Dillon v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Commission , 258 F. App'x 577 ( 2007 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 06-2221
    CYNTHIA DILLON,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    versus
    MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
    COMMISSION,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    No. 06-2309
    CYNTHIA DILLON,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    MARYLAND-NATIONAL CAPITAL PARK AND PLANNING
    COMMISSION,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of
    Maryland, at Greenbelt.     William Connelly, Magistrate Judge.
    (8:04-cv-00994)
    Submitted:   November 19, 2007         Decided:     December 11, 2007
    Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Adrian Robert Gardner, General Counsel, William C. Dickerson,
    Riverdale, Maryland, for Appellant/Cross-appellee.     Michael P.
    Deeds, KESTELL & ASSOCIATES, Washington, D.C., for Appellee/Cross-
    appellant.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    These consolidated appeals arise from Cynthia Dillon’s
    successful action against the Maryland-National Capital Park and
    Planning     Commission     (“Commission”),        alleging      that    she   was
    wrongfully terminated in violation of the Family and Medical Leave
    Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000) (“FMLA”).                     The Commission
    asserts that the district court erred when it denied its motions
    for judgment as a matter of law, as well as when it denied in part
    its motion in limine and overruled its evidentiary objections to
    exclude     Dillon’s      post-termination         evidence     regarding      her
    qualification for FMLA protection.             Dillon has cross-appealed and
    asserts that the district court erred when it granted, in part, the
    Commission’s summary judgment motion and dismissed her liquidated
    damages claim, and when it reduced the jury’s backpay award.
    Finding no error, we affirm.
    We   find     that   the    district    court,1     in   a   thorough
    memorandum    opinion     explaining     its   denial    of    the   Commission’s
    renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, properly determined
    that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict in Dillon’s
    favor.     See Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctrs. Inc., 
    333 F.3d 536
    ,
    543 (4th Cir. 2003).        Moreover, because it was Dillon’s burden to
    establish    that   her    leave   qualified     for    FMLA   protection,     see
    1
    The parties consented to the exercise of the district court’s
    jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)
    (2000).
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    Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., LLC, 
    446 F.3d 541
    , 549 (4th
    Cir. 2006), the district court correctly found Dillon’s post-
    termination evidence of which the Commission was unaware to be
    relevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401.          The Commission’s assertions to
    the   contrary,   we   find   that   any   prejudicial   effect   that   this
    evidence may have had was significantly reduced by the district
    court’s limiting instruction to the jury to consider the post-
    termination evidence only in the context of determining whether
    Dillon’s leave qualified for FMLA protection, and not whether the
    Commission violated the Act.         See United States v. Love, 
    134 F.3d 595
    , 603 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that we will not overturn a
    district court’s Fed. R. Evid. 403 judgment “except under the most
    extraordinary of circumstances, where a trial court’s discretion
    has been plainly abused”)       (internal brackets and quotation marks
    omitted); United States v. Francisco, 
    35 F.3d 116
    , 119 (4th Cir.
    1994) (“We generally follow the presumption that the jury obeyed
    the limiting instructions of the district court”).2
    2
    The Commission also summarily asserts that the district court
    erred in refusing to answer the jury’s post-instruction question as
    to whether violating the Commission’s merit rules constituted
    “insubordination.” We find that the district court appropriately
    directed the jury to make its own determination by relying on the
    district court’s jury instruction defining “insubordination.” See
    Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
    477 U.S. 242
    , 255 (1986)
    (“Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the
    drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
    not those of a judge.”).
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    We also conclude that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in granting the Commission summary judgment on
    Dillon’s liquidated damages claim.           See Taylor v. Progress Energy,
    Inc., 
    493 F.3d 454
    , 459-60 (4th Cir. 2007) (analogizing FMLA claims
    to Fair Labor Standards Act claims); Mayhew v. Wells, 
    125 F.3d 216
    ,
    218 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that this court reviews the district
    court’s denial of liquidated damages under the Fair Labor Standards
    Act for abuse of discretion).            The record supports the district
    court’s conclusion that the Commission considered the possibility
    that Dillon’s request for leave constituted a request for FMLA
    leave   and    gave      her   several    opportunities    to   clarify    her
    relationship with her grandmother.           Although the jury later found
    the Commission’s determination that Dillon’s leave was not FMLA-
    protected     to   be   incorrect,   the     record   establishes   that   the
    Commission reasonably believed Dillon’s leave did not qualify for
    FMLA protection.        Accordingly, we conclude that the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Dillon’s request for
    liquidated damages.        Cf. Roy v. County of Lexington, SC, 
    141 F.3d 533
    , 548-49 (4th Cir. 1998) (upholding district court’s denial of
    liquidated damages claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act where
    there was no evidence the defendant’s actions were designed to
    circumvent the Act).
    Last, we find that the district court did not err when it
    amended the judgment reducing Dillon’s backpay award to reflect the
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    evidence presented by Dillon.      See State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v.
    Barton, 
    897 F.2d 729
    , 733 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Neither the existence,
    causation nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess or
    speculation.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s final amended judgment.
    We   dispense   with   oral   argument   because   the   facts   and   legal
    contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
    court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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