Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC ( 2022 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1410
DEBORAH LAUFER,
Plaintiff, Appellant,
v.
ACHESON HOTELS, LLC,
Defendant, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. George Z. Singal, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Howard, and Thompson,
Circuit Judges.
Thomas B. Bacon, with whom Thomas B. Bacon, P.A. was on brief,
for appellant.
Sally A. Morris, with whom Jennifer H. Rohde and Sally A.
Morris, Attorney at Law, LLC, were on brief, for appellee.
October 5, 2022
THOMPSON, Circuit Judge. We're asked today to weigh in
for the first time on an Article III standing question that has
divided the circuit courts. Certain regulations under the
Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") require places of public
lodging to make information about the hotel's accessibility
available on any reservation portal to those with disabilities.
In the age of websites, that means a disabled person can comb the
web looking for non-compliant websites, even if she has no plans
whatsoever to actually book a room at the hotel. Thus, the
information could be viewed as irrelevant to her -- except to
whether the website is complying with the law. Has she suffered
a concrete and particularized injury in fact to have standing to
sue in federal court? Contrary to the district court's thinking,
we think the answer is yes.1 We further conclude that Laufer has
standing to pursue injunctive relief and that the case is not moot.
So we reverse.
1 By our count of the precedential opinions, three of our
sibling circuit courts have said no, and one has said yes. See
Laufer v. Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2022)
(standing); Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 444 (2d
Cir. 2022) (no standing); Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 879–81,
883 (10th Cir. 2022) (same); Laufer v. Mann Hosp. L.L.C., 996 F.3d
269, 273 (5th Cir. 2021) (same). One other has said no in a non-
precedential judgment without analysis. See Laufer v. Alamac Inc.,
No. 21-7056, 2021 WL 4765435, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 10, 2021).
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I.
A.
Deborah Laufer is disabled. She can't walk more than a
few steps without assistance and instead uses a wheelchair or a
cane to move around. She also has limited use of her hands and is
vision impaired. Among other requirements to accommodate her
disabilities, she needs special accessible parking and has to use
passageways wide enough and properly graded for her wheelchair.
Certain surfaces also need to be lowered so she can reach them,
pipes under a sink need to be wrapped so she doesn't scrape her
legs on them, and bathrooms need grab bars so she can transfer
from her wheelchair.
Defendant Acheson Hotels, LLC, operates The Coast
Village Inn and Cottages in a small town on Maine's southern coast.
It accepts reservations for the Inn on its own and other travel-
related websites. When Laufer first visited Acheson's website,
she found that it didn't identify accessible rooms, didn't provide
an option for booking an accessible room, and didn't give her
sufficient information to determine whether the rooms and features
of the Inn were accessible to her. She also says she faced the
same dearth of information when she visited the Inn's reservation
service through thirteen other third-party websites, including
Expedia.com, Hotels.com, and Booking.com. And she alleges that
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she plans to revisit these websites "[i]n the near future" to see
if they still lack this information she needs.
B.
That brings us to the next piece of the story: the
statutory background that brings color to Laufer's claim. Congress
enacted the ADA recognizing that "many people with physical or
mental disabilities have been precluded from [participating in all
aspects of society] because of discrimination," 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(1), and that those with disabilities, "as a group,
occupy an inferior status in our society," id. § 12101(a)(6).
Congress found that "individuals with disabilities continually
encounter various forms of discrimination, including . . . failure
to make modifications to existing facilities and practices, . . .
segregation, and relegation to lesser services, programs,
activities, benefits, jobs, or other opportunities." Id.
§ 12101(a)(5); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 536–37
(2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (describing the congressional
impetus of the ADA); Cushing v. Packard, 30 F.4th 27, 59 (1st Cir.
2022) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (same).
Title III of the ADA provides that "[n]o individual shall
be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full
and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public
accommodation by any person who owns . . . or operates a place of
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public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Specifically, the
ADA makes it discriminatory to provide disabled individuals with
an "opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good, service,
facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation" unequal to those
without disabilities. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii). And it defines
discrimination to include the "failure to make reasonable
modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations to
individuals with disabilities." Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). Laufer
qualifies as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.
The ADA also delegates to the Attorney General the
authority to promulgate regulations to carry out § 12182. Id.
§ 12186(b). One of those regulations pertains to hotel
reservations.2 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e). The regulation provides
that a "public accommodation" operating a "place of lodging" must
"with respect to reservations made by any means . . . [i]dentify
and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms
offered through its reservations service in enough detail to
reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess
independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her
accessibility needs." Id. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii).
2 Acheson does not argue that this regulation exceeds the
authority granted to the Attorney General under § 12186(b).
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The Department of Justice's guidance on these
regulations says that "basic nondiscrimination principles mandate
that individuals with disabilities should be able to reserve hotel
rooms with the same efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those
who do not need accessible guest rooms." 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app.
A (2010), Guidance on Revisions to ADA Regulation on
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public
Accommodations and Commercial Facilities ("DOJ Guidance"). The
Reservation Rule, DOJ says, "is essential to ensure that
individuals with disabilities receive the information they need to
benefit from the services offered by the place of lodging." Id.
And although "a reservations system is not intended to be an
accessibility survey," public accommodations still must provide
some detail -- "enough detail" -- to allow individuals with
disabilities to know what services they can enjoy. Id.
When a public accommodation violates the ADA and
discriminates against a disabled person, the ADA and the
regulations promulgated under it permit private individuals to
bring enforcement actions in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a);
28 C.F.R. § 36.501.
C.
And that's what Laufer did. Availing herself of that
procedure, Laufer sued Acheson in the District of Maine. Which
she's familiar doing: Laufer is a self-proclaimed ADA "tester"
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and advocate for disabled persons and has filed hundreds of other
ADA-related suits in federal courts from coast to coast. Against
Acheson, she brought a single claim for violation of 42 U.S.C.
§ 12181 and 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e) (the Reservation Rule) and sought
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees and
costs.
Responding, Acheson moved to dismiss. Pointing to
Laufer's hundreds of other ADA suits around the country, Acheson
said that Laufer had no real intention of booking a room at its
Inn. So, Acheson said, Laufer lacks Article III standing to bring
her suit, and the court accordingly lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case. Laufer opposed the motion and amended
her complaint to detail her plans to visit Maine. The district
court took Acheson's side and dismissed the case for lack of
standing. Laufer timely appealed.
II.
Acheson moved under Rule 12(b)(1). See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1). There are two species of 12(b)(1) attacks on subject-
matter jurisdiction: facial and factual challenges. See Torres-
Negrón v. J & N Recs., LLC, 504 F.3d 151, 162 (1st Cir. 2007).
When the attack is facial, the relevant facts are the well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint, which the court must take as true.
Toddle Inn Franchising, LLC v. KPJ Assocs., LLC, 8 F.4th 56, 61
n.5 (1st Cir. 2021). If the attack is factual, then the court
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"need not accept the plaintiff's allegations as true but can 'weigh
the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence of its power
to hear the case.'" Id. (quoting Torres-Negrón, 504 F.3d at 163).
The challenge here was only facial, so we, too, take the
complaint's well-pleaded allegations as true when analyzing our
jurisdiction. See id. Our review of the allegations mirrors the
plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Hochendoner v.
Genzyme Corp., 823 F.3d 724, 730 (1st Cir. 2016). At the end of
the day, then, our question is whether the plaintiff's complaint
-- taking as true all of Laufer's factual allegations, drawing all
inferences in her favor, but discarding legal conclusions and
threadbare recitations of the elements, see Zell v. Ricci, 957
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2020) -- contains enough factual heft to
demonstrate that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction, see
Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). We review
the district court's decision de novo, meaning we look at things
with fresh eyes and without any deference to the able district
judge's analysis. Amrhein v. eClinical Works, LLC, 954 F.3d 328,
330 (1st Cir. 2020).
III.
A.
Article III of the Constitution gives the federal courts
the power to hear only "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. Const.
art. III, § 2. That constitutional limitation means courts can
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resolve only "genuine, live dispute[s] between adverse parties."
Carney v. Adams, 141 S. Ct. 493, 498 (2020). Out of that general
rule has emerged the multi-faceted doctrine of standing, see id.,a doctrine simple to describe but often tricky to apply.
To have standing, a plaintiff has to show three things:
that she "(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly
traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that
is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision."
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). We're focused
on the first part here -- injury in fact. An injury in fact, as
we use that term of art, means "the invasion of a legally protected
interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Amrhein, 954 F.3d at
330 (cleaned up) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339). (What that
all means we'll get into more detail on later.)
Standing doctrine serves many purposes. "It tends to
assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be
resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society,
but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic
appreciation of the consequences of judicial action." Valley Forge
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). It also ensures the federal courts
aren't morphed into "no more than a vehicle for the vindication of
the value interests of concerned bystanders." Id. (quoting United
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States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)). And it reflects
separation-of-powers principles that the courts shouldn't be used
to "usurp the powers of the political branches." Clapper v.
Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013).
Article III standing operates as a limit on federal
courts' jurisdiction. Id. And because it is jurisdictional, it
cannot be waived or forfeited and can be raised at any time, by
anyone. See Va. House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 139 S. Ct.
1945, 1951 (2019). When it is raised, the burden of showing
standing rests on the party invoking the court's jurisdiction.
Id. Meeting that burden is mission critical for their case -- no
standing, no jurisdiction, and the case must be dismissed.
B.
Acheson first asserts that the Reservation Rule did not
require it to reveal all the information Laufer wants, and so she
suffered no injury via a violation of the rule. But we don't have
to untangle Acheson's argument on the merits of Laufer's claim to
determine her standing.
Standing is, "[i]n essence," a question of "whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
dispute or of particular issues." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750-51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)),
abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014). "[S]tanding in no way
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depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular
conduct is illegal." Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 734 (quoting Warth,
422 U.S. at 500); see Fed. Election Comm'n v. Cruz, 142 S. Ct.
1638, 1647 (2022). In other words, that a plaintiff's ultimate
recovery "may be uncertain or even unlikely . . . is of no moment"
to us now. See Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC,
139 S. Ct. 1652, 1660 (2019); see also Ariz. State Legislature v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015) ("one
must not confuse weakness on the merits with absence of Article
III standing" (cleaned up)). At this point, our only question is,
putting the merits aside, whether Laufer plausibly alleges she was
injured under her theory of the underlying legal claim. See
Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 734; see also Cruz, 142 S. Ct. at 1647–
48 ("For standing purposes, we accept as valid the merits of
appellees' legal claims.").
Nor is Laufer's claim "so implausible that it is
insufficient to preserve jurisdiction." See Chafin v. Chafin, 568
U.S. 165, 174 (2013). Though Acheson thinks Laufer could've just
picked up the phone to ask for the information and that this was
supposed to be an interactive process, the regulations clearly
provide that hotels' reservation portals still must provide some
detail -- "enough detail" -- to allow individuals with disabilities
to know what services they can enjoy. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e); DOJ
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Guidance, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2010). Which Laufer alleges
Acheson's portals didn't do.
So for our standing analysis, we assume, in line with
Laufer's theory, that the Reservation Rule requires Acheson to
give her certain information. And we further assume, as she
alleges in her complaint, that Acheson's website and other third-
party reservation services didn't provide that information.
C.
That brings us to our next question: Is Acheson's
failure to provide that information a sufficiently concrete injury
to Laufer to give her standing?
Acheson thinks not. It says Laufer never had any
intention of traveling to Maine or booking a room at its Inn.3
Instead, Laufer was just sitting on her computer hunting websites
for ADA non-compliance from over a thousand miles away in her
Florida home. Whatever information she was denied, then, she never
needed. And, its argument goes, that destroys her standing -- it
makes her risk of harm counterfactual since "there was no prospect
that she would have tried to exercise" her statutory rights to
information about accommodations at the Inn she never wanted to go
to. So, Acheson says, her injury is not concrete enough -- to be
Side note: We mentioned a few pages back that Laufer amended
3
her complaint to allege her intent to travel to Maine. But she
now on appeal disclaims any such intent.
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concrete enough, Laufer would need to allege that her informational
drought harmed her in some way.
1.
First we zoom out to take a broader look at what makes
an injury concrete.
Concrete injuries must be "'de facto'; that is, [they]
must actually exist." Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340. Although easier
to recognize, the injury doesn't have to be "tangible," id., "like
a picked pocket or a broken leg," to be concrete, Amrhein, 954
F.3d at 330. Intangible injuries -- like "the suppression of free
speech or religious exercise" or the invasion of common-law rights
"actionable without wallet injury" -- can also be concrete. Id.
at 331; see Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340; Valley Forge Christian Coll.,
454 U.S. at 486 (noneconomic injuries can count just as much as
economic ones, and collecting cases).
Because they're less obvious, intangible injuries can
raise more of a question on whether there's an Article III case or
controversy. See Amrhein, 954 F.3d at 331. In determining whether
an intangible harm rises to the level of a concrete injury, the
Supreme Court has told us that "both history" (particularly
"whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a
harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for
a lawsuit in English or American courts") and "the judgment of
Congress play important roles." Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340-41.
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"Congress," the Court has said, "is well positioned to identify
intangible harms that meet minimum Article III requirements," id.
at 341, and "may 'elevate to the status of legally cognizable
injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously
inadequate in law,'" TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190,
2205 (2021) (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Yet still, not
even Congress can "spin a 'bare procedural violation, divorced
from any concrete harm' into an 'injury-in-fact,'" Amrhein, 954
F.3d at 331 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341) -- though the
violation of some procedural rights Congress grants can, without
any additional harm, be concrete enough, Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342.
In all, this just means that we judges must still "independently
decide whether a plaintiff has suffered a concrete harm under
Article III," even if Congress adamantly says they do. TransUnion,
141 S. Ct. at 2205.
2.
Our bearings set, back to Laufer's case. Does Laufer's
self-admitted status as a tester -- that she had no intent to do
anything but test the website's ADA compliance -- mean she hasn't
suffered an injury?
Acheson seems to accept that tester status alone doesn't
defeat standing -- a party can set out to determine whether public
accommodations are complying with a statute. That concession makes
sense. We said just a year ago that a plaintiff's status as a
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tester does not destroy her standing. See Suárez-Torres v.
Panaderia Y Reposteria España, Inc., 988 F.3d 542, 550–51 (1st
Cir. 2021). That is, a plaintiff's deliberate choice to see if
accommodations are obeying a statute doesn't mean that her injury
in fact is any less real or concrete. Id. And Suárez broke no
new ground -- the Supreme Court reached the same result forty years
ago. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74
(1982).
But in somewhat of a twist on that proposition, Acheson
further posits that a lack of intent to do anything with the
information -- like a tester does -- makes the information not
relevant, and the injury accordingly not concrete for standing.
To solve that puzzle, we start by turning back to one of the
Supreme Court's earlier tester cases, Havens Realty.
a.
Havens Realty involved racial steering. One Black
plaintiff asked Havens Realty on multiple occasions whether it had
any units open to rent in its two apartment complexes. Id. at
368. She was told no, but a white plaintiff who went to test that
out was given the opposite answer -- there were vacancies. Id.So they sued under section 804 of Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3604, which prohibited falsely representing the
unavailability of a dwelling "because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373.
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Importantly, this Black plaintiff was a tester, too --
she had no intent of ever renting an apartment from the defendant
and went posing as a renter only to figure out if the defendant
was violating the law. Id. Yet the Supreme Court said that she
still had standing. Id. at 374. Because she was the object of
the misrepresentation and "suffered injury in precisely the form
the statute was intended to guard against," the Black tester
plaintiff had standing. Id. at 373–74. "That the tester may have
approached the real estate agent fully expecting that [s]he would
receive false information, and without any intention of buying or
renting a home" was neither here nor there, our judicial superiors
said -- it "does not negate the simple fact of injury within the
meaning of [the statute]." Id. at 374; see also Cruz, 142 S. Ct.
at 1647 (noting that the Court has long held that an injury is an
injury "even if [it] could be described in some sense as willingly
incurred," citing Havens Realty); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202,
204 (1958) (a Black plaintiff's choice to board a segregated "bus
for the purpose of instituting this litigation is not significant"
to the standing inquiry).
Havens Realty appears right on the nose for Laufer's
case -- both to her status as a tester and the injury she suffered.
The Reservation Rule requires that places of lodging make available
-- in their accommodation descriptions on their reservations
services -- information about the accessible features in their
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hotels and guest rooms. 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii). The purpose
of this requirement is "to reasonably permit [Laufer] to assess
independently whether a given hotel . . . meets . . . her
accessibility needs." See id. And that is precisely what Laufer
was doing. Just as in Havens Realty, there is no carveout that
the information need only be turned over if the person trying to
make a reservation actually wants to make a reservation. Compare
id. § 36.302(e), with Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373–74 (noting
that § 804(d) gave "all 'persons' a legal right to truthful
information about available housing" and did not impose any "bona
fide offer" requirement). So if the Black tester plaintiff had
standing in Havens Realty where the statute gave her a right to
truthful information, which she was denied, then Havens Realty
would mean that Laufer, too, has standing because she was denied
information to which she has a legal entitlement. Just as the
Black tester plaintiff's lack of intent to rent an apartment in
Havens Realty "d[id] not negate the simple fact of injury," neither
does Laufer's lack of intent to book a room at Acheson's Inn negate
her standing. See 455 U.S. at 373–74.
Adding on, the Supreme Court has repeatedly said that
denial of information to which plaintiffs have a legal right can
be a concrete injury in fact. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Akins,
524 U.S. 11, 20–21 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Just.,
491 U.S. 440, 449–50 (1989); see also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 342
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(noting that "the violation of a procedural right granted by
statute can be sufficient in some circumstances to constitute
injury in fact," citing Akins and Public Citizen). Akins was a
suit where a group of voters sought (among other things)
information about a list of donors to a political organization
they said was subject to public-disclosure requirements under
elections laws. 524 U.S. at 15, 21. Noting that "[t]here [wa]s
no reason to doubt [the voters'] claim that the information would
help them . . . evaluate candidates for public office," the Court
said that they suffered an injury in fact because they "fail[ed]
to obtain information which," at least under their view of the
law, "must be publicly disclosed pursuant to a statute." Id. at
21. Similarly, Public Citizen was a suit by advocacy groups to
obtain information they asserted was subject to public disclosure
under the Federal Advisory Committee Act. 491 U.S. at 447–48.
The Court said that the groups suffered an injury in fact because
they were denied information the statute gave them the right to.
Id. at 449. As the Court put it: "Our decisions interpreting the
Freedom of Information Act have never suggested that those
requesting information under it need show more than that they
sought and were denied specific agency records." Id.; accord
Maloney v. Murphy, 984 F.3d 50, 60 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (holding that
a FOIA "requester's circumstances -- why he wants the information,
what he plans to do with it, what harm he suffered from the failure
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to disclose -- are irrelevant to his standing" (quoting Zivotofsky
v. Sec'y of State, 444 F.3d 614, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2006))).
So to sum it up so far: Havens Realty, Akins, and Public
Citizen make clear that a denial of information that a plaintiff
is statutorily entitled to have can make for a concrete injury in
fact. And Havens Realty and Public Citizen tell us that the denial
of information to a member of a protected class alone can suffice
to make an injury in fact -- that person's intended use of the
information is not relevant.
b.
Were that the whole landscape, this case would prove
quite simple. But there's a wrinkle. Acheson jumps all over three
lines in a Supreme Court decision from last year, TransUnion, which
Acheson says marked a sea change in the law of informational
standing that casts doubt on Havens Realty's application to this
case.
TransUnion involved a class action brought by consumers
against a credit-reporting agency under the Fair Credit Reporting
Act. 141 S. Ct. at 2200. Part of the claim was that the credit-
reporting agency didn't provide information in the format required
by the FCRA. See id. at 2214. The Court addressed the plaintiffs'
standing, drawing on the Court's explanation of intangible
injuries in Spokeo. (Recall that Spokeo teaches that Congress's
judgment is important to finding intangible-but-nonetheless-
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concrete harms, but its judgment is not the end all be all since
there must still be a concrete injury accompanying a bare
procedural violation -- though the Court did caveat that the
violation of some statutory procedural rights could pose a concrete
injury even without additional harm. See 578 U.S. at 340–42.) An
amicus threw in the argument that the plaintiffs had standing for
an informational injury, citing to Akins and Public Citizen. 141
S. Ct. at 2214. Which the Court rejected, saying Akins and Public
Citizen didn't "control" because the plaintiffs weren't denied any
information; rather, they received it in the wrong format. Id.
But -- and here's where it gets important for us -- the Court added
a "[m]oreover": It said the plaintiffs "identified no 'downstream
consequences' from failing to receive the required information"
and that "'[a]n asserted informational injury that causes no
adverse effects cannot satisfy Article III.'" Id. (quoting
Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 1004 (11th
Cir. 2020)).
With that "moreover" morsel in mind, Acheson presses
that Havens Realty and Public Citizen don't survive Spokeo and
TransUnion. And to be sure, it has some support behind it from
our sibling circuits who have addressed suits like this one since
TransUnion. See Harty v. W. Point Realty, Inc., 28 F.4th 435, 444
(2d Cir. 2022) (concluding an ADA-Reservation-Rule tester
plaintiff can't show a concrete injury from the denial of
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information without also showing downstream consequences post-
TransUnion); Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871, 879–81, 883 (10th
Cir. 2022) (same); see also Laufer v. Mann Hosp. L.L.C., 996 F.3d
269, 273 (5th Cir. 2021) (concluding Laufer had no standing because
she couldn't show the information she was denied had "some
relevance" to her).
Here's the issue: We can't overrule prior Supreme Court
cases -- that much the Court has made clear. "And because
overruling Supreme Court precedent is the Court's job, not ours,
we must follow [precedent] until the Court specifically tells us
not to" -- even if we think those older decisions are in tension
with newer ones. See United States v. Morosco, 822 F.3d 1, 7 (1st
Cir. 2016); see also Scheiber v. Dolby Lab'ys, Inc., 293 F.3d 1014,
1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) ("[W]e have no authority to
overrule a Supreme Court decision no matter how dubious its
reasoning strikes us, or even how out of touch with the Supreme
Court's current thinking the decision seems.").
As we said before, we think Havens Realty shows the clear
path here -- it is so similar to Laufer's case as to render any
distinction insufficiently material. We're thus bound by that
decision unless the Supreme Court tells us that TransUnion
overruled it.4 Under Laufer's theory, she had a right to the
4True, we're "bound by the Supreme Court's considered dicta
almost as firmly as by the Court's outright holdings, particularly
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information that she alleges Acheson didn't give her. And the
statute makes that denial of information discrimination against
disabled persons and gives Laufer the right to sue in response.
That Laufer had no intent to use the information for anything but
a lawsuit doesn't change things -- she was still injured in
precisely the way the statute was designed to protect.
c.
i.
Acheson's various attempts to distinguish Havens Realty
don't change our view that it governs here.
Acheson says that the denial of information here wasn't
in itself discriminatory, but the lies to the plaintiff in Havens
Realty were. Yes, the misinformation in Havens Realty certainly
when . . . a dictum is of recent vintage and not enfeebled by any
subsequent statement." McCoy v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 950 F.2d
13, 19 (1st Cir. 1991); see United States v. Báez-Martínez, 950
F.3d 119, 132 (1st Cir. 2020). But when later dictum might call
into question a prior holding, we're still bound by the Court's
earlier holding, not its dictum. See Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley
v. ACT, Inc., 798 F.3d 46, 50 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2015). And
TransUnion's downstream-consequences-needed-for-informational-
injury proviso certainly looks like dictum given that the Court
concluded the plaintiffs didn't allege they hadn't received any
required information. See 141 S. Ct. at 2214. Moreover, we've
called "suspect" arguments that the Supreme Court implicitly
overruled one of its prior decisions. See United States v.
Symonevich, 688 F.3d 12, 19 n.4 (1st Cir. 2012). And we think it
suspect, too, that the Court would overrule Havens Realty
implicitly, in dictum, and with only three sentences of
explanation. Cf. In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059, 1064 (D.C.
Cir. 1998) ("[I]t is rather implausible that the Supreme Court, in
dicta -- not to mention in a footnote -- meant to overrule sub
silentio the holdings in" prior cases.).
- 22 -
looks like it was borne out of racial animus. Yet still, Acheson's
distinction is hard to square up. The regulations here
specifically make the denial of accessibility information
actionable discrimination against disabled persons, see 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.501; DOJ Guidance, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A (2010) (noting
the Reservation Rule is borne out of "basic nondiscrimination
principles") -- just as the statute made the denial of information
in Havens Realty actionable racial discrimination.
Next, echoing our colleagues in the Fifth Circuit,
Acheson claims that the misrepresentation in Havens Realty had
"some relevance" to the tester plaintiff, but the information
Laufer wanted here didn't since she never wanted to book a room at
the Inn. See Mann Hosp., 996 F.3d at 273. But the only relevance
the misrepresentation had to the Black tester plaintiff in Havens
Realty was to help her figure out if the defendant was breaking
the law by engaging in racial steering. See 455 U.S. at 373–74.
And she had standing. Id. Same goes here. See also Laufer v.
Arpan LLC, 29 F.4th 1268, 1281 (11th Cir. 2022) (Jordan, J.,
concurring) (explaining why this distinction doesn't work).5
5 Similarly, the credit-union cases relied on by Acheson are
inapposite. Those cases concluded an ADA tester had no standing
to sue for credit-union websites' failure to have information in
a format accessible to disabled persons where there was a legal
bar to the plaintiff joining the credit union. See, e.g., Carello
v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 834 (7th Cir. 2019)
(Barrett, J.); Griffin v. Dep't of Lab. Fed. Credit Union, 912
F.3d 649, 654 (4th Cir. 2019). There are no legal bars to Laufer's
- 23 -
Further, Acheson posits that Laufer wasn't injured in
the way the statute was designed to protect since she wasn't
prevented from reserving a room. Au contraire: The regulation
was not designed only to make sure that a disabled person could
book a room -- the Reservation Rule's requirements are meant to
ensure that disabled persons can "assess independently whether a
given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs."
28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1)(ii). The rule recognizes that the public
information on accessibility features is necessary to make sure
disabled persons are "able to reserve hotel rooms with the same
efficiency, immediacy, and convenience as those who do not need
accessible guest rooms." DOJ Guidance, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. A
(2010). Denying Laufer the same "efficiency, immediacy, and
convenience" as those not requiring accommodations is exactly the
discrimination the regulations are trying to stamp out.
booking a room at the Inn. See also Carello, 930 F.3d at 834
(Barrett, J.) (making clear the holding was "no broader" than one
about plaintiffs who are "legally barred" from using the
defendant's services (emphasis in original)). Additionally,
Carello affirmed the proposition that in "informational injury"
cases (which, according to that court, "typically" but do not
exclusively involve "sunshine law[s]"), "a plaintiff 'need not
allege any additional harm beyond' [her] failure to receive
information that the law renders subject to disclosure." 930 F.3d
at 835 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341).
- 24 -
ii.
Nor, with respect, do we find our sibling circuits'
explanations of why Laufer doesn't have standing under Havens
Realty, or Public Citizen, persuasive.
The Second Circuit recently said a Reservation-Rule
tester plaintiff had no concrete injury because he couldn't "show
. . . an 'interest in using the information beyond bringing his
lawsuit.'" Harty, 28 F.4th at 444 (cleaned up, then a new
alteration added) (quoting Looper, 22 F.4th at 881); see also
Laufer v. Ganesha Hosp. LLC, No. 21-995, 2022 WL 2444747, at *2
(2d Cir. July 5, 2022) (summary order) (applying Harty to a suit
brought by Laufer in Connecticut). So Havens Realty didn't help
the plaintiff, the court said, because it shows testers can have
standing only when they suffer some actual injury. Harty, 28 F.4th
at 444. But that distinction really doesn't do anything. No one
disputes that being a tester alone doesn't give you standing --
the question is whether the test left her with some injury. And
our judicial neighbors did not explain why the ADA tester plaintiff
didn't suffer an injury but the Black tester plaintiff in Havens
Realty did, even though her only "interest in using the
information" was testing compliance and bringing her lawsuit --
just as with an ADA-Reservation-Rule tester.
The Tenth Circuit suggested there lies some distinction
in the fact that Havens Realty involved a misrepresentation, but
- 25 -
the ADA-Reservation-Rule cases involve a lack of any
representation. See Looper, 22 F.4th at 879. Yet that seems a
distinction without a difference. In either case, in order to
shine a light on unlawful discrimination, the law conferred on the
plaintiff "a legal right to truthful information" about an
accommodation. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373; see also Arpan, 29
F.4th at 1282 (Jordan, J., concurring).
The Tenth Circuit also thought that Akins and Public
Citizen made clear years ago that there needed to be a downstream
consequence from the denial of information. See Looper, 22 F.4th
at 881. True, the Court in both cases described what the
plaintiffs wanted to do with the information they sought. See
Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (noting the plaintiffs wanted to use the
information "to evaluate candidates for public office" and "the
role that [the organization]'s financial assistance might play in
a specific election"); Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449 (noting the
plaintiff wanted to "monitor [the organization's] workings and
participate more effectively in the judicial selection process").
But, for one thing, that doesn't show why Havens Realty wouldn't
still apply and give standing, since the Black tester plaintiff
there wanted the information only to test the defendant's
compliance with the law. See 455 U.S. at 373–74. And, for another,
it's hard to square with the Court's clear statement in Public
Citizen that the Court's "decisions interpreting the Freedom of
- 26 -
Information Act have never suggested that those requesting
information under it need show more than that they sought and were
denied specific agency records." 491 U.S. at 449; see also
Maloney, 984 F.3d at 60 (the D.C. Circuit holding that a FOIA
"requester's circumstances -- why he wants the information, what
he plans to do with it, what harm he suffered from the failure to
disclose -- are irrelevant to his standing" (quoting Zivotofsky,
444 F.3d at 617)). That the plaintiff had a reason it wanted the
information then seems more a matter of factual context than a
legal rule. Moreover, the Court recently reaffirmed that "the
violation of a procedural right granted by statute can be
sufficient in some circumstances" such that plaintiffs "need not
allege any additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified,"
specifically citing Akins and Public Citizen. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at
342. And when giving its parenthetical explanations of Akins and
Public Citizen, the Court did not mention any of the "downstream
effects" the plaintiffs in those cases may have suffered from the
denial of information or their purpose for the information -- just
that they were denied information a statute gave them the right to
have. See id.
We understand that our sibling circuits thought Havens
Realty doesn't decide this case. But we respectfully disagree.
- 27 -
None has convincingly explained why Havens Realty can't illuminate
the path to decision.6
d.
What's more, Laufer suffered a concrete injury in fact
even if TransUnion ushered in a new era of informational injury.
TransUnion says that informational injuries need to "cause[] . . .
adverse effects" to satisfy Article III. 141 S. Ct. at 2214
(quoting Trichell, 964 F.3d at 1004). One could read the
informational injury to the Black tester plaintiff in Havens Realty
as doing so: She was discriminated against in violation of the
law. Dignitary harm or stigmatic injuries caused by discrimination
have long been held a concrete injury in fact, even without
informational injury. See Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 738-
40 (1984); see also Allen, 468 U.S. at 755 (individuals personally
denied equal treatment under the law can have standing); Carello
6 Reinforcing our view that Havens Realty can be relied on
here is that other cases exist where the Court compared the ADA
with the FHA or Title VII (two other of the nation's most important
antidiscrimination regimes) to guide a decision under one of those
statutory schemes. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624,
631 (1998) (looking to the definition of "handicap" in the Fair
Housing Amendments Act and its interpretation by other courts for
guidance in interpreting the "ADA's definition of disability");
Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Hum.
Servs., 532 U.S. 598, 610 (2001) (in a case brought under both the
ADA and the Fair Housing Amendments Act, interpreting in parallel
the definition of "prevailing party" in the attorney fees
provisions of both statutes); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 357 (2013) (in a Title VII case, contrasting
the direct discussion of workplace retaliation in the ADA with the
absence of similar "clear textual terms" in Title VII).
- 28 -
v. Aurora Policemen Credit Union, 930 F.3d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir.
2019) (Barrett, J.) ("There is no doubt that dignitary harm is
cognizable; stigmatic injury is 'one of the most serious
consequences' of discrimination." (citation omitted)).
"[D]iscrimination itself, by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as
'innately inferior' and therefore as less worthy participants in
the political community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries to
those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely
because of their membership in a disfavored group." Heckler, 465
U.S. at 739–40 (citation omitted). Indeed, TransUnion itself cited
Allen and "discriminatory treatment" as an example of "concrete,
de facto injuries that were previously inadequate at law" that
"Congress may 'elevate to the status of legally cognizable
injuries.'" 141 S. Ct. at 2204–05 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at
341).
Laufer alleges she suffered "frustration and
humiliation" when Acheson's reservation portals didn't give her
adequate information about whether she could take advantage of the
accommodations. Without that information, Laufer is put on unequal
footing to experience the world in the same way as those who do
not have disabilities. She alleges that the "discriminatory
conditions" on Acheson's website contribute to her "sense of
segregation and isolation" and deprive her of "full and equal
- 29 -
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, and/or
accommodations available to the general public." Avoiding that
was part of the point of the ADA -- the Act "is a measure expected
to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with
disabilities" by aiming to "guarantee a baseline of equal
citizenship by protecting against stigma and systematic exclusion
from public and private opportunities." Lane, 541 U.S. at 536(Ginsburg, J., concurring) (cleaned up). In a similar case, the
Eleventh Circuit found that this harm alleged by Laufer was
sufficient stigmatic injury to give rise to Article III standing.
Arpan, 29 F.4th at 1274. We need not decide that exact issue here.
Rather, we find that Laufer's feelings of frustration,
humiliation, and second-class citizenry are indeed "downstream
consequences" and "adverse effects" of the informational injury
she experienced. See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2214. So even if
post-TransUnion a plaintiff in the same shoes as the Black tester
plaintiff in Havens Realty must show some "additional harm" from
the denial of information to demonstrate a concrete injury, Laufer
still meets that newly set bar.
D.
Pulling out all the stops, Acheson also contends that
Laufer's injury is not particularized. On top of being concrete,
the plaintiff's injury must be particularized to show injury in
fact. Amrhein, 954 F.3d at 330–31. Particularized means that the
- 30 -
injury must "affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual
way." Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 560 n.1 (1992)). In other words, the injury has to
be "personal," "distinct," and "not undifferentiated." Id.(cleaned up and citations omitted). In contrast, "[i]njuries that
are too 'widely shared' or are 'comparable to the common concern
for obedience to the law'" may not be particularized. Lyman v.
Baker, 954 F.3d 351, 361 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Becker v. Fed.
Election Comm'n, 230 F.3d 381, 390 (1st Cir. 2000)). The
particularization requirement "reflects the commonsense notion
that the party asserting standing . . . must allege that he,
himself, is among the persons injured by th[e defendant's]
conduct." Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731–32. That way we ensure
the issue is sharpened "in a concrete factual context" with parties
with "a direct stake in the outcome." Id. (citations omitted).
Under any reading of Havens Realty or TransUnion,
Laufer's injury is particularized. As a pure informational injury,
Laufer was not given information she personally had a right to
under the ADA and its regulations, causing her precisely the type
of harm Congress and the regulation sought to curb -- the unequal
ability to know what accommodations a person with disabilities can
take advantage of. See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374 (the Black
tester plaintiff had standing because she "alleged injury to her
statutorily created right to truthful housing information"
- 31 -
(emphasis added)). And she alleges that she personally suffered
the loss of dignity in feeling less than equal, enduring
humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment. See Heckler, 465
U.S. at 739–40; cf. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755–56 (dignitary harm from
discrimination wasn't concrete because the discrimination wasn't
personally experienced); Carello, 930 F.3d at 834 (concreteness
and particularity are "two sides of the same coin" for dignitary
harms since discrimination that doesn't impact the plaintiff isn't
concrete and also doesn't affect the plaintiff in an individual
way). Those harms affected her "in a personal and individual way."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
Further, contrary to Acheson's suggestions, Laufer's
claim is not a generalized grievance based on her desire that
Acheson follow the law. For starters, the Court's generalized-
grievance cases typically focus on allegedly unlawful conduct by
the government, id. at 576, and are driven, at least in part, by
separation-of-powers concerns with the courts supervising the co-
equal branches' activities, see id. at 577. But even more, Lujan
also recognized that "[n]othing in [it] contradicts the principle
that 'the injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue
of "statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing,"'" even though the right is widely shared. Id. at 578(cleaned up with new alterations added) (quoting Warth, 422 U.S.
at 500). Nothing in the ADA or its regulations "abandon[s] the
- 32 -
requirement that the party seeking review must [her]self have
suffered an injury." See id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 738 (1972)). As we've already explained, the ADA and
its regulations offer a route to those themselves suffering an
injury by being discriminated against on the basis of their
disability. It does not permit anybody to sue just because she
saw an ADA violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1); 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.501(a). Which shows the differentiation of the injury:
Laufer is a person with disabilities -- not just any one of the
hundreds of millions of Americans with a laptop -- and personally
suffered the denial of information the law entitles her, as a
person with disabilities, to have.
IV.
Onward we go to the next step of the standing analysis
-- Laufer's standing to seek injunctive relief.7
The party seeking review has to show they have standing
for each form of relief they seek. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). For
Laufer's claim for injunctive relief, demonstrating her "past
exposure to illegal conduct" -- here, her pre-suit encounters with
7 To be clear, Laufer's complaint seeks only declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as attorney's fees and costs. It does
not seek damages for past violations. Damages are not an available
remedy for private suits under Title III of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(a)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 36.501(a); see also G. v. Fay Sch., 931
F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2019).
- 33 -
Acheson's reservation system on its and third parties' websites --
isn't "in itself" sufficient to show standing absent "continuing,
present adverse effects." City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95, 102 (1983) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495-96
(1974)). Standing for injunctive relief depends on "whether [s]he
[i]s likely to suffer future injury," id. at 105 -- that is, "a
sufficient likelihood that she will again be wronged in a similar
way," Gray v. Cummings, 917 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting
Am. Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir.
1992)).
That proviso is sometimes referred to as "imminence."
See, e.g., Berner v. Delahanty, 129 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 1997).
Though a "somewhat elastic concept," imminence shouldn't be
stretched too far -- it "ensure[s] that the alleged injury is not
too speculative for Article III purposes." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564
n.2. At bottom, it requires that the injury not be "conjectural"
or "hypothetical" or simply "possible." See Clapper, 568 U.S. at
412, 416, 420. For an injury to be imminent enough to provide
standing, it must be "certainly impending." Id. at 416.
Describing the imminence of a future harm, our judicial
higher-ups have said that a plaintiff's proclaimed "'intent' to
return to the places they had visited before -- where they will
presumably, this time, be [injured again] -- is simply not enough."
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564. For example, plaintiffs' averred intent
- 34 -
to visit Egypt and Sri Lanka at some unspecified point "[i]n the
future" was insufficient to show an imminent injury. See id. at
563–64. "Such 'some day' intentions -- without any description of
concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some
day will be -- do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent'
injury." Id. at 564.
Here, though, Laufer's plans to revisit the websites are
far from those "some day intentions" found insufficient in Lujan
-- she's alleged her "concrete plans" to go back to the websites
in the near future. As an ADA tester, Laufer says she has a
sophisticated system to continue monitoring the non-compliant
websites she finds. She visits the website multiple times before
filing her complaints, and then schedules herself to review the
website again after the complaint is filed. And she says she will
revisit Acheson's online reservation system "[i]n the near future"
to test its ADA compliance. So, far from a mere possibility that
someday Laufer will eventually head overseas to Sri Lanka or Egypt
to see an endangered species that'll be forced into extinction,
she has given her "description of [her] concrete plans" to re-
visit the websites, easily accessible from her home, in the near
future. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64; cf. Carney, 141 S. Ct. at
501–03 (plaintiff's assertion that he "would apply" for the job,
"without any actual past injury, without reference to an
anticipated timeframe, . . . and without any other supporting
- 35 -
evidence" was not sufficient in a "highly fact-specific case");
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 496 (2009) (an
assertion that the plaintiff "wants to go" to the area affected is
too "vague"). Take all of that, too, with the fact that Laufer is
a self-proclaimed ADA tester who makes it her vocation to test
websites for ADA compliance. See Houston v. Marod Supermarkets,
Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1340 (11th Cir. 2013) (considering that "ADA
testing appears to be [the plaintiff's] avocation or at least what
he does on a daily basis"). Also, importantly, Laufer asserts in
her reply brief that while Acheson has made its website ADA-
compliant, Acheson hasn't persuaded the third-party reservation
services to do the same (a point we return to in section V). Her
likelihood of future injury is far from conjectural or
hypothetical; it's sufficiently imminent.8
V.
Swinging its final punch, Acheson tucks in a quick
suggestion that the case may also be moot. It says that because
its website now shows that the Inn has no ADA-compliant lodging,
Laufer can't contend that she'll suffer the same injury again.
Mootness is another part of the Article III case-or-
controversy schema. Because we "decide only live controversies
8 Judge Howard agrees that the complaint adequately alleges
standing for declaratory relief, but he is doubtful that it
sufficiently alleges standing to pursue injunctive relief.
- 36 -
that will have a real effect on real parties in interest," we don't
decide cases where the parties' dispute has since been resolved.
Bos. Bit Labs, Inc. v. Baker, 11 F.4th 3, 8 (1st Cir. 2021); see
Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172. Since mootness goes to our Article III
jurisdiction, we have to cross-check for it throughout the
litigation: "'It is not enough that a dispute was very much alive
when suit was filed'; the parties must 'continue'" -- even on
appeal -- "'to have a personal stake' in the ultimate disposition
of the lawsuit." Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172 (cleaned up) (quoting
Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78 (1990)).
Yet getting a case declared moot is a "demanding
standard" -- one met only when "'it is impossible for a court to
grant any effectual relief whatever' to [the plaintiff] assuming
it prevails." Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1660 (quoting
Chafin, 568 U.S. at 172). The "heavy burden" of meeting that
demanding standard falls on the party asserting mootness; so here,
Acheson. Bos. Bit Labs, 11 F.4th at 8. Acheson hasn't met it.
Laufer's alleged violations are not just about what was
(or more aptly, wasn't) on Acheson's own website. Laufer also
alleged that Acheson violated the Reservation Rule via the booking
portals on third-party booking websites, like Hotels.com. And as
noted earlier, she avers that although Acheson's own website made
changes, it hasn't gotten the third parties to update their
websites.
- 37 -
Again, to assess mootness, we need not decide whether
Acheson can be held liable for those third-party websites' non-
compliance. That a plaintiff's ultimate recovery "may be uncertain
or even unlikely . . . is of no moment" to the mootness inquiry.
Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1660. Instead, we assume
the claim's legal validity to determine whether it is nonetheless
moot. See Town of Portsmouth v. Lewis, 813 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir.
2016); see also Mission Prod. Holdings, 139 S. Ct. at 1660.
And, for the record, nothing seems "so implausible,"
Chafin, 568 U.S. at 174, or "wholly insubstantial and frivolous"
about Laufer's claim based on the third-party websites, see Town
of Portsmouth, 813 F.3d at 61. Acheson hasn't suggested that the
third-party websites have been updated, and the regulations
provide that the public accommodation's obligations extend to
"reservations made by any means, including . . . through a third
party." 28 C.F.R. § 36.302(e)(1); see DOJ Guidance, 28 C.F.R. pt.
36, app. A (2010) (rejecting hotels' notice-and-comment arguments
that "they are unable to control the actions of unrelated parties"
and stating that hotels "that use third-party reservations
services . . . must provide these third-party services with
information concerning the accessible features of the hotel and
the accessible rooms"). Nor has Acheson represented that it made
that information available to all of the thirteen third-party
booking websites that Laufer alleges were non-compliant, but they
- 38 -
just haven't put the info online. Cf. DOJ Guidance, 28 C.F.R. pt.
36, app. A (2010) (providing that if the hotel makes the
information about accessibility available to the third-party
booking website but the third-party doesn't give the information
out, the hotel "will not be responsible"). So there's still a
live claim to decide.9
* * *
For all these reasons, the district court has Article
III jurisdiction over this case (at least for now). The judgment
of the district court is therefore reversed, and the case is
remanded for further proceedings. Costs to appellant.
9Given our conclusion, we need not decide at this point
whether the changes to Acheson's own website in response to this
litigation would be sufficient to moot the case in the absence of
the allegations concerning unremediated third-party websites. See
Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 189 ("[A] defendant's voluntary
cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court
of its power to determine the legality of the practice" unless it
is "absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could
not reasonably be expected to recur." (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
- 39 -