In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Falter (Slip Opinion) , 2021 Ohio 1705 ( 2021 )


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  • [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as In
    re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Falter, Slip Opinion No. 
    2021-Ohio-1705
    .]
    NOTICE
    This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an
    advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to
    promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65
    South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other
    formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before
    the opinion is published.
    SLIP OPINION NO. 
    2021-OHIO-1705
    IN RE JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN COMPLAINT AGAINST FALTER.
    [Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it
    may be cited as In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Falter, Slip
    Opinion No. 
    2021-Ohio-1705
    .]
    Judges—Judicial campaigns—Misconduct—Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) prohibits judicial
    candidates from knowingly or recklessly disseminating false information
    about opponents—Candidate’s erroneous statements regarding when and
    why opponent had moved to county violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A)—Public
    reprimand affirmed.
    (No. 2020-0407—Submitted January 13, 2021—Decided May 20, 2021.)
    APPEAL from the Order of the Judicial Commission of the Supreme Court.
    __________________
    Per Curiam.
    {¶ 1} Respondent, Karen Kopich Falter, of Cincinnati, Ohio, Attorney
    
    Registration No. 0066770,
     was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1996.
    Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(D), a five-judge commission concluded that while
    Falter was a judicial candidate in 2020, she committed two violations of
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), which prohibits a judicial candidate from disseminating
    campaign material about an opponent either knowing that it is false or in reckless
    disregard of whether or not it is false. The commission publicly reprimanded Falter
    and ordered her to pay a $1,000 fine and the costs of the proceedings. Falter appeals
    the commission’s sanction. For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
    Background
    {¶ 2} In March 2017, former Governor John Kasich appointed Curt
    Hartman—the complainant in this disciplinary action—to a vacant seat as a judge
    of the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Hartman was later defeated in
    the November 2018 general election.
    {¶ 3} In 2020, Hartman and Falter were opponents in the Republican
    primary for a different seat on the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas.1 In
    February of that year, Falter’s campaign committee sent to 202 Republican voters
    a letter stating that Hartman had “moved to Hamilton County 3 years ago to take a
    judicial appointment from Governor John Kasich in March, 2017.” (Underlining
    sic.) The letter additionally stated that Falter had grown up in Hamilton County,
    had served for 23 years as a public servant in the county, and was recommended by
    the Hamilton County Republican Party Judicial Screening Committee.
    {¶ 4} Hartman filed a judicial-campaign grievance against Falter with the
    Board of Professional Conduct. Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(B), a probable-cause
    panel of the board found that probable cause existed to file a formal complaint, and
    the board’s director certified a complaint charging Falter with two violations of
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). The complaint alleged that in Falter’s campaign letter, she
    made statements about when and why Hartman had moved to Hamilton County that
    she either knew were false or that she had made with a reckless disregard of whether
    or not they were false.
    1. Hartman won the primary election but was defeated in the November 2020 general election.
    2
    January Term, 2021
    {¶ 5} The matter proceeded to a hearing before a three-member panel of the
    board. Hartman, Falter, and one of Falter’s campaign consultants testified. Based
    on the hearing evidence, the panel found that Falter’s statements about Hartman in
    her letter were false: Hartman had moved to Hamilton County in May 2014 with
    the goal of running for a seat in the Ohio General Assembly, not—as Falter had
    alleged—in 2017 in order to obtain a judicial appointment in that same year. And
    according to the panel, a check of public records would have easily shown that
    Falter’s allegations were untrue. Yet Falter, the panel found, made no effort to
    confirm the truthfulness of her allegations against Hartman and instead chose to
    rely on statements from her campaign consultants and “what was essentially
    courthouse and party-insider gossip or rumors” about when and why Hartman had
    moved to Hamilton County. The panel determined that Falter had acted with
    reckless disregard as to whether or not the statements in her letter were false and
    that she had therefore violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). The panel recommended that
    she be publicly reprimanded and ordered to pay a $1,000 fine and the costs of the
    proceedings.
    {¶ 6} A five-judge commission appointed by this court pursuant to
    Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(D)(1) reviewed the record of the proceedings, the panel’s report,
    Falter’s objections to the report, and Hartman’s responses to her objections. In
    April 2020, the commission found that the panel had not abused its discretion and
    that the record supported its findings by clear and convincing evidence. 
    158 Ohio St.3d 1458
    , 
    2020-Ohio-1413
    , 
    142 N.E.3d 680
    . The commission therefore publicly
    reprimanded Falter, fined her $1,000, and ordered her to pay the costs of the
    proceedings.
    {¶ 7} Pursuant to Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(E), Falter appeals, arguing that we
    should dismiss the charges against her or, in the alternative, vacate the public
    reprimand.
    3
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    Falter’s Objections to the Commission’s Findings of Misconduct
    {¶ 8} Falter sets forth five objections to the commission’s findings that she
    violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). For ease of analysis, we will address the issues posed
    by her objections out of order.
    New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
    {¶ 9} Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 provides:
    During the course of any campaign for nomination or
    election to judicial office, a judicial candidate, by means of
    campaign materials, including sample ballots, advertisements on
    radio or television or in a newspaper or periodical, electronic
    communications, a public speech, press release, or otherwise, shall
    not knowingly or with reckless disregard do any of the following:
    (A) Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute
    information concerning the judicial candidate or an opponent, either
    knowing the information to be false or with a reckless disregard of
    whether or not it was false.
    {¶ 10} The primary issue in this appeal is whether Falter distributed her
    letter “with a reckless disregard of whether or not it was false” for purposes of
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A).     In her first objection, Falter argues that this language
    incorporates the actual-malice standard established in New York Times Co. v.
    Sullivan, 
    376 U.S. 254
    , 
    84 S.Ct. 710
    , 
    11 L.Ed.2d 686
     (1964), and its progeny.
    Under that standard, Falter asserts, a false statement must have been made with a
    specific mental state. She also asserts that “reckless disregard” as to a statement’s
    “truth or falsity” is a term of art that requires “ ‘sufficient evidence to permit the
    conclusion that the [maker of the statement] in fact entertained serious doubts as to
    the truth of his publication,’ ” Varanese v. Gall, 
    35 Ohio St.3d 78
    , 80, 
    518 N.E.2d 4
    January Term, 2021
    117 (1988), quoting St. Amant v. Thompson, 
    390 U.S. 727
    , 731, 
    88 S.Ct. 1323
    , 
    20 L.Ed.2d 262
     (1968), or to permit the conclusion that there was “a high degree of
    awareness of its probable falsity,” Varanese at 80. Falter claims that because there
    was no evidence presented that she entertained serious doubt as to the truth of her
    statements about Hartman, she lacked the necessary mens rea “required by
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) and the First Amendment.”
    {¶ 11} Falter is correct that Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) requires a specific mens rea.
    In In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against O’Toole, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 355
    , 2014-
    Ohio-4046, 
    24 N.E.3d 114
    , we affirmed the constitutionality of the portion of
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) at issue in this case and concluded that it requires “a specific
    mental state as to the information’s accuracy (with knowledge of its falsity or with
    reckless disregard as to its truth or falsity),” id. at ¶ 41.
    {¶ 12} We disagree, however, with Falter’s assertion that Jud.Cond.R.
    4.3(A) incorporates the subjective actual-malice definition employed in public-
    figure defamation cases. Although the language of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) resembles
    the actual-malice standard established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, id. at 280
    (defining “actual malice” as acting “with knowledge that [the statement] was false
    or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”), there are important
    differences between the interests served by defamation law and those served by
    ethical rules for judges and judicial candidates. As the Supreme Court of Michigan
    concluded, the subjective actual-malice standard is inappropriate in this context and
    adopting it “ ‘would immunize accusations, however reckless or irresponsible, from
    censure as long as the attorney uttering them did not actually entertain serious
    doubts as to their truth.’ ” In re Chmura, 
    461 Mich. 517
    , 543, 
    608 N.W.2d 31
    (2000), quoting In re Holtzman, 
    78 N.Y.2d 184
    , 192, 
    573 N.Y.S.2d 39
    , 
    577 N.E.2d 30
     (1991). Instead, the determination whether a judicial candidate recklessly
    disregarded the truth or falsity of campaign material is an objective one.
    5
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    {¶ 13} We previously determined that an “objective version” of the actual-
    malice test applies in attorney-discipline proceedings arising from a lawyer’s false
    statements impugning the integrity of a judge. We explained:
    “Defamation actions seek to remedy an essentially private wrong by
    compensating individuals for harm caused to their reputation and
    standing in the community.        Ethical rules that prohibit false
    statements impugning the integrity of judges, by contrast, are not
    designed to shield judges from unpleasant or offensive criticism, but
    to preserve public confidence in the fairness and impartiality of our
    system of justice.”
    ***
    * * * [T]he state’s compelling interest in preserving public
    confidence in the judiciary supports applying a standard in
    disciplinary proceedings different from that applicable in
    defamation cases. Under the objective standard, an attorney may
    still freely exercise free speech rights and make statements
    supported by a reasonable factual basis, even if the attorney turns
    out to be mistaken.
    (Citations omitted.) Disciplinary Counsel v. Gardner, 
    99 Ohio St.3d 416
    , 2003-
    Ohio-4048, 
    793 N.E.2d 425
    , ¶ 29, 31, quoting Standing Commt. on Discipline of
    the United States Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of California v. Yagman, 
    55 F.3d 1430
    , 1437 (9th Cir.1995).
    {¶ 14} Similar reasoning applies here. The purpose of this proceeding is
    not to compensate any person for injuries to his or her reputation. Rather, sanctions
    against judges and judicial candidates for violating Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial
    Conduct “inform the public of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession and
    6
    January Term, 2021
    enhance public confidence in the integrity of judicial proceedings.” O’Toole, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 355
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4046
    , 
    24 N.E.3d 114
    , at ¶ 64. “Ohio has a compelling
    interest in promoting and maintaining an independent judiciary, ensuring public
    confidence in the independence, impartiality, integrity, and competence of judges,
    and ensuring that the conduct of judicial candidates furthers, rather than impairs,
    these interests.” Id. at ¶ 29.
    {¶ 15} In addition, the limits on a judicial candidate’s speech are not
    necessarily coextensive with the limits of the First Amendment. The United States
    Supreme Court has recognized that “[s]tates may regulate judicial elections
    differently than they regulate political elections, because the role of judges differs
    from the role of politicians.” Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 
    575 U.S. 433
    , 446,
    
    135 S.Ct. 1656
    , 
    191 L.Ed.2d 570
     (2015); see also Disciplinary Counsel v.
    Tamburrino, 
    151 Ohio St.3d 148
    , 
    2016-Ohio-8014
    , 
    87 N.E.3d 158
    , ¶ 17 (noting
    that First Amendment principles in other contexts do not apply “to disciplinary
    sanctions for knowingly false or recklessly false statements by judicial
    candidates”); O’Toole at ¶ 22-29.
    {¶ 16} Thus, Ohio’s interest in preserving public confidence in the integrity
    of its judiciary supports applying a standard in judicial-candidate-discipline
    proceedings different from that applicable in defamation cases. And an objective
    standard for determining violations of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) strikes a balance
    between a judicial candidate’s First Amendment rights and the state’s compelling
    interests. Falter’s argument in this case fails to account for the fact that “judicial
    elections fundamentally alter the constitutional calculus,” Platt v. Bd. of Commrs.
    on Grievances and Discipline of the Ohio Supreme Court, 
    894 F.3d 235
    , 267 (6th
    Cir.2018). Therefore, whether Falter subjectively had serious doubts about the
    truth of her allegations is not the sole determinative factor in analyzing whether she
    acted with the requisite mens rea. We accordingly overrule this objection.
    7
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    The alleged ambiguity of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A)
    {¶ 17} In her fifth objection to the misconduct findings, Falter argues that
    if the actual-malice standard of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is inapplicable,
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) “does not provide notice” of what it prohibits and “encourages
    arbitrary enforcement.” Falter therefore requests that we “find that Jud.Cond.R.
    4.3(A) is ambiguous and dismiss the charges.”
    {¶ 18} Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) is not ambiguous; it “applies to specific
    communications      made    by judicial        candidates   under   narrowly   defined
    circumstances.” O’Toole, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 355
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4046
    , 
    24 N.E.3d 1114
    ,
    at ¶ 41. As noted above, to violate Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), the judicial candidate must
    have acted with a specific mental state as to the campaign material’s accuracy:
    either knowing the information was false or with a reckless disregard of whether or
    not it was false. A judicial candidate acts knowingly if he or she has “actual
    knowledge of the fact in question,” although a person’s knowledge may be inferred
    from circumstances. Jud.Cond.R. 4.6(G). A candidate “acts ‘recklessly’ if the
    result is possible and the candidate chooses to ignore the risk.” In re Judicial
    Campaign Complaint Against Moll, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 156
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5674
    , 
    985 N.E.2d 436
    , ¶ 11. Negligently made false statements or negligent misstatements
    are not prohibited by the rule.
    {¶ 19} In determining whether a judicial candidate acted with the requisite
    mens rea for purposes of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), we consider factors similar to those
    used when determining whether a lawyer has violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.2(a) by
    making a statement that the lawyer either knew was false or made “with reckless
    disregard as to its truth or falsity” concerning the integrity of a judicial officer. We
    look to the nature of the candidate’s statements and the context in which they were
    made to determine whether the candidate had a reasonable factual basis for making
    them. Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallo, 
    131 Ohio St.3d 309
    , 
    2012-Ohio-758
    , 
    964 N.E.2d 1024
    , ¶ 19; accord Disciplinary Counsel v. Marshall, 
    142 Ohio St.3d 1
    ,
    8
    January Term, 2021
    
    2014-Ohio-4815
    , 
    27 N.E.3d 481
    , ¶ 59 (“In determining whether an attorney has
    knowingly or recklessly made false statements concerning the integrity of a judicial
    officer, we consider whether the attorney had a reasonable factual basis for making
    the statements”).
    {¶ 20} Determining whether a judicial candidate made a false statement
    with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity may require weighing evidence and
    assessing witness credibility—as in any other attorney-discipline case.           But
    contrary to Falter’s position, that process does not make enforcement of
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) “arbitrary.” In O’Toole, we affirmed the constitutionality of
    the portion of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) at issue in this case, id. at ¶ 41, and Falter has
    failed to sufficiently explain why this language is ambiguous.
    The evidence supporting the violations
    {¶ 21} Falter argues in her third objection that even if the standard set forth
    in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan is inapplicable, the charges should be dismissed
    because she did not act recklessly. According to Falter, she relied on reputable
    campaign consultants—not gossip—when she included the statements about
    Hartman in the letter. She similarly argues in her fourth objection that because she
    relied on her consultants, the record lacked clear and convincing evidence of a
    Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) violation.
    {¶ 22} Upon our review of the record, we agree with the commission that
    the record supports the panel’s findings that Falter violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A).
    {¶ 23} At the panel hearing, Hartman testified that he moved from Clermont
    County to Hamilton County in May 2014. He submitted records from the Hamilton
    County Auditor’s office and the Hamilton County Board of Elections showing that
    he purchased a condominium in Hamilton County in May 2014, registered to vote
    and cast a provisional ballot in Hamilton County in May 2014, and voted in every
    Hamilton County election since May 2014. Hartman also testified that he moved
    to Hamilton County to be closer to his Cincinnati legal practice and to potentially
    9
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    run for a seat in the Ohio General Assembly, although he later decided against it.
    In 2016, he learned about the judicial vacancy on the Hamilton County Court of
    Common Pleas and was appointed to the open seat in 2017. Thus, Hartman
    testified, both of Falter’s statements about his move—that he moved to Hamilton
    County in 2017 and that he did so for the purpose of taking a judicial appointment—
    were false.
    {¶ 24} Falter admitted that she had personally typed the February 2020
    campaign letter stating that Hartman had “moved to Hamilton County 3 years ago
    to take a judicial appointment from Governor John Kasich in March, 2017.”
    (Underlining sic.) She also admitted that prior to sending the letter, she had not
    researched Hartman’s voting history or his property ownership. And she admitted
    that her statements about Hartman turned out to be untrue.
    {¶ 25} As her defense, Falter claimed that the information in her letter came
    from her campaign consultants and that she expected the consultants to ensure the
    accuracy of her campaign messages. But Falter also testified that she did not know
    how her consultants allegedly knew this information about Hartman and that she
    never specifically asked them to confirm the accuracy of the allegations or to
    research his voting history. And one of Falter’s campaign consultants testified that
    the letter was “technically one of [Falter’s] projects;” that at the time the letter was
    being prepared, he did not know when Hartman had moved to Hamilton County;
    that he did not know where some of the information in the letter came from; and
    that although there had been discussions about the validity of Hartman’s residency,
    there was “never really a specific time given nor did [the consultants] actually do
    the full research on it.” The campaign consultant also testified that he had reviewed
    Falter’s letter for “grammatical errors,” and he explained that “when a client does
    something on their own, I trust that they have good knowledge of what they’re
    putting in there,” especially when his consulting firm had no part in creating the
    campaign material.
    10
    January Term, 2021
    {¶ 26} Similar to her argument on appeal, Falter also testified that she did
    not rely on rumors when she prepared the campaign letter. But when Falter was
    asked whether she had done anything to verify her allegation regarding the reason
    Hartman had moved to Hamilton County, she responded that it was “common
    knowledge within the legal system.” Falter learned of this common knowledge,
    she testified, through conversations with “different people within the Republican
    Party” and over lunch with assistant prosecutors who had practiced before Hartman
    when he was a judge. In attempting to further explain the basis for this knowledge
    about Hartman, Falter stated that the talk of the legal community was that Hartman
    had “moved from Clermont County to Hamilton County to be eligible to take an
    appointment” and that it was “just the common discussion of why Mr. Hartman
    ended up in Hamilton County.”
    {¶ 27} Based on this testimony, the panel concluded that Falter “chose to
    believe what was essentially courthouse and party-insider gossip or rumors without
    making any effort to check the truthfulness of the allegation.” The panel also found
    that Falter’s contract with her consultants did not expressly require them to do “fact
    checking” of her campaign materials. Because Falter’s statements were the type
    that must be verified and because she failed to take any action to do so, the panel
    concluded that she acted with reckless disregard of whether or not the statements
    were false.
    {¶ 28} To be sure, the panel heard conflicting testimony. But similar to
    attorney-discipline proceedings, “it is of no consequence that the * * * findings of
    fact are in contravention of [the] respondent’s or any other witness’s testimony.
    ‘Where the evidence is in conflict, the trier of facts may determine what should be
    accepted as the truth and what should be rejected as false.’ ” Disciplinary Counsel
    v. Zingarelli, 
    89 Ohio St.3d 210
    , 217, 
    729 N.E.2d 1167
     (2000), quoting Cross v.
    Ledford, 161 Ohio St 469, 478, 
    120 N.E.2d 118
     (1954). And “[u]nless the record
    weighs heavily against a hearing panel’s findings, we defer to the panel’s credibility
    11
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard the witnesses
    firsthand.” Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 
    108 Ohio St.3d 164
    , 
    2006-Ohio-550
    ,
    
    842 N.E.2d 35
    , ¶ 24.
    {¶ 29} The record here does not weigh heavily against the panel’s findings.
    Falter made a pointed attack against her election opponent, citing a specific date
    and intention.   Her accusations, however, were false, and as the panel and
    commission found, a cursory search of public records would have revealed that her
    allegations were untrue. Yet Falter made no effort to verify her statements.
    Although she now argues that she relied on her consultants to fact-check her letter,
    one of her consultants provided contrary testimony at the hearing and described the
    letter as Falter’s “project.”    Considering the specific factual nature of her
    statements, verification of them was necessary.       She should have personally
    confirmed the accuracy of her allegations or ensured that her consultants had done
    so. A judicial candidate cannot avoid discipline by claiming that she merely
    repeated statements from her campaign consultants without taking some action to
    ensure the accuracy of those statements or to inquire about the credibility of the
    sources.
    {¶ 30} In the end, Falter had no reasonable basis to include her allegations
    about Hartman in her letter and chose to ignore the risk that they were false. By
    repeating gossip about her election opponent without making any effort to verify
    the accuracy of her allegations, she acted with a reckless disregard of whether or
    not her statements were false.
    The truth or falsity of Falter’s statements
    {¶ 31} Falter argues in her second objection that the charges should be
    dismissed because her allegations against Hartman were “substantially true” and
    that any inaccuracies were immaterial.       Specifically, she asserts that it was
    immaterial whether Hartman moved in 2014 or 2017, because the purpose of her
    letter was to identify him as a “carpetbagger” and the facts regarding Hartman’s
    12
    January Term, 2021
    move support the gist of that characterization. She also argues that her letter was
    immaterial because only a fraction of the Hamilton County electorate received it.
    {¶ 32} We need not determine whether, as Falter contends, Jud.Cond.R.
    4.3(A) incorporates a “materiality test.” Falter’s statements about Hartman were
    false and material to the campaign: she claimed that he moved to Hamilton County
    three years after he actually did and for the purpose of filling a judicial vacancy that
    did not exist at the time he moved. Her statements were not reasonably susceptible
    to a truthful interpretation. In addition, it is irrelevant under Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A)
    whether she distributed the letter to 200 or 2,000 voters, and 202 households in a
    primary election is not an insignificant number of voters.
    {¶ 33} “However much or however little truth-bending the public has come
    to expect from candidates for political jobs, ‘[j]udges are not politicians,’ and a
    ‘State’s decision to elect its judiciary does not compel it to treat judicial candidates
    like campaigners for political office.’ ” Winter v. Wolnitzek, 
    834 F.3d 681
    , 693 (6th
    Cir.2016), quoting Williams-Yulee, 575 U.S. at 437-438, 
    135 S.Ct. 1656
    , 
    191 L.Ed.2d 570
    . We overrule this objection.
    {¶ 34} Having overruled Falter’s objections to the commission’s findings
    of misconduct, we affirm the commission’s conclusion that she committed two
    violations of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). The rules in Canon 4 “are intended to ensure that
    judges and judicial candidates campaign in a way that fosters and enhances respect
    for, and confidence in, the judiciary.” O’Toole, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 355
    , 2014-Ohio-
    4046, 
    24 N.E.3d 1114
    , at ¶ 25. Falter violated both the plain language of the rule
    and the purpose behind it.
    Falter’s Objections to the Commission’s Sanction
    {¶ 35} In addition to challenging the commission’s misconduct findings,
    Falter argues that the public reprimand should be vacated. “On an appeal of a
    commission’s order of sanctions, our review is limited to whether the commission
    abused its discretion.” O’Toole at ¶ 61. “ ‘A decision constitutes an abuse of
    13
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    discretion when it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable.’ ” Moll, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 156
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5674
    , 
    985 N.E.2d 436
    , at ¶ 17, quoting State ex rel. Ebbing
    v. Ricketts, 
    133 Ohio St.3d 339
    , 
    2012-Ohio-4699
    , 
    978 N.E.2d 188
    , ¶ 13.
    {¶ 36} In reviewing whether the commission abused its discretion, we
    consider the purpose of sanctions. We have often recognized that “the primary
    purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to punish the offender, but to protect the
    public.” Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 
    103 Ohio St.3d 204
    , 
    2004-Ohio-4704
    ,
    
    815 N.E.2d 286
    , ¶ 53; see Disciplinary Counsel v. Farris, 
    157 Ohio St.3d 527
    ,
    
    2019-Ohio-4810
    , 
    138 N.E.3d 1134
    , ¶ 17. But in judicial-candidate-discipline
    proceedings, we have also explained that the purpose of sanctions is to inform other
    judicial candidates of the seriousness of such misconduct and to deter similar
    violations in future elections. See O’Toole at ¶ 64. “[T]he public’s faith in the
    disciplinary proceedings against judges and judicial candidates is fostered by
    sanctions that reflect the unique injuries on the public by judges and judicial
    candidates who are not truthful in the information they disseminate.” 
    Id.
    {¶ 37} The commission determined that a public reprimand was appropriate
    because merely ordering Falter to pay a fine and costs would not serve the
    deterrence purpose of a sanction.     Falter raises two objections to the public
    reprimand.
    Aggravating and mitigating factors
    {¶ 38} Falter first argues that the commission erred by failing to consider
    the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in Gov.Bar R. V(13).            Falter
    acknowledges that the hearing panel considered those factors, but she additionally
    argues that the panel misapplied them. For example, she argues that the panel failed
    to give her mitigating credit for retracting her statements about Hartman after she
    learned that they were inaccurate.
    {¶ 39} With respect to Falter’s argument about the commission, we hold
    that the commission did not err by omitting consideration of the aggravating and
    14
    January Term, 2021
    mitigating factors in its order. Gov.Jud.R. II(5) provides that “a grievance that
    alleges a violation by a judicial candidate of Canon 4 of the Code of Judicial
    Conduct during the course of a campaign for judicial office shall be brought,
    conducted, and disposed of in accordance with this rule and Gov.Bar R. V, as
    modified by this section.” (Emphasis added.) Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(D)(1) requires the
    commission to review the hearing panel’s report. If the commission “concludes the
    record supports the hearing panel’s finding that a violation of Canon 4 has occurred
    and there has been no abuse of discretion by the hearing panel, the commission may
    enter an order that includes one or more of the following:” a disciplinary sanction,
    a cease-and-desist order, a fine, an assessment of costs, or an assessment of attorney
    fees. Nothing in Gov.Jud.R. II(5) required the commission to also independently
    weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors applicable in other attorney-discipline
    cases.
    {¶ 40} With respect to the hearing panel’s findings, we commend Falter for
    issuing a retraction letter shortly after Hartman’s campaign notified her that the
    letter was inaccurate. But that fact does not mean that her public reprimand should
    be vacated.    Nor has she established that the panel’s weighing of the other
    aggravating or mitigating factors should have any impact on her sanction.
    The public reprimand
    {¶ 41} Falter next argues that her disciplinary sanction should be vacated
    because she “has been sufficiently reprimanded in public.”          She claims that
    although she quickly retracted her campaign letter, she received negative media
    attention, which culminated in her loss in the primary election. With her objections,
    Falter submitted screenshots of social-media posts criticizing her for the false
    campaign letter. She argues that in light of the damage to her reputation, the
    commission’s public reprimand was excessive.
    {¶ 42} Gov.Jud.R. II(5)(C)(3) provides for a formal hearing before a
    hearing panel and there is no provision in Gov.Jud.R. II(5) for the introduction of
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    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    additional evidence when the proceedings are in this court on appeal. Similar to
    other attorney-discipline cases, we would consider accepting additional evidence at
    this late stage only in the most exceptional circumstances. See Lorain Cty. Bar
    Assn. v. Weir, 
    156 Ohio St.3d 566
    , 
    2019-Ohio-2151
    , 
    130 N.E.3d 275
    , ¶ 13. No
    exceptional circumstances exist here that would allow Falter to introduce evidence
    for the first time in her objections. Nor has she otherwise established why alleged
    critical comments in the media or on social media could somehow substitute for a
    public reprimand from this court.
    {¶ 43} We therefore overrule Falter’s two additional objections to the
    public reprimand. Falter has not established that the commission acted in an
    unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. A public reprimand is in line
    with other cases in which judicial candidates have violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A).
    See O’Toole, 
    141 Ohio St.3d 355
    , 
    2014-Ohio-4046
    , 
    24 N.E.3d 1114
    ; Moll, 
    135 Ohio St.3d 156
    , 
    2012-Ohio-5674
    , 
    985 N.E.2d 436
    . And the sanction will serve as
    a deterrent to prevent other judicial candidates from knowingly or recklessly
    disseminating false information during their campaigns. See O’Toole at ¶ 64.
    Conclusion
    {¶ 44} Because we overrule Falter’s objections to the commission’s
    misconduct findings and because the commission did not abuse its discretion in
    issuing sanctions against Falter for her violations of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), we affirm
    the commission’s order.
    Order affirmed.
    O’CONNOR, C.J., and GALLAGHER, POWELL, HALL, DONNELLY, and
    BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    STEWART, J., concurs in judgment only, with an opinion.
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., of the Eighth District Court of Appeals, sitting for
    KENNEDY, J.
    16
    January Term, 2021
    STEPHEN W. POWELL, J., of the Twelfth District Court of Appeals, sitting
    for FISCHER, J.
    MICHAEL T. HALL, J., of the Second District Court of Appeals, sitting for
    DEWINE, J.
    _________________
    STEWART, J., concurring in judgment only.
    {¶ 45} I agree with the per curiam opinion’s holding that an objective, rather
    than a subjective, standard applies in determining whether a candidate for judicial
    office has violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). I also agree that in this case, respondent,
    Karen Kopich Falter, did not have a reasonable factual basis for the statements she
    published about her opponent, Curt Hartman. I nevertheless concur in judgment
    only, because I think it is important to acknowledge that the test we are using to
    determine whether a false statement was published with “a reckless disregard of
    whether or not it was false” under Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) is in fact a negligence test.
    {¶ 46} We are ruling that Falter violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) when she
    published information that she gathered from speaking with her campaign
    consultants and with members of the bar without undertaking to fact-check it. She
    could have easily discovered the correct information by checking the county
    auditor’s website to see when Hartman had purchased a condominium in Hamilton
    County and by checking Hartman’s voting records. At bottom, the reason for this
    court’s conclusion that Falter violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) is that she failed to act
    as a prudent judicial candidate would have acted when she failed to diligently
    investigate the information before publishing it. In other words, Falter negligently
    published false information. See, e.g., Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 
    9 Ohio St.3d 177
    , 180, 
    459 N.E.2d 555
     (1984), quoting Embers Supper Club, Inc. v.
    Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 
    9 Ohio St.3d 22
    , 
    457 N.E.2d 1164
     (1984),
    syllabus, modified on other grounds, Lansdowne v. Beacon Journal Publishing Co.,
    
    32 Ohio St.3d 176
    , 
    512 N.E.2d 979
     (1987) (plurality opinion) (the negligence
    17
    SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
    standard asks “ ‘whether the defendant acted reasonably in attempting to discover
    the truth or falsity or defamatory character of the publication’ ”). The per curiam
    opinion’s insistence that “[n]egligently made false statements or negligent
    misstatements are not prohibited by” Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A), majority opinion at ¶ 18,
    cannot therefore be reconciled with the fact that this court has adopted and applied
    an objective-reasonableness test.
    _________________
    Finney Law Firm, L.L.C., and Christopher P. Finney, for complainant.
    Isaac, Wiles, Burkholder & Teetor, L.L.C., Donald C. Brey, and Matthew
    R. Aumann, for respondent.
    _________________
    18