Jardin de las Catalinas LP v. Joyner , 766 F.3d 127 ( 2014 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 12-1757
JARDÍN DE LAS CATALINAS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
AND JARDÍN DE SANTA MARIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
GEORGE R. JOYNER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE PUERTO RICO HOUSING FINANCE AUTHORITY,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
[Hon. Camille Vélez-Rivé, U.S. Magistrate Judge]
Before
Thompson, Baldock** and Selya,
Circuit Judges.
Ignacio Fernández de Lahongrais, with whom Bufete Fernández &
Alcaraz, C.S.P. was on brief, for appellants.
Tomás A. Román-Santos, with whom José L. Ramírez-Coll and
Fiddler, González & Rodríguez, PSC were on brief, for appellee.
September 12, 2014
*
Of the Tenth Circuit, sitting by designation.
SELYA, Circuit Judge. This is what might be called a
"pick your poison" case. In the proceedings below, the district
court identified three justifications supporting its grant of
judgment on the pleadings: waiver, untimeliness, and the absence of
a constitutionally protected property interest in the tax credits
sought by the plaintiffs. Although all of these avenues appear
promising, principles of judicial economy and restraint counsel
that we write no more broadly than is necessary to resolve this
appeal.
When we conduct the necessary triage, what jumps off the
page is the tardiness of the plaintiffs' action. We therefore
train our sights on this facet of the district court's decision.
Concluding, as we do, that the plaintiffs' action was brought
outside the applicable limitations period and that equitable
tolling does not rescue it, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We start with a brief exposition of the relevant
statutory scheme. Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code provides
for tax credits designed to encourage investment in low-income
housing. See I.R.C. § 42, 26 U.S.C. § 42. The statute requires
each state agency to develop a qualified allocation plan, see id.
§ 42(m)(1)(B), and gives such agencies broad discretion to
determine whether and to whom the credits will be allocated, see
Barrington Cove Ltd. P'ship v. R. I. Hous. & Mortg. Fin. Corp., 246
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F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2001). The allocation of such credits to
particular taxpayers occurs through the issuance, annually, of
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 8609 forms. See Treas. Reg. § 1.42-
1(h).
The amount of the annual credit is equal to the
"applicable percentage" of the "qualified basis" of a covered
project. See I.R.C. § 42(a). The qualified basis is determined
with reference to (among other things) the cost of development and
the ratio of low-income units to other units in the project. See
id. § 42(c)(1), (d). For projects like those at issue here, the
applicable percentage is a rate calculated to yield, over a ten-
year period, a credit of 70% of the present value of the qualified
basis. See id. § 42(b)(1)(B)(i). For any given project, this
percentage typically is locked in either upon the execution of a
binding agreement between the state agency and the taxpayer or when
the building is placed into service. See id. § 42(b)(1).
Even though such allocation agreements are binding, the
ultimate award of credits is subject to the state agency's
assessment of financial feasibility. See Treas. Reg. § 1.42-
8(a)(5). The agency may reduce the previously agreed credit amount
if, after considering certain factors, it determines that the
project would be financially viable without the full subsidy. See
id.; I.R.C. § 42(m)(2).
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Against this backdrop, we turn to the case at hand.
Because this case was decided on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, we assume the accuracy of the well-pleaded facts and
supplement those facts by reference to documents incorporated in
the pleadings and matters susceptible to judicial notice. See
Greenpack of P.R., Inc. v. Am. President Lines, 684 F.3d 20, 25-26
(1st Cir. 2012); see also Cruz v. Melecio, 204 F.3d 14, 21 (1st
Cir. 2000).
The plaintiffs, Jardín de las Catalinas Limited
Partnership and Jardín de Santa Maria Limited Partnership, each own
an apartment building in Puerto Rico that qualifies (under section
42) for low-income housing tax credits. The defendant is the
Executive Director of the Puerto Rico Housing Finance Authority
(the PRHFA), which is the agency responsible for allocating these
credits in Puerto Rico.1
The events giving rise to this appeal began when the
plaintiffs and the PRHFA entered into so-called carryover
allocation agreements (the Agreements) setting the applicable
percentage for their covered projects at 8.12%. Based on this rate
and estimates of each project's qualified basis, the Agreements
provided each plaintiff with a projected tax-credit allocation of
more than $1,000,000 annually.
1
For purposes of the statutory scheme, Puerto Rico is treated
as a state. See I.R.C. §§ 42(h)(8)(B), 7701(d). The PRHFA is,
therefore, the functional equivalent of a state agency.
-4-
Congress thereafter passed the Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008 (HERA), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654.
Among its constellation of provisions, HERA amended section 42 to
provide temporarily that the applicable percentage for developments
such as those owned by the plaintiffs "shall not be less than 9
[%]." Id. § 3002(a)(1), 122 Stat. at 2879 (codified at I.R.C.
§ 42(b)(2)). The new 9% floor applied even to taxpayers, like the
plaintiffs, who previously had agreed to lower applicable
percentages. See I.R.S. Notice 2008-106, 2008-49 I.R.B. 1239 (Dec.
8, 2008).
The plaintiffs allege that, under the HERA amendment,
they were entitled to additional credits aggregating over $278,000
annually for their two projects combined.2 The plaintiffs further
aver that, on April 15, 2010, the PRHFA delivered to them over 300
IRS 8609 forms, each corresponding to a particular apartment unit
within one of the covered projects. On each form, line 1b
specified the dollar amount of the tax credit allocated to the
particular unit; line 2 specified the applicable percentage (9%);
and line 3a specified the qualified basis for that unit. The
plaintiffs signed the forms and submitted them to the IRS on the
same day, apparently without regard to whether the total of the
credits matched their expectations.
2
This amount represents the product of the increase in
applicable percentage from 8.12% to 9%, applied to the qualified
bases stipulated in the Agreements.
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As matters turned out, the PRHFA had allocated to the
plaintiffs the exact amount of credits specified in the Agreements,
and no more. To reach this figure, the PRHFA had reduced the
qualified basis for each unit such that, when multiplied by the new
9% rate required by HERA, no additional credits were due.
Some months elapsed before the plaintiffs, on November 5,
2010, sent an e-mail to the PRHFA bringing this perceived
discrepancy to its attention. In an e-mailed response dated
November 8, the agency confirmed its calculation methodology and
stood by the amount of the allocation.3
On April 19, 2011 — more than one year after they signed
and forwarded the IRS 8609 forms to the IRS — the plaintiffs
repaired to the federal district court. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
they sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant
in his official capacity, charging that the PRHFA had unlawfully
seized the additional tax credits to which they ostensibly were
entitled under HERA. The defendant answered, denying that any
unlawful seizure of tax credits had transpired.
In due course, the defendant moved for judgment on the
pleadings, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), asserting that the
plaintiffs' action was time-barred and that, in all events, the
3
These e-mails, which are in Spanish, were not translated
into English as required by First Circuit Rule 30.0(e). Because
their content does not affect our decision, we adopt the
plaintiffs' characterization of them.
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plaintiffs had no cognizable property interest in any additional
tax credits. The motion was referred to a magistrate judge, who
granted the plaintiffs an extension of time within which to file an
opposition. However, the plaintiffs failed to file their
opposition within the extended period. The magistrate judge then
issued a report and recommendation, urging that the defendant's
unopposed motion for judgment on the pleadings be allowed.
The plaintiffs unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration.
They also filed objections to the magistrate judge's report and
recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). The district court
overruled these objections, accepted the magistrate judge's
recommendation, and granted the defendant's motion for judgment on
the pleadings. See Jardín de las Catalinas Ltd. P'ship v. Joyner,
861 F. Supp. 2d 12, 18 (D.P.R. 2012). This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
For simplicity's sake, we do not hereafter distinguish
between the district judge and the magistrate judge but, rather,
take an institutional view and refer to the determinations below as
those of the district court. We review a district court's entry of
judgment on the pleadings de novo.4 See Gulf Coast Bank & Trust
Co. v. Reder, 355 F.3d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 2004). The applicable
4
Noting that the plaintiffs failed to file a timely
opposition before the magistrate judge, the defendant contends that
our review should be for plain error. Because the decision below
easily survives de novo review, we need not address this
contention.
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standard of review is identical to the standard of review for
motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6). See Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina, 491 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
2007).
The district court discussed three possible
justifications for the entry of judgment on the pleadings: waiver,
untimeliness, and the absence of any cognizable property interest
in the additional tax credits. It would serve no useful purpose to
explore all of these avenues. Where a trial court decides a case
on alternative theories, each of which is independently sufficient
to ground its judgment, a reviewing court completes its work when
it determines that any one of those theories is fully supportable.
So it is here: the plaintiffs' action is plainly time-barred, and
we go directly to that dispositive point.
A limitations defense may be asserted through a motion
for judgment on the pleadings when it appears on the face of the
properly considered documents that the time for suit has expired.
See Rivera-Gomez v. de Castro, 843 F.2d 631, 632 (1st Cir. 1988);
5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 1368 (3d ed. 2004). Here, we consider not only the
pleadings but also the IRS 8609 forms and the Agreements (all of
which are relied upon in the complaint).
The plaintiffs brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which creates a private right of action to redress the deprivation
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of federally protected rights at the hands of state actors. Since
section 1983 does not contain a built-in statute of limitations,
courts borrow the forum state's statute of limitations for personal
injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 279-80 (1985);
Rivera-Muriente v. Agosto-Alicea, 959 F.2d 349, 352 (1st Cir.
1992). The parties agree that the Puerto Rico limitations period
for personal injury actions is one year, exclusive of the date of
accrual. See Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de
Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing P.R. Laws Ann. tit.
31, § 5298(2)).
Unlike the limitations period, the date of accrual is
determined strictly in accordance with federal law. See Rivera-
Muriente, 959 F.2d at 353. A section 1983 claim normally accrues
at the time of the injury, when the putative "plaintiff has a
complete and present cause of action" and can sue. Wallace v.
Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see Randall v. Laconia, N.H., 679 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2012). But
to the extent that the facts necessary to bring a claim are
unknown, the discovery rule may delay accrual until such facts "are
or should be apparent to a reasonably prudent person similarly
situated." Nieves-Márquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 119-20
(1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation mark omitted). Typically, the
discovery rule comes into play either when the injury has lain
dormant without manifestation or when "the facts about causation
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[are] in the control of the putative defendant, unavailable to the
plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain." United States v.
Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 122 (1979); see McIntyre v. United States,
367 F.3d 38, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2004).
Here, the parties' dispute centers on when the one-year
period began to run. The injury is the supposed seizure of tax
credits. A claim for such an injury usually accrues on the date of
the wrongful appropriation. See Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo,
430 F.3d 66, 70 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing cases). Taking the
plaintiffs' complaint at face value, they suffered harm and had "a
complete and present cause of action" when the PRHFA, without
notice, unilaterally lowered the qualified bases used in connection
with the various IRS 8609 forms and thereby allocated less
munificent tax credits than the plaintiffs expected. Wallace, 549
U.S. at 388 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This much is not controversial; what is controversial is
whether the plaintiffs knew or reasonably should have known of the
injury at the time the seizure occurred. It is this controversy
that we must resolve.
The plaintiffs received, signed, and forwarded to the IRS
the offending forms on April 15, 2010. The forms were easy to
read: each form consisted of a single page and supplied, unit by
unit, an allocated credit amount, the applicable percentage, and
the qualified basis. The sum of these unit-by-unit allocations
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represented the total allocation for the covered buildings. With
some simple arithmetic, the plaintiffs easily could have
determined, then and there, that the PRHFA had short-changed them
by allocating significantly less munificent tax credits than HERA
allegedly required. As their complaint acknowledges, the PRHFA
methodology was transparent: the sum of the "qualified basis" lines
on the various IRS 8609 forms is equal to the agreed (pre-HERA)
credit amount divided by 9% (the "applicable percentage" specified
in each form).
Given this mise-en-scène, we discern no error in the
district court's conclusion that the plaintiffs, on April 15, 2010,
knew or should have known all the facts necessary to prosecute
their claim. The limitations clock started on April 15, 2010, when
the plaintiffs were apprised of their injury and the defendant's
causal connection to that injury. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23.
From that point forward, it was up to the plaintiffs to connect the
dots.
The plaintiffs argue that the large number of forms (341
or so) complicated their task and masked what the PRHFA was doing.
This argument is hopeless. The plaintiffs are business entities
that had hundreds of thousands of dollars at stake, and adding up
the tax credits on the forms was an exercise in simple arithmetic
that any middle-schooler could have performed in a matter of hours.
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In an effort to efface this reasoning, the plaintiffs
seek refuge in the discovery rule. The essence of their argument
is a tripartite lament that they were lulled into complacency by a
combination of (i) the PRHFA's inclusion of the 9% rate on the IRS
8609 forms, (ii) the alleged concealment of the seizure in the
"minutiae" of those forms, and (iii) the omission from the PRHFA's
transmittal letter (which accompanied the delivery of the forms) of
any mention of its decision to decrease the qualified bases.
Implicit in this lamentation is the premise that a reasonable
person would not have examined the forms before submitting them to
the IRS, notwithstanding the obvious financial stakes. We think
that this premise is untenable, especially in light of the general
rule that a taxpayer is deemed to be aware of the contents of his
tax filings. See Greer v. Comm'r, 595 F.3d 338, 347 n.4 (6th Cir.
2010) ("A taxpayer who signs a tax return will not be heard to
claim innocence for not having actually read the return, as he or
she is charged with constructive knowledge of its contents.");
Hayman v. Comm'r, 992 F.2d 1256, 1262 (2d Cir. 1993) (similar);
Korchak v. Comm'r, 92 T.C.M. 199, 213 (2006) (similar).
Contrary to the plaintiffs' importunings, the discovery
rule is not apposite here. The discovery rule is meant to aid
plaintiffs who, for reasons beyond their control, could not have
promptly discovered the facts that form the foundation of their
claims. See Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. This is not such a case.
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In this instance, the plaintiffs had in hand all of the
facts needed to bring their claim no later than April 15, 2010. By
that date, there was nothing of consequence left for them to
discover. Because they did not sue within the one-year period next
following, their suit was time-barred.
Battling on, the plaintiffs attack on a different front.
They fustigate that their suit cannot be deemed untimely because
they did not receive "fair notice" of the PRHFA's alleged sleight
of hand until November of 2010 (when the PRHFA confirmed its
calculations in an e-mail). This cross-pollinated argument is
misshapen; it conflates the "notice" component of due process with
the knowledge requirement for accrual of the limitations period.
Cf. Kelly v. City of Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 512-13 (7th Cir. 1993)
("Just because the state believed that fairness compelled it to
allow judicial review of its decision to revoke the liquor license,
does not mean that the date of injury is postponed until exhaustion
of the appeals process.").
Once a plaintiff has knowledge of the facts needed to
bring a claim, it cannot wait idly for process to be afforded or
for the defendant to change its mind. See Rivera-Muriente, 959
F.2d at 354. Wishful thinking does not toll the statute of
limitations.
Staring into the abyss, the plaintiffs struggle to shift
the trajectory of the debate. They suggest that their action is
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really one for breach of contract and that Puerto Rico's 15-year
statute of limitations for such actions, see K-Mart Corp. v.
Oriental Plaza, Inc., 875 F.2d 907, 911 n.2 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing
P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5294), therefore applies. This
suggestion is fatuous.
The plaintiffs' complaint cannot fairly be read to plead
breach of contract. It seeks only equitable relief and does not
identify any particular provisions of the Agreements that might
have been breached. Nor could it: the Agreements state
unambiguously that the basis figures that lie at the heart of the
plaintiffs' claim are "estimates for computation purposes only."
There is simply no way to construe this language as a binding
promise.5
The plaintiffs have a fallback position. They assert
that, notwithstanding the customary operation of the limitations
period, the district court should have resurrected their suit by
invoking the doctrine of equitable tolling. This assertion lacks
force.
5
At any rate, reading the complaint as one for breach of
contract would not extricate the plaintiffs from the hole they have
dug. Were the complaint to be read as pleading a claim for breach
of contract instead of a claim for violation of section 1983, the
federal courts would lack subject-matter jurisdiction over the
action. See Mun'y of Mayagüez v. Corporación Para el Desarrollo
del Oeste, Inc., 726 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2013). In such an event,
this entire proceeding would be a nullity.
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"We review a district court's ruling rejecting the
application of the doctrine of equitable tolling for abuse of
discretion." Abraham v. Woods Hole Ocean. Inst., 553 F.3d 114, 119
(1st Cir. 2009). This review takes place in light of the
background precepts that equitable tolling is available only "in
exceptional circumstances," Neverson v. Farquharson, 366 F.3d 32,
40 (1st Cir. 2004), and "only when the circumstances that cause a
plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are out of [its] hands," Kelley
v. NLRB, 79 F.3d 1238, 1248 (1st Cir. 1996) (internal quotation
mark omitted).
There was no abuse of discretion here. The plaintiffs'
delay in bringing suit was of their own contrivance; by April 15,
2010, they had every bit of information that they needed to
institute a civil action against the PRHFA. The agency's failure
to be more forthcoming when transmitting the IRS 8609 forms did
not, on any realistic view of the situation, prevent the plaintiffs
from meeting the limitations deadline. A party is entitled to
knowledge of the relevant facts, not to a spoon-feeding of those
facts.
To cinch matters, we cannot fault the district court for
determining that there were no exceptional circumstances such as
would justify the plaintiffs' failure to sue within the limitations
period. Courts, like the Deity, are prone to help those who help
themselves; and the plaintiffs, having failed to exercise
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reasonable vigilance to protect their own interests, could not
expect the district court to regard the absence of a more explicit
agency statement as an excusatory circumstance.
III. CONCLUSION
We need go no further.6 For the reasons elucidated
above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Affirmed.
6
Because the district court's entry of judgment on the
pleadings is fully supportable on temporal grounds, we have no
occasion to discuss either its waiver ruling or its determination
that the plaintiffs lacked a constitutionally protected property
interest in the additional tax credits. After all, there is no
point in shooting bullets into a corpse.
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