R.R. Isla Verde Hotel Corp. v. Howard Johnson International, Inc. , 121 F. App'x 870 ( 2005 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1367
R.R. ISLA VERDE HOTEL CORP. and BENITO R. FERNANDEZ,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HOWARD JOHNSON INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Carmen Consuelo Cerezo, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Wallace Vázquez Sanabria on brief for appellants.
Arthur L. Pressman, Gordon M. Jones, III and Nixon Peabody,
LLP, on brief for appellee.
January 25, 2005
Per Curiam. This is an appeal from the grant of summary
judgment to the defendant, Howard Johnson International, Inc., in
a case brought by plaintiffs R.R. Isla Verde Hotel Corp. and its
sole shareholder, Benito Fernández, alleging that Howard Johnson
tortiously interfered with plaintiffs' contractual arrangements
with a third party, Hotel Associates, Inc., to renovate and operate
a Howard Johnson hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico. We affirm, albeit
for reasons other than those given by the district court.
DISCUSSION
A. Summary Judgment Standards
This court reviews the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same criteria as the district court,
Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 2004),
namely, whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party opposing a
properly supported motion for summary judgment1 may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of the pleadings, "but the adverse
party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
1
Plaintiffs do not argue that defendant's motion was not
adequately supported.
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issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If the opposing party
"fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of
an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial, . . . [t]he moving party is
'entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c)); see also Whitman v. Miles, 387 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2004).
B. Tortious Interference with Contractual Relations
The parties plausibly agree that plaintiffs' tortious
interference claim is governed by the law of Puerto Rico, where the
allegedly tortious conduct occurred. Under Puerto Rico law, to
prevail on a claim of tortious interference with a contractual
relationship, a plaintiff must show: (1) a contract with which the
defendant interferes, (2) tortious action by the defendant with
knowledge of the contract's existence, (3) damage to the plaintiff,
and (4) a causal relationship between the tortious conduct and the
damage. See Gen. Office Prods. Corp. v. A.M. Capen's Sons, Inc.,
780 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Gen. Office Prods.
Corp. v. A.M. Capen's Sons, Inc., 115 P.R. Dec. 553, 558-59
(1984)). As the Puerto Rico Supreme Court has emphasized, the
first element--existence of a contract for a fixed period of time--
is "indispensable," Dolphin Int'l, Inc. v. Ryder Truck Lines, Inc.,
27 P.R. Offic. Trans. 869, ___ (1991); "[i]f what is affected is .
. . a profitable financial relationship where there is no contract,
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the action does not lie . . . ." Gen. Office Prods. Corp, 780 F.2d
at 1081.
Here, plaintiffs have stumbled on that first, essential
step. The "contract" with which they allege interference is the
alleged "agreement between [plaintiffs and Hotel] Associates for
the development of the hotel, using the Howard Johnson's flag."
However, in an attempt to reverse the entry of summary judgment on
this point, plaintiffs rely solely on the allegations of the
complaint, which, as discussed above, are insufficient to meet
their burden under Rule 56(e). See Roger Edwards, LLC v. Fiddes &
Sons, Ltd., 387 F.3d 90, 94 (1st Cir. 2004) (finding "'[c]onjectural
allegations, conclusory assertions, and inconsequential evidence'"
insufficient to meet opposing party's burden in defeating motion
for summary judgment)(citation omitted)). Because plaintiffs have
thus failed to meet their burden of demonstrating, "by materials of
evidentiary quality," Acosta, 386 F.3d at 8, a genuine dispute of
fact as to this essential element of their claim, we affirm the
district court's entry of summary judgment on this ground, without
reaching the merits of the alternative ground relied upon by the
district court. See Hope Furnace Assocs., Inc. v. FDIC, 71 F.3d
39, 42 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that appellate court is free to
affirm entry of summary judgment on any independently sufficient
ground).
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The district court judgment is summarily affirmed. See
Loc. R. 27(c).
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