McMillian v. Carochi , 198 F. App'x 766 ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 12, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
C HA RLES JEFFR EY M C MILLIAN,
Petitioner-A ppellant, No. 05-1393
(D.C. No. 05-cv-985-ZLW )
v. (Colorado)
TONY CAROCHI, W arden;
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE
STA TE OF C OLO RA D O ,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT
Before HA RTZ, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Charles Jeffrey M cM illian, a Colorado state prisoner appearing pro se, filed
this application for a certificate of appealability (COA), see 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A), seeking to challenge the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his
28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition as untimely. 1 He also seeks leave to proceed in
form a pauperis (ifp) on appeal.
W here the district court dismisses a petition on procedural grounds, the
inmate m ust show in his application for a COA “that it is reasonably debatable
1
Because he is proceeding pro se, we review M r. M cM illian’s pleadings
and filings liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
whether (1) the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right,
and (2) the district court’s procedural ruling is correct.” Dulworth v. Evans, 442
F.3d 1265 (10th Cir. 2006), (citing Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84
(2000)). Because we conclude that the basis for the district court’s procedural
ruling is not correct and a quick review of M r. M cM illian’s claims on the merits
satisfies the first prong, we grant his applications for a COA and ifp status, vacate
the district court’s judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
M r. M cM illian pled guilty in Colorado state court to charges of conspiracy
to comm it first-degree murder, retaliation against a witness, second-degree
murder, and aggravated motor vehicle theft. Prior to sentencing, he filed a
motion under Rule 32(d) of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure to
withdraw his guilty plea. That motion was denied and he was sentenced to sixty-
four years imprisonment. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and on M ay
22, 1997, the Colorado Supreme Court denied certiorari review. The period of
time before which a conviction becomes final continues “until after the United
States Supreme Court has denied review, or, if no petition for certiorari is filed,
after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court has
passed.” Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999). M r. M cM illian’s
conviction thus became final on August 22, 1997.
Before his conviction became final, M r. M cM illian filed a motion for
postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 35 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal
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Procedure on M ay 22, 1997. That motion was denied on February 18, 1998, and
M r. M cM illian’s appeal of that denial was dismissed by the Colorado Court of
Appeals on April 15, 1999. The Colorado Supreme Court subsequently denied his
petition for a writ of certiorari on September 27, 1999.
M r. M cM illian then filed a second Rule 35 motion for postconviction relief
on April 17, 2000. It was denied and M r. M cM illian’s appeal of that denial was
dismissed by the C olorado Court of A ppeals. The Colorado Supreme Court
subsequently denied his petition for a w rit of certiorari on April 25, 2005. M r.
M cM illian filed the present § 2254 habeas petition on M ay 31, 2005. The district
court dismissed his petition as untimely.
A one-year period of limitation applies to an application for a federal writ
of habeas corpus and begins to run from the latest of “the date on which the
judgment [of conviction] became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). A s
we have shown above, M r. M cM illian’s conviction became final on August 22,
1997. The district court’s determination that his conviction “became final prior to
April 24, 1996” is therefore incorrect.
Absent any tolling of the limitation period, M r. M cM illian would have had
until August 22, 1998 to file a habeas corpus petition in federal court, and his
petition of M ay 31, 2005 w ould have been untimely. M r. M cM illian filed two
state motions for postconviction relief. The first was pending from M ay 30, 1997
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until September 27, 1999, and the second was pending from April 17, 2000 until
April 25, 2005. Section 2244(d)(2) provides that “[t]he time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with
respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward
any period of limitation under this section.” Because M r. M cM illian’s first
motion for post-conviction relief was filed prior to his judgment becoming final,
the one-year limitation period did not start to run until September 27, 1999.
Thus, absent his second motion for postconviction relief, M r. M cM illian had until
September 27, 2000 to file his habeas petition.
Instead, on April 17, 2000, six months and nineteen days after the Colorado
Supreme Court denied his request for a writ of certiorari as to his first motion,
M r. M cM illian filed a timely second motion for postconviction relief. 2
Successive state motions for postconviction relief toll 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(2)’s
2
The United States Supreme Court has held that time limits for filing state
motions for postconviction relief are to be considered “filing conditions” when
determining whether a state motion was “properly filed” so as to toll 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(2)’s one-year limitation period. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 417
(2005). Accordingly, a state postconviction motion rejected by the state court as
untimely is not “properly filed” and does not toll the limitation period. Id. at 410.
In the present case, the trial court dismissed M r. M cM illian’s second motion for
postconviction relief as successive and untimely. Rec. at 63, 6-12 The Colorado
Court of Appeals affirmed, but not on the grounds that M r. M cM illian’s motion
was untimely. Rather, the court of appeals affirmed solely on the grounds that the
motion was successive. Our review of the record suggests the motion was timely
filed within Colorado’s three-year statute of limitation for collateral attack on a
trial court’s judgment. C OLO . R EV . S TAT . § 16-5-402(1) (2006). Thus, the
Supreme Court’s holding in Pace does not apply to this case.
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one-year limitation period as long as they were otherwise “properly filed.” See
Habteselassie v. Novak, 209 F.3d 1208, 1210-12 (10th Cir. 2000). See also Artuz
v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000); Drew v. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1284
(11th Cir. 2002); Smith v. Walls, 276 F.3d 340, 342 (7th Cir. 2002); Palmer v.
Carlton, 276 F.3d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 2002); Snow v. Ault, 238 F.3d 1033, 1035
(8th Cir. 2001); Villegas v. Johnson, 184 F.3d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1999);
Lovasz v. Vaughn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3d Cir. 1998). Thus, M r. M cM illian’s
motion tolled the one-year period of limitation until April 25, 2005, the date on
which the Colorado Supreme Court denied his request for a writ of certiorari, at
which point the limitation period began to run once again.
M r. M cM illian filed the present habeas petition on M ay 31, 2005, one
month and six days from April 25, 2005, the date on which his second motion for
postconviction relief was no longer pending. Adding together that one month and
six days to the six months and nineteen days between motions for postconviction
relief, it appears that when he filed the present habeas petition, M r. M cM illan had
as much as four months and five days left on the one-year limitations period. The
district court erred in ruling that his § 2254 petition was untimely.
Accordingly, we GR ANT M r. M cM illian’s application for a COA on the
question of the timeliness of his § 2254 petition as well as his request to proceed
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ifp. W e VAC ATE the judgment of the district court dismissing M r. M cM illian’s
petition and R EM A N D for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 3
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
3
In light of our remand of Mr. McMillian’s case, the district court should
consider in the first instance Mr.McMillian’s request to supplement his § 2254 petition.
Mr.McMillian’s motion on appeal, filed on May 9, 2006, is therefore DENIED.
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