Shigemura, Edward v. Duft, Diane , 211 F. App'x 499 ( 2006 )


Menu:
  •                             UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted October 30, 2006*
    Decided December 21, 2006
    Before
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-1258
    EDWARD SHIGEMURA,                            Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     Court for the Central District of Illinois
    v.                                     No. 01-3260
    DIANE DUFT, et al.,                          Harold A. Baker,
    Defendants-Appellees.                    Judge.
    ORDER
    This is the second time we are reviewing an appeal in this case. In the first
    appeal, Edward Shigemura argued that the district court erred by granting
    summary judgment under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     to his Illinois jailers, whom he believed
    violated his due process rights by revoking good-time credits without an adequate
    hearing; we agreed and remanded the case for further proceedings. Shigemura v.
    Duft, 111 F.App’x 843 (7th Cir. 2004). In this appeal, Shigemura argues that the
    district court erred on remand by awarding him only nominal damages for the
    violation. This time we affirm the district court’s judgment.
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeals are submitted on the briefs and
    the record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 06-1258                                                                     Page 2
    After Shigemura triggered an intruder alarm in the prison’s computer
    system, a disciplinary committee held a hearing to determine whether he abused
    his computer privileges and disobeyed an order by using his instructor’s password
    to access an unauthorized network. Based on a disciplinary report and a
    conversation with the computer instructor, the committee found Shigemura guilty
    and recommended a sentence of 15 days in segregation and 30 days of lowered
    prison status.
    After reviewing the case the warden remanded the matter back to the
    committee, however, because he believed that the committee was not aware that
    Shigemura was a repeat offender. Without notifying Shigemura, the committee
    spoke with the computer instructor again, who confirmed that Shigemura had
    committed prior offenses. The committee then decided—without hearing from
    Shigemura—to recommend that the sentence be increased by revoking 90 days of
    good-time credit and lengthening the terms of segregation and his demotion in
    status. Shigemura filed a grievance, which he appealed to the Administrative
    Review Board. The Board upheld the guilty verdict, but reinstated the original,
    lower sentence. Although the good-time credits were returned, it was too late
    because Shigemura had already been released from Illinois custody and into
    Missouri custody to serve out another sentence.
    Shigemura sued the prison officials under § 1983 for violating his due process
    rights, and the district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. We
    reversed and remanded, however, ruling that Shigemura was entitled to a new
    hearing before being deprived of his good-time credits. Shigemura, 111 F.App’x at
    846. We ruled under Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 563-72 (1974), that he had a
    liberty interest in his good-time credits and the disciplinary committee should not
    have based a decision to revoke these credits on a claim of prior offenses without
    giving Shigemura notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. at 845-46.
    On remand, the district court determined that it was necessary to hold a jury
    trial to ascertain the damages for the due process violation. Prior to the trial, the
    parties stipulated to certain uncontested facts; specifically, the parties agreed that
    upon release from Illinois custody, Shigemura was immediately taken into custody
    by Missouri officials so that he could finish serving a longer, concurrent sentence in
    Missouri. Shigemura’s trial testimony was consistent with the uncontested facts.
    He testified that he was detained by Missouri authorities immediately after his
    release from Illinois custody and that, because of his concurrent (but longer)
    sentence in Missouri, his total time in incarceration did not change as a result of his
    loss of good-time credits.
    After the parties submitted all of their testimonial evidence, the court
    granted judgment as a matter of law for Shigemura, Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). The
    No. 06-1258                                                                     Page 3
    court reasoned, consistent with our earlier decision, that the prison had violated
    Shigemura’s due process rights by not conducting a second hearing before revoking
    his good-time credits. But the court determined that because he went directly from
    Illinois custody to Missouri custody and because the length of his imprisonment was
    not affected, Shigemura could not recover compensatory damages (he made no claim
    for punitive damages). Accordingly, the court granted only $1.00 in nominal
    damages.
    The court also concluded that two of the defendants were not responsible for
    the due process violation. Gilbert Romero, the warden of the prison in which the
    disciplinary hearings were held, was considered not liable because he became
    warden only after the good-time credits had been revoked. James Page, the warden
    of Stateville Correctional Center (the maximum security facility to which
    Shigemura had been transferred to serve his increased disciplinary penalty), was
    deemed not liable because he was not involved in the disciplinary proceedings.
    On appeal, Shigemura first argues that the district court erred by awarding
    nominal damages as a matter of law, rather than allowing the jury to decide the
    amount. A prisoner may receive compensatory damages for a term of unlawful
    confinement. Carey v. Piphus, 
    435 U.S. 247
    , 266-67 (1978); Lopez v. City of Chicago,
    
    464 F.3d 711
    , 722 (7th Cir. 2006). But if an inmate whose procedural due process
    rights have been violated cannot show actual damages the inmate is entitled only to
    a nominal damage award. Carey, 
    435 U.S. at 266-67
    ; Gates v. Towery, 
    430 F.3d 429
    , 431 (7th Cir. 2005). Shigemura has not offered evidence of any actual
    damages. He testified that he was detained by Missouri authorities immediately
    after being released from Illinois custody. He also acknowledged that the total
    length of his confinement would not have changed if his good-time credits had not
    been revoked. Hence, because Shigemura cannot show that he has been injured as
    a result of the procedural violations, the district court did not err by limiting
    recovery to nominal damages.
    Shigemura also argues that even if the length of his time in prison was not
    shortened by the deprivation of due process, he is still entitled to a more significant
    damage award because he was forced to transfer to Stateville Correctional Center to
    serve the remainder of his sentence in segregation. But he is entitled only to
    damages that resulted from the due process violation. Although a prisoner has a
    liberty interest in good-time credits, Hamilton v. O’Leary, 
    976 F.2d 341
    , 344 (7th
    Cir. 1992), a prisoner does not have a similar interest in avoiding segregation.
    Lekas v. Briley, 
    405 F.3d 602
    , 607 (7th Cir. 2005). An inmate’s liberty interests are
    affected only if a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the
    inmate,” Sandin v. Conner, 
    515 U.S. 472
    , 484-86 (1995), which segregation
    ordinarily does not. Shigemura asserts that the increased disciplinary penalty led
    to an additional 75 days in segregation and was unduly hard. But we have held
    No. 06-1258                                                                    Page 4
    that even 90 days in segregation at Stateville does not pose an atypical and
    significant hardship. Lekas, 
    405 F.3d at 612
    . Because Shigemura’s time in
    segregation does not trigger any procedural due process rights, the prison’s failure
    to conduct a second hearing did not result in a due process violation that would
    entitle Shigemura to damages for his time in segregation.
    Finally, Shigemura argues that the district court should not have dismissed
    the claims against Romero and Page because they did not take any corrective
    actions after he was deprived of his good-time credits. But “to recover damages
    under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible
    for the deprivation of a constitutional right.” Johnson v. Snyder, 
    444 F.3d 579
    , 583
    (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Gentry v. Duckwotrth, 
    65 F.3d 555
    , 561 (7th Cir. 1995)).
    And Shigemura admitted at trial that neither Romero nor Page caused the due
    process violation.
    Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.