United States v. Rentas-Muniz , 887 F.3d 1 ( 2018 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 15-2275
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
JAYSON RENTAS-MUÑIZ,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Aida M. Delgado-Colón, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Selya and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Maria Soledad Ramirez-Becerra and Maria Soledad-Ramirez
Becerra Law Office on brief for appellant.
Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Mariana
E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief,
Appellate Division, and John A. Mathews II, Assistant United States
Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 3, 2018
SELYA, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellant Jayson
Rentas-Muñiz pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine base (crack cocaine) and to possessing a
firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district
court sentenced him to a 202-month term of immurement on the drug-
conspiracy charge and a sixty-month term of immurement on the
firearms charge, stipulating that those prison terms would run
consecutive to one another and to the undischarged portions of
multiple Puerto Rico sentences that he was then serving. Before
us, the appellant primarily challenges the district court's
determination to run the federal sentences consecutive to the
Puerto Rico sentences previously imposed. After careful
consideration, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Since this appeal follows a guilty plea, we draw the
relevant facts from the plea agreement (the Agreement), the change-
of-plea colloquy, the undisputed portions of the presentence
investigation report (PSI Report), and the sentencing transcript.
See United States v. Nuñez, 852 F.3d 141, 143 (1st Cir. 2017);
United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir. 2010).
The appellant is no stranger to the judicial system.
Going back in time, he was convicted in Puerto Rico of attempted
aggravated burglary in 2000, robbery and unlicensed use of a weapon
in 2002, and conspiracy against a judicial officer in 2006. He
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continued to operate on the wrong side of the law and, by 2012,
had become engaged in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, crack
cocaine, heroin, and marijuana in and around Ponce, Puerto Rico.
During this phase of his criminal career, the appellant sold drugs,
served as an enforcer for the drug ring, and assisted in the
storage of contraband. Separately, he was involved (on November
30, 2012) in the premeditated murder of a high-school student,
Juan Ruiz-Vega.
These chickens ultimately came home to roost: the
appellant was charged in the Puerto Rico courts and convicted of
a laundry list of crimes. He was sentenced to multiple terms of
imprisonment,1 including ninety-nine years for murder, ten years
for attempted murder, thirty years for the unlawful use of
firearms, and one year for the unlawful distribution and possession
of controlled substances. These sentences were ordered to run
consecutive to one another.
On September 4, 2013, a federal grand jury in the
District of Puerto Rico charged the appellant — who was then
incarcerated in consequence of his state crimes — with conspiring
1Although Puerto Rico is not a state, sentences imposed by
Puerto Rico courts are treated the same as sentences imposed by
state courts for most federal sentencing purposes. See United
States v. Román-Díaz, 853 F.3d 591, 594 n.1 (1st Cir. 2017); United
States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 24-25, 27 (1st Cir.
2009). For ease in exposition, we henceforth refer to the
appellant's Puerto Rico sentences as state sentences.
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to possess with intent to distribute in excess of 280 grams of
cocaine base and detectable amounts of cocaine, heroin, and
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 (count
1) and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking
crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (count 2). About two
months later, the appellant pleaded guilty to both counts pursuant
to the Agreement. As part of the Agreement, the appellant
stipulated to having handled between 112 and 196 grams of crack
cocaine, and both sides agreed that the appellant's drug-
distribution convictions in the Puerto Rico courts should be
considered overt acts with respect to the federal drug-conspiracy
charge. The parties jointly recommended a sixty-month sentence on
count one to run consecutive to a sixty-month mandatory minimum
sentence on count two. The Agreement did not address whether the
federal sentences should run consecutive to or concurrent with the
state sentences.
The parties agree that the November 2014 edition of the
sentencing guidelines applies in this case. Using that version of
the guidelines, the PSI Report recommended that the appellant's
base offense level be adjusted upward to reflect his involvement
in Ruiz-Vegas's murder — an adjustment that would have yielded a
guideline sentencing range of 360 to 480 months. See USSG §§2A1.1,
2D1.1(d)(1). At the disposition hearing, the district court
declined to treat the Ruiz-Vega murder as relevant conduct, see
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id. §1B1.3, and therefore eschewed the murder cross-reference.
But since the appellant had at least two prior felony convictions
for crimes of violence, the court concluded that he was a career
offender, see id. §4B1.1 — a determination that resulted in a
guideline range of 262 to 327 months. The court proceeded to
impose a below-the-range sentence of 202 months on count one and
a mandatory minimum sentence of sixty months on count two, with
these sentences to run consecutive to one another and to the
undischarged portions of the state sentences.
This timely appeal ensued. Although the Agreement
contains a waiver-of-appeal provision, the government concedes —
as it must — that this appeal falls outside the margins of that
provision.
II. ANALYSIS
The appellant does not challenge the district court's
finding that he was a career offender, nor does he challenge any
other aspect of the district court's calculation of his guideline
sentencing range. He trains his fire instead on the district
court's decision to run his federal sentences consecutive to his
undischarged state sentences.
The appellant's challenge to the district court's
imposition of a consecutive sentence on the firearms offense is
easily dispatched. Although a sentencing court often has
discretion to determine whether to run a sentence consecutively or
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concurrently, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3584; see also USSG §5G1.3,
that is not true with respect to the appellant's firearms offense.
The statute of conviction underlying that offense requires a
consecutive sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). This statutory
requirement "removes the discretion to run sentences
concurrently." Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1177
(2017). Accordingly, the court below had no choice but to run the
term of imprisonment on the firearms count consecutive to any other
term of imprisonment, whether state or federal. See United States
v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 11 (1997).
This leaves the federal sentence on the drug-conspiracy
charge. The appellant claims that it was procedural error for the
district court to run that sentence consecutive to the undischarged
state sentences. Because this claim of error was not raised below,
our review is for plain error.2 See United States v. Ruiz-Huertas,
792 F.3d 223, 226 (1st Cir. 2015). Under this rigorous standard,
the appellant must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was
clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [his] substantial
rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity,
2 Based on certain statements made at the sentencing hearing,
the government invites us to find that the appellant waived this
claim of error. See United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 7, 11
(1st Cir. 2006) (holding that waived arguments cannot be considered
on appeal); United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 437 (1st
Cir. 2002) (same). We decline to take up this invitation: even
assuming that the claim of error was not waived, it nonetheless
fails.
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or public reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v.
Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001).
In this instance, we discern no error, plain or
otherwise. With respect to offenses like the offense underlying
the drug-conspiracy count, Congress left open the question of
whether a particular sentence should run concurrent with,
partially concurrent with, or consecutive to an undischarged state
sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). In making such a
determination, the district court must give consideration to the
factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the applicable
sentencing guidelines and policy statements. See id. § 3584(b);
United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 22, 27 (1st Cir.
2009). Of particular pertinence for present purposes is USSG
§5G1.3, which addresses situations (like this one) where the
defendant is subject to undischarged state sentences.
This guideline provision advises that a federal sentence
be imposed to run concurrent with an undischarged state sentence
when the state sentence is for an offense that constitutes
"relevant conduct" with respect to the offense of conviction. See
USSG §5G1.3(b)-(c); United States v. Román-Díaz, 853 F.3d 591, 598
(1st Cir. 2017). In drug-trafficking cases, "relevant conduct"
includes all acts and omissions "that were part of the same course
of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction."
USSG §1B1.3(a)(2). Where the acts or omissions comprise unrelated
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conduct, the district court enjoys discretion to run the federal
sentence "concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively
to the prior undischarged [state] term of imprisonment to achieve
a reasonable punishment for the instant offense." Id. §5G1.3(d).
The appellant contends that section 5G1.3(b) applies
here. To prevail on this contention, he must show "that [he]
satisfies each and every element of the guideline." United States
v. Vélez-Soto, 804 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 2015) (alteration in
original) (quoting Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d at 27). This means,
among other things, that he must show that the undischarged state
sentences resulted from an offense or offenses that constitute
relevant conduct with respect to the federal offense of conviction.
See United States v. Figueroa-Figueroa, 791 F.3d 187, 192 (1st
Cir. 2015) (citing USSG §5G1.3 cmt. n.2(A)).
In an effort to make this showing, the appellant submits
that all of his undischarged state sentences relate to offenses
comprising relevant conduct with respect to his federal drug-
conspiracy conviction. To this end, he relies heavily on the fact
that the Agreement denominates the state drug crimes as overt acts
in the federal conspiracy.
But this proves too little: the drug crimes form only a
tiny part of the underpinnings of the state sentences that the
appellant is currently serving. They account for only one year of
the 140 years to which the appellant was sentenced. With respect
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to the non-drug crimes, the Agreement is silent; it does not
specify any of those crimes as overt acts of the federal drug
conspiracy. Moreover, the record offers no convincing explanation
as to why any, let alone all, of the non-drug crimes should be
regarded as part of the same course of conduct, common scheme, or
plan as the federal offense of conviction. The appellant had the
burden of proof on this issue, and he did not carry it.
The bottom line is that the appellant's situation cannot
be viewed as a seamless whole but, rather, demands the application
of two different rules. While the state drug crimes constitute
relevant conduct vis-á-vis the federal offense of conviction, the
same cannot be said for the state non-drug crimes (the murder,
attempted murder, and firearms offenses). Simply put, the
appellant has not carried his burden of showing that the state
non-drug crimes come within the relevant conduct rubric.
Consequently, the state sentences based on the latter crimes
dictate the application of a different rule. See USSG §5G1.3(d).
The Sentencing Commission has anticipated this type of
hybrid scenario. An application note to the relevant guideline
instructs that when "a defendant may be subject to multiple
undischarged terms of imprisonment that seemingly call for the
application of different rules," the sentencing court "may
exercise its discretion in accordance with subsection (d) to
fashion a sentence of appropriate length and structure it to run
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in any appropriate manner to achieve a reasonable punishment for
the instant offense." Id. §5G1.3 cmt. n.4(D); see, e.g., United
States v. Rogers, 521 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying this
instruction). Because this is such a case, our inquiry thus
reduces to whether the district court's decision to run the federal
drug-conspiracy sentence consecutive to the undischarged state
sentences was within the compass of the court's discretion.
Here, the sentencing court accurately determined the
applicable guideline range and analyzed the section 3553(a)
factors with scrupulous care. Among other things, the court
considered the appellant's age, his sordid criminal history, the
length of the sentences imposed by the Puerto Rico courts, the
nature and seriousness of the federal offense of conviction, the
appellant's multiple roles in the drug ring, and the concomitant
federal firearms conviction.3 After weighing these and other
relevant factors, the court opted to impose a below-the-range
sentence, but decreed that this downwardly variant sentence should
run consecutive to the undischarged state sentences (which were
almost exclusively for unrelated conduct). Given the sprawling
nature of the drug ring, the appellant's versatile roles as a
3It is of no moment that the district court did not explicitly
reference section 5G1.3. "What counts is not whether a sentencing
court explicitly mentions a guideline provision but, rather,
whether the court correctly applied that provision." Román-Díaz,
853 F.3d at 598 n.7.
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seller of narcotics, an enforcer, and a warehouseman, the violence
that characterized the drug-trafficking activities and what the
district court described as the drug ring's "war" for territorial
dominance, the appellant's career offender status (which included
convictions for murder and attempted murder), the obvious need for
incapacitation and deterrence, and the complexities inherent in
this sentencing determination, we cannot say that the district
court's decision to impose a consecutive sentence was an abuse of
discretion.
The appellant proffers one last claim of error: he
attempts to challenge the substantive reasonableness of his
sentence. The standard of review for unpreserved claims of
substantive reasonableness is "somewhat blurred." Ruiz-Huertas,
792 F.3d at 228. Here, however, we can safely bypass this
uncertainty and assume, favorably to the appellant, that abuse of
discretion review applies. See, e.g., United States v. Márquez-
García, 862 F.3d 143, 147 (1st Cir. 2017); Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d
at 228.
In the case at hand, the district court imposed a
sentence on the drug-conspiracy count (202 months) that fell below
the bottom of the guideline range.4 We have made pellucid that
4 Although the appellant's challenge is undifferentiated, we
limit our discussion to the sentence imposed on the drug-conspiracy
count. After all, the sixty-month sentence imposed on the firearms
count was a mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. See
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"[i]t is a rare below-the-range sentence that will prove vulnerable
to a defendant's claim of substantive unreasonableness." United
States v. King, 741 F.3d 305, 310 (1st Cir. 2014). This is not so
rare a case: the 202-month sentence seems modest when measured
against the gravity of the offense and the appellant's historical
involvement in criminal activity.
The appellant implicitly concedes this point. He does
not so much as hint that the length of his downwardly variant
federal drug-conspiracy sentence is unreasonable. Instead, he
focuses narrowly on the fact that the court chose to run the drug-
conspiracy sentence consecutive to the undischarged state
sentences. He was 35 years old when sentenced, and in his view
there is no actuarial likelihood that he will survive the state
sentences. Building on this foundation, he contends that running
the federal drug-conspiracy sentence consecutive to the state
sentences renders the former substantively unreasonable.
As we have explained, the court below was authorized to
impose the drug-conspiracy sentence concurrent with, partially
concurrent with, or consecutive to the undischarged state
sentences. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584; USSG §5G1.3(d). Typically, the
exercise of such authority is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Rivera-González, 776 F.3d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 2015);
18 U.S.C. § 924(c). So, too, running that sentence consecutive to
the state sentences was dictated by statute. See id.
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Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d at 26. In this instance, we already
have determined that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in choosing to run the drug-conspiracy sentence
consecutive to the undischarged state sentences. Seen in this
light, a challenge for lack of substantive reasonableness is an
awkward fit: it is difficult to imagine how a decision to run a
sentence consecutively can be a proper exercise of a sentencing
court's discretion, yet render the sentence substantively
unreasonable under section 3553(a).5 Cf. United States v. Berry,
565 F.3d 332, 342 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that a challenge to a
sentencing court's decision to impose a consecutive sentence is
not easily classified under the rubric of substantive
reasonableness).
When all is said and done, though, we need not tackle
the question of whether the decision to impose a consecutive
sentence may ever be within the sentencing court's discretion and
still render the sentence substantively unreasonable. A party who
challenges the substantive reasonableness of a sentence bears the
burden of persuasion. See United States v. Clogston, 662 F.3d
5
In some instances, of course, the imposition of a consecutive
sentence may implicate Eighth Amendment concerns. See United
States v. Rivera-Ruperto, 884 F.3d 25, 26 (1st Cir. 2018) (Barron,
J., concurring in order denying rehearing en banc). Inasmuch as
the appellant makes no claim that his sentence was so
disproportionate as to render it unconstitutional, we need not
address this issue.
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588, 593 (1st Cir. 2011). The appellant has not carried this
burden: it is evident that the district court wanted to ensure
that the drug-conspiracy sentence produced a long period of
incapacitation, and (on this record) the status of the state
sentences is largely unknown. We cannot tell, for example, whether
any of those sentences are still under judicial review or are open
to petitions for post-conviction relief. Nor do we know what
prospects there may be for parole or commutation. We therefore
reject the claim of substantive unreasonableness as unproven.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,
the judgment of the district court is
Affirmed.
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