Chardon-Dubos v. United States , 273 F. App'x 5 ( 2008 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 07-1966
FREDERIC CHARDON-DUBOS,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Juan M. Pérez-Giménez, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Circuit Judge,
Selya, Senior Circuit Judge,
and Howard, Circuit Judge.
Frederic Chardon-Dubos on brief pro se.
Rosa Emilia Rodriguez-Velez, United States Attorney, Nelson
Perez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, and Mariana E. Bauza-
Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney on brief for appellee.
April 17, 2008
Per Curiam. Plaintiff-appellant Frederic Chardon-Dubos
appeals from the district court's judgment granting the
government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and the court's denial of his motion to alter or amend
the judgment. "We review a district court's dismissal for want of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo. For that purpose, we give
weight to the well-pleaded factual averments in the operative
pleading . . . and indulge every reasonable inference in the
pleader's favor." Aguilar v. United States Immigr. and Customs
Enf., 510 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007).
Where standing is at issue, heightened
specificity is obligatory at the pleading
stage. The resultant burden cannot be
satisfied by purely conclusory allegations or
by a Micawberish reading of a party's
generalized averments. To the contrary, the
proponent's pleadings "must be something more
than an ingenious academic exercise in the
conceivable." [United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures]
(SCRAP), 412 U.S. [669,] at 688 [(1973)].
United States v. AVX Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1992).
"The requisite elements of Article III standing are well
established: 'A plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly
traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely
to be redressed by the requested relief.'" Hein v. Freedom from
Religion Found.,127 S.Ct. 2553, 2562 (2007). In addition to these
constitutional requirements, "the federal judiciary has also
adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the
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question of standing. . . . [E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged
redressable injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III,
the Court has refrained from adjudicating 'abstract questions of
wide public significance' which amount to 'generalized grievances,'
pervasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the
representative branches." Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 474-75 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-
500(1975)).
Whether styled as a constitutional or
prudential limit on standing, the Court has
sometimes determined that where large numbers
of Americans suffer alike, the political
process, rather than the judicial process, may
provide the more appropriate remedy for a
widely shared grievance. [Such judicial
language], however, invariably appears in
cases where the harm at issue is not only
widely shared, but is also of an abstract and
indefinite nature - for example, harm to the
"common concern for obedience to law." . . .
Often the fact that an interest is abstract
and the fact that it is widely shared go hand
in hand. But their association is not
invariable, and where harm is concrete, though
widely shared, the Court has found "injury in
fact."
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998).
Chardon-Dubos claims that Public Law 600 and Puerto
Rico's Commonwealth status, which resulted represent an
unconstitutional disposition of Congress's sovereign territorial
powers under art. IV, §3 of the United States Constitution ("the
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Territorial Clause").1 Public Law 600, 64 Stat. 319(1950)(codified at 48 U.S.C. § 731b, et seq.) authorized Puerto
Rico to enact a constitution for local self-government, which
constitution was approved by Public Law 447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952).
To satisfy the injury in fact requirement, Chardon-Dubos
was required to show some "invasion of a legally protected interest
which is (a) concrete and particularized[] and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). He was also required to plead
a "causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of" and that it is "'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'" Id.
at 560-61.
The injury that Chardon-Dubos alleged in his amended
complaint was conjectural. The amended complaint alleged that the
Federal Government's failure to exercise sovereignty over Puerto
Rico resulted in the Puerto Rican government choosing to spend
money lobbying Congress on the issue of Puerto Rico's status, which
in turn reduced government expenditures for other purposes, causing
price increases and reduced services to Chardon-Dubos as a resident
1
The Territorial Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2,
provides that "[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this
Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of
the United States, or of any particular State."
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of Puerto Rico. In a d d i t ion to the cl a i m e d i n j u r y ' s
deficiencies, "the line of causation between [Congress' challenged
action] and such injury is not apparent from the complaint." Warth,
422 U.S. at 508. Chardon-Dubos failed to allege a sufficiently
direct causal link between the claimed violation (enactment of
Public Law 600) and the claimed personal injury (increased prices
and reduced services for residents of Puerto Rico). The causal
connection depended upon speculation about how the Puerto Rico
legislature would spend funds and how such decisions would impact
the local economy. "[A] party seeking federal jurisdiction cannot
rely on such '[s]peculative inferences . . . to connect [his]
injury to the challenged actions of [the defendant]."
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 346 (2006); see Biszko
v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 758 F.2d 769, 771 (1st Cir. 1985)(stating that
"'broad allegations of speculative injury will not suffice'")
(citation omitted).
To the extent that Chardon-Dubos claims standing simply
as a taxpayer, "[i]t has been . . . clear for more than three-
quarters of a century that, with certain narrow exceptions not
implicated here, taxpayers, as such, lack generalized standing to
challenge the constitutionality of governmental action." Osediacz
v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 142 (1st Cir. 2005).
Specifically, a "plaintiff's standing . . . cannot be grounded on
the mere fact that []he pays taxes to a municipality which, in
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turn, expends funds to further an unconstitutional exercise of
governmental power." Id.Chardon-Dubos argues that the district court erred in
denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment to permit him to
amend his complaint further to include the factual allegations of
personal injury in support of standing contained in his "Verified
Statement" in his opposition to the government's motion to dismiss.
Even if the motion to amend had been properly before the district
court, "[a]n order denying leave to amend will be overturned only
where the district court has abused its discretion." Epstein v.
C.R. Bard, Inc., 460 F.3d 183, 190 (1st Cir. 2006). The "Verified
Statement" was filed more than a year after the filing of the
original complaint and the government's motion to dismiss. The
facts allegedly occurred prior to the filing of the original
complaint. Moreover, it does not appear that the newly alleged
facts could establish Chardon-Dubos' standing to challenge Public
Law 600. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion. See id. at
191.
The district court judgment dismissing the complaint with
prejudice and its order denying the motion to alter or amend that
judgment are affirmed.
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