Balaguer-Santiago v. Echegoyen , 219 F. App'x 13 ( 2007 )


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  •                Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter.
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 06-1281
    RAFAEL BALAGUER-SANTIAGO; NIMIA ORTIZ-ALICEA;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BALAGUER-ORTIZ; JOSÉ A. IRIZARRY-TORO;
    SYLVIA ESPINOSA-MARTÍNEZ; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
    IRIZARRY-ESPINOSA; FÉLIX CASIANO-MERCADO;
    RAMONITA RODRÍGUEZ-CANCEL; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
    CASIANO-RODRÍGUEZ; IVETTE MALDONADO-VÁZQUEZ;
    ABIEZER DÍAZ-BERRIOS; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF DÍAZ-MALDONADO;
    IGNACIO ECHEVARRÍA-ALMONDÓVAR; ÁNGELA VALENTÍN-SOTO;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP ECHEVARRÍA-VALENTÍN;
    MARIBEL RIVER-SANTIAGO; JOSÉ NELSON REYES CRUZ;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP REYES-RIVERA; JOSÉ COLLAZO-GONZÁLEZ;
    JORGE MALDONADO-GONZÁLEZ,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    ILEANA ECHEGOYEN, in her personal capacity and in her official
    capacity as Secretary of Housing of the Commonwealth of
    Puerto Rico; JULIA TORRES HERNANDEZ, in her personal capacity
    and in her official capacity as Executive Director of the
    Housing Development and Improvements Administration (ADMV);
    ARLENE RIVERA-RIVERA, in her personal capacity and in her
    official capacity as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human
    Resources of the Commonwealth Department of Housing;
    GIOVANY LLORENS-MERCADO, in his personal capacity and his
    capacity as Director of the Mayagüez Regional Office of the
    Department of Housing; LYDIA FERNANDEZ, in her personal capacity
    and in her official capacity as Bayamón Regional Director
    of ADMV; ESPERANZA MOLINA, in her personal capacity;
    GONZALO GARCIA-CASIANO, in his personal capacity;
    ANA YOLANDA GONZALES, in her personal capacity; JOHN DOES,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Circuit Judge,
    Stahl and Baldock,* Senior Circuit Judges.
    Valéry López Torres for appellants.
    Zaira Z. Girón-Anadón, Assistant Solicitor General,
    Department of Justice, with whom Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts,
    Solicitor General, Mariana D. Negrón-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor
    General and Maite Oronoz-Rodríguez, Deputy Solicitor General,
    were on brief, for appellees.
    February 12, 2007
    *
    Of the Tenth Circuit, Sitting by designation.
    Per Curiam. Plaintiffs Rafael Balaguer, Jose Irizarry,
    Ignacio Echevarria, Felix Casiano, Jose Collazo, Maribel Rivera,
    Jorge Maldonado, and Ivette Maldonado brought this action under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
         against     defendant      government       officials       Ileana
    Echegoyen, Julia Torres, Arlene Rivera, Giovanny Llorens, Gonzalo
    Garcia,       Esperanza    Molina,        Lydia    Fernandez,       and   Ana     Yolanda
    Gonzalez,      claiming     that     defendants         violated    their      First   and
    Fourteenth Amendment rights by discriminating against them on
    account   of     their     political      affiliation.1        The    district       court
    granted       summary     judgment    to     the    defendants,       and    plaintiffs
    appealed.
    I.
    As we write primarily for the parties, we will recount
    only   those      facts     essential       to    our    analysis.        In      essence,
    plaintiffs,      all     current     or    former       employees    of     the    Housing
    Development and Improvement administration (HDIA), complain of
    their treatment following the change in government after the 2000
    elections.       Plaintiffs, who are members of the New Progressive
    Party ("NPP"), maintain that defendants, who are members of the
    Popular   Democratic        Party    ("PDP"),       took   discriminatory          actions
    against them based upon their political allegiance.                          As did the
    district court in considering their claims, we may group the
    1
    Appellants focus upon their political discrimination claims rather
    than their due process claims on appeal.
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    plaintiffs      into   three    categories.        The    first   group,   Rafael
    Balaguer, Felix Casiano, Ignacio Echevarria, and Jose Irizarry,
    contests the closing of the Guanica office and their transfer to
    the Mayaguez office ("Guanica plaintiffs"). The Guanica plaintiffs
    assert that defendants closed the Guanica office to unfairly
    deprive them of their supervisory functions.                  The second group,
    Maribel Rivera, Jorge Maldonado, and Jose Collazo, contests the
    termination of their irregular employment contracts ("contract
    plaintiffs").2     The contract plaintiffs assert that the defendants
    failed to renew their contracts to punish them because of their
    allegiance to the NPP.           Lastly, there is Ivette Maldonado, who
    claims to have been deprived of her normal duties, assigned to
    tasks for which she had no training, and harassed, all because of
    her NPP membership.
    The district court concluded that none of the plaintiffs
    had established a prima facie case, largely based upon the lack of
    evidence    that   defendants      were   aware    of     plaintiffs'   political
    affiliation and/or because plaintiffs could not link the disputed
    actions    to   political      animus.     The    court    also   concluded   that
    plaintiffs could not refute defendants' tendered nondiscriminatory
    2
    All three worked on temporary contracts of three to six months,
    with renewal contingent upon the agency's needs and available
    budget. Rivera and Maldonado's contracts expired in March 2002,
    while Collazo's contract expired in September 2001.
    -4-
    explanation that budgetary problems had prompted the challenged
    actions.
    II.
    All plaintiffs claim that there was sufficient evidence
    to create a triable issue of defendants' motive for taking the
    disputed employment actions.
    We review the granting of summary judgment de novo,
    assessing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
    party.    Nieves-Luciano v. Hernandez-Torres,               
    397 F.3d 1
    , 3-4 (1st
    Cir. 2005).      Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine
    issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
    as a matter of law.           See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).           In reviewing a
    summary       judgment     decision,    "we    do     not   consider     conclusory
    allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation."
    Velez-Rivera        v.    Agosto-Alicea,      
    437 F.3d 145
    ,   154   (1st   Cir.
    2006)(internal citation and quotation omitted).
    To briefly recap the standards for establishing liability
    under § 1983, "plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the
    evidence that:           (1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a
    person acting under color of state law; and (2) the conduct
    deprived the plaintiff of rights secured by the Constitution or
    laws of the United States."             Velez-Rivera, 
    437 F.3d at 151-52
    .
    There    is    no   dispute    that    the    First   Amendment    protects     non-
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    policymaking public employees from adverse employment actions based
    upon their political views.          
    Id. at 152
    .
    "When alleging a claim of political discrimination, a
    plaintiff   bears    the    burden   of   producing   sufficient    evidence,
    whether     direct    or     circumstantial,       that    he    engaged   in
    constitutionally protected conduct and that political affiliation
    was a substantial or motivating factor behind the challenged
    employment action."        Nieves-Luciano, 
    397 F.3d at 4
    .       In general, a
    plaintiff must "make four showings to prove a case of political
    discrimination: (1) the plaintiff and the defendant belong to
    opposing political affiliations; (2) the defendant has knowledge of
    the plaintiff's opposing political affiliation; (3) there is a
    challenged employment action; and (4) sufficient evidence, whether
    direct or circumstantial, . . . that political affiliation was a
    substantial or motivating factor . . . ."                 Peguero-Moronta v.
    Santiago, 
    464 F.3d 29
    , 48 (1st Cir. 2006)(internal citation and
    quotation omitted).          Once a plaintiff satisfies this initial
    burden, defendants must "demonstrate that (i) they would have taken
    the same action in any event; and (ii) they would have taken such
    action for reasons that are not unconstitutional."              Velez-Rivera,
    
    437 F.3d at
    152 (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v.
    Doyle, 
    429 U.S. 274
    , 286-87 (1977)).          If the defendant makes such
    a showing, the plaintiff may attempt to discredit the tendered
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    nondiscriminatory      reason     with   either   direct   or    circumstantial
    evidence.    Velez-Rivera, 
    437 F.3d at 153
    .
    Guanica Plaintiffs
    The Guanica plaintiffs argue that the Guanica office was
    closed to punish them for their political allegiance and deprive
    them (particularly Balaguer) of their supervisory responsibilities.
    Guanica plaintiffs further contend that defendants' explanation for
    the closure is unsupported by the evidence.                  Even giving the
    Guanica plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt on their prima facie
    case, they have failed to overcome the defendants' defense that
    they closed the office for a nondiscriminatory reason.
    Defendants asserted that the closing of the Guanica
    office was brought about solely by budgetary concerns, and offered
    the following facts in support of their position:                (1) HDIA   faced
    a 7% budget decrease; (2) defendants decided to close certain local
    offices to consolidate services in the regional offices and reduce
    operating expenses; (3) four local offices (including Guanica) were
    closed and their employees transferred to the appropriate regional
    office;   (4)   each   of   the    closed      local   offices   had   employees
    belonging to both political parties; and (5) the Guanica office is
    closed and no employee, of either party, reports to work there.
    To counter these facts, the Guanica plaintiffs first
    offer some ambiguous comments by Secretary Echegoyen about whether
    she was specifically notified of and participated in the decision
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    to close the offices, or just generally advised about the need to
    economize because of the budget reduction. This quibbling does not
    undermine    the    underlying   explanation         by    defendants.       Second,
    plaintiffs state, without elaboration, that three PDP members still
    work in the town of Guanica.         This fact is of little value to their
    case, given that plaintiffs concede that the Guanica HDIA office is
    no longer operating, and that no one reports there.                             Third,
    plaintiffs argue that no "formal study" was done to evaluate the
    advantages    and    disadvantages     of    closing        the   Guanica    office.
    However, the defendants maintain that the viability of the various
    offices, if not formally studied, was fully considered, and the
    Guanica plaintiffs do not meaningfully contest this.                        On this
    record, the Guanica plaintiffs have failed to show a material
    dispute concerning defendants' tendered explanation for closing the
    Guanica office.       Contrast Padilla-Garcia v. Guillermo Rodriguez,
    
    212 F.3d 69
    , 78 (1st Cir. 2000) (that only plaintiff impacted by
    "restructuring"       of   department        casts        doubt   on     defendant's
    explanation).
    Contract Plaintiffs
    The contract plaintiffs maintain that their irregular
    contracts    were    not   renewed    solely    to    punish      them    for   their
    political allegiance.        While conceding that they were renewed on
    multiple occasions after the elections, the contract plaintiffs
    maintain that defendants eventually saw an opportunity to remove
    -8-
    them   based   upon   their    political     views.   They   also    claim   that
    defendants' stated justification - a lack of funds - was mere
    pretext, as the plaintiffs were replaced by members of the PDP.                As
    with the Guanica plaintiffs, we conclude that summary judgment was
    properly granted.
    We begin with the contract plaintiffs' prima facie cases.
    The record reveals little evidence that the relevant decision-
    makers   were     aware   of     the    contract      plaintiffs'     political
    affiliation.     In essence, the contract plaintiffs, all low level
    functionaries, claim that the various defendants "must have known"
    them because they worked at the agency, "must have known" their
    political      affiliation     because       the   defendants       could    have
    investigated it and found out, and "must have discriminated"
    against them because their contracts were not renewed.                       These
    assertions are inadequate to state a prima facie case however, for,
    as we noted in Mercado-Alicea v. P.R. Tourism Co., 
    396 F.3d 46
    , 52
    (1st Cir. 2005), merely juxtaposing the decision-maker's politics
    against an adverse employment decision is insufficient to support
    a claim of political discrimination.
    Moreover, the contract plaintiffs have failed to cast any
    doubt on the defendants' Mt. Healthy defense.                   We begin with
    plaintiff Collazo, who conceded at his deposition that he was based
    in Guanica as a title searcher, that the Guanica office did not
    employ a title searcher after his departure, and that the Guanica
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    office was closed very shortly after his contract was not renewed.
    In light of these concessions, it is difficult to see pretext in
    defendants' explanation that his contract was not renewed for
    budgetary reasons.    Moreover, his contention that other title
    searchers were hired "island wide" does not address the relevant
    question: whether his contract services were needed in Guanica.
    Plaintiff Maldonado's claim that he was replaced also fails, as he
    conceded at his deposition that no one filled his position after he
    was terminated. As to plaintiff Rivera, she claims that, after her
    termination, she was temporarily replaced by two employees from
    another office and that defendant Lydia Fernandez's cousin (who
    Rivera surmises belongs to the PDP) was placed in Rivera's old
    position (with the same title and salary) by the end of the year.
    Neither claim holds up under scrutiny.    First, that two current
    employees were temporarily transferred to perform Rivera's duties,
    as opposed to a new hire, does not by itself refute the defendants'
    budgetary shortfall explanation.   Second, as to the employment of
    defendant Fernandez's cousin, Rivera relies largely on Fernandez's
    answer to an interrogatory, in which she states that her cousin did
    start to work in the office, but the interrogatory answer says
    nothing about the employee's title or duties, and moreover it
    asserts that the cousin's contract was separately funded.     That
    evidence does not support Rivera's assertion of a material factual
    dispute.
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    Ivette Maldonado
    Lastly, plaintiff Maldonado argues that she established
    her prima facie case, but presents no challenge to the district
    court's acceptance of defendants' Mt. Healthy defense.                    Thus,
    Maldonado has abandoned any challenge to the district court's
    conclusion.   See     In   re   Miles,   
    436 F.3d 291
    ,   294   (1st    Cir.
    2006)(failure to challenge district court's reasonable rationale is
    fatal to an appeal); Horizon Bank & Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 
    391 F.3d 48
    , 53 (1st Cir. 2004)(failure to appeal both of district
    court's alternative grounds for result moots the appeal because
    reviewing court can give no effective relief).
    Affirmed.
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