United States v. Catalano , 429 F. App'x 943 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-10527 JUNE 14, 2011
JOHN LEY
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 8:04-cr-00348-SCB-TGW-3
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
STEVEN CATALANO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(June 14, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Steven Catalano, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s denial of his
motions to revisit his prison sentence that was imposed approximately three years
earlier, after a jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit racketeering. He
contends that he filed his motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and raises the
substantive claim that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to conduct an individualized assessment. The government
responds that, pursuant to the unambiguous language of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Catalano’s motions to revisit his
sentence.
“We review de novo questions concerning the jurisdiction of the district
court.” United States v. Oliver, 148 F.3d 1274, 1275 (11th Cir. 1998). Whether
the district court has the authority to modify a custodial sentence after it has been
imposed is a question of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Phillips,
597 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.9 (11th Cir. 2010).
We recently held that “[t]he authority of a district court to modify an
imprisonment sentence [once it has been imposed] is narrowly limited by statute”:
Specifically, [18 U.S.C.] § 3582(c) provides that a court may not
modify an imprisonment sentence except in these three
circumstances: (1) where the Bureau of Prisons has filed a motion and
either extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction or
the defendant is at least 70 years old and meets certain other
requirements, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); (2) where another
statute or Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 expressly permits a
sentence modification, see id. § 3582(c)(1)(B); or (3) where a
defendant has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
2
sentencing range that was subsequently lowered by the Commission
and certain other requirements are met, see id. § 3582(c)(2).
Id. at 1194-95; see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As to the second circumstance allowing a
sentence modification set forth in § 3582, “[t]he unambiguous language of
§ 3582(c)(1)(B) indicates that, absent other express statutory authority,
modification of an imprisonment sentence can only be done pursuant to Rule 35.”
Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1195. Further, a district court has no “inherent authority” to
modify a sentence that has already been imposed. See United States v. Diaz-Clark,
292 F.3d 1310, 1315, 1319 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court erred
in concluding that it had “inherent power” to correct a sentence it had imposed six
years earlier and which it viewed to be illegal).
We conclude that none of the circumstances allowing a district court to
modify a sentence are present in the instant case. The district court recognized
that it had no authority to reconsider Catalano’s sentence by stating that it
“cannot” reconsider the motion. The district court was correct that it lacked
jurisdiction and thus we affirm.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Catalano’s request for oral argument is denied.
3