Cruz v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., PR, Inc. , 699 F.3d 563 ( 2012 )


Menu:
  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 11-1617
    CESAR I. CRUZ; JOSE I. LASANTA; MARCELO DIAZ,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    JANE DOE; JANE DOE 1; JANE DOE 2;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP LASANTA-DOE 1;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP CRUZ-DOE;
    CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP DIAZ-DOE 2,
    Plaintiffs,
    v.
    BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB COMPANY, PR, INC.;
    BRISTOL-MYERS SQUIBB MFG., INC.;
    BMS SEVERANCE PLAN,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Lynch, Chief Judge,
    Boudin and Lipez, Circuit Judges.
    Frank E. Laboy Blanc on brief for appellants.
    Lourdes C. Hernández-Venegas, Ana B. Rosado-Frontanés, and
    Schuster Aguiló LLP on brief for appellees.
    November 7, 2012
    LIPEZ, Circuit Judge.     After they were fired from their
    jobs, appellants Cesar Cruz, Jose Lasanta, and Marcelo Diaz filed
    suit in federal district court against their former employer,
    appellee Bristol-Myers Squibb Manufacturing Company ("Bristol-
    Myers"), and against the severance plan established by Bristol-
    Myers pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income and Security Act
    ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, appellee BMS Severance Plan.
    The district court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment,
    and appellants now challenge that ruling, as well as a number of
    the district court's other orders. Discerning no error, we affirm.
    I.
    A.   Factual Background
    In 2003, Bristol-Myers began winding down operations at
    the multi-building site where Cruz had worked as a mechanic since
    1993.   By letter, Bristol-Myers notified Cruz on July 29, 2003,
    that he would receive a cash bonus upon discharge, in addition to
    any severance package for which he might be eligible.    The letter
    explained that the amount of the bonus depended on the timing of
    the discharge: if Cruz's employment ended when normal operations in
    Building 5 stopped, he would get three months' salary; if he left
    when operations in Buildings 2 and 29 stopped, he would get six
    months' salary; if he was dismissed when sterile operations in
    Building 5 stopped, he would get nine months' salary.
    -2-
    As   part   of    the     winding-down   process,      Bristol-Myers
    developed   a    ranking     system    to    determine    the   order   in    which
    employees occupying the same positions would be terminated.                     The
    ranking system took into account both professional skills and
    seniority within the company.           In 2007, as operations in Building
    2 were coming to a halt, Bristol-Myers decided to terminate two of
    its four mechanics.        Among the mechanics, Cruz was ranked third in
    skills and fourth in seniority.             On June 22, 2007, he was informed
    that there would be a reduction in force that would result in his
    discharge on August 29, 2007.               At the time, Cruz was forty-two
    years old. The two mechanics who were retained were, respectively,
    fifty years old and forty-three years old.                No one was hired to
    replace Cruz, and he was paid a cash bonus of six months salary.
    Prior to Cruz's dismissal, Bristol-Myers had adopted a
    severance plan, pursuant to ERISA, to assist employees who were
    being downsized. Under the plan, in exchange for signing a general
    release of any claims against Bristol-Myers, Cruz would have been
    eligible for a severance package of $47,833. Cruz never signed the
    release and, as a result, never received a severance package.
    B.   Procedural History
    Appellants'      complaint      was   filed   on    April   11,   2008,
    asserting federal claims under ERISA, the Age Discrimination in
    Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, the Americans with
    Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, the Worker
    -3-
    Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act ("WARN"), 29 U.S.C. §§
    2101-2109, and the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
    ("COBRA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1169, which amended ERISA.                              The
    complaint also asserted a common-law breach of contract claim, as
    well as an employment discrimination claim under the Puerto Rico
    Anti-Discrimination Act (also known as Law 100), P.R. Laws. Ann.
    tit. 29, §§ 146-151, and an unjustified dismissal claim under
    Puerto Rico Law 80, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29, §§ 185a-m.
    Because the allegations in the complaint were difficult
    to   decipher,    appellees        filed    a    motion   for    a    more    definite
    statement.       See   Fed.   R.    Civ.     P. 12(e).      On       July    11,   2008,
    appellants submitted a new complaint raising identical claims,
    which appellees answered.           After reviewing the new complaint, the
    district court tentatively determined that there was no basis for
    appellants to be joined together as plaintiffs in a single lawsuit.
    See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1).              Hence, the district court ordered
    appellants to show cause why Diaz and Lasanta should not be severed
    from the case, leaving Cruz (as the first named plaintiff) to
    proceed alone.         Appellants responded that joinder was proper
    because their individual rights to relief arose from the same
    occurrence - namely, a large-scale reduction in force at the
    Bristol-Myers site where they had worked.
    On February 25, 2009, before the district court had
    conclusively ruled on the propriety of joinder, appellants filed a
    -4-
    motion seeking to have their suit certified as a collective action
    under the ADEA.       See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (incorporating 29 U.S.C.
    § 216(b)); see also Hoffman-La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 
    493 U.S. 165
    ,   170   (1989)    ("Congress    has    stated   its   policy     that   ADEA
    plaintiffs should have the opportunity to proceed collectively.").
    On January 28, 2010, the district court issued an order severing
    Diaz and Lasanta and dismissing their claims without prejudice on
    the ground that appellants had failed to establish that a question
    of law or fact common to all of them would arise in the case.                See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(B).         The district court then declared the
    motion seeking certification of appellants' suit as a collective
    action to be moot.        See Cruz v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. P.R. Inc.,
    
    264 F.R.D. 22
    (D.P.R. 2010).
    On   February    10,   2010,   the   district    court    issued   a
    scheduling order informing the remaining parties that any amended
    pleadings had to be filed by March 9, 2010.                After the deadline
    passed, Cruz filed a "corrected complaint" on April 26, 2010, which
    deleted his ADA, WARN, and COBRA claims.             Appellees answered the
    corrected complaint on May 4, 2010, and discovery began.                 On June
    13, 2010, Cruz moved to amend the complaint in order to augment his
    ADEA   and    Law   100    claims   with    information      unearthed   during
    discovery.    The district court denied his motion without comment.
    On December 13, 2010, after discovery had concluded, Cruz once more
    moved to amend the complaint for the purposes of reinforcing his
    -5-
    existing    claims,   adding      an   allegedly   indispensable     party   (an
    unidentified successor-in-interest to Bristol-Myers), and rejoining
    Diaz as a plaintiff. The motion was denied, again without comment.
    On   January   11,    2011,      appellees    moved   for   summary
    judgment, affixing to their motion a statement of uncontested facts
    ("SUF"), as required by the district court's rules.                 See D.P.R.
    Civ. R. 56(b).        On January 23, 2011, Cruz opposed the summary
    judgment motion but neglected to submit a counter-statement along
    with his opposition admitting, denying, or qualifying each fact in
    the SUF.    See D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(c).          Instead, he submitted a short
    narrative outlining his view of the case.                 Deeming admitted the
    facts in appellees' SUF, see D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(e), the district
    court granted appellees' motion for summary judgment, see Cruz v.
    Bristol Myers Squibb Co. PR, Inc., 
    777 F. Supp. 2d 321
    , 340 (D.P.R.
    2011).     This appeal followed.
    II.
    A.   Party Joinder
    We begin our analysis by considering whether the district
    court abused its discretion in severing Diaz and Lasanta.                    See
    Coughlin v. Rogers, 
    130 F.3d 1348
    , 1351 (9th Cir. 1997) (reviewing
    for abuse of discretion). Multiple plaintiffs may join together in
    a single action if "they assert any right to relief jointly,
    severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of
    the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
    -6-
    occurrences" and "any question of law or fact common to all
    plaintiffs will arise in the action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A)-
    (B).    If both elements of this test are not satisfied, "a court, in
    its discretion, may sever the misjoined parties, so long as no
    substantial right will be prejudiced by the severance.              In such a
    case, the court can generally dismiss all but the first named
    plaintiff without prejudice to the institution of new, separate
    lawsuits by the dropped plaintiffs . . . ."         
    Coughlin, 130 F.3d at 1350
    (citations omitted).
    In this case, appellants made no effort to demonstrate
    that any common question of law or fact would arise.               It appears
    that each appellant lost his job under different circumstances and
    each has distinct legal claims against appellees.                Although the
    rules governing party joinder are construed liberally for the sake
    of convenience and economy, see Desert Empire Bank v. Ins. Co. of
    N. Am., 
    623 F.2d 1371
    , 1375-76 (9th Cir. 1980), we discern no abuse
    of discretion in the district court's decision to sever Diaz and
    Lasanta and dismiss their claims without prejudice.
    B. Certification as a Collective Action
    For substantially the same reasons, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in declining to certify appellants'
    suit as a collective action under the ADEA.          See Thiessen v. Gen.
    Elec.    Capital   Corp.,   
    267 F.3d 1095
    ,   1102   (10th    Cir.   2001)
    (reviewing for abuse of discretion).        Employees seeking to bring a
    -7-
    collective action under the ADEA must establish that they are
    similarly situated.          See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (incorporating 29
    U.S.C. § 216(b)); Hipp v. Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 
    252 F.3d 1208
    , 1216-17 (11th Cir. 2001).             This requirement is even less
    stringent than the test for party joinder, see Grayson v. K Mart
    Corp., 
    79 F.3d 1086
    , 1095-96 (11th Cir. 1996), but it still has
    teeth, see Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc., 
    551 F.3d 1233
    ,
    1261 (11th Cir. 2008).         The modest factual showing that must be
    made "cannot be satisfied simply by unsupported assertions," Myers
    v.   Hertz    Corp.,   
    624 F.3d 537
    ,    555   (2d   Cir.    2010)    (internal
    quotation marks omitted), such as those in this case.                  Appellants'
    barebones motion for certification stated only that appellants are
    "similarly situated and victims of a single decision, policy or
    plan"    to   reduce   Bristol-Myers'       workforce.         These    conclusory
    allegations were insufficient to warrant the certification of a
    collective action.
    C.   Amendments to the Complaint
    There also was no abuse of discretion in the denial of
    Cruz's belated motions to amend his complaint.                   See Trans-Spec
    Truck Serv., Inc. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 
    524 F.3d 315
    , 326 (1st Cir.
    2008).    Cruz argued his motions under Rule 15's liberal amendment
    policy, which "provides that . . . '[t]he court should freely give
    leave when justice so requires.'”          
    Id. at 327 (quoting
    Fed. R. Civ.
    P. 15(a)(2)). Because the motions to amend came after the deadline
    -8-
    established by the district court's scheduling order, however, they
    could be granted only upon a showing of good cause, see O'Connell
    v. Hyatt Hotels of P.R., 
    357 F.3d 152
    , 154-55 (1st Cir. 2004); Fed.
    R.   Civ.   P.   16(b)(4).        "Rule        16(b)'s   'good      cause'     standard
    emphasizes the diligence of the party seeking the amendment."
    
    O'Connell, 357 F.3d at 155
    .
    Partly due to his misapprehension of the correct legal
    standard, Cruz made minimal effort to demonstrate that good cause
    justified permitting an amendment.               Cruz filed his first motion to
    amend three months after the deadline set forth in the district
    court's scheduling       order.          The    motion   sought     to   add    factual
    allegations regarding "a statement . . . made in writing by
    plaintiff's immediate supervisor obtained during our efforts to
    prepare for      the   case   and    to    comply    with    various       information
    requests put forth by [defendants]."               This document was evidently
    in plaintiff's possession, raising questions as to why it abruptly
    surfaced over two years after he initiated this litigation.
    Counsel claimed that their efforts to obtain this evidence were
    complicated by Cruz's move to Florida and ill-defined health
    problems.    These cursory explanations do not demonstrate why this
    supposedly    crucial    piece      of    information       could    not     have   been
    uncovered earlier with appropriate diligence.1
    1
    The timing of Cruz's first motion to amend was puzzling,
    since by that point it was unlikely that he would face further
    motions to dismiss. The value of adding factual support for his
    -9-
    Cruz's second motion to amend came nine months after the
    district court's deadline.       This motion similarly failed to offer
    sufficient explanation for the delay in seeking amendment.              Cruz
    never identified the allegedly indispensable party he sought to add
    as a successor-in-interest to Bristol-Myers, and he failed to
    explain why he delayed until after discovery had ended to seek to
    rejoin Diaz as a plaintiff, despite having already filed three
    versions of his complaint.       See 
    O'Connell, 357 F.3d at 155
    ("Such
    a long and unexplained delay vindicates the district court's
    conclusion   that   plaintiffs    were    not   diligently   pursuing   this
    litigation."); Leary v. Daeschner, 
    349 F.3d 888
    , 907 (6th Cir.
    2003) (affirming denial of leave to amend where "[p]laintiffs gave
    the district court no excuse for their considerable delay").
    "A scheduling order is not a frivolous piece of paper,
    idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel
    without peril.”     Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 
    975 F.2d 604
    , 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    Cruz's failure to show his diligence in seeking an amendment doomed
    this motion as well.
    claims was therefore limited. Moreover, Cruz could not hope to
    evade summary judgment by relying only on his complaint. See Ruiz-
    Rosa v. Rullán, 
    485 F.3d 150
    , 156 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Allegations
    made in a plaintiff's complaint, standing alone, are not enough to
    oppose a properly supported motion for summary judgment.").
    -10-
    D.   Summary Judgment
    We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de
    novo.   See Vicor Corp. v. Vigilant Ins. Co., 
    674 F.3d 1
    , 20 (1st
    Cir. 2012).     Because Cruz did not properly controvert appellees'
    SUF, the district court deemed the facts therein admitted, as was
    its prerogative.         See   D.P.R.   Civ.    R. 56(e);      Ríos-Jiménez    v.
    Principi, 
    520 F.3d 31
    , 38-39 (1st Cir. 2008). We therefore confine
    our analysis to those facts, see 
    Ríos-Jiménez, 520 F.3d at 39
    , as
    summarized above and described in greater detail in the district
    court's decision, see 
    Cruz, 777 F. Supp. 2d at 331-34
    .
    1.   The ADEA Claim
    Under   the    ADEA,   it    is    unlawful   for   an   employer   to
    discharge an employee because of the employee's age. See 29 U.S.C.
    § 623(a)(1); Bonefont-Igaravidez v. Int'l Shipping Corp., 
    659 F.3d 120
    , 123 (1st Cir. 2011).       To prevail on an ADEA claim, an employee
    must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that age was the
    but-for cause of his or her termination.             See Gross v. FBL Fin.
    Servs., Inc., 
    557 U.S. 167
    , 176 (2009); Vélez v. Thermo King de
    P.R., Inc., 
    585 F.3d 441
    , 446 (1st Cir. 2009).                 "Where, as here,
    the employee lacks direct evidence, we utilize the burden-shifting
    framework developed by the Supreme Court to facilitate the process
    of proving discrimination."        
    Bonefont-Igaravidez, 659 F.3d at 123
    (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802-05
    (1973)); see also 
    Vélez, 585 F.3d at 446-47
    & n.2.               In the context
    -11-
    of a reduction in force, the first step of this framework requires
    the employee to make out a prima facie case of discrimination by
    showing that (1) he or she was at least forty years old at the time
    of discharge; (2) he or she was qualified for his or her position;
    (3) he or she was fired; and (4) his or her employer either did not
    treat age neutrally or retained younger employees in the same
    position.    See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 
    51 F.3d 1087
    , 1091
    (1st Cir. 1995).        The burden then shifts to the employer to
    articulate    a    legitimate,      nondiscriminatory    reason     for    the
    employee's termination, see 
    id., which the employee
    may rebut by
    showing   that    the   proffered    reason   is   "merely   a   pretext   for
    impermissible age discrimination," 
    id. at 1092. In
    this case, there is no dispute that Cruz satisfied the
    first three requirements of a prima facie discrimination case.
    However, there is no evidence that Bristol-Myers either failed to
    treat age neutrally in deciding to discharge Cruz or retained
    younger employees in his position.          The record plainly shows that
    Cruz was laid off pursuant to a ranking system that considered only
    his professional skills and seniority, and the two mechanics who
    were retained were both older than Cruz.            Hence, no prima facie
    case was established.       See Goncalves v. Plymouth Cnty. Sheriff's
    Dep't, 
    659 F.3d 101
    , 105-07 (1st Cir. 2011).
    -12-
    2.   The Law 100 and Law 80 Claims
    The Law 100 claim fails for similar reasons.   Under Law
    100, "a plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie
    case by (1) demonstrating that he was actually or constructively
    discharged, and (2) alleging that the decision was discriminatory."
    Velázquez-Fernández v. NCE Foods, Inc., 
    476 F.3d 6
    , 11 (1st Cir.
    2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).        After the plaintiff
    makes this "rather undemanding" showing, the burden of persuasion
    then shifts to the employer to show that it had just cause for the
    employee's termination.      Id.; see also Baralt v. Nationwide Mut.
    Ins. Co., 
    251 F.3d 10
    , 16 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2001) (explaining that
    making out prima facie case under Law 100 requires less than what
    plaintiff must bring forward to satisfy prima facie showing under
    ADEA).   If the employer can establish just cause, then, "as under
    the ADEA, the burden of persuasion returns to the employee to show
    that the employer's decision was motivated by age discrimination."
    
    Velázquez-Fernandez, 476 F.3d at 11
    (internal quotation marks
    omitted).    "Ultimately . . . the employee is faced with the same
    burden of persuasion as an employee bringing suit under the ADEA."
    
    Id. As the Puerto Rico
    Supreme Court has explained, because
    Law 100 does not define what constitutes just cause, guidance is
    drawn from Law 80.    See Báez García v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 20 P.R.
    Offic. Trans. 153, 164 (P.R. 1987); see also Baltodano v. Merck,
    -13-
    Sharp & Dohme (I.A.) Corp., 
    637 F.3d 38
    , 41-42 (1st Cir. 2011)
    ("Law 80 and Law 100 employ identical standards for just cause.").
    According to Law 80, a dismissal is for just cause if it results
    from the "[f]ull, temporar[y] or partial closing of the operations
    of the establishment."     P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 29 § 185b(d).
    Hence, even assuming that Cruz made the "minimal showing"
    required to make out a prima facie case under Law 100, 
    Baralt, 251 F.3d at 16
    , Bristol-Myers has shown that there was just cause for
    his dismissal, since the company was engaged in a large-scale
    reduction in force.     Defendant has adduced evidence showing that
    Cruz's layoff took place as a result of a neutrally-applied ranking
    system that took into account both his seniority and skill level.
    Cruz has not rebutted this showing by demonstrating that his
    termination was, in fact, motivated by age discrimination. Indeed,
    any inference of discrimination is severely undermined by the fact
    that the two employees who were retained after the layoff were
    older than Cruz.
    Likewise, the Law 80 claim fails.            Law 80 requires an
    employer   to   make   severance   payments   to   an    employee   who   is
    discharged without just cause.       See P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 29, §
    185a; see also 
    Baltodano, 637 F.3d at 41-42
    .            It, too, employs a
    burden-shifting scheme.      See 
    id. at 42. Once
    an employee has
    established that he or she was discharged, it is up to the employer
    to show that the discharge was for just cause.               See 
    id. The -14- employee
    then must rebut this showing.                  See 
    id. As we have
    already
    said, Bristol-Myers showed that there was just cause for Cruz's
    dismissal, and Cruz has not rebutted this showing.
    3.     The ERISA and Breach of Contract Claims
    The final two claims - the ERISA claim and the breach of
    contract claim - fail for entirely different reasons.                     The ERISA
    claim alleges that Cruz was denied the severance package due to him
    under the severance plan.            This claim is barred because, as Cruz
    concedes, he neglected to exhaust his administrative remedies prior
    to filing suit, as required under ERISA.                  See Madera v. Marsh USA,
    Inc., 
    426 F.3d 56
    , 61-62 (1st Cir. 2005).                          Cruz attempts to
    circumvent this bar by arguing that the severance plan was not a
    bona     fide    ERISA    plan     and,    therefore,       that    the   exhaustion
    requirement is inapposite.             However, this argument is woefully
    undeveloped.       It is not supported by reference to either legal
    authority or evidence in the record.                     As a result, we deem it
    waived.    See McDonough v. Donahoe, 
    673 F.3d 41
    , 49 n.14 (1st Cir.
    2012).
    The breach of contract claim alleges that the July 29,
    2003 letter informing Cruz that he would receive a cash bonus upon
    discharge constituted a contract that Bristol-Myers breached by
    paying him less than the agreed amount.                   Even if the letter was a
    contract,       there    is   no   evidence      that    Bristol-Myers    failed   to
    perform. The letter described a three-tiered bonus structure, with
    -15-
    the bonus amount determined by the timing of Cruz's departure. The
    letter clearly stated that, if Cruz was dismissed when operations
    in Buildings 2 and 29 stopped, he would receive six months' salary.
    That is precisely what happened.
    III.
    In sum, there was no error in the management of this case
    or the grant of appellees' motion for summary judgment.         The
    judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    So ordered.
    -16-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 11-1617

Citation Numbers: 699 F.3d 563

Judges: Boudin, Lipez, Lynch

Filed Date: 11/7/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023

Authorities (25)

Velazquez-Fernandez v. NCE Food, Inc. , 476 F.3d 6 ( 2007 )

Baltodano v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme (I.A.) Corp. , 637 F.3d 38 ( 2011 )

Madera v. Marsh USA, Inc. , 426 F.3d 56 ( 2005 )

Ruiz-Rosa v. Rivera-Gonzalez , 485 F.3d 150 ( 2007 )

Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp. , 51 F.3d 1087 ( 1995 )

Bonefont-Igaravidez v. International Shipping Corp. , 659 F.3d 120 ( 2011 )

Rios-Jimenez v. Principi , 520 F.3d 31 ( 2008 )

Trans-Spec Truck Service, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc. , 524 F.3d 315 ( 2008 )

O'Connell v. Hyatt Hotels , 357 F.3d 152 ( 2004 )

McDonough v. Donahoe , 673 F.3d 41 ( 2012 )

Velez v. Thermo King De Puerto Rico, Inc. , 585 F.3d 441 ( 2009 )

Goncalves v. Plymouth County Sheriff's Department , 659 F.3d 101 ( 2011 )

manuel-a-baralt-lizette-pena-aviles-conjugal-partnership-baralt-pena-juan , 251 F.3d 10 ( 2001 )

Vicor Corp. v. Vigilant Insurance , 674 F.3d 1 ( 2012 )

Morgan v. Family Dollar Stores, Inc. , 551 F.3d 1233 ( 2008 )

Mary Elizabeth Leary and Glenda H. Williams v. Stephen ... , 349 F.3d 888 ( 2003 )

Desert Empire Bank, Etc. v. Insurance Co. Of North America, ... , 623 F.2d 1371 ( 1980 )

Myers v. Hertz Corp. , 624 F.3d 537 ( 2010 )

mercer-david-grayson-v-k-mart-corporation-cross-appellee-ronald-l , 79 F.3d 1086 ( 1996 )

gary-a-thiessen-v-general-electric-capital-corporation-doing-business-as , 267 F.3d 1095 ( 2001 )

View All Authorities »