Chevere-Rodriguez v. Barnes-Pagan ( 2004 )

Not for Publication in West's Federal Reporter
Citation Limited Pursuant to 1st Cir. Loc. R. 32.3
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 04-1491
FRANCISO CHÉVERE-RODRÍGUEZ ET AL.,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
INES BARNÉS PAGÁN, ETC., ET AL.,
Defendants, Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
[Hon. Raymond L. Acosta, Senior U.S. District Judge]
Before
Selya, Circuit Judge,
Coffin and Cyr, Senior Circuit Judges.
Nicolas Nogueras, Jr. on brief for appellants.
November 19, 2004
Per Curiam. This appeal follows the entry of an order
dismissing a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as time-barred. Because
the district court erred in its calculation of the limitations
period, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Plaintiff-appellant Francisco Chévere-Rodríguez is a
former employee of the municipality of Bayamón, Puerto Rico, and a
self-styled whistleblower. Chévere-Rodríguez claims that his
whistleblowing resulted in various acts of reprisal. Following a
confrontation at the home of a municipal hierarch (defendant-
appellee Inés Barnés Pagán), municipal officers arrested Chévere-
Rodríguez and prosecuted him on what he characterizes as trumped-up
charges.
At a trial in a Puerto Rico court, a petit jury cleared
Chévere-Rodríguez of all charges. The jury returned its verdict on
August 13, 1999. On August 14, 2000, Chévere-Rodríguez, on behalf
of himself, his wife, and their conjugal partnership, instituted a
civil action in the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico. He alleged, inter alia, that by fabricating the
criminal charges and falsely incriminating him, the town and the
four individual defendants (all municipal officials) had collogued
to abrogate his civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11
Chévere-Rodríguez subsequently filed an amended complaint,
dropping the municipality as a party.
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After considerable pretrial skirmishing, two of the
individual defendants, Barnés Pagán and Fuentes, moved for judgment
on the pleadings. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). They posited that
the action was time-barred. The district court granted the motion
and subsequently dismissed the action against the remaining two
defendants as well.
Following an unsuccessful motion for reconsideration,
this appeal ensued. Chévere-Rodríguez has filed a brief but, for
reasons that are not immediately apparent, the defendants have
elected not to submit an opposing brief.
In Puerto Rico, the limitations period applicable to
section 1983 actions is one year. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, §
5298(2); see also Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278-80
(characterizing section 1983 claims as "personal injury actions"
and holding that state tort law supplies the applicable limitations
period). It cannot be gainsaid that the cause of action described
in the amended complaint accrued on August 13, 1999 — the day that
the criminal jury exonerated Chévere-Rodríguez.2 See, e.g., Smith
v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 113 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a section
1983 claim in the nature of malicious prosecution does not accrue
while there is still a potential for judgment of conviction in the
2
To be sure, the amended complaint mentions several incidents
leading up to the malicious prosecution. Chévere-Rodríguez does
not suggest, however, that any of those earlier incidents remain
independently actionable.
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underlying criminal case). The dispositive issue, then, is whether
the commencement date of the civil action — August 14, 2000 — falls
within the one-year limitations period.
Chévere-Rodríguez's timeliness argument has two
components. We examine each of them.
First, Chévere-Rodríguez asserts that the limitations
clock did not begin to tick until August 14, 1999 (the day next
following the accrual date). We agree with this assertion. The
controlling authority is our decision in Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-
Cruz, 127 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 1997) (per curiam). There, we
construed Puerto Rico law as supporting the proposition that the
limitations period begins on the day following the date of accrual.
Id. at 175; see P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 1, § 72 ("The time in which any
act provided by law is to be done is computed by excluding the
first day, and including the last . . . ."); see also Yensip v.
Lufthansa German Airlines, 725 F. Supp. 113, 115 (D.P.R. 1989).3
The second component of Chévere-Rodríguez's argument
begins where the first component ends, that is, it starts with the
assumption that the limitations period began to run on August 14,
1999. Since the year 2000 was a leap year, Chévere-Rodríguez had
3
In all events, the result would be the same under federal
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 (a) ("In computing any period of time
prescribed or allowed by these rules, by the local rules of any
district court, by order of court, or by any applicable statute,
the day of the act, event, or default from which the designated
period of time begins to run shall not be included.").
-4-
366 days in which to sue. See Carreras-Rosa, 127 F.3d at 174.
Under ordinary circumstances, then, the last day for commencing a
timely action would have been August 13, 2000 (the 366th day of the
limitations period). Because Chévere-Rodríguez did not sue until
August 14, 2000, it is easy to see how the district court concluded
that his suit was "one day late."
Appearances can be deceiving, however, and the
circumstances here are out of the ordinary because, in the year
2000, August 13 fell on a Sunday.4 When the final day of a
computed period of time prescribed or allowed by an applicable
statute for doing an act falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, the period is automatically extended to the next business
day. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a). Consequently, Chévere-Rodríguez
had until Monday, August 14, 2000, to institute the suit. Because
he filed his complaint with the district court on that date, he
commenced the action within the one-year limitations period.
We need go no further. Based on the foregoing, we
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the instant
action as time-barred.
Reversed and remanded.
4
Although Chévere-Rodríguez's opposition to the motion to
dismiss did not emphasize this point, his motion for
reconsideration harped on it.
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