United States v. Mejia-Encarnacion , 887 F.3d 41 ( 2018 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1030
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
JOSÉ MEJÍA-ENCARNACIÓN,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Rafael F. Castro-Lang on brief for appellant.
Francisco A. Besosa-Martínez, Assistant United States
Attorney, Mariana E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States
Attorney, Chief, Appellate Division, Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez,
United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
April 4, 2018
LIPEZ, Circuit Judge. José Mejía-Encarnación appeals
from a judgment of conviction and a sentence of 121 months'
imprisonment entered by the district court after he pleaded guilty
to two counts of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute
narcotics. On appeal, Mejía argues that, at the change of plea
hearing, the district court did not adequately probe whether the
medications he was taking would affect the voluntariness of his
plea, and that the district court abused its discretion by denying
his third motion for substitute counsel after his plea was entered.
He seeks to have his sentence vacated and the case remanded for a
hearing to determine whether his guilty plea should be set aside.
Because we find no plain error or abuse of discretion in the
district court's actions, we affirm.
I.
Mejía was indicted in July 2012 on two counts of
knowingly and intentionally conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute narcotics in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He had
allegedly conspired with two others, one of whom turned out to be
a government informant, to import cocaine and heroin into Puerto
Rico from the Dominican Republic in March through May of 2012.
Mejía instructed the informant to travel from Puerto Rico to the
Dominican Republic in his car via ferry, to meet with a supplier
who would load the car with narcotics, and to return to Puerto
Rico with the car. Subsequently, upon re-entry into Puerto Rico,
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Customs and Border Patrol agents stopped and searched the vehicles
of both the informant and Mejía's co-conspirator, finding 2,576
grams of heroin in one vehicle and 8 kilograms of cocaine in the
other.
During the pre-trial proceedings, Mejía was represented
by three different attorneys. First, Federal Public Defender
Victor González-Bothwell was appointed to represent him, but Mejía
soon chose to retain Luis Rivera-Rodríguez as counsel instead.
While Mejía was represented by Rivera, the government presented
him with a plea deal. After seeking and receiving several
extensions of the deadline to file a motion for change of plea,
Mejía moved for change of plea at a scheduling conference, and a
hearing on that motion was set for May 2013.
A week before the scheduled change of plea hearing, Mejía
filed a pro se motion for substitute counsel, claiming that Rivera
had provided ineffective assistance of counsel due to his "lack of
action and continuous omissions." Rivera then filed a letter
explaining to the court that he had met with Mejía and that Mejía
had stated that he filed the motion because he was frustrated that
Rivera "could not get a better offer/plea agreement from the
government," but that Mejía had indicated that he was willing to
continue to have Rivera represent him. At the hearing, Mejía
confirmed that he filed the motion because he was unsatisfied with
the government's plea deal. The court explained that "[t]he
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decision to offer you a plea has nothing to do with Mr. Rivera.
That's a decision of the prosecution." The government agreed,
stating that its "offer stands as it is" and that "[i]t's nothing
that is in the power or control of Mr. Rivera." Despite these
explanations, Mejía stated that he wanted new counsel, and the
court granted his request, appointing Ovidio E. Zayas-Pérez to
represent him.
While represented by Zayas, Mejía filed a second change
of plea motion. On the day of the hearing on that motion, however,
the government informed the magistrate judge that no agreement had
been reached, and it requested that a trial date be set. At the
same time, Zayas filed a motion to withdraw as Mejía's defense
counsel. His motion explained that, although he had obtained a
more favorable plea deal than the one offered to Mejía when he was
represented by Rivera, and although he had met with Mejía several
times to discuss the plea offer, Mejía was not satisfied with his
representation and had rejected the deal. The judge granted the
motion and reappointed González, the federal public defender, to
represent Mejía.
Although González continued to try to negotiate a plea
agreement on Mejía's behalf, the government declined to offer
another deal. Mejía was thus confronted with the option of
pleading guilty without any agreement or going to trial. On the
day the trial was set to begin, González informed the court that
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Mejía intended to enter a guilty plea, and a change of plea hearing
was held. The court began the hearing by asking Mejía how he was
feeling. The following conversation ensued:
MR. MEJÍA: I feel fine physically and mentally
in spite of the fact that I have
some health conditions. I have high
blood pressure. I have a hernia in
my groin. I also take medication for
cholesterol. And finally I’m taking
medication to be able to sleep, as
well as for depression.
COURT INTERPRETER: Correction. I’m taking medication
for depression in order to be able
to sleep because I can’t sleep.
THE COURT: So you’re taking for cholesterol
some medicine and to help you to
sleep?
MR. MEJÍA: Yes. And also for high blood
pressure.
THE COURT: And how often do you take these
medicines?
MR. MEJÍA: Daily.
THE COURT: In the morning or except the one to
sleep which is at night?
MR. MEJÍA: No, Your Honor, I take all my
medication at night because I work
in the kitchen at the MDC
institution.
Satisfied with Mejía's answers, the court moved on with
the plea colloquy before ultimately concluding that Mejía was
competent to plea. The court accepted Mejía's guilty plea to both
counts of the indictment.
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Mejía subsequently requested that González file a motion
to withdraw as his attorney and a motion to withdraw his plea of
guilty. At the hearing on those motions, Mejía told the judge
that he did not trust González and that his "Constitutional
[r]ights as an inmate" had been violated. When the judge asked
"which ones?", Mejía did not name any specific rights, saying only
that he thought there were more motions that González should have
filed. Mejía also asserted that the court should grant his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea because he was innocent. The judge
pressed Mejía to explain how his assertion of innocence could be
reconciled with a pro se motion he had filed that admitted his
participation in the conspiracy and encouraged the court to see
his role as a minor participant. When Mejía was unable to explain
which of those positions was the truth, the judge denied both his
motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and González's motion to
withdraw as counsel, explaining to Mejía that he did not have a
right to counsel of his choice, that González was a well-regarded
and experienced attorney, and that, in the absence of specific
allegations regarding the inadequacy of González's representation,
there was no reason for the court to grant the motion to withdraw.
At the sentencing hearing, Mejía stated that he had not
reviewed the presentence report (PSR) with González, despite
González's assurance to the contrary. The court therefore reviewed
and discussed relevant portions of the PSR with Mejía, and Mejía
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indicated that the information regarding his personal background,
finances, and criminal record was correct. In addition, González
argued that the guideline range should have been lower than the
range calculated in the PSR and that Mejía should be sentenced to
the statutory minimum sentence of 120 months. The district court
ultimately sentenced Mejía to 121 months' imprisonment. This
appeal followed.
II.
A. Medication Inquiry During Plea Colloquy
Mejía contends that the district court violated Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by insufficiently inquiring about
the medications he was taking and their effect on his capacity to
make an intelligent and voluntary guilty plea. Because Mejía did
not move to withdraw his guilty plea on this ground in the district
court,1 our review is for plain error. See United States v.
Mescual-Cruz, 387 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) ("An unobjected-to
error in the Rule 11 colloquy is reversible error only upon a
showing of plain error."). Pursuant to the plain error standard,
Mejía must show "(1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or
1 Although Mejía did move to withdraw his guilty plea, he did
not articulate in the motion a particular reason why it should be
withdrawn, requesting only that "his change of plea to guilty be
vacated, and a hearing be had if necessary." United States v.
Mejía-Encarnación, No. 3:12-cr-00567-PG, ECF No. 244, at 1 (D.P.R.
2015). At the hearing on the motion, he asserted only that the
plea should be withdrawn because he was innocent.
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obvious and which not only (3) affected his substantial rights,
but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of judicial proceedings." United States v. Delgado-
Hernández, 420 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 2005) (alteration omitted)
(quoting United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2001)).
As a general matter, "[w]hen a defendant in a Rule 11
hearing confirms that he is on medication, the district court has
a duty to inquire into the defendant's capacity to enter a plea."
Cody v. United States, 249 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2001). Here, the
record shows that the district court did ask follow-up questions
of Mejía to discover the purpose, timing, and frequency of the
medications he was taking. Although the court did not specifically
inquire into the names and doses of the medication, there is "no
settled rule that a hearing cannot proceed unless precise names
and quantities of drugs have been identified." United States v.
Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 47 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d 265, 269 (1st Cir. 2000)).
Mejía argues that, pursuant to our decision in United
States v. Parra-Ibañez, 936 F.2d 588, 596 (1st Cir. 1991), the
court was nonetheless required to inquire into the effect of each
medication. In that case, we held that the district court erred
by "failing to explore questions raised by appellant's
acknowledged use of prescription medications" after the defendant
indicated that within the last 24 hours he had ingested three
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medications, including one to "control [his] nerves." Id. at 590.
Since Parra-Ibañez was decided, however, we have clarified that
the court's error was a "failure to make any further inquiry
whatsoever" into the defendant's capacity to enter a voluntary
plea. United States v. Llanos-Falero, 847 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir.
2017). Further, we have explained that the circumstances of that
case -- "the defendant had, prior to the plea, revealed a history
of psychiatric treatment and drug abuse sufficient to justify a
psychiatric evaluation for competency," and then "after the plea,
there was additional concrete evidence of serious emotional
disturbance" -- distinguish it from cases that involve a defendant
with no known mental health or drug abuse issues, such as this
one. Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269. Instead, we have emphasized
that the essential inquiry is whether any medication taken by the
defendant will affect his ability to understand the proceedings or
enter a voluntary guilty plea. See Llanos-Falero, 847 F.3d at 34
(upholding plea colloquy on plain error review where the court
asked the defendant only "Do you feel okay today?" and "Can you
make a voluntary and knowing plea?").
Here, although the court did not specifically inquire
whether the medications affected Mejía's ability to enter a
voluntary plea, the court did ask Mejía how he was feeling, and he
responded that he felt fine "physically and mentally." (Emphasis
added.) Further, we are satisfied that Mejía's responses to the
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court's general questions regarding the voluntariness of his plea,2
when considered together with his performance throughout the
hearing, were sufficient to support a finding by the court that he
was not under the influence of any medication and was competent to
plea. See Savinon-Acosta, 232 F.3d at 269 (stating that "the
defendant's own performance in the course of a colloquy may
confirm, or occasionally undermine, his assurances"). After the
court explained that it was too late for the government to submit
a plea agreement, Mejía affirmed that he understood "perfectly"
that he now had to "decide between the two options that had been
offered" -- going to trial or entering a straight guilty plea.
When the court asked which one he chose, he said, "I plead guilty.
I accept the guilt." Then, the court started to proceed with the
plea colloquy, but Mejía insisted that he did not have enough time
to meet with his attorney to go over the evidence against him and
requested that the court give him time to confer with his attorney,
which it did. Contrary to Mejía’s contention that his actions at
the hearing were "erratic," Mejía's behavior demonstrated that he
was aware of exactly what was happening, what his choices were,
2
The court asked standard questions regarding Mejía’s
understanding of the charges and evidence against him, the
consequences of pleading guilty, his opportunity to consult with
counsel, the range of possible sentences for the crimes with which
he had been charged, and whether he had been improperly coerced or
induced into pleading guilty. Mejía answered each question clearly
and directly.
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and what rights he had during the hearing. It was therefore not
erroneous for the court to conclude that he was competent to plea
without further inquiry into his medications or mental state. See
United States v. Morrisette, 429 F.3d 318, 323 (1st Cir. 2005)
(finding no error where, "after observing [the defendant's]
demeanor first hand, the district court made an explicit finding
that [he] was competent to enter the guilty plea"). Hence, Mejía's
argument fails at the first step of the plain error analysis.
B. Motion for Substitute Counsel
Mejía contends that the district court erred by denying
his third motion for substitute counsel because his relationship
with counsel suffered from a lack of trust that amounted to a
conflict of interest. We review the denial of the motion for
substitute counsel for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
Karmue, 841 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir. 2016).
"A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is a right of the highest order." United States v. Jones, 778
F.3d 375, 388 (1st Cir. 2015). Although an "essential component
of that right is the accused's opportunity to obtain counsel of
his own choice," United States v. Díaz-Rodríguez, 745 F.3d 586,
590 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Panzardi Alvarez,
816 F.2d 813, 815 (1st Cir. 1987)), the Sixth Amendment does not
give a defendant "an unbounded right to the particular counsel of
his choosing," Jones, 778 F.3d at 388. To determine whether the
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district court's denial of a motion for substitute counsel violated
the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, we assess three factors:
"(1) the timeliness of the motion; (2) the adequacy of the court's
inquiry into the defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the
conflict between the defendant and his counsel was so great that
it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate
defense." United States v. Kar, 851 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2017)
(quoting United States v. Francois, 715 F.3d 21, 28 (1st Cir.
2013)). Because the government does not challenge the timeliness
of Mejía's motion, we begin with the second factor: the adequacy
of the court's inquiry.
Although Mejía asserts that he was "not allowed to
articulate his reasons" for seeking substitute counsel and did not
have an opportunity to explain the asserted conflict of interest,
the record demonstrates that the court gave him several
opportunities at the hearing to explain his concerns with his
counsel's representation. When Mejía initially asserted broad
complaints such as lack of trust, ineffective assistance, and
violation of his constitutional rights, the court asked clarifying
questions. In particular, the court asked Mejía to articulate how
he thought his constitutional rights had been violated and why he
did not trust his attorney, but Mejía was unable to point to any
concrete problems with González's representation other than
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González’s failure to file unspecified motions.3 The court
correctly determined that this vague complaint alone was not a
sufficient reason to justify substitution of counsel. See United
States v. Woodard, 291 F.3d 95, 108 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that
an attorney's failure to file a "motion that he considered to be
meritless does not constitute good cause for substitution of
counsel"). Contrary to Mejía's contention, the court's thorough
inquiry was more than adequate to allow the district court to
determine whether substitution of counsel was necessary. See,
e.g., United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 1986)
(holding that the court's inquiry was "comprehensive" where "[t]he
court invited appellant to make a statement, listened to his
reasons for being dissatisfied with his counsel, and found them to
be without merit").
With regard to the third factor, a "total lack of
communication preventing an adequate defense," Mejía contends that
González had a conflict of interest that prevented him from
adequately representing Mejía with respect to his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. However, Mejía has never explained --
3 Mejía's assertion that he would have explained the alleged
conflict of interest and violations of his rights if given the
chance at the hearing is undermined by his failure to do so in his
briefing on appeal. Mejía has never identified what motion he
wanted González to file or how González's failure to file that
motion affected his constitutional rights or led to a conflict of
interest.
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at the hearing or now on appeal -- the specifics of the alleged
conflict of interest, other than his disagreement with González's
decision not to file motions that Mejía thought should have been
filed. "Disfavoring counsel's guidance is distinct from failing
to communicate with counsel," and Mejía is not entitled to
substitute counsel merely because he disagreed with unspecified
strategic decisions made by González. Kar, 851 F.3d at 66.
Moreover, the record reflects that González continued to
represent Mejía to the best of his ability despite the alleged
breakdown in trust and communication. González met with Mejía
after the change of plea hearing and fulfilled Mejía's request
that he file motions to withdraw the guilty plea and to withdraw
as counsel, despite the fact that Mejía was no longer cooperating
with González's efforts to represent him. At the beginning of the
hearing on the motions, González explained Mejía's position
regarding the motion for substitute counsel. Following the court's
denial of the motion for substitute counsel, González continued to
meet with Mejía to prepare for sentencing and zealously represented
him at the sentencing hearing, arguing for the statutory minimum
sentence despite Mejía's refusal to cooperate with González and to
participate in the preparation of the PSR. See United States v.
Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 209 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding denial of
motion for substitute counsel where the attorney "continued to
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represent the appellant to the bitter end, and represented him
proficiently").
Thus, the record demonstrates that despite the alleged
breakdown in communication between Mejía and González, González
was still able to adequately represent Mejía, and that any effect
on the representation was caused by Mejía's own refusal to
participate in his representation, not on a breakdown of trust or
communication. See United States v. Reyes, 352 F.3d 511, 516 (1st
Cir. 2003) (stating that "a defendant cannot compel a change to
counsel by the device of refusing to talk with his lawyer"). The
district court therefore did not abuse its discretion when it
denied Mejía's third motion for substitute counsel.
Affirmed.
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