Kenner Jackson v. Kathy Biedenharn , 429 F. App'x 369 ( 2011 )


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  •      Case: 10-30909     Document: 00511513692          Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/20/2011
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT  United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    June 20, 2011
    No. 10-30909
    Summary Calendar                         Lyle W. Cayce
    Clerk
    KENNER FITZGERALD JACKSON,
    Plaintiff-Appellant
    v.
    KATHY BIEDENHARN; PAMELA BOZEMAN; LACY N. JOHNSTON;
    ZAKIYYH VAUGHN,
    Defendants-Appellees
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Louisiana
    USDC No. 5:08-CV-422
    Before WIENER, OWEN, and SOUTHWICK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:*
    When he was nearing the end of a federal prison sentence, Plaintiff-
    Appellant Kenner Fitzgerald Jackson was transferred to the City of Faith
    halfway house in Shreveport, Louisiana.               Later, Jackson, who is African
    American, sued four employees of the halfway house for discriminating against
    him on the basis of his race, asserting violations of 
    42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
    , 1982,
    1985, and 1986. Specifically, he alleged that because of disciplinary charges he
    *
    Pursuant to 5TH CIR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not
    be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR .
    R. 47.5.4.
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    No. 10-30909
    received, he was not permitted to leave the halfway house to work, even though
    a Caucasian resident who received similar charges was permitted to work
    outside of the halfway house. He also alleged that he was not permitted to leave
    for other purposes including to go to the doctor, the dentist, or the barber.
    Accordingly, he asserted, the halfway house employees interfered with his right
    to make and enforce contracts with potential employers, deprived him of income
    he would have received as a result of this employment, and conspired to deprive
    him of his constitutional rights, all because of his race. The district court
    granted summary judgment in favor of the halfway house employees, and
    Jackson appeals.
    We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Nickell
    v. Beau View of Biloxi, L.L.C., 
    636 F.3d 752
    , 754 (5th Cir. 2011). Summary
    judgment is proper if the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
    a material fact. 
    Id.
     If the moving party meets this initial burden, then the
    burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific evidence to support the
    claims; the nonmovant may not simply rest on the allegations in the complaint
    or on “conclusory allegations,” “unsubstantiated assertions,” or a mere “scintilla
    of evidence.” Duffie v. United States, 
    600 F.3d 362
    , 371 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    131 S. Ct. 355
     (2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We view
    all facts and draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing
    summary judgment.       Dillon v. Rogers, 
    596 F.3d 260
    , 266 (5th Cir. 2010).
    However, we may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Mid-Continent
    Cas. Co. v. Bay Rock Operating Co., 
    614 F.3d 105
    , 110 (5th Cir. 2010).
    As relevant here, § 1981 prohibits interfering with an individual’s right to
    make or enforce a contract on the basis of race. Jackson does not allege that he
    entered into or attempted to enter into any contract with the halfway house
    employees; instead, he alleges that the employees interfered with his attempt to
    contract with third parties. We have expressed doubt whether § 1981 extends
    to an action against a party with whom the defendant has not contracted or
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    sought to contract. Bellows v. Amoco Oil Co., 
    118 F.3d 268
    , 274 (5th Cir. 1997).
    In any event, Jackson has not produced sufficient evidence that he lost any
    actual contract interest. See Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 
    277 F.3d 743
    ,
    751 (5th Cir. 2001). Jackson points only to his own general, unsubstantiated
    assertions that he entered into or attempted to enter into contracts with two
    staffing agencies, but he fails to produce any evidence of, or even describe, terms
    or obligations under any contract or potential contract. At most, his allegations
    amount to a mere scintilla of evidence, insufficient to survive summary
    judgment. See Duffie, 
    600 F.3d at 371
    . Without any evidence of a tangible
    contract interest, any potential contract that he might have entered into is at
    most prospective and speculative and thus cannot form the basis of a § 1981
    claim. See Morris, 
    277 F.3d at 751
    .
    To the extent that Jackson’s claim is based on an alleged contract with the
    halfway house, he cannot succeed. Even though Jackson signed numerous forms
    attesting that he understood and would abide by the halfway house’s rules and
    policies, none of these forms establish a commercial relationship between
    Jackson and the halfway house. In any event, Jackson does not explain how the
    employees’ actions interfered with any rights he may have had under any
    agreement with the halfway house.
    Section 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in inheriting, purchasing,
    leasing, selling, holding, and conveying “real and personal property.” Jackson
    argues that his rights to employment and to receive income from employment
    constitute “property” for purposes of § 1982. Regardless whether Jackson is
    correct, his claim fails. Unless a plaintiff establishes that a party or parties
    impaired his ability to enter into a contract for property under § 1981, he cannot
    establish a § 1982 claim for the deprivation of an interest in property. Morris v.
    Office Max, Inc., 
    89 F.3d 411
    , 414 (7th Cir.1996); see also Tillman v. Wheaton-
    Haven Recreation Ass’n Inc., 
    410 U.S. 431
    , 439-40 (1973) (explaining that the
    language of §§ 1981 and 1982 stem from the same source and construing the two
    3
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    statutes together). Jackson simply has offered no evidence that the halfway
    house employees interfered with any property transaction.
    Jackson fares no better on his claims under §§ 1985(3) and 1986. Section
    1985(3) prohibits conspiracies to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws
    or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws on the basis of race.
    Griffin v. Breckenridge, 
    403 U.S. 88
    , 102-03 (1971). Jackson cannot show that
    any of the defendants conspired or otherwise agreed to deprive him of his rights.
    Crowe v. Lucas, 
    595 F.2d 985
    , 993 (5th Cir. 1979); see also Green v. State Bar of
    Tex., 
    27 F.3d 1083
    , 1089 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that an “agreement among
    the parties” is a necessary element of a § 1985(3) claim). Jackson points to his
    affidavit and those of other halfway house residents (all of which are practically
    identical) attesting that the halfway house employees “agreed and conspired” to
    deny Jackson “equal rights and privileges,” but none of these conclusional
    affidavits provides any discrete facts or details of how or when such an
    agreement took place. Thus they are not competent evidence. See United States
    v. $92,203.00 in U.S. Currency, 
    537 F.3d 504
    , 508 (5th Cir. 2008) (recognizing
    that an affidavit not based on personal knowledge is not admissible for purposes
    of summary judgment). Moreover, the assertions that the defendants entered
    into an agreement are unsupported by specific facts and thus do not create a
    genuine issue for trial. See Clark v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 
    110 F.3d 295
    , 297 (5th Cir. 1997). Because Jackson’s § 1985(3) claim fails, his claim
    under § 1986 necessarily fails as well. See Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 
    161 F.3d 276
    , 281 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998).
    Asserting that he was not permitted adequately to discover facts to
    support his claims, Jackson next challenges the district court’s decision to deny
    his motion to continue discovery under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The
    district court did not abuse its discretion because Jackson has not adequately
    explained how additional discovery would have created a genuine issue of
    material fact. See Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 
    465 F.3d 156
    , 161
    4
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    (5th Cir. 2006). Jackson lists the additional discovery he seeks, but he fails to
    address in his brief to this court how any of it would establish that the
    defendants interfered with a contract interest. He contends that he was diligent
    in seeking discovery, but he does not explain any acts that he took in trying to
    obtain information regarding any contract negotiations with the staffing
    agencies. As for evidence of a conspiracy to violate his rights, Jackson explains
    that he seeks the identities of all of the halfway house employees and residents
    so that he can obtain affidavits from them regarding, among other things,
    whether the defendants denied him “equal rights.” At most, this amounts to a
    vague assertion of what additional discovery might turn up; however, it is
    insufficient to establish that the district court abused its discretion in not
    granting a continuance. See 
    id. at 162
    .
    Jackson also challenges the district court’s decision to grant summary
    judgment without holding a hearing and taking testimony. Jackson had no right
    to a hearing; indeed, many district courts decide motions for summary judgment
    without holding hearings. Johnson v. United States, 
    460 F.3d 616
    , 619, n. 2 (5th
    Cir. 2006); Daniels v. Morris, 
    746 F.2d 271
    , 275 (5th Cir. 1984). The district
    court acted within its discretion. Jackson had ample opportunity to present
    evidence—in the form of affidavits and other documents—in opposition to the
    employees’ motion for summary judgment.
    Jackson has moved to supplement the record on appeal with documents
    related to his disciplinary record and has asked this court to take judicial notice
    of related documents. The halfway house employees have moved to strike these
    motions and documents. Generally, we will not supplement the record with
    evidence that was not before the district court, McIntosh v. Partridge, 
    540 F.3d 315
    , 327 (5th Cir. 2008); and Jackson has not provided a reason to depart from
    this general rule. As for the motion to take judicial notice, the facts that Jackson
    does present are not susceptible of accurate and ready determination and thus
    are not amenable to judicial notice. See United States v. Herrera-Ochoa, 245
    5
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    30909 F.3d 495
    , 501 (5th Cir. 2001); F ED. R. E VID . 201(b), (f). In any event, the new
    documents that Jackson would have this court consider would not change the
    outcome of his appeal because they do not address the gaps in Jackson’s proof
    addressed above, specifically Jackson’s alleged contractual relationships and any
    alleged agreement among the employees to violate Jackson’s rights.
    Jackson has also moved to disqualify opposing counsel and to strike the
    halfway house employees’ brief, but he provides no legal grounds that entitle
    him to this relief. And, we decline the halfway house employees’ request to
    impose sanctions on Jackson.
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. Jackson’s motions to
    supplement the record on appeal, for judicial notice, to disqualify counsel, and
    to strike the appellees’ brief are DENIED, and the halfway house employees’
    motion to strike is GRANTED, but their request for extraordinary relief is
    DENIED.
    6