MacFarlane v. McKean ( 1997 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1853
JAMES MACFARLANE,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
EDGAR D. MCKEAN, III, ESQUIRE, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Shane Devine, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
James MacFarlane on brief pro se.
Jeffrey H. Karlin, Jennifer L. Murphy, and Wadleigh, Starr,
Peters, Dunn & Chiesa on brief for appellee.
August 19, 1997
Per Curiam. James MacFarlane appeals from the
district court's grant of the motion by appellees, Edgar D.
McKean, III, Esq., Julia M. Nye, Esq. and the law firm of
McKean, Mattson and Latici, P.A., for judgment as a matter of
law under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). We agree with the district
court that appellant failed to introduce evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find causation in this legal
malpractice case. We also find no abuse of discretion in the
district court's exclusion of one of appellant's expert
witnesses. Finally, we decline appellant's request to vacate
a sanction imposed jointly on him and his attorney pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.
1. Rule 50(a) Dismissal
We have carefully reviewed the evidence and the
inferences reasonably to be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to MacFarlane. See Gibson v. City of Cranston, 37
F.3d 731, 735 (1st Cir. 1994). As the governing standard
requires, we have not considered the credibility of
witnesses, resolved conflicts in testimony, or evaluated the
weight of evidence. See id. Applying plenary review to the
district court's judgment, we conclude that the evidence of
causation "is such that reasonable minds could not differ as
to the outcome." Rolon-Alvorado v. Municipality of San Juan,
1 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 1993).
No reasonable jury could have found that, but for the
breaches of duty identified by MacFarlane's expert,
MacFarlane should have obtained a more favorable result in
his divorce trial. Specifically, in the absence of evidence
-3-
regarding the contents of the mortgage application, Beryl
Rich's financial circumstances or her own representation of
those circumstances, the jury would have been required to
speculate as to the probable result if the alleged errors at
the trial and appellate level had not occurred. "Speculation
about what might have occurred fails to create a jury
question as to the alleged damage sustained by plaintiff."
Tanner v. Caplin & Drysdale, 24 F.3d 874, 878 (6th Cir.
1994).
B. Exclusion of Expert Witness
"[T]he court has broad discretionary powers in
determining whether or not the proposed expert is qualified
by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education.'
Fed. R. Evil. 702." Bogosian v. Mercedes-Benz of North
America, Inc., 104 F.3d 472, 476 (1st Cir. 1997). The trial
court did not abuse that discretion in excluding Roberta
Harding, Esq., as an expert witness.
C. Award of Attorneys' Fees
In accordance with this court's order of March 18, 1997,
that part of MacFarlane's appeal that seeks to vacate the
sanction award is dismissed.
The judgment of the district court, granting
defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, is
affirmed.
-4-