Georcely v. Ashcroft , 375 F.3d 45 ( 2004 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 03-1922
    DIEUDONNA GEORCELY,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    JOHN ASHCROFT, ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER
    OF THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS
    Before
    Boudin, Chief Judge,
    Torruella and Howard, Circuit Judges.
    David Iverson on brief for petitioner.
    Michelle R. Thresher, Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
    Division, Department of Justice, Peter D. Keisler, Assistant
    Attorney General, Civil Division, Department of Justice, and
    Linda S. Wendtland, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration
    Litigation, on brief for respondent.
    July 12, 2004
    BOUDIN, Chief Judge.       Dieudonna Georcely, a citizen of
    Haiti, arrived in the United States Virgin Islands on or about
    January    25,   2002.      In   January    2002,   the   Immigration     and
    Naturalization Service (“INS”), as it was then named, charged
    Georcely with removability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1182
    (a)(6)(A)(i) (2000)
    as an alien who had arrived in the United States without lawful
    authority.       Georcely   conceded   removability   but   said   that    he
    intended to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
    under the Convention Against Torture.1
    On or about March 15, 2002, the immigration judge set a
    hearing to be held in St. Thomas, the Virgin Islands, on April 29,
    2002.     Georcely had by then apparently relocated to Boca Raton,
    Florida, to stay with a cousin.            On April 11, 2002, his lawyer
    mailed to the immigration judge a motion to change venue to Miami,
    Florida.     The day before the scheduled hearing Georcely's counsel
    called the immigration court and was informed that the court had
    not yet received the motion.
    Neither Georcely nor his counsel appeared at the April
    29, 2002, hearing. As is permitted by the statute, the immigration
    1
    Asylum and withholding of removal are both administrative
    measures, with somewhat different incidents, that can be invoked by
    an alien who is threatened with harm.           See 
    8 U.S.C. §§ 1101
    (a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1), 1231(b)(3)(A) (2000); 
    8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13
    (b), 208.16 (2004); see also Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 118
    , 130 (1st Cir. 2004).
    -2-
    judge conducted the hearing in absentia, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A)
    (2000), and on that same day ordered Georcely removed to Haiti.
    On June 25, 2002, Georcely's counsel filed a motion to
    reopen and change venue claiming that Georcely "in good faith
    believed that a change of venue to the Miami District, where he was
    residing, would be or had been granted."        The apparent delay in the
    mail and failure of the immigration court to approve the transfer
    were, he asserted, events "beyond the knowledge much less control
    of   the   alien"    and    supported     a   finding   of       “exceptional
    circumstances" justifying relief.         See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C),
    (e)(1) (2000).
    The INS opposed the request to reopen and on July 18,
    2002, the immigration judge denied Georcely's motion.              The judge
    said that Georcely's attorney had "filed many motions for reopening
    claiming the same situation," that neither an alien nor his counsel
    were entitled to assume that a motion to change venue will be
    granted, and that Georcely's counsel was "well aware" that the
    motion had not been granted because he had called the court the day
    before and was told the motion had not arrived.
    On    August    16,   2002,    Georcely   filed   a    motion   to
    reconsider.     He said it was reasonable for him to believe that the
    motion would be granted because at an earlier bond reduction
    hearing for Georcely, the immigration judge had inquired of the INS
    whether it would oppose a change in venue to the Miami district if
    -3-
    the petitioner so requested, and the INS attorney allegedly said
    she would have no objection.      Georcely's counsel also argued that
    it was reasonable for him to think that his mailed motion would
    arrive within 5 to 7 days--well within the 18 days before the
    hearing.
    Georcely's counsel stated that his alien client "had
    inquired repeatedly” as to whether the motion to change venue had
    been sent and was told that it had been.           Accordingly, Georcely
    “was unaware” that the motion had not been received or granted and
    that he had not been excused from appearing in St. Thomas.        Even if
    Georcely had known that he was not excused, said counsel, Georcely
    could not have arrived in St. Thomas “on one day's notice."
    Finally, Georcely’s counsel cited Matter of Lozada, 
    91 I. & N. Dec. 637
     (BIA 1988), as holding that “ineffective assistance
    of   counsel    is   another   ground    for   finding   of   exceptional
    circumstances.”      He described as “analogous”    another case (Matter
    of Grijalva-Barrera, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 472
     (BIA 1996)), where relief
    was granted because counsel as a "tactic of delay” deliberately
    misinformed the respondent that he did not have to appear. Counsel
    continued:
    Lozada required that a bar complaint be filed
    in order to claim ineffective assistance of
    counsel; however, [Esposito v. INS, 
    987 F.2d 108
    , 110-11 (2d Cir. 1993) and Figueroa v.
    INS, 
    886 F.2d 76
     (4th Cir. 1989)] hold that
    ineffective assistance of counsel can be
    established without such complaint being made.
    Obviously,    undersigned    is   less    than
    -4-
    comfortable making a self-denunciation to the
    bar, but will do so if the Court so requires.
    The immigration judge denied the motion to reconsider,
    saying that this was the fifth time the court had to confront
    counsel’s “way of representing clients before this Court” and that
    the court "will not tolerate any longer this counsel's way of
    representing clients before this Court”; that lawyers who file
    motions have to take account of the mails; and that “counsel was
    less than diligent in this and all the other cases where he brings
    up the same shaky excuses.”
    Georcely's counsel then filed an appeal to the Board of
    Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), repeating earlier arguments and adding
    that Georcely, "unemployed and indigent, would not have been able
    to afford a ticket to go to St. Thomas in any event."               The BIA
    denied   the   appeal,   saying   in   substance   that    the   exceptional
    circumstances test was intended for compelling matters (e.g., a
    serious illness preventing attendance) and did not include an
    alien's voluntary absence from a scheduled hearing.
    Georcely now appeals to this court.            At the threshold,
    we face an issue of venue.         Shortly before the scheduled oral
    argument, Georcely's counsel moved to submit the case without
    argument (a motion we granted), observing in passing that the case
    arose in the Virgin Islands and that the Third Circuit customarily
    had jurisdiction over cases arising in the Virgin Islands.            See 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     (2000); 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c) (2000); Government of
    -5-
    Virgin Islands v. Rivera, 
    333 F.3d 143
    , 146 (3d Cir. 2003).
    Construing     this   as    a   motion   to    change   venue,       the    government
    responded, saying that it
    agree[d] with the Petitioner that because the
    hearing during which the Petitioner was
    ordered removed in absentia took place in the
    Virgin Islands, this case is not properly
    before this Court, and should be transferred
    to the Third Circuit.
    The applicable statute for review of INS decisions, 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (b)(2) (2000), provides (as to “venue and forms”) that
    “[t]he petition for review shall be filed with the court of appeals
    for the judicial circuit in which the immigration judge completed
    the proceedings."      The question posed by this language--actually a
    double question of some difficulty--can be understood only against
    the background of the geographic operations of the immigration
    court in the Caribbean.
    It appears from the information available to us that the
    immigration court responsible for the present case is based in
    Guaynabo, Puerto Rico, that it has jurisdiction over Puerto Rico,
    St.   Thomas   and    St.   Croix   (the       latter   two   being        U.S.   Virgin
    Islands), and that the immigration judge based in Guaynabo holds in
    person hearings       in    the   Virgin      Islands   as    well    as    telephonic
    hearings with St. Croix.2         In our case--perhaps in all such cases--
    2
    See United States Department of Justice, Guaynabo, PR
    Immigration    Court   -    Frequently   Asked   Questions,   at
    http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/sibpages/saj/faq.htm (last visited May
    25, 2004).
    -6-
    stamps on the documents indicate that filings by counsel with the
    immigration court were sent to and docketed in Guaynabo.
    Here, the immigration judge conducted the in absentia
    hearing that resulted in the removal order in St. Thomas; but there
    is a reasonable likelihood that the order was officially filed and
    docketed at the headquarters in Guaynabo; admittedly, the record is
    unclear on this point.3       If the removal order "completed" the
    proceedings, the question posed would be whether the completion
    occurred in the Third Circuit where the ruling was made (St.
    Thomas) or the First Circuit (Guaynabo) where we think that the
    order was officially filed and docketed.
    If   the   order   was   officially   filed   and   docketed   in
    Guaynabo, the most straightforward reading of the language of
    section 1252(b)(2) would probably lead us to conclude that the
    removal proceedings were completed in Guaynabo (assuming that they
    were completed by the removal order rather than by the later denial
    of the motion to reopen).     This is so because a judicial order is
    normally effective when filed and docketed, see United States v.
    Fiorelli, 
    337 F.3d 282
    , 287 (3d Cir. 2003); Willhauck v. Halpin,
    
    953 F.2d 689
    , 701 (1st Cir. 1991); 11 Wright, Miller, and Kane,
    3
    Mysteriously the removal order itself has a typed letterhead
    and, after the legend "Immigration Court," there follows on a new
    line, "St. Thomas, Virgin Islands." Whether this latter reference
    is merely to the site of the hearing or whether there is some
    arrangement for filing and docketing in St. Thomas remains
    unexplained.
    -7-
    Federal Practice and Procedure § 2785 (2d ed. 1995 & Supp. 2004),
    although exceptions exist.       As it happens, the appeal in this case
    was originally filed in the Eleventh Circuit, presumably because
    counsel hoped to associate it with the Miami office of the INS.
    When the INS then moved for a transfer to this circuit, a motion
    not opposed by Georcely, the INS said that “the immigration judge
    completed proceedings in San Juan, Puerto Rico.”
    This view that the place of filing and docketing controls
    must   be   tentative.    The    statutory    language   is   so    far     from
    conclusive, see Ramos v. Ashcroft, No. 03-4050, 2004 U.S. App.
    Lexis 11692, at *2-*3 (7th Cir. June 15, 2004), that absent
    legislative history, policy concerns would matter if they weighed
    heavily on either side.         Further facts might affect the outcome
    (e.g., perhaps the removal order for some reason was effective when
    announced).       And,   most    important,    a   definitive      ruling    is
    unnecessary here because--as we will see--the venue issue has been
    forfeited.
    In the interest of getting issues on the table, a further
    complication should be mentioned.         Even if the removal proceedings
    might otherwise be deemed to have been completed in St. Thomas
    (contrary to our tentative assessment), the removal order itself
    was followed by a motion to reopen, later denied without an oral
    hearing.     Both the motion and the order denying it were filed and
    docketed in Guaynabo.     See also 
    8 C.F.R. § 1003.31
    (a) (2004) ("All
    -8-
    documents   and   applications     that   are    to   be   considered     in   a
    proceeding before an Immigration Judge must be filed with the
    Immigration Court having administrative control over the Record of
    Proceeding.")     In such a case, does Guaynabo thereby become the
    place of completion?
    On this issue, the government argues that the place where
    the immigration judge "completed" the proceedings is the place
    where the    immigration   judge    issued   a   final     order   of   removal
    "notwithstanding the fact that [an] alien subsequently files a
    motion to reopen or reconsider, except when the Judge grants the
    Petitioner's motion and reopens proceedings." The government reads
    Nwaokolo v. INS, 
    314 F.3d 303
     (7th Cir. 2002), as suggesting an
    opposite reading of the statute but regards it as mistaken.
    In all events, we need not resolve such questions.             The
    challenge is to venue, not jurisdiction; the statute says so, as
    does Nwaokolo, 
    314 F.3d at 306
    .       Objections to venue are normally
    waived unless asserted in timely fashion.             
    28 U.S.C. § 1406
    (b)
    (2000); W.A. Stackpole Motor Transp., Inc. v. Malden Spinning &
    Dyeing Co., 
    263 F.2d 47
    , 50 (1st Cir. 1958); 15 Wright, Miller &
    Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3829 (2d ed. 1986).
    Although section 1406(b) explicitly requires a “timely” objection
    in district court proceedings, Nwaokolo, 
    314 F.3d at 306
    , found the
    same requirement implicitly applicable to immigration appeals, as
    do we.
    -9-
    Venue requirements are normally for the convenience of
    the parties and, if the parties do not object, ordinarily there is
    no policy objection to proceeding in any court with jurisdiction.
    Here, the government sought, and Georcely did not contest, the
    transfer to this circuit as the appropriate venue--and certainly
    that   was   a    colorable   contention.     Any   contrary    suggestion,
    belatedly made on the eve of a scheduled argument, is forfeited and
    need not be considered.
    No one circuit can speak definitively as to when the
    proceedings are “completed,” and yet uniform rules are highly
    desirable for both the courts and the litigants.               Perhaps INS
    regulations would help toward a solution, see Ramos v. Ashcroft,
    supra, 2004 U.S. App. Lexis 11692, at *2 (suggesting that course);
    Congress can certainly provide one.         Copies of this decision will
    be sent to the appropriate congressional authorities and, in this
    case, to the Attorney General.
    Turning to the merits, we begin with the statutory
    framework.       When the BIA issues its own opinion, we review the
    Board's decision and not the immigration judge's.              Albathani v.
    INS, 
    318 F.3d 365
    , 373 (1st Cir. 2003).             The statute governing
    judicial review of in absentia removal orders confines review to
    certain limited issues but among them is "the reasons for the
    alien's not attending the proceeding."        8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(D).
    -10-
    The standard of review ordinarily varies with the nature of the
    issue, Bolton v. Taylor, 
    367 F.3d 5
    , 7-8 & n.1 (1st Cir. 2004).
    An order for removal entered in absentia may be rescinded
    "upon a motion to reopen filed within 180 days after the date of
    the order of removal if the alien demonstrates that the failure to
    appear was because of exceptional circumstances." 8 U.S.C. §
    1229a(b)(5)(C).   The statute says that this means “exceptional
    circumstances (such as serious illness of the alien or serious
    illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but
    not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of
    the alien."   Id. § 1229a(e)(1).
    It appears that Georcely knew that a hearing had been set
    in St. Thomas--the notice to him so provided--and that his lawyer
    had moved for a transfer of the matter to Miami.   But there is no
    claim that his lawyer told him that the motion had been granted.
    So Georcely, as well as his lawyer, were obligated to appear at the
    St. Thomas hearing.    Simply to assume that the motion would be
    granted because the INS had not objected is not remotely an
    exceptional circumstance beyond the alien’s control.   See Tang v.
    Ashcroft, 
    354 F.3d 1192
    , 1195 (10th Cir. 2003).
    The exceptional circumstances requirement, a fairly tough
    one, was adopted by Congress precisely because failures to appear
    -11-
    at scheduled INS hearings had greatly burdened the agency.4                 To
    charge Georcely with knowledge of his legal obligations may be
    unrealistic--he    apparently      does    not    read    English--but     such
    knowledge is expected of all, e.g., Atkins v. Parker, 
    472 U.S. 115
    ,
    130 (1985); United States v. Aquino-Chacon, 
    109 F.3d 936
    , 938 (4th
    Cir.), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 931
     (1997), and the obligation as
    applied here is less surprising than many others.
    Georcely’s counsel told the Board (late in the day and
    without evidence) that his client was indigent and could not at the
    last minute have come back to St. Thomas.          If so, then he was ill-
    advised to go to Miami in the first place.               Certainly he had no
    excuse for waiting until the hearing date had passed to raise such
    an excuse.      Compare Herbert, 325 F.3d at 70, 72 (exceptional
    circumstances    where   counsel   was     held   in   another   hearing   and
    promptly advised the immigration court); Romero-Morales v. INS, 
    25 F.3d 125
    , 127, 129 (2d Cir. 1994).
    We note also that Georcely did not submit affidavits or
    any evidentiary materials to the immigration judge or BIA in
    support of his claim that he was financially unable to travel to
    the hearing, see, e.g., Ursachi v. INS, 
    296 F.3d 592
    , 594 (7th Cir.
    4
    Herbert v. Ashcroft, 
    325 F.3d 68
    , 71 (1st Cir. 2003). Prior
    to 1990, the statute required only that the alien show "reasonable
    cause" excusing his or her absence. Tang, 
    354 F.3d at
    1194 n.3,
    1195 n.4; see also Maldonado-Perez v. INS, 
    865 F.2d 328
    , 333 (D.C.
    Cir. 1989); Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545,
    104 Stat 4978, 5063-65 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(c)(3), (f)(2)
    (repealed)).
    -12-
    2002); In re J-P-, 
    22 I. & N. Dec. 33
    , 34-35 (BIA 1998).               Nor did
    he explain how he was able to travel to Florida from the Virgin
    Islands but could not afford the return trip, see Hernandez-Vivas
    v. INS, 
    23 F.3d 1557
    , 1560 (9th Cir. 1994); Maldonado-Perez, 
    865 F.2d at 333
    , or why he could not have stayed in the Virgin Islands
    in the first place until the motion was granted.
    Turning from Georcely’s conduct to that of his counsel,
    the BIA has held that ineffective assistance of counsel can under
    certain circumstances count as an exceptional circumstance. See In
    Re Rivera, 
    21 I. & N. Dec. 599
    , 602-03 (BIA 1996).                Indeed,   in
    immigration cases, ineffective assistance is sometimes treated as
    a basis for relief without regard to such a statutory hook, even
    though such proceedings are civil and the Sixth Amendment guarantee
    inapplicable.5
    However,   if     freely    indulged,    ineffective    assistance
    claims   would   undermine    the     stringent    requirements   of   section
    1229a(b)(5)(C) (and much else in the statute besides) so the BIA
    has insisted that the alien has to comply with the procedural
    requirements of Matter of Lozada, 
    19 I. & N. Dec. 637
     (BIA 1988).
    5
    This is no easy accomplishment since plenty of other civil
    cases have serious consequences, yet the party is still charged
    with his lawyer’s errors; but the cases do treat immigration
    proceedings differently, using the due process clause as the
    justification. See, for example, Jobe v. INS, 
    238 F.3d 96
    , 99 n.3
    (1st Cir. 2001); Hernandez v. Reno, 
    238 F.3d 50
    , 55 (1st Cir.
    2001); and Lozada v. INS, 
    857 F.2d 10
    , 13-14 (1st Cir. 1988), for
    pertinent background.
    -13-
    These include the filing of a bar complaint against counsel or
    adequately explaining why the complaint has not been filed.             See
    Tang, 
    354 F.3d at 1196
    ; In Re Rivera, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 603.           So
    far as we know, neither has occurred in this case.
    Although     we   have   hinted   that   full   compliance   with
    Lozada's requirements might be excused in an appropriate case,
    Betouche v. Ashcroft, 
    357 F.3d 147
    , 150 (1st Cir. 2004), the Lozada
    requirements generally make sense.          It is all too easy after the
    fact to denounce counsel and achieve a further delay while that
    issue is sorted out.    And in the absence of a complaint to the bar
    authorities, counsel may have all too obvious an incentive to help
    his client disparage the quality of the representation.
    The present case is a perfect example.              A claim of
    inadequate representation has not been squarely made either before
    the Board or on this appeal.       Counsel has sought to make his own
    carelessness, if that is the proper characterization, an excuse for
    Georcely’s failure to appear, while never conceding that his own
    conduct as counsel was ineffective representation--a standard that
    requires a showing of significant incompetence and a likely adverse
    effect on the ultimate outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 691-92 (1984).
    It is not even clear that counsel was “incompetent,”
    although surely more sloppy than he should have been.           There was
    probably good reason to expect that the mail would arrive more
    -14-
    quickly, that (given the alleged INS lack of opposition) the motion
    would be granted, and that a new hearing date in Miami would be
    set.       This    self-induced    expectation     does   not   excuse   the
    “exceptional      circumstances”   test    for   reopening,   but   counsel’s
    failure to check in timely fashion that the motion was received and
    granted is a default hardly unknown in law practice.6
    In all events, the ineffective assistance claim has not
    been squarely raised; no reason for ignoring Lozada has been
    suggested; and ineffective assistance and prejudice are far from
    apparent on this record.     If Georcely wishes to pursue this issue,
    he is free to attempt habeas proceedings in the district court.
    Several circuits have suggested this remedy is available for such
    claims, e.g., Chmakov v. Blackman, 
    266 F.3d 210
    , 215 (3d Cir.
    2001), but we have no occasion to address the subject here.
    Affirmed.
    6
    The immigration judge’s suggestion that this was a routine
    practice by this counsel is a different matter but the immigration
    court is aware of the situation and is free to address the problem.
    -15-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 03-1922

Citation Numbers: 375 F.3d 45

Judges: Boudin, Howard, Torruella

Filed Date: 7/12/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/3/2023

Authorities (22)

Betouche v. Ashcroft , 357 F.3d 147 ( 2004 )

Mekhoukh v. Ashcroft , 358 F.3d 118 ( 2004 )

W. A. Stackpole Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Malden ... , 263 F.2d 47 ( 1958 )

Herbert v. Ashcroft , 325 F.3d 68 ( 2003 )

Jobe v. Immigration & Naturalization Service , 238 F.3d 96 ( 2001 )

Hernandez v. Reno , 238 F.3d 50 ( 2001 )

United States v. Joseph Fiorelli , 337 F.3d 282 ( 2003 )

Aleksandr Chmakov Nadejda Chmakova Denis Chmakov v. J. ... , 266 F.3d 210 ( 2001 )

Tang v. Ashcroft , 354 F.3d 1192 ( 2003 )

Antonio Esposito v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 987 F.2d 108 ( 1993 )

Julio Lozada v. Immigration and Naturalization Service , 857 F.2d 10 ( 1988 )

Albathani v. INS , 318 F.3d 365 ( 2003 )

Porfirio Romero-Morales v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 25 F.3d 125 ( 1994 )

Bolton v. Taylor , 367 F.3d 5 ( 2004 )

Pablo Maldonado-Perez v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 865 F.2d 328 ( 1989 )

united-states-v-miguel-aquino-chacon-aka-miguel-chacon-aquino-aka , 109 F.3d 936 ( 1997 )

Philomena Iweka Nwaokolo v. Immigration and Naturalization ... , 314 F.3d 303 ( 2002 )

Ricardo Hernandez-Vivas v. Immigration & Naturalization ... , 23 F.3d 1557 ( 1994 )

Rafael Figeroa, A/K/A Rafael Najarro-Morales v. U.S. ... , 886 F.2d 76 ( 1989 )

Government of the Virgin Islands v. Jamel Rivera , 333 F.3d 143 ( 2003 )

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Albathani v. INS , 318 F.3d 365 ( 2003 )

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