Brayall v. Dart Industries Inc ( 1993 )

March 18, 1993 [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 92-2161
VALERIE A. BRAYALL AND
RICHARD M. BRAYALL,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
DART INDUSTRIES, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Cyr and Boudin,
Circuit Judges.
Richard M. Brayall and Valerie A. Brayall on brief pro se.
Christopher R. O'Hara, Nutter, McClennen & Fish, and Ray C.
Stoner, Eckert, Seamans, Cherin & Mellott, on brief for
appellees.
Per Curiam. This is an appeal from a district
court order refusing to reopen a judgment entered pursuant to
a settlement agreement. Appellants, Valerie and Richard
Brayall, filed their motion to reopen almost two years after
the settlement order of dismissal.
I.
The Brayalls, former Tupperware distributors, filed
an action in May 1987 in Massachusetts superior court against
appellees, Dart Industries and various individuals ("Dart").
The complaint contained charges that Dart had violated RICO.
Essentially, the Brayalls were unhappy with their
distributorship, claiming that they were misled as to how
much money they would earn. As a result of the RICO claims,
Dart removed the action to the Massachusetts federal district
court. The district court then remanded the state claims to
state court.
On August 30, 1989, the attorney for the Brayalls
sent a letter to the district court informing it that the
RICO claim had been settled. The letter stated that the
parties had reached an agreement "in principle" which
included the dismissal of the RICO claim "with prejudice."
The letter went on to provide that the parties "shall soon be
filing the required paperwork." Accordingly, the district
court issued, on August 31, 1989, a settlement order of
dismissal. The order provided for the dismissal "without
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prejudice to the right of any party upon good cause shown
within 60 days, to reopen the action if settlement is not
consummated." Nothing happened until May 20, 1991, when the
Brayalls, now appearing pro se, filed their motion to reopen.
As support for this motion, they argued that (1) no
"settlement papers or signed agreements" had been filed with
the court; (2) a "suggestion of bankruptcy," although
docketed on February 20, 1990, should have operated as an
automatic stay of the RICO action; (3) their attorney had
resigned before the 60-day period had ended; (4) they were
forced into bankruptcy due to the cost of the litigation; (5)
evidence was withheld concerning the RICO claim; and (6)
there existed "overwhelming evidence" of mail and wire fraud.
Dart opposed this motion and moved to enforce the
settlement. Attached to Dart's motion was a letter dated
August 28, 1989, sent by the Brayalls' attorney to counsel
for Dart. This letter set forth the specific terms of the
agreement; it not only affirmed that the RICO action was to
be dismissed but also detailed the financial terms of the
settlement of a collection action (also pending in the
district court) initiated by Dart against the Brayalls.
In further support of its opposition to the motion
to reopen, Dart submitted an affidavit of the Brayalls'
attorney filed in state court in which he stated:
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Agreements were reached to settle the two
Federal Court litigations in August of 1989. The
terms were set out in letter form and the Federal
Court was notified. However, the Brayalls withdrew
their approval of the settlements before the
confirmatory paperwork was prepared and executed.
The Brayalls also discharged me, after I indicated
that I was not willing to renege on the agreements.
Also attached to Dart's opposition was a letter sent by the
Brayalls to a superior court judge. In it, they indicated
that they had agreed to the settlement so that they could
proceed to trial in the state case.
The Brayalls filed an answer to the motion to
enforce the settlement in which they argued, in addition to
the claims in their motion to reopen, that their attorney had
failed to notify the district court that the terms of the
settlement had not been fully agreed upon, that the
settlement agreement was unfair, that they had settled only
because they were facing bankruptcy, that Dart had refused to
engage in discovery and that the Brayalls had not waived
their right to reopen the case.
II.
"The decision to grant or deny a motion for relief
from a final judgment is committed to the sound discretion of
the trial court." United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc.,
909 F.2d 657, 660 (1st Cir. 1990). Thus, we will reverse the
district court's decision only upon a demonstration of abuse
of discretion. Id. Where litigants have voluntarily
determined not to pursue their claims, the party seeking
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relief bears an especially heavy burden to show the presence
of "extraordinary circumstances." Id. The considerations
relevant to our inquiry on appeal are whether the Brayalls
can show a good reason for not taking action sooner and
whether Dart has been prejudiced by the delay. See id. at
661.
The reasons stated by the Brayalls do not
adequately explain the length of time between the order of
dismissal and the filing of the motion to reopen. It appears
that within the 60-day period they had in fact decided that
they did not wish to settle. In his affidavit, their
attorney states that they withdrew their approval of the
settlement terms and, as a result, discharged him. Further,
according to the Brayalls themselves, their attorney's
"resignation" occurred before the expiration of the 60 days.
Thus, it appears that the Brayalls were in a position to file
a motion to reopen within the time limit set by the district
court or at least very shortly thereafter. Yet two years
elapsed before they did so.
Even if we disregarded the remarkable length of the
delay, it is impossible to discern from the Brayalls' filings
any substantial basis to justify undoing a final judgment.
References to exhaustion, duress and coercion abound, but
there is no coherent account of facts to support such claims.
It may well be that the expense and burden of litigation
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impelled the Brayalls to countenance a settlement, but that
is part of many settlement equations and no basis for setting
one aside. Nor is the strength of their claims a basis for
reopening or else no such dismissal would ever be final.
The Brayalls argue that there was no meeting of the
minds as to their settlement and that no signed papers were
ever filed. This argument misses the essential point: the
Brayalls are attacking a judgment dismissing their case.
Having discharged their attorney and taken the litigation
into their own hands, it was their responsibility to file in
the district court promptly if the settlement collapsed and
they wished to reopen. They did not do so and, absent an
extraordinary excuse for the lengthy lapse, may not do so
now.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
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