Securities & Exchang v. Gullett ( 1998 )


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  •   [NOT FOR PUBLICATION--NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 97-2275
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    ELLIS L. DEYON, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    BRADLEY T. GULLETT,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 97-2276
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    ELLIS L. DEYON, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    SHERWOOD H. CRAIG,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    No. 97-2277
    SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
    Plaintiff, Appellee,
    v.
    ELLIS L. DEYON, ET AL.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    WILLIAM HANKE,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
    [Hon. Morton A. Brody, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Boudin, Circuit Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
    Bradley T. Gullett on brief pro se.
    Sherwood H. Craig on brief pro se.
    Richard H. Walker, General Counsel, Jacob H. Stillman,
    Associate General Counsel, Katharine B. Gresham, Assistant General
    Counsel, and Diane v. White, Senior Counsel, on brief for the
    Securities and Exchange Commission, appellee.
    July 1, 1998
    Per Curiam.  Having carefully reviewed the record in
    this case, including the briefs of the parties, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court, essentially for the reasons
    given by the district court in its findings of fact and
    conclusions of law, dated August 21, 1997.  We limit ourselves
    to the following remarks.
    Like the district court, we find that the investment
    of pooled funds in a common account from which investors were
    to be paid interest on a pro rata basis constitutes a "common
    enterprise" for the purpose of investment contract analysis.
    The claim that the fixed interest payments promised investors
    does not constitute "profit" was not raised with sufficient
    clarity below and hence has been waived on appeal absent
    exceptional circumstances.  See In re Rauh, 
    119 F.3d 46
    , 51
    (1st. Cir. 1997).  No such circumstances exist in this case.
    We further find no clear error in the district court
    determination that defendants/appellants acted with the
    required scienter in offering these securities.  Finally, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing the
    penalties it assessed or in denying the belated request for a
    jury trial made by defendants/appellants.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-2275

Filed Date: 7/8/1998

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021