State of New Hampshire v. Elizabeth Seibel ( 2021 )


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    THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    ___________________________
    Carroll
    No. 2018-0336
    STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
    v.
    ELIZABETH SEIBEL
    Argued: April 14, 2021
    Opinion Issued: September 22, 2021
    Gordon J. MacDonald, attorney general (Brandon H. Garod, senior
    assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
    Thomas Barnard, senior assistant appellate defender, of Concord, on the
    brief and orally, for the defendant.
    DONOVAN, J. The defendant, Elizabeth Seibel, appeals her convictions,
    following a bench trial in the Superior Court (Ignatius, J.), on one count of
    financial exploitation of an elderly person, see RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) (2016), and
    two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3 (2016). She
    challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all three convictions. Because the
    State presented sufficient evidence to support each of the defendant’s
    convictions, we affirm.
    I. Facts
    The trial court found or could have found the following facts. The victim
    is an elderly widow and the defendant’s mother-in-law. In November 2012, the
    victim and her husband moved to New Hampshire to be close to their son and
    his wife, the defendant. About one month later, the victim’s husband died. At
    that time, the victim had about $11,300 in her personal checking account and
    owned four certificates of deposit (CDs) totaling about $110,000. She also
    received approximately $3,500 each month in social security, pension, and
    annuity payments. The victim had concerns about whether these financial
    resources were sufficient to support her for the rest of her life.
    Shortly after her husband’s death, the victim opened another checking
    account (Account #1), into which she deposited thousands of dollars. The
    victim also executed a durable general power of attorney granting her son
    authority to act on her behalf and authorizing the defendant to act as her agent
    if her son became “unavailable or unable” to do so.
    In January 2013, the defendant and the son added their names to
    Account #1 without the victim’s knowledge or consent. When the victim
    discovered the arrangement, the defendant and the son told her that co-owning
    the account would make it “easier to pay the bills.” Although the victim
    believed that the defendant and the son were contributing money to the
    account, neither did so. In February 2013, the victim, with the assistance of
    the defendant, redeemed one of her CDs to pay her husband’s funeral
    expenses.
    In March 2013, the victim moved into a condominium that was closer to
    the defendant and the son, with whom she regularly visited. The victim lived
    independently, paying her own bills and shopping for herself. She enjoyed
    living in her condominium, but was concerned about her ability to afford it.
    In October 2013, the defendant began transferring money online from
    Account #1 to her own personal checking account. Between October 2013 and
    May 2014, the defendant transferred $12,000 from Account #1 to her own
    account in separate online transactions of $1,000 or $2,000. The victim did
    not authorize any of these online transfers and, at the time, she was unaware
    that they had occurred.
    In March 2014, the defendant and the son informed the victim that they
    planned to purchase a house in Conway and asked her to move in with them
    and pay rent equal to the monthly amount she paid for her condominium.
    The victim visited the house with the defendant and the son, but was
    unimpressed. Afterwards, she told them that she believed the house needed
    2
    too much work and would cost too much in renovations. Despite these
    concerns, the victim agreed to move into the house, believing that her rental
    payments would help the defendant and the son.
    Shortly thereafter, the defendant and the son asked the victim to sign
    various documents without giving her an opportunity to review them, including
    a special power of attorney (SPOA) granting the defendant authority to
    purchase the house on the victim’s behalf. The victim was unaware that she
    had authorized the defendant to purchase the house on her behalf. She had
    no interest in the Conway house and never agreed to purchase it with her own
    money.
    As of May 2014, the defendant had redeemed each of the victim’s three
    remaining CDs, without the victim’s knowledge or consent, and transferred the
    proceeds into Account #1. In early May 2014, the defendant and the son
    opened another joint account (Account #2) without the victim’s knowledge or
    consent, naming themselves and the victim as co-owners. The defendant then
    began transferring money from Account #1 to Account #2. Throughout its
    existence, the only source of funds deposited into Account #2 was Account #1,
    which, as previously noted, held the victim’s money. The only debit card
    associated with Account #2 was issued in the defendant’s name.
    In late May 2014, the closing for the Conway house took place. The
    defendant attended without the victim and used her authority under the SPOA
    to execute legal documents obligating the victim, then eighty-four years old, to
    a thirty-year mortgage. The victim was unaware that the defendant had
    purchased the house on her behalf.
    In June 2014, all of the parties moved into the Conway house. The
    defendant then began spending money from Account #2 to pay for various
    personal and household expenses. In total, and unbeknownst to the victim,
    the defendant issued approximately $42,000 in checks and made
    approximately $33,000 in debit purchases from Account #2. The defendant
    used some of the funds in Account #2 to renovate and furnish the house. The
    defendant also spent some of the funds on goods and services that were
    personal to her, such as her hairstylist and her personal credit card and cell
    phone bills. In all, after January 2015, the defendant spent approximately
    $2,762 on expenses that were unrelated to the Conway house. As of May
    2015, the victim’s financial resources were essentially depleted.
    Although the victim had agreed to share some household expenses with
    the defendant and the son, she never authorized the defendant’s use of the
    money in Account #2. The defendant’s use of this money was also “radically
    different” from the victim’s personal spending habits. The victim “made regular
    payments every month with checks [from Account #1] . . . to a small number of
    vendors with regular recurring identities” and was “very careful in writing down
    3
    what the reason for the payments were.” By contrast, the defendant’s
    expenditures from Account #2 included payments to a wide variety of vendors
    for goods and services that the victim did not normally purchase.
    The defendant’s transfers from Account #1 also differed from the victim’s
    spending habits. Whenever the victim gave the defendant or the son money or
    reimbursed them for certain expenses, she issued checks to them or gave them
    cash. The victim tended to make such gifts and reimbursements in precise
    amounts, at irregular intervals, and for specific reasons, which she often
    detailed on the checks that she issued. She did not transfer money between
    accounts online, as she generally did not use computers and was unfamiliar
    with online banking. By contrast, the defendant’s transfers from Account #1 to
    her own personal account were made at consistent intervals, in “broad . . . and
    very general” amounts of $1,000 and $2,000, which did not appear to
    correspond to any particular expense incurred by the victim.
    While the victim resided in the Conway house, the defendant and the son
    prevented her from examining her bank statements. On one occasion, they
    showed the victim one statement, but due to their resistance, the victim never
    asked again. The victim was also told that the defendant and the son cashed
    her remaining CDs to settle a lawsuit on the victim’s behalf when, in fact, no
    such lawsuit had ever been brought against her.
    In June 2015, the victim contacted an attorney after discovering that she
    owned the Conway house. Following a police investigation, the defendant was
    charged with one count of theft by unauthorized taking in connection with
    money totaling more than $1,500 that the defendant transferred from Account
    #1 to her own account between October 2013 and May 2014; one count of theft
    by unauthorized taking relating to purchases totaling more than $1,500 that
    the defendant made from Account #2 between May 2014 and June 2015; and
    one count of financial exploitation of an elderly person with respect to
    purchases totaling more than $1,500 from Account #2 after January 1, 2015.
    After the State rested, and again at the close of the evidence, the
    defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the evidence was
    insufficient to convict her. The trial court denied the motions and convicted
    the defendant on all three counts. The trial court likewise denied the
    defendant’s post-trial motion to set aside the verdicts. This appeal followed.
    II. Analysis
    On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on all
    three of her convictions. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence raises a
    question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Saintil-Brown, 
    172 N.H. 110
    , 117 (2019). When considering such challenges, we objectively review the
    entire record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found
    4
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the evidence, and all reasonable
    inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the State. 
    Id.
     We
    examine each item of evidence in the context of the entire case, and not in
    isolation. 
    Id.
     The trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from facts
    proved as well as from facts found as the result of other inferences, provided
    they can be reasonably drawn therefrom. 
    Id.
     Because the defendant chose to
    present a case, we review the entire trial record to determine the sufficiency of
    the evidence. 
    Id.
     The defendant bears the burden of proving that the evidence
    was insufficient to prove guilt. 
    Id.
    If the evidence presented at trial consists of both direct and
    circumstantial evidence, we apply the standard set forth above and uphold the
    verdict unless no rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     If, however, the record contains only circumstantial
    evidence, the defendant must establish that the evidence fails to exclude all
    reasonable conclusions except guilt. 
    Id.
     The proper analysis is not whether
    the evidence excludes every possible conclusion consistent with innocence, but
    whether it has excluded all reasonable conclusions other than guilt. 
    Id.
     We do
    not determine whether the defendant has suggested another possible
    hypothesis that could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion. State v.
    Roy, 
    167 N.H. 276
    , 292 (2015). Rather, we evaluate the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the State and determine whether the alternative hypothesis is
    sufficiently reasonable that a rational trier of fact could not have found proof of
    guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
    Id.
     “[W]here solely circumstantial evidence is
    at issue, the critical question is whether, even assuming all credibility
    resolutions in favor of the State, the inferential chain of circumstances is of
    sufficient strength that guilt is the sole rational conclusion.” State v. Ruiz, 
    170 N.H. 553
    , 569 (2018) (quotation and emphasis omitted).
    A. Financial Exploitation
    We first address the defendant’s argument that the evidence was
    insufficient to support her financial exploitation of an elderly person conviction.
    The defendant was charged with violating RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), which states, in
    relevant part:
    I. Whoever commits any of the following acts against an elderly,
    disabled, or impaired adult, . . . shall be guilty of financial
    exploitation . . . if:
    (a) In breach of a fiduciary obligation recognized in law,
    including pertinent regulations, contractual obligations,
    documented consent by a competent person, including, but not
    limited to, an agent under a durable power of attorney,
    guardian, conservator, or trustee, a person, knowingly or
    recklessly, for his or her own profit or advantage:
    5
    ....
    (2) Unless authorized by the instrument establishing
    fiduciary obligation, deprives, uses, manages, or takes either
    temporarily or permanently the real or personal property or
    other financial resources of the elderly, disabled, or impaired
    adult for the benefit of someone other than the elderly,
    disabled, or impaired adult.
    RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) (emphases added).
    The defendant argues that, in order to prove that she breached a
    fiduciary obligation, as required by RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State had to prove
    that she exercised a fiduciary power or acted in a fiduciary capacity after
    January 1, 2015, when RSA 631:9 took effect. The defendant contends that
    the State failed to meet this burden because it presented no evidence that she
    exercised a fiduciary power or acted in a fiduciary capacity after May 2014,
    when the Conway house was purchased. Specifically, the defendant asserts
    that because she co-owned Account #2 with the victim and the son, she was
    authorized to make purchases from that account in her capacity as co-owner of
    the account without exercising any fiduciary power under the SPOA.
    Resolving the defendant’s argument requires that we interpret the
    language of RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). The interpretation of a statute raises a question
    of law, which we review de novo. See State v. Pinault, 
    168 N.H. 28
    , 31 (2015).
    In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiters of the intent of
    the legislature as expressed in the words of the statute considered as a whole.
    
    Id.
     We construe provisions of the Criminal Code according to the fair import of
    their terms and to promote justice. 
    Id.
     We first look to the language of the
    statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and
    ordinary meaning. 
    Id.
     We interpret legislative intent from the statute as
    written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add
    language that the legislature did not see fit to include. 
    Id.
     We interpret
    statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. 
    Id.
    We disagree with the defendant’s argument that, in order to prove that
    she breached a fiduciary obligation, the State had to prove that she acted in a
    fiduciary capacity or exercised a fiduciary power after January 1, 2015. As an
    initial matter, we observe that nothing in the plain language of the statute
    supports such an interpretation of the State’s burden of proof. In order to
    convict the defendant under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State was required to prove,
    as relevant here, that the defendant acted “[i]n breach of a fiduciary obligation
    recognized in law” and that the defendant’s actions were not “authorized by the
    instrument establishing [the] fiduciary obligation.” RSA 631:9, I(a)(2).
    6
    In State v. Folley, 
    172 N.H. 760
     (2020), we upheld the financial
    exploitation conviction of a defendant who — similar to the defendant here —
    was accused of breaching a fiduciary obligation under the victim’s durable
    power of attorney by spending money for his own benefit from a joint account
    that he owned with the victim. Folley, 172 N.H. at 762-66, 770-71. There, the
    defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction
    because the State failed to prove that he acted without the victim’s
    authorization. Id. at 770. We rejected this argument, explaining that “the
    State was not required to prove that [the defendant] took funds without
    authorization from the victim; it was required to prove that [the defendant] took
    funds, in breach of a fiduciary duty, without authorization from the instrument
    establishing that fiduciary duty — the power of attorney.” Id. We further
    observed that, although the power of attorney allowed the defendant to spend
    the victim’s money on her behalf, it “placed [the defendant] under a fiduciary
    duty to make such financial decisions in a way that [was] ‘reasonable in view of
    the interests of the victim and in view of the way in which a person of ordinary
    judgment would act in carrying out that person’s own affairs’” and prohibited
    him from “‘using the money or property for his own benefit or to make gifts to
    himself or others.’” Id. (brackets omitted).
    Because the defendant in Folley did not dispute that he acted pursuant
    to the victim’s durable power of attorney when he spent money from the joint
    account, we had no occasion to consider the question presented here —
    whether a defendant, serving as an agent under a power of attorney, can be
    liable for a breach of a fiduciary obligation, as required by RSA 631:9, I(a)(2),
    when purporting to act in his or her individual capacity as co-owner of a joint
    bank account. See id. at 770-71. To the extent that the defendant here argues
    that RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires proof in every case that the defendant acted in
    a fiduciary capacity, we disagree. RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires the State to prove,
    as relevant here, that the defendant acted “[i]n breach of a fiduciary obligation
    recognized in law.” When determining whether a defendant breached a
    fiduciary obligation, we look to the nature and scope of the fiduciary
    relationship as informed by the terms of the instrument creating that
    relationship. See id. (relying upon the language of the durable power of
    attorney to determine whether the defendant breached his fiduciary obligations
    to the victim); see also Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.01 cmt. c at 254
    (2006) (explaining that “an agent’s fiduciary duties to the principal vary
    depending on the parties’ agreement and the scope of the parties’
    relationship”). Thus, in order to determine whether the defendant here
    breached a fiduciary obligation, we look to the language of the SPOA.
    The SPOA authorized the defendant “to do anything whatsoever that [the
    victim] may or could do in person, with regard to [the victim’s] purchase of [the
    Conway] property.” The SPOA provided that, as the victim’s attorney-in-fact,
    the defendant had authority “to make decisions about the money, property or
    both belonging to the [victim] and to spend the [victim’s] money, property or
    7
    both on [the victim’s] behalf in accordance with the terms of [the SPOA].”
    Similar to the language of the durable power of attorney in Folley, the SPOA
    also placed the defendant “under a duty (called a ‘fiduciary duty’) to observe
    the standards observed by a prudent person dealing with the property of
    another” and prohibited her from using the victim’s “money or property for
    [her] own benefit or to make gifts to [her]self or others” unless the SPOA
    specifically authorized her to do so. The SPOA did not include any language
    suggesting that, under certain circumstances, the defendant could spend the
    victim’s money for her own personal benefit. Thus, under the terms of the
    SPOA, it made no difference whether the defendant acted in a fiduciary
    capacity or in her capacity as co-owner of Account #2; any use of the victim’s
    money for her own personal benefit was contrary to her fiduciary obligation
    established by the SPOA. We therefore conclude that the State’s burden was
    limited to proving that the defendant breached a fiduciary obligation imposed
    by the SPOA when she used the victim’s money for her own benefit. See RSA
    631:9, I(a)(2).
    The defendant argues, however, that “[i]n light of the fact that [under
    Folley] a defendant can violate RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) [by] engaging in conduct that
    the victim authorized, it would produce absurd results to hold that the
    provision can also apply to acts that do not involve the exercise of fiduciary
    powers.” In essence, the defendant asserts that any individual in a fiduciary
    relationship with an elderly person would be prohibited from accepting gifts
    from the elderly person unless the instrument creating the fiduciary
    relationship allowed the fiduciary to use the elderly person’s property for his or
    her own benefit. It would make no difference, the defendant posits, that the
    elderly person independently authorized the gift or the fiduciary exercised no
    fiduciary power in accepting it. This, the defendant asserts, would produce
    absurd results.
    We reject the premise of the defendant’s argument that our decision in
    Folley precludes a defendant from raising the victim’s authorization or consent
    as a defense to a violation of RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). In Folley, we held that, in
    order to establish that the defendant breached a fiduciary obligation under
    RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), the State need not prove that the defendant lacked
    authorization from the victim. See Folley, 172 N.H. at 770. We did not hold,
    however, as the defendant asserts here, that “the victim’s authorization [is]
    irrelevant to a charge under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2).” Consent remains a viable
    defense under the statute, provided that the defendant did not know, or have a
    reason to know, that the elderly, disabled, or impaired adult lacked capacity to
    consent. See RSA 631:9, IV (2016); see also RSA 626:6, I (2016).
    The defendant also argues that construing RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) in this
    manner implicates double jeopardy concerns, as it leaves “little to distinguish
    [RSA 631:9, I(a)(2)] from the crime of theft by unauthorized taking under RSA
    637:3.” Whether two offenses constitute the same crime for double jeopardy
    8
    purposes depends upon “whether proof of the elements of the crimes as
    charged will require a difference in evidence.” State v. Ramsey, 
    166 N.H. 45
    ,
    51 (2014); see also Blockburger v. United States, 
    284 U.S. 299
    , 304 (1932)
    (holding that, under the Federal Constitution, two offenses are not the same if
    “each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not”). The
    defendant argues that RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) must require proof that the defendant
    acted in her fiduciary capacity because, otherwise, “both crimes would require
    proof that [the] defendant used the victim’s property without the victim’s
    authorization,” thereby rendering them the same offense for double jeopardy
    purposes.
    We are not persuaded by the defendant’s double jeopardy argument.
    Whereas RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) requires proof that the defendant acted “[i]n breach
    of a fiduciary obligation recognized in law,” RSA 637:3, I, provides only that “[a]
    person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the
    property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.” Moreover, unlike
    RSA 637:3, I, RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) does not require proof that the defendant acted
    without the victim’s authorization. See Folley, 172 N.H. at 770.
    In light of our conclusion that the State was required to prove only that
    the defendant violated a fiduciary obligation when she spent money from
    Account #2, we further conclude that the evidence was sufficient to establish
    that, after January 1, 2015, the defendant breached her fiduciary obligation
    under the SPOA by spending the victim’s money for her own personal benefit.
    Although the defendant purchased the Conway house on the victim’s behalf in
    May 2014, before RSA 631:9, I(a)(2) took effect, the SPOA’s broad language
    indicates that the defendant’s fiduciary obligations continued after the
    purchase of the property. In addition to authorizing the defendant to purchase
    the property on the victim’s behalf, the SPOA granted the defendant authority
    to, among other things, “bargain, sell, convey, lease, mortgage or discharge” the
    Conway house and “do any and all things, whether herein enumerated or not,
    which [the defendant] shall consider advantageous or proper in connection
    with [the victim’s] affairs concerning [the Conway house].” The SPOA provided
    that this additional, specified authority was not intended to “limit[] the
    generality of the [defendant’s] foregoing broad power.” The SPOA further stated
    that the defendant’s authority to act under the SPOA “will end when the
    [victim] dies.” Based upon this language, we conclude that the defendant’s
    fiduciary obligations did not expire with the purchase of the property.1
    Moreover, a rational trier of fact could have found that, during her
    fiduciary relationship with the victim, the defendant spent the victim’s money
    for her own benefit and to make gifts to herself, in violation of her fiduciary
    obligations under the SPOA. Specifically, a rational trier of fact could have
    1Indeed, the defendant conceded at trial that the SPOA did not expire upon the purchase of the
    Conway house.
    9
    found that, after January 1, 2015, the defendant spent approximately $2,762
    from Account #2 on expenses that were unrelated to the Conway house. These
    expenses included payments for goods and services that were personal to the
    defendant, such as the defendant’s hairstylist and credit card and cell phone
    bills. The defendant does not dispute that the money in Account #2 belonged
    solely to the victim. Nor does she dispute that the victim never consented to
    her use of the money in Account #2. Cf. State v. Gagne, 
    165 N.H. 363
    , 370-72
    (2013) (concluding that funds in a joint account owned by the defendant and
    the victim constituted “property of another,” as defined by RSA 637:2, IV, when
    the arrangement between the defendant and the victim did not privilege the
    defendant “to infringe upon the victim’s interest in the funds in the joint
    account for [her] own use” (quotation omitted)). Therefore, even assuming that
    the defendant acted in her individual capacity as co-owner of Account #2 when
    she spent money from that account, a rational trier of fact could have
    nonetheless found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she violated her fiduciary
    obligations under the SPOA by using the victim’s money for her own personal
    benefit. Accordingly, because the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of
    fact to find that the defendant breached a fiduciary obligation, the defendant
    has failed to meet her burden of establishing that the evidence was insufficient
    to support her conviction under RSA 631:9, I(a)(2). See Roy, 167 N.H. at 292.
    B. Theft by Unauthorized Taking
    We next address the defendant’s argument that the evidence was
    insufficient to support either of her theft by unauthorized taking convictions. A
    person is guilty of theft by unauthorized taking if he or she “obtains or
    exercises unauthorized control over the property of another with a purpose to
    deprive him thereof.” RSA 637:3, I. The defendant argues that the evidence
    was insufficient to prove that she knew her actions were unauthorized.
    Specifically, she asserts that the evidence was insufficient to exclude the
    possibility that the son deceived her into believing that the victim authorized
    her to transfer money from Account #1 to her own personal checking account
    and to spend money from Account #2 on certain purchases.
    For the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that RSA
    637:3, I, requires the State to prove that the defendant knew her actions were
    unauthorized. We also assume, without deciding, that the evidence of the
    defendant’s knowledge was wholly circumstantial. Nonetheless, we conclude
    that the defendant’s alternative explanation — that she believed the victim
    authorized her to transfer $12,000 from Account #1 to her personal account
    and to spend money from Account #2 on purchases that benefited her alone —
    is not sufficiently reasonable to prevent a rational trier of fact from finding
    proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. The totality of
    the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, fails to support a
    reasonable conclusion that the defendant did not know that her actions were
    unauthorized.
    10
    Viewing the evidence and its inferences in the light most favorable to the
    State, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant concealed her
    conduct from the victim by preventing the victim from examining her bank
    statements and lying to the victim about using the CDs to settle a fictitious
    lawsuit. A rational trier of fact could have therefore found that the defendant’s
    deceptive behavior evidenced her consciousness of guilt, and, thus, her
    knowledge that the transfers and expenditures were unauthorized. See Folley,
    172 N.H. at 768-69 (concluding that the defendants’ out-of-court statements
    evidenced their consciousness of guilt where their statements were “squarely
    contradicted” by certain records).
    A rational trier of fact could have also found that the victim was of
    relatively limited means and was concerned about having sufficient resources
    to support her in the future. Because the defendant occasionally assisted the
    victim with her finances and co-owned both Account #1 and Account #2, a
    rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant was aware of the
    victim’s financial limitations. Yet, the defendant depleted nearly all of the
    victim’s financial resources in order to pay for things in which the victim
    expressed no interest. Based upon this evidence, a rational trier of fact could
    have inferred that the defendant knew her actions were unauthorized.
    Moreover, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant’s
    use of the victim’s money was markedly different from how the victim normally
    spent her money. The expenditures from Account #2 included payments to a
    wide variety of vendors for goods and services on which the victim did not
    normally spend money, and the transfers from Account #1 to the defendant’s
    personal account were made at regular intervals and in amounts that did not
    correspond to any particular expense incurred by the victim. Because the
    defendant, as co-owner of both accounts, had access to the victim’s billing
    statements, a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant knew
    the purchases and transfers at issue were inconsistent with how the victim
    normally spent her money.
    Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
    we conclude that the defendant’s proposed alternative conclusion — that she
    believed the victim, an elderly widow with limited financial resources,
    authorized her to transfer $12,000 from Account #1 to her personal account
    and spend money from Account #2 to pay for things in which the victim
    showed no interest and for which she received no benefit — is not sufficiently
    reasonable to prevent a rational trier of fact from finding proof of guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt. Roy, 167 N.H. at 292. The defendant has therefore failed to
    meet her burden of establishing that the evidence was insufficient to support
    her theft by unauthorized taking convictions. See id.
    11
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions on one
    count of financial exploitation of an elderly person, see RSA 631:9, I(a)(2), and
    two counts of theft by unauthorized taking, see RSA 637:3. Any issues that
    the defendant raised in her notice of appeal, but did not brief, are deemed
    waived. State v. Bazinet, 
    170 N.H. 680
    , 688 (2018).
    Affirmed.
    HICKS, BASSETT, and HANTZ MARCONI, JJ., concurred.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018-0336

Filed Date: 9/22/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/31/2021