Smith v. Williamson , 172 F. App'x 444 ( 2006 )

Opinions of the United
2006 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
3-29-2006
Smith v. Williamson
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 05-3021
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Recommended Citation
"Smith v. Williamson" (2006). 2006 Decisions. Paper 1370.
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3021
_______________________________
KENNETH SMITH,
Appellant
v.
T. WILLIAMSON
___________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00058)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 9, 2006
Before: MCKEE, FUENTES AND NYGAARD, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed March 29, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Kenneth D. Smith, a federal prisoner, appeals pro se the order of the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his habeas petition filed
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
The parties are familiar with the facts, so we will only briefly revisit them here.
On March 24, 1999, Smith was arrested on state charges of robbery, theft, receiving
stolen property, and carrying a firearm without a license. On June 10, 1999, the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (“the Board”) revoked Smith’s parole
supervision from a previous state term. The Board then imposed a 12 month term of
imprisonment. The state charges against Smith stemming from his March 24 arrest were
nolle prossed the following month in favor of federal prosecution. Smith was delivered to
the United States Marshals Service on July 15, 1999, on a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum to answer a federal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
On April 25, 2001, Smith was sentenced by the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania to, inter alia, 120 month’ imprisonment. The United States
Marshals Service then returned Smith to the custody of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, placing his federal judgment and commitment order as a detainer. Based
on his federal conviction, the Board found that Smith had committed new criminal
conduct. Accordingly, on November 19, 2001, the Board imposed a 30 month term of
imprisonment to run concurrent with Smith’s 12 month term imposed on June 10, 1999.
Smith completed his state parole violator terms and was taken into federal custody
on September 6, 2003. At that time, the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) determined that
Smith’s federal sentence should be served consecutively to his state parole violator terms,
and credited Smith’s sentence with the twenty-five months (March 24, 1999, through
April 24, 2001) that he served prior to his sentencing in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. However, the BOP declined to credit Smith’s federal sentence
with the period from April 25, 2001, through September 5, 2003, because Smith spent
that time serving his state parole violator terms. The BOP has calculated Smith’s
projected release date as September 9, 2010, via good conduct credits.
In January 2005, Smith filed the underlying § 2241 petition in the District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Smith alleged that he is entitled
to federal sentence credit for the period from April 25, 2001, through September 5, 2003.
By order entered June 1, 2005, the District Court denied Smith’s petition. Specifically,
the District Court concluded that Smith was not entitled to federal sentence credit for the
time period at issue because it had already been applied to Smith’s state parole violator
terms. This timely appeal followed.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a
clearly erroneous standard to its factual findings. See Cradle v. U.S. ex rel. Miner, 290
F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002). A federal prisoner is statutorily entitled to credit for time
spent in official detention prior to the date his federal sentence commences that resulted
from: (1) the offense for which the sentence was imposed; or (2) any other charge for
which the defendant was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the
sentence was imposed, if that time has not been credited against another sentence. 18
U.S.C. § 3585(b). Smith’s federal sentence commenced on September 6, 2003, when he
was released by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and taken into federal custody. See
18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333-34 (1992). Because the
entire period between Smith’s sentencing in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (April 25, 2001) and the date his federal sentence commenced (September
5, 2003) was spent in service of his state parole violator terms, the BOP could not credit
Smith’s federal sentence with any of that time. See, e.g., Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337
(explaining that a prisoner can “not receive double credit for his detention time”); Rios v.
Wiley, 201 F.3d 257, 272 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that 22 months spent serving state
sentence prior to imposition of federal sentence could not be credited under
§ 3585(b)). Smith’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. In short, if Smith’s federal
sentence were credited for the time period from April 25, 2001, through September 5,
2003, he would be receiving improper double credit.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s June 1, 2005, order.