Claimant's remaining contentions are equally
    unavailing.  Given the dearth of evidence, medical and
    otherwise, in the record, the ALJ's conclusion that claimant
    retained the ability to perform his past work was adequately
    supported.  See Jones v. Chater, 
    65 F.3d 102
    , 104 (8th Cir.
    1995)(retrospective medical opinions are usually insufficient
    to establish disability absent corroboration of claimant's
    condition during insured period by lay witnesses, such as
    family members); Irlanda Ortiz v. Secretary of Health and Human
    Services, 
    955 F.2d 765
    , 770 (1st Cir. 1991)(per curiam)(absence
    of evidence of sustained mental health treatment bolstered
    nondisability finding).  Claimant  plainly errs insofar as he
    contends that he was not required to prove his impairment with
    objective medical evidence.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
    423(d)(3)(defining physical or mental impairments as those
    which result from abnormalities demonstrable by medically
    acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques); 20
    C.F.R. 404.1529, 404.1527(a)(1)(similar); 20 C.F.R. 404.1508
    (physical and mental impairments must be established by medical
    evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory
    findings).
    In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the
    district court is affirmed.