Moringlane-Ruiz v. Trujillo-Panisse , 232 F. App'x 8 ( 2007 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-2469
AIDA LUZ MORINGLANE-RUIZ; AURELIO FERNANDEZ-MALDONADO;
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP MORINGLANE-MALDONADO,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
MARCELO TRUJILLO-PANISSE, in his personal and his official
capacity as Mayor of Humacao; MUNICIPALITY OF HUMACAO,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Daniel R. Domínguez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Lipez, and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Valéry López Torres, on brief for appellants.
Johanna M. Emanuelli-Huertas, Carmen Edith Torres-Rodriguez
and Law Offices Pedro Ortiz Alvarez, on brief for appellees.
May 9, 2007
Per curiam. This appeal from a grant of summary judgment
in a political discrimination case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 raises
one procedural and one substantive issue. The procedural issue
concerns the district court's decision to reject the plaintiffs'
opposition to summary judgment as untimely, and the substantive
issue concerns the district court's ultimate ruling that the
defendants were entitled to summary judgment.
The underlying dispute involves a decision by defendant
Marcelo Trujillo-Panisse, the Mayor of the Municipality of Humacao,
Puerto Rico, to terminate a lease with plaintiff Aida Moringlane-
Ruiz to house a Head Start program in a building that Moringlane
owned. The Mayor was a member of the Popular Democratic Party, and
Moringlane was a member of the New Progressive Party. Moringlane
claims that the decision to terminate her lease was motivated by
the Mayor's politically-based animus against her.
In June 2004, Moringlane, her spouse, and their conjugal
partnership filed a complaint in federal district court against the
Mayor and Municipality alleging, inter alia, that the termination
of the lease was impermissible discrimination in violation of the
First Amendment. In January 2005, the district court convened an
initial scheduling conference, during which the parties discussed
a timetable for proceeding with the litigation. After the
conference, the district court entered a case management order
which set the close of discovery on May 19, 2005, the filing of
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summary judgment motions on or before June 20, 2005, and the filing
of oppositions to any such motions on or before July 20, 2005.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
In accord with the prescribed deadlines, the defendants
filed their motion for summary judgment on June 20, 2005. Two days
after this filing, the plaintiffs' attorney moved to withdraw from
the case but did not ask to extend the July 20 deadline. The
district court did not rule on the withdrawal motion immediately,
and the July 20 deadline passed without the plaintiffs having filed
an opposition. On August 9, 2005, the plaintiffs' new attorney
filed an appearance and asked for an additional forty-five days to
complete discovery and oppose the motion for summary judgment. The
motion for an extension of the filing deadline was not immediately
acted on, and the plaintiffs filed their summary judgment
opposition on September 23, 2005, the last day for filing that they
had requested in their motion for an extension. On October 20,
2005, the district court granted the first attorney's motion to
withdraw, noted the appearance of new counsel, denied the
plaintiffs' request for an extension, and ruled that their
opposition to the motion for summary judgment was untimely. The
court therefore deemed undisputed the facts provided by the
defendants in support of their summary judgment motion.
The plaintiffs contend that the denial of their motion to
extend the filing deadline was an abuse of discretion. They claim
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that, as of the date that their first attorney moved to withdraw,
they were unrepresented and that it was unfair to hold them to a
filing deadline that arose while they were without counsel.
The district court "has significant discretionary
authority to set and enforce filing deadlines in accordance with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, even when those deadlines are
difficult for lawyers to meet." Perez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart P.R.,
440 F.3d 531, 533 (1st Cir. 2006). This discretion is a
recognition that district courts are responsible for case
management and "must often be firm in managing crowded dockets and
demanding adherence to announced deadlines." Mendez v. Banco
Popular de P.R., 900 F.2d 4, 7 (1st Cir. 1990). Indeed, we have
rarely overturned the denial of a motion for an extension of a
filing deadline and have done so only where the appellant has
demonstrated that she was justifiably surprised by the court's
action or where the individual circumstances make the denial
unfair. Perez-Cordero, 440 F.3d at 534.
In light of this standard, the plaintiffs' assertion that
their attorney's request to withdraw entitled them to an extension
of the filing deadline lacks merit. The plaintiffs did not ask for
an extension when their lawyer withdrew. According to the
plaintiffs, included in their lawyer's motion to withdraw was an
"implicit" request for an extension. This argument gains no
traction in the face of our clear admonition that "a party's
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decision to discharge one lawyer and retain another does not serve
as a free pass to ignore court-appointed deadlines." Velez v.
Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 2004). "Judges are
not expected to be mindreaders," Schneider v. Local 103 I.B.E.W.
Health Plan, 442 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006) (citation omitted), and
therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to seek more time
if they needed it, see Velez, 375 F.3d at 41 ("A party who seeks to
be relieved from a court-appointed deadline has an obligation, at
a bare minimum, to present his arguments for relief to the ordering
court.").
The plaintiffs explicitly requested an extension of the
filing deadline on August 9, more than two weeks after the filing
deadline had passed. Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2), a party
seeking to extend a deadline that has already passed must
demonstrate excusable neglect for not seeking an extension before
the deadline's expiration. In moving for the extension on August
9, the plaintiffs did not present a claim of excusable neglect.
See Bromsted v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 421 F.3d 459, 464 (7th
Cir. 2005) (affirming the denial of a post-deadline motion for an
extension of time because the moving party did not argue that his
neglect was excusable). Indeed, they have not done so even on
appeal. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion
in denying the plaintiffs' request for an extension of time to
oppose the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
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Where a party fails to file a timely opposition to an
adversary's summary judgment motion, the district court, as it did
here, may take as uncontested the evidence submitted with the
motion. Perez-Cordero, 440 F.3d at 533-34. Nevertheless, the
moving party's motion must still be scrutinized under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56. Id. at 534. The district court did so and concluded that
the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because there was
undisputed evidence that the defendants cancelled the plaintiffs'
lease for a non-discriminatory reason. We review this ruling de
novo. See Wolinetz v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 361 F.3d 44, 47
(1st Cir. 2004).
The undisputed facts are as follows. In July 1997, the
Municipality signed a lease with Moringlane to rent property from
her to house a Head Start school. After signing the lease,
Moringlane placed a fence in the back of the building that limited
the outdoor space available to the children.
From 1998 through 2001, the Municipality renewed the
lease. When Mayor Trujillo assumed office in January 2001, the
Municipality had already begun to search for another property to
house the school because of the lack of outdoor space at
Moringlane's property.
In June 2001, the Municipality extended Moringlane's
contract for six months but told her that it was looking to move
the school. The Municipality nevertheless extended Moringlane's
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lease because it was unable to locate a suitable alternative site.
In the meantime, the Municipality learned that Moringlane's
property suffered from several health and safety problems in
addition to the lack of adequate outdoor space. On May 27, 2003,
Mayor Trujillo signed a letter stating that the lease would be
terminated.
A defendant is entitled to summary judgment on a
political discrimination claim when the undisputed facts establish
a legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation for the adverse
decision. See Aguiar-Carrasquillo v. Agosto-Alicea, 445 F.3d 19,
26-27 (1st Cir. 2006). The undisputed facts establish that the
defendants ended their lease with Moringlane because her property
was not a suitable site for housing a Head Start school due to
health and safety problems and the lack of outdoor space. The
plaintiffs allude to evidence that they contend supports their
claim that political discrimination was the real reason for the
defendants' decision to end the lease, but none of this evidence is
properly before us because the plaintiffs failed to timely oppose
the defendants' motion for summary judgment. As is often true, the
plaintiffs' "failure to oppose summary judgment is fatal to [their]
case." Perez-Cordero, 440 F.3d at 534.
Affirmed.
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