O'Callaghan v. Shirazi , 204 F. App'x 35 ( 2006 )

Not For Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 06-1349
ALISON E. CLAPP O'CALLAGHAN, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
HOMAYOUN SHIRAZI, M.D., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Douglas P. Woodlock, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Selya, Howard,
Circuit Judges.
Daniel J. O'Callaghan and Alison E. Clapp O'Callaghan on brief
pro se.
Harvey Weiner, John J. O'Connor and Peabody & Arnold LLP,
Dennis R. Anti, Susan Sachs and Morrison, Mahoney & Miller,
Katherine A. Robertson and Bulkley , Richardson and Gelinas, LLP,
William C. Newman and Lesser, Newman, Souweine & Nasser, John P.
Pucci, C. Jeffrey Kinder and Fierst & Pucci, and Thomas A. Barnico,
Office of the Attorney General, Mary Lynn Carroll, pro se and Susan
Schroder, pro se, on brief for appellees.
November 8, 2006
Per Curiam. After a thorough review of the record and of
the parties’ submissions, we affirm the district court’s denial of
the Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion.
To the extent that the appellants, Alison E. Clapp
O’Callaghan and Daniel J. O’Callaghan (“the O’Callaghans”), sought
relief under Rule 60(b)(5) and/or (6), we review the denial of the
motion for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Boch
Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990). “It is well
settled that courts will not disturb final judgments unless the
moving party demonstrates the existence of extraordinary
circumstances.” Id. at 660 (citing United States v. Swift, 286
U.S. 106, 119 (1932)). Ordinarily, a change in decisional law is
not considered an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief
from judgment. See United States ex rel. Garibaldi v. Orleans
Parish Sch. Bd., 397 F.3d 334, 337-38 (5th Cir. 2005) (Supreme
Court decision clarifying law and resolving circuit split was not
an “extraordinary circumstance” justifying relief under Rule
60(b)); Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trustees of UMWA Combined Benefit
Fund, 249 F.3d 519, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2001) (notwithstanding change
in decisional law, equity favored denial of Rule 60(b)(6) motion,
given the amount of time that had passed since final judgment;
reliance of parties upon that judgment; and public policy favoring
finality of judgments). Moreover, a motion filed pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5) or (6) must be filed within a reasonable time.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). In determining whether a Rule 60(b)
motion has been filed within a reasonable time, the court should
consider “whether the parties have been prejudiced by the delay.”
Id.We see no extraordinary circumstances here that would
have justified the district court in allowing the motion. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Ind. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005), is not an extraordinary
circumstance, as that decision only clarified existing law.
Moreover, substantial prejudice would result if this judgment were
reopened, and, as the appellees correctly note, the prejudicial
effects would be difficult to quantify. This dispute originated as
a guardianship petition, and the subject of that petition –
Hortense Clapp Pollard – has been dead for over four years.
Pollard’s will has been probated and her assets have been
distributed. The O’Callaghans’ request to reopen these proceedings
not only could prejudice severely those who long ago inherited from
Pollard, but it seemingly would require the federal courts to (once
again) second-guess the final judgments of the state court that
probated Pollard’s will.
Because we find no extraordinary circumstances present,
and because it appears that allowing the motion under either Rule
60(b)(5) or (6) would have resulted in significant prejudice, the
lower court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion.
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To the extent that the O’Callaghans sought relief on the
basis that the original judgment was void, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4), the court reviews a denial of the motion de novo. See
Esso Standard Oil Co. (P.R.) v. Rodriguez-Perez, 455 F.3d 1, 4-5
(1st Cir. 2006). We find no error in the court’s denial of the
Rule 60(b)(4) motion, because the original judgment in this case is
not void. “There are only two sets of circumstances in which a
judgment is void (as opposed to voidable). The first is when the
rendering court lacked either subject matter jurisdiction or
jurisdiction over the defendant's person. [] The second is when the
rendering court's actions so far exceeded a proper exercise of
judicial power that a violation of the Due Process Clause results.”
Farm Credit Bank v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir. 2003)
(citing Boch Oldsmobile, 909 F.2d at 661).
The O’Callaghans do not claim that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this dispute; indeed, they
say the opposite, that is, that because Rooker-Feldman does not
apply, the district court did have subject matter jurisdiction.
See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,
486 (1983) (federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over
challenges to state court decisions). Accordingly, the Rule
60(b)(4) motion should have been granted only if the district
court’s original decision “so far exceeded a proper exercise of
judicial power that a violation of the Due Process Clause
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result[ed].” Farm Credit Bank, 316 F.3d at 67. We see no such
exercise of judicial power, and the O’Callaghans do not explain how
the court’s original judgment could be so characterized. Indeed,
we would be hesitant to say a court’s decision that it lacked the
power to act in a matter (because it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction) could be said to have exceeded the court’s power. In
any event, the O’Callaghans only argue that the court’s original
decision was wrong (because it improperly applied the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine), not that it was an improper exercise of judicial
power. Their argument is insufficient to establish that the
judgment was void. “A judgment is not void merely because it is or
may be erroneous [] or because the precedent upon which it was
based is later altered or even overruled.” Boch Oldsmobile, 909
F.2d at 661 (citing Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 376 (1940)).
Upon review of the appellees’ motion for sanctions
pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 38, we deny the motion.
Affirmed. See 1st Cir. R. 27(c).
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