Chadwick v. Ct Common Pleas , 244 F. App'x 451 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2007 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-15-2007
    Chadwick v. Ct Common Pleas
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 06-3529
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    Recommended Citation
    "Chadwick v. Ct Common Pleas" (2007). 2007 Decisions. Paper 937.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2007/937
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    NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 06-3529
    ________________
    H. BEATTY CHADWICK,
    Appellant
    v.
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA;
    GEO GROUP INC;
    RONALD NARDOLILLO, Warden, George W. Hill Correctional Facility;
    CHARLES P. SEXTON, JR., Chairperson, Board of Prison Inspectors
    _________________________
    On Appeal From the United States District Court
    For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-01443)
    District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick
    _______________________________________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 15, 2007
    BEFORE: BARRY, CHAGARES and ROTH, CIRCUIT JUDGES
    (Filed June 15, 2007)
    _______________________
    OPINION
    _______________________
    PER CURIAM
    Appellant H. Beatty Chadwick, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint in the
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in March 2005,
    followed by an “Emergency Motion to Seek Order Compelling the Defendants to Cease
    Imprisoning Him in Delaware County Prison in View of His Medical Condition.” The
    District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants The Geo Group, Inc.,
    Ronald Nardolillo and Charles P. Sexton (referred to hereafter as the “Prison
    Defendants”), granted the motion to dismiss filed by Defendant Court of Common Pleas
    of Delaware County and denied Chadwick’s emergency motion. We will affirm.
    As noted by the District Court, the circumstances of Chadwick’s legal saga are
    well-known by the parties and are, for the most part, documented in Chadwick v. Janecka,
    
    312 F.3d 597
    , 599-601 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 
    538 U.S. 1000
     (2003).1 Basically,
    Chadwick has been incarcerated for civil contempt since April 1995 for failing to comply
    with a July 22, 1994 order in a matrimonial proceeding directing him to pay over $2.5
    million into an escrow account. The complaint and emergency motion arise from facts
    surrounding his incarceration. Chadwick’s complaint alleges that, given his
    “deteriorating medical condition” in the form of recurring non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, the
    current conditions of his confinement deprive him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to
    be free from cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . In
    particular, Chadwick asserts that his continual imprisonment in a county jail designed for
    short term confinement is injurious to his health because he is deprived of: a clean,
    1
    It appears that Chadwick has applied at least ten times to the state courts, and no
    fewer than six times to the federal court, to gain release from custody. Id. at 600. His
    attempts have thus far been unsuccessful. A federal habeas corpus petition is currently
    pending in the District Court. See Chadwick v. Hill, E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 06-cv-01709.
    2
    hygienic living environment; an appropriate diet; an opportunity to exercise; fresh air and
    sunshine; uninterrupted sleep; emotional support from family, friends and support groups;
    immediate contact with the specialized medical experts who treat him; the ability to plan
    and schedule necessary medical appointments; and the ability to participate in clinical
    trials.
    Defendant Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County filed a motion to dismiss
    the complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that Chadwick’s claim against
    it is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and further that, pursuant to Callahan v.
    Philadelphia, 
    207 F.3d 668
     (3d Cir. 2000), Pennsylvania courts are not “persons” for §
    1983 purposes. The Prison Defendants likewise filed a motion seeking to dismiss
    Chadwick’s complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
    The Prison Defendants argued that Chadwick’s complaint is essentially nothing
    more than an attempt to avoid the requirements of 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
     by filing a second or
    successive habeas petition under the guise of a § 1983 action. Defendants asserted further
    that, to the extent the filing could be construed as a § 2254 petition, it was also subject to
    dismissal on exhaustion grounds. Moreover, defendants argued that the complaint was
    barred by the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata given the fact that the issue
    regarding how the conditions of Chadwick’s confinement impact his medical condition
    was actually litigated in and adjudicated by the state courts in the proceedings
    surrounding Chadwick’s “Motion for Release” filed with the Court of Common Pleas of
    Delaware County and in the state habeas petition filed with the Pennsylvania Superior
    3
    Court in December 2004. Finally, the Prison Defendants argued that Chadwick failed to
    state a claim upon which relief could be granted insofar as the conditions of his instant
    confinement are not tantamount to punishment, that Chadwick is being held pursuant to a
    court order and that they do not have the legal authority to release him, that the doctrine
    of respondeat superior cannot form the basis of liability under § 1983 for the claims
    against defendants Nardolillo and Sexton, and that these defendants are, in any event,
    entitled to qualified immunity. The Prison Defendants supported their motion with, inter
    alia, the transcripts from the hearing held before the Court of Common Pleas on
    September 29, 2004 on Chadwick’s “Motion for Release,” the deposition testimony of
    Chadwick’s treating oncologist, Dr. Steven John Schuster, M.D., and of Dr. Victoria
    Gessner, M.D., former medical director at the George W. Hill Correctional Facility, as
    well as the Common Pleas Court’s Findings of Fact and Decision denying Chadwick’s
    Motion for Release.
    In a Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on June 16, 2006, the District Court
    treated the Prison Defendants’ motion as one for summary judgment and, over
    Chadwick’s objections, granted judgment in their favor while denying Chadwick’s
    “Emergency Motion.” Accepting Chadwick’s contention that he sought merely to
    challenge the conditions of his confinement, the District Court construed the complaint as
    one filed pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    . The court concluded that, under the standard
    enunciated by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
     (1979), Chadwick
    failed to establish that the conditions of his confinement at the Delaware County Prison
    4
    have deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of punishment. While
    noting its understanding of the seriousness of Chadwick’s medical condition, the District
    Court nonetheless concluded that the prison conditions challenged by Chadwick were not
    imposed with the objective of punishing appellant, that they did not amount to
    punishment insofar as they are “reasonably related to the Government’s interest in
    maintaining security and order and operating the institution in a manageable fashion,”
    D.Ct. Memorandum Opinion at 10, quoting Bell, 
    441 U.S. at 540
    , and that they have not
    become “excessive in relation to the purposes assigned for them.” 
    Id.,
     quoting Union
    County Jail Inmates v. DiBuono, 
    713 F.2d 984
    , 992 (3d Cir. 1983).
    Chadwick’s challenge to the adequacy of the medical care he was receiving was
    likewise rejected. The District Court noted that the responsibility of “maintaining
    security and order” and operating the prison “in a manageable fashion” necessarily
    requires the development of policies for the provision of medical care. The conditions
    under which Chadwick requests and receives medical treatment (i.e., coordinating outside
    treatment with prison medical staff and the Court of Common Pleas, and utilizing prison
    medical staff if an emergency occurs), do not, the District Court concluded, amount to
    punishment. The court supported this conclusion with reference to Dr. Schuster’s
    testimony that, “although [Chadwick’s] imprisonment poses some potential risks, he has
    thus far been able to treat [Chadwick’s] lymphoma without any ‘adverse event[s] related
    to his current situation,” id. at 11, and “is satisfied with [Chadwick’s] ability to be
    initially observed and treated by Dr. Gessner at the Prison ....” Id. The court further
    5
    concluded that it was clear that prison officials have not demonstrated “deliberate
    indifference” to Chadwick’s medical needs and, in fact, the state court record indicated
    that prison officials and the Court of Common Pleas “have taken affirmative steps to
    ensure that [Chadwick] receives appropriate and necessary medical care.” Id. at 12-13.
    Accordingly, the District Court granted the Prison Defendants’ converted summary
    judgment motion and denied Chadwick’s Emergency Motion.
    The District Court addressed the motion to dismiss filed by the Court of Common
    Pleas of Delaware County in a subsequent order entered on June 26, 2006. The District
    Court began its analysis by stating that “[r]elief against judicial officers under Section
    1983 is strictly limited by the doctrine of judicial immunity.” D.Ct. Memorandum Order
    at 1. The court continued by concluding that the actions of the individual judges in
    holding Chadwick in contempt and in directing his incarceration until the contempt is
    purged, as well as their actions in denying his state habeas petitions and motions for
    release constitute judicial acts. Because the individual judges did not act in the complete
    absence of jurisdiction in issuing these orders and because Chadwick’s constitutional
    rights are not being violated by the conditions of his confinement in any event, the court
    concluded that the judges are entitled to judicial immunity. The Court of Common Pleas’
    motion to dismiss the complaint was thus granted. Chadwick’s motion for
    reconsideration was thereafter denied, and this timely appeal followed.
    Initially, we note our agreement with Chadwick’s contention that the District Court
    erred in converting the Prison Defendants’ motion to dismiss into one for summary
    6
    judgment without first affording him notice of its intent to do so. Rule 12(b) provides
    that if, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
    excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and
    disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity
    to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.” Because the Prison
    Defendants tendered “matters outside the pleading,” the District Court certainly had the
    option of treating their Rule 12(b)(6) motion as a motion for summary judgment. This
    Court has held, however, that “the ‘reasonable opportunity’ provision of Rule 12(b)
    incorporates the minimum notice provision of Rule 56(c). ‘To exercise the right to
    oppose summary judgment, a party must have notice.’” Hancock Industries v. Schaeffer,
    
    811 F.2d 225
    , 229 (3d Cir. 1987), quoting Bryson v. Brand Insulations, Inc., 
    621 F.2d 556
    , 559 (3d Cir.1980). Moreover, this Court has “insisted on strict compliance with the
    procedural requirements of Rule 56(c),” Brooks v. Hussman Corp., 
    878 F.2d 115
    , 117 (3d
    Cir. 1989), and Chadwick’s status as an attorney proceeding pro se does not obviate his
    entitlement to notice.
    Nonetheless, we have held that the District Court’s failure to provide notice may
    be excused if the failure was harmless error, i.e., where no state of facts exists on which
    the plaintiff could conceivably recover. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d at 342. Here,
    Chadwick does not appear to have been prejudiced by the District Court’s conversion
    7
    decision. Considering the number and types of exhibits 2 appended to the Prison
    Defendants’ motion, including the deposition testimony of Chadwick’s treating
    oncologist, Dr. Steven John Schuster, M.D., it is not clear how he would have benefitted
    if given an opportunity to produce even more documentation. Additionally, given the
    District Court’s holdings on the merits, we do not see how Chadwick could have
    presented material that would overcome the court’s determination that the conditions
    under which he is confined do not constitute impermissible punishment under the Due
    Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the standards enunciated in Bell v.
    Wolfish, 
    441 U.S. 520
     (1979), even considering what Chadwick describes as his “unique
    circumstance.” Thus, we find that the District Court’s decision to convert the motion to
    one for summary judgment without first formally notifying the parties was harmless, and
    that the court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Chadwick’s motion filed under
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) seeking reconsideration of that decision. See Le v. Univ. of
    Pennsylvania., 
    321 F.3d 403
    , 405-06 (3d Cir. 2003).
    We next examine Chadwick’s contention that the District Court erred in granting
    Defendant Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County’s motion to dismiss, a decision
    which we review de novo. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc., 
    417 F.3d 384
    , 386
    (3d Cir. 2005). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the party
    making the claim would be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be
    2
    Contrary to Chadwick’s contention, we agree with the District Court’s determination
    that these documents are relevant to the substantive allegations of the complaint.
    8
    established in support of his claim. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 
    467 U.S. 69
    , 73
    (1984). As noted previously, the District Court determined that the Defendant individual
    judges of the Court of Commons Pleas are entitled to judicial immunity for their actions
    in holding Chadwick in contempt and in directing his continued incarceration until the
    contempt is purged. While the Supreme Court held in Pulliam v. Allen, 
    466 U.S. 522
    ,
    540-42 (1984), that judicial immunity was not a bar to claims for injunctive or declaratory
    relief under § 1983, Congress amended § 1983 in 1996 as part of the Federal Courts
    Improvement Act to provide that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an
    act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be
    granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”
    See Brandon E. ex rel. Listenbee v. Reynolds, 
    201 F.3d 194
    , 197 (3d Cir. 2000).
    Chadwick does not argue that the statutory exceptions set out in this provision should
    apply, and we agree with the District Court’s determination that the challenged actions of
    the judges of the Court of Common Pleas fell within the range of judicial action. See,
    e.g., Figueroa v. Blackburn, 
    208 F.3d 435
    , 443 (3d Cir.2000). Moreover, even if such
    claims were not barred by judicial immunity, Chadwick has not demonstrated “an
    inadequate remedy at law,”see Pulliam, 
    466 U.S. at 537-38
    , and, as the District Court
    properly determined, his constitutional rights have not been violated in any event.
    Accordingly, given the foregoing, we will affirm the judgment of the District
    Court.
    9