Madelux International, Inc. v. Barama Co. , 186 F. App'x 10 ( 2006 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 05-1568
No. 05-1862
MADELUX INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
BARAMA CO. LTD. ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Héctor M. Laffitte, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Lynch and Lipez,
Circuit Judges.
Freddie Perez-Gonzalez, with whom Freddie Perez-Gonzalez &
Assoc., P.S.C. was on brief, for appellant.
Jorge Martinez Luciano, with whom Alfredo Acevedo Cruz and Law
Offices of Pedro E. Ortiz Álvarez, PSC were on brief, for appellee
Aljoma Lumber, Inc.
Kenneth C. Suria, with whom William Estrella Law Offices, PSC
was on brief, for remaining appellees.
June 16, 2006
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal in which the
applicable standard of review determines the outcome. In the
underlying action, plaintiff-appellant Madelux International, Inc.
(MII) sued three defendants — Barama Co. Ltd. (Barama), Sterling
Wood Products Corp. (Sterling), and Aljoma Lumber, Inc. (Aljoma) —
for pecuniary damages. Its amended complaint (the operative
pleading for present purposes) alleged that the lead defendant,
Barama, had transgressed the Dealer's Act, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 10,
§ 278a (Law 75), by terminating, without the required statutory
notice or cause, a purported exclusive distributorship agreement
relating to the importation and sale of certain plywood panels in
Puerto Rico. Relatedly, the amended complaint alleged that another
defendant, Aljoma, had tortiously interfered with these exclusive
distribution rights.1 See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5141.
The case went to trial before the district court on
December 6, 2004. After MII rested, the court, ruling ore sponte,
granted Aljoma's motion to dismiss. At the conclusion of all the
evidence, the court took the remaining issues under advisement. It
subsequently wrote a thoughtful rescript, in which it exonerated
Barama and Sterling from liability under Law 75. See Madelux
1
The allegations against Sterling were vague and, in all
events, the parties have treated Sterling as a marketing arm of
Barama. Accordingly, there is no need to discuss Sterling’s
liability separately.
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Int'l, Inc. v. Barama Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.P.R. 2005).
This appeal followed.
We need not tarry. The district court, as evidenced by
its rescript, id. at 73-74, correctly understood the applicable law
(indeed, MII's appellate counsel, when pointedly questioned at oral
argument, was unable to identify any material error of law). The
case against Barama and Sterling therefore turns on the
supportability of the district court's factual findings. See
Sierra Fria Corp. v. Donald J. Evans, P.C., 127 F.3d 175, 180 (1st
Cir. 1997). We can disturb those findings if, and only if, they
are clearly erroneous, that is, if "after careful evaluation of the
evidence, we are left with an abiding conviction that those
findings . . . are simply wrong." State Police Ass'n v. Comm'r,
125 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997); accord Cumpiano v. Banco Santander
P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 152 (1st Cir. 1990); Reliance Steel Prods. Co.
v. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 575, 576 (1st Cir. 1989). In
conducting this tamisage, credibility determinations must be
regarded as falling squarely within the trier's domain. See, e.g.,
Anthony v. Sundlun, 952 F.2d 603, 606 (1st Cir. 1991). It follows
inexorably that the loser in a bench trial invariably faces a steep
uphill climb when it aspires to impugn the trial court's factual
findings.
Here, the attempt is hopeless. The applicability of Law
75 depends, inter alia, on proof that protected distributorship
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rights exist. See Borschow Hosp. & Med. Supplies, Inc. v. Cesar
Castillo Inc., 96 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir. 1996); Vulcan Tools of P.R.
v. Makita USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1994). The lower
court found, on conflicting facts and shades of meaning, that MII
never enjoyed any such protected distributorship rights. See
Madelux Int’l, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 74-75. We are satisfied, after
close perscrutation of the record, that this finding was not
clearly erroneous. Thus, we must respect it.
MII argues that two pieces of correspondence — one dated
December 11, 1995, and the other dated June 19, 1999 — compel a
contrary finding. We do not agree. While those letters, in
combination with other evidence, might have supported an inference
favorable to MII, the district judge, sitting as the finder of the
facts, chose not to draw such an inference. See id. at 75. Where,
as here, the trier chooses between competing inferences, each of
which is reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole, that
choice cannot be deemed clearly erroneous.2 See Anderson v. City
2
MII also argues that, apart from Law 75, it was entitled to
recover on one or more other theories, namely, (i) for breach of
contract, (ii) as a sales representative under Law 21, P.R. Laws
Ann. tit. 10, § 279, and (iii) under common law. These arguments
were not raised below and, accordingly, cannot be advanced on
appeal. See Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers Union,
Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir.
1992) ("If any principle is settled in this circuit, it is that,
absent the most extraordinary circumstances, legal theories not
raised squarely in the lower court cannot be broached for the first
time on appeal.").
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of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985); Cumpiano, 902 F.2d
at 152.
The same sort of reasoning applies to the entry of
judgment in favor of Aljoma. Pertinently, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(c) provides that "[i]f during a trial without a jury
a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court finds
against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment"
against that party without further ado. That is precisely what
transpired here.
When a trial court enters judgment under Rule 52(c), we
scrutinize its findings of fact for clear error.3 See Marina Bay
Realty Trust LLC v. United States, 407 F.3d 418, 423 (1st Cir.
2005). In this instance, the court found as a fact that Aljoma had
no awareness of any protected distributorship rights held by MII
(and, thus, was not liable for tortious interference with the
same). See New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287
F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that, in bringing such a
claim under Puerto Rico law, "the plaintiff must show that the
defendant intended to interfere with the contract, knowing that
this interference would cause injury to the plaintiff"). Bearing
in mind that MII had the burden of proof on the issue of knowing
3
With respect to Aljoma, as was the case with respect to
Barama and Sterling, MII has not shown that the ruling appealed
from is infected by any material error of law.
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interference, see id., this finding, though perhaps not inevitable,
was surely not clearly erroneous.
There is one remaining loose end. MII requests for the
first time on appeal that we certify a question as to the meaning
and scope of Law 75 to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court. We deny that
request. MII chose a federal forum and eschewed any request to the
district court for certification. Even in far more auspicious
circumstances, we have not been receptive to requests for
certification newly asserted on appeal, see, e.g., Nieves v. Univ.
of P.R., 7 F.3d 270, 278 (1st Cir. 1993), and here, the district
court’s supportable factual finding that no protected
distributorship rights existed undermines the argument that some
unsettled issue of Puerto Rico law might be controlling. Under
these inauspicious circumstances, we once again refuse a belated
request for certification. See, e.g., id.; Fischer v. Bar Harbor
Banking & Trust Co., 857 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1988).
We need go no further.4 For the reasons elucidated
above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.
4
MII also complains of an error regarding the lower court’s
handling of expert testimony. That testimony, however, related
almost exclusively to damages. Since we affirm the district
court's finding of no liability, the issue of damages (and, hence,
the evidentiary issue) is moot. See Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman,
Dillon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 5 n.5 (1st Cir. 1983).
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