Whitney v. Spencer , 475 F. App'x 771 ( 2012 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 11-2214
JOHN WHITNEY,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
LUIS SPENCER,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Mark L. Wolf, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Chief Judge,
Lipez and Howard, Circuit Judges.
Joseph F. Krowski for appellant.
Amy L. Karangekis, Assistant Attorney General, with whom
Martha Coakley, Attorney General of Massachusetts, was on brief,
for appellee.
August 30, 2012
Per Curiam. After a jury trial in the Massachusetts
Superior Court, appellant John Whitney was convicted of murder in
the second degree and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a
notice of appeal and a motion for a new trial, which was denied
without appeal. Whitney then filed a second motion for a new
trial, which was denied after a three-day evidentiary hearing.
Whitney appealed that denial. The Massachusetts Appeals Court
affirmed Whitney's conviction and the denial of his second motion
for a new trial. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court denied
Whitney's petition for review. Whitney then petitioned for habeas
relief in the federal district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254,
seeking reversal of his conviction or, in the alternative, a new
trial. The district court denied the petition and simultaneously
granted a certificate of appealability on all claims. This appeal
followed.
Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, federal
habeas relief under § 2254 is available only where the court
determines that the decision below was "contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,"
§ 2254(d)(1), or was "based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of evidence presented in the [s]tate court
proceeding," § 2254(d)(2). See also Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d
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39, 46 (1st Cir. 2012). In assessing a factual challenge, the
court must presume that the state court's factual findings are
correct unless the petitioner rebuts this "presumption of
correctness" with "clear and convincing evidence" to the contrary.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
Whitney argues that he is entitled to relief under
§ 2254(d)(2) because the Massachusetts Appeals Court based its
decision on determinations of fact that were unreasonable in light
of the evidence presented at his trial and post-conviction
evidentiary hearing. Whitney also claims that he is entitled to
relief under § 2254(d)(1) because the Appeals Court's decision was
contrary to, or involved the unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law with regard to (1) the sufficiency of the
evidence, (2) ineffective assistance of counsel, (3) verdict
coercion by the trial court judge, and (4) the applicability of the
Confrontation Clause to evidence admitted under the excited
utterance exception to the hearsay rule.
The district court denied Whitney's petition after
examining each of his claims in a thorough and well-reasoned
opinion. Whitney v. Spencer, C.A. No. 07-10820-MLW, 2011 WL
4625352 (D. Mass. Sept. 29, 2011). We have long held that "when a
lower court accurately takes the measure of a case, applies the
correct legal rules, and articulates a convincing rationale, 'an
appellate court should refrain from writing at length to no other
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end than to hear its own words resonate.'" Mir-Yépez v. Banco
Popular de P.R., 560 F.3d 14, 15 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting Lawton v.
State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am., 101 F.3d 218, 220 (1st Cir.
1996)). This is such a case. After careful examination, the
district court concluded that Whitney was not entitled to relief on
any of the grounds argued in his habeas petition. We agree for the
reasons articulated in the district court's opinion.
Affirmed.
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