Burrell v. Board of Trustees , 15 F. App'x 5 ( 2001 )

[NOT FOR PUBLICATION–NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 00-2250
WILLIAM L. BURRELL, JR.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF MAINE SYSTEM, ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. David M. Cohen, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Torruella, Circuit Judge,
Bownes and Stahl, Senior Circuit Judges.
William L. Burrell, Jr. on brief pro se.
Patricia A. Peard, Joan M. Fortin, and Bernstein, Shur,
Sawyer & Nelson on brief for appellees Board of Trustees for the
University of Maine, Carl Hill, Judy Ryan, Craig Hutchinson,
Helen Gorgas, Aaron Haynes, Heather Monroe, Amy Fairfield,
Richard L. Pattenaude, Terrence MacTaggert, James Stanhope,
Jolene Chonko, Tim Rich, Mike Mullett and Mike Gauthier.
Philip M. Coffin, III, Teresa M. Cloutier, and Lambert,
Coffin, Rudman & Hochman on brief for appellees Jean Kaestner
and Elizabeth Finlayson.
JULY 10, 2001
Per Curiam. After a thorough review of the record
and of the parties’ submissions, we affirm. We see no error
in the lower court’s refusal to consider the prior versions
of the complaint (a decision essentially denying the motions
to amend), given the daunting task the court and the parties
faced in reviewing the voluminous submissions, Acosta-Mestre
v. Hilton Int’l of Puerto Rico, Inc., 156 F.3d 49, 52 (1st
Cir. 1998); and the court did not err in refusing to allow
oral argument on the motion to dismiss. Domegan v. Fair,
859 F.2d 1059, 1065 (1 st Cir. 1988). We disagree that the
court misapplied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 or
that it imposed a “heightened pleading standard.”
Appellant William L. Burrell Jr. (“Burrell”) has
forfeited any substantive arguments in support of his claims
because he failed to address them in his appellate
submissions. United States v. Fernandez, 145 F.3d 59, 63
(1st Cir. 1998) (issues not fully addressed in appellate
submissions are deemed forfeited). Still, the court has
reviewed Burrell’s substantive claims and, after reviewing
the entire record in this matter, we agree that his federal
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claims were subject to dismissal. His due process claim
fails because he failed to allege facts sufficient to show
a property interest in his job. Krennerich v. Inhabitants
of Town of Bristol, 943 F. Supp. 1345, 1352 (D. Me. 1996)
(citations omitted) (in Maine, a public employee has no
property interest sufficient to invoke the Fourteenth
Amendment’s due process guarantees unless the applicable
statute or employment contract provides that employment may
be terminated only on a showing of ‘cause.’). Even if
Burrell’s contract of employment had provided him a property
interest in his job, Burrell received all the due process
required by the Constitution. Figueroa-Serrano v. Ramos-
Alverio, 221 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2000) (Due Process Clause
requires that individuals with a property interest in their
employment receive notice and a meaningful opportunity to
respond prior to termination). There is no authority for
Burrell’s suggestion that any post-termination review should
include the right to cross-examine witnesses or the right to
a hearing within a certain amount of time. Finally, even if
Burrell had been denied due process prior to the decision to
terminate him, Burrell failed to pursue state remedies that
were available to him. Herwins v. City of Revere, 163 F.3d
15, 20 (1st Cir. 1998) (where state provides post-termination
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remedy, one who fails to take advantage of that remedy is
barred from pursuing a federal due process claim).
Burrell’s first amendment claim fails because the
Constitution does not protect the speech of public employees
regarding internal office matters. Connick v. Myers, 461
U.S. 138, 147 (1983). Though Burrell contends his
termination was due to complaints about alleged racial
discrimination -- speech which inherently addresses a matter
of public concern, id. at 148 n. 8 -- we have reviewed in
detail Burrell’s factual allegations, and we see no
allegation that he complained regarding racial
discrimination prior to his termination. The remainder of
his federal claims are without merit, for the reasons stated
in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation; and the
court did not err in refusing to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the state law claims. Pejepscot Indus.
Park, Inc. v. Maine Ctrl. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 195, 200 (1 st
Cir. 2000).
“Perhaps the government employer’s dismissal of the
worker may not be fair, but ordinary dismissals from
government service which violate no fixed tenure or
applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial
review even if the reasons for the dismissal are alleged to
be mistaken or unreasonable.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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Affirmed. 1st Cir. Loc. R. 27(c).
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