Washington v. State Street Bank & Trust Co. , 14 F. App'x 12 ( 2001 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2201
KEITH D. WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO.;
STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO., AS SPONSOR & FIDUCIARY OF
THE SHORT AND LONG TERM DISABILITY PLAN;
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,
Defendants, Appellees.
No. 00-2202
KEITH D. WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
STATE STREET BANK & TRUST CO.;
MASTERMAN, CULBERT & TULLY LLP; MARY E. O’NEIL, Esq.;
PATRICIA A. GRANGER, Esq.; EDWARD I. MASTERMAN, Esq.;
ANDREW C. CULBERT, Esq.; NEAL C. TULLY, Esq.;
PAUL L. BACCARI, Esq.; JAMES D. MASTERMAN, Esq.;
JEFFREY H. LERER, Esq.; PAUL J. MCNAMARA;
ROBERT D. WILLIAMS, Esq.; LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY;
LOIS DEHARO; LATRONICO & WHITESTONE; JEAN M. SHEA, Esq.;
ROBERT M. WEINER, M.D.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Bownes, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
Keith D. Washington on briefs pro se.
Mary E. O’Neil, Patricia A. Granger, and Masterman, Culbert
& Tully LLP on brief for appellees State Street Bank & Trust
Co.; State Street Bank & Trust Co., as Sponsor and Fiduciary of
the Short and Long Term Disability Plan in No. 00-2201.
Mary E. O’Neil, Patricia A. Granger, and Masterman, Culbert
& Tully LLP on brief for appellees State Street Bank & Trust
Co.; Masterman, Culbert & Tully LLP; Mary E. O’Neal, Esq.;
Patricia A. Granger, Esq.; Edward I. Masterman, Esq.; Andrew C.
Culbert, Esq.; Neal C. Tully, Esq.; Paul L. Baccari, Esq.; James
D. Masterman, Esq.; Jeffrey H. Lerer, Esq.; Paul J. McNamara,
Esq. and Robert D. Williams, Esq. in No. 00-2202.
Edward P. O’Leary and Fitzhugh & Associates on brief for
appellee The Prudential Insurance Company of America.
Marc Lacasse and McCormack & Epstein on brief for appellees
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Lois Deharo, Latronico &
Whitestone, and Jean M. Shea, Esq.
Janet J. Bobit, Lisa M. Maloney, and Hunter & Bobit, P.C.
on brief for appellee Robert Weiner, M.D.
July 19, 2001
Per Curiam. Following his resignation as an employee of
State Street Bank & Trust Company ("SSB"), plaintiff-appellant
Keith D. Washington filed three consecutive pro se lawsuits
against SSB and other defendants attempting to right various
wrongs he believes he suffered both during his employment at SSB
and in connection with his termination and subsequent attempt to
get benefits. Taken together, Washington's complaints allege
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
and the Americans With Disabilities Act, breach of fiduciary
duty and wrongful denial of benefits, defamation, conspiracy to
deprive him of his civil rights, wrongful termination,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with
contractual relations, obstruction of justice, vicarious
liability, gross negligence, retaliation, and breach of
contract. The instant pro se appeals stem from the first and
third lawsuits. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Appeal No. 00-2201 arises from the first lawsuit and is from
the denial of a second motion for relief pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). The underlying lawsuit alleged, inter alia,
discrimination on the basis of race and mental disability. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of SSB on the
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ground that these claims are time-barred. In his post-judgment
motion, Washington came forward with new factual information
about the chain of events leading to his resignation which, he
suggests, alters the analysis as to the triggering event for the
running of the statute of limitations. The motion is premised
on Rule 60(b)(1) (excusable neglect), Rule 60(b)(2) (newly
discovered evidence), and Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud).
Our review is limited to the denial of the Rule 60(b)
motion, not the underlying judgment, and is solely for abuse of
discretion. See Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1995).
The district court properly concluded that Washington failed to
present grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)(1) (excusable
neglect). Putting aside any question as to whether the new
information would have made a difference if timely presented,
Washington failed to provide sufficient excuse for the delay.
There is no suggestion that the information was unknown to him.
Rather, Washington makes reference to his lack of litigating
experience, the fact that certain documents were not readily
available due to his move from the Northeast to Atlanta, and his
mental difficulties. However, the move to Atlanta occurred long
before the initiation of the lawsuit, and the limitations issue
had already been litigated, once before, in proceedings before
the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination and the
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Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Washington's alleged
mental difficulties did not otherwise interfere with his ability
to provide factual detail.
It is even plainer that Washington failed to present grounds
for relief under Rule 60(b)(2) (newly discovered evidence) or
Rule 60(b)(3) (fraud). A motion for relief from judgment based
on newly discovered evidence requires proof, inter alia, that
the evidence could not by due diligence have been discovered
earlier. Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir.
1998). To prevail on a Rule 60(b)(3) motion a movant must
demonstrate that alleged misrepresentations prevented him from
fully and fairly presenting his case. Perez-Perez v. Popular
Leasing Rental, Inc., 993 F.2d 281, 286 (1st Cir. 1993).
Misrepresentations can have this effect only when a party did
not have knowledge of the alleged inaccuracies. Ojeda-Toro v.
Rivera-Mendez, 853 F.2d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1988). In the instant
case, Washington's prior knowledge defeats his attempt to
invoke either (b)(2) or (b)(3).
Appeal No. 00-2202 is from the dismissal of Washington's
claims in the third lawsuit on the grounds of res judicata or
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
With the exception of Washington's breach of contract claim, we
affirm essentially for the reasons stated by the district court
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in its memorandum and order dated August 8, 2000. Contrary to
Washington's suggestion, a federal court judgment has res
judicata effect as soon as it is issued notwithstanding the
possibility or even pendency of an appeal. See 18 James Wm.
Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 131.30[2][c][ii], at
131-97 to -98 (3d ed. 1999). In any event, our resolution of
Appeal No. 00-2201 forecloses any further argument that the
judgment in the first suit should not be given preclusive
effect.
As for Washington's breach of contract claim in his third
complaint, it is, perhaps, a close question as to whether the
district court properly dismissed this claim in its entirety
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We agree that Washington's
allegations that SSB failed to provide him an executive
severance package "consistent with what other senior executive
were afforded" is inadequate pleading of a contract claim. The
claim is not bolstered by references to an executive agreement
applying in the event of a change in control of the corporation.
There was no such change in control. However, arguably
Washington's allegations that he was denied compensation
"required" by SSB's guidelines, coupled with latter allegations
that an employee handbook establishes contractual rights to a
certain minimum salary, are sufficient to survive the Rule
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12(b)(6) hurdle.1
We need not decide the issue since we think that the claim
is precluded. This court has adopted a transactional approach
to determining whether causes of action are sufficiently related
to support a res judicata defense. See Massachusetts Sch. of
Law at Andover, Inc. v. American Bar Ass'n, 142 F.3d 26, 38 (1st
Cir. 1998). We consider such factors as whether the facts are
related in time, space, origin, or motivation; whether they form
a convenient trial unit; and whether their treatment as a unit
conforms to the parties' expectations. Id. In the first
lawsuit, Washington alleged that SSB discriminated against him
on the basis of race by failing to provide appropriate
compensation. The breach of contract claim seeks recovery for
the same failure, and the difference is a mere difference in
theory of liability. Accordingly, the doctrine of res judicata
applies.2 Cf. Brzostowski v. Laidlaw Waste Systems, Inc., 49
F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 1995) (concluding that res judicata barred
employee's discrimination suit arising from the same events as
prior breach of contract suit).
1
We express no opinion as to whether the employee handbook
does, indeed, create any contractual rights.
2We note that the judgment in the second suit arguably
reserved the breach of contract of claim for later litigation.
However, the same cannot be said of the judgment in the first
suit, a judgment which was handed down later in time.
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Affirmed.
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