Lyman v. Baker ( 2020 )


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  •           United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 18-2235
    RICHARD J. LYMAN, WILLIAM F. WELD, and
    ROBERT D. CAPODILUPO,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    CHARLES D. BAKER, in his official capacity as
    Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; and
    WILLIAM FRANCIS GALVIN, in his official capacity as
    Secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Patti B. Saris, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Lipez, and Kayatta,
    Circuit Judges.
    David Boies, with whom James P. Denvir III, Amy J. Mauser,
    Karen L. Dunn, Lisa Barclay, Amy L. Neuhardt, Hamish P.M. Hume,
    Melissa Shube, Trevor P. Stutz, Nafees Syed, Boies Schiller Flexner
    LLP, Jennifer D. Hackett, James R. Martin, Allison M. Vissichelli,
    Zelle LLP, Mark Guerrero, Mary Whittle, Guerrero & Whittle PLLC,
    Randall L. Allen, Alston & Bird LLP, David H. Fry, J. Max Rosen,
    Michael B. Desanctis, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP, Scott A. Martin,
    Irving Scher, Jeanette Bayoumi, Michael D. Hausfeld, Swathi
    Bojedla, Hausfeld LLP, María Amelia Calaf, Jack A. Simms, Jr.,
    Ryan A. Botkin, Katherine P. Chiarello, Karen S. Vladeck, W. Reid
    Wittliff, Wittliff Cutter Austin, PLLC, and Samuel Issacharoff,
    were on brief, for appellants.
    Amy Spector, Assistant Attorney General, with whom Maura
    Healey, Attorney General, and Robert E. Toone, Assistant Attorney
    General, were on brief, for appellees.
    March 31, 2020
    -2-
    TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.          The appellants in this case
    are three Massachusetts voters who challenge the constitutionality
    of the winner-take-all method for selecting presidential electors
    that Massachusetts has adopted pursuant to its authority under
    Article II of the United States Constitution.                 They allege that
    the winner-take-all elector-selection method violates their right
    to an equally weighted vote under the Equal Protection Clause of
    the Fourteenth Amendment as well as their associational rights
    under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.               The district court
    dismissed their complaint for lack of standing and failure to state
    a claim.   Even though we determine that the appellants do have
    standing to bring their claims, we agree that they have failed to
    state a claim upon which relief can be granted under either of
    their constitutional theories.          Therefore, we affirm.
    I.
    A.   Factual Background
    Because this is an appeal from the granting of a motion
    to   dismiss,    "we   rehearse   the    facts   as    they    appear   in    the
    plaintiffs'     complaint[]    (including     documents       incorporated    by
    reference therein)."       Hochendoner v. Genzyme Corp., 
    823 F.3d 724
    ,
    728 (1st Cir. 2016).
    The    United    States   elects      its   president     and     vice
    president through the Electoral College, which is a body of
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    electors    appointed      by     each    state    in   proportion     to    its
    representation in the Senate and the House of Representatives.
    U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 2;
    id. amend. XII.
                   The candidate
    that   receives   a    majority    of    those    electors'   votes   wins   the
    presidency.    See
    id. amend. XII.
    1
    Pursuant      to    its      constitutional       authority,     the
    Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("Massachusetts") has enacted a
    statutory scheme that provides for the appointment of electors for
    president and vice president on a winner-take-all basis (the "WTA
    system").     See
    id. art. II,
    § 1, cl. 2; see generally Mass. Gen.
    Laws ch. 53-54.       The core statutes providing the structure of the
    WTA system are established in Massachusetts General Laws chapter
    53, section 8, as well as chapter 54, sections 43, 118, and 148.
    Chapter 53, section 8 states that "[t]he state committees of the
    respective political parties . . . shall nominate the presidential
    electors" for their parties, which "shall include a pledge by the
    presidential elector to vote for the candidate named in the
    filing."    Chapter 54, section 43 provides:
    The names of the candidates for presidential electors
    shall not be printed on the ballot, but in lieu
    thereof the surnames of the candidates of each party
    for president and vice president shall be printed
    thereon in one line under the designation "Electors
    1  The Twelfth Amendment also provides a mechanism for resolving
    a situation in which no candidate receives a majority of the
    electoral votes.
    -4-
    of president and vice president" and arranged in the
    alphabetical order of the surnames of the candidates
    for president, with the political designation of the
    party placed at the right of and in the same line with
    the surnames.
    Section 118 of the same chapter proclaims:
    The copies of the records of votes for presidential
    electors shall . . . be examined by the governor and
    council, who shall thereafter declare . . . the names
    of the persons who have received at least one-fifth
    of the entire number of votes cast for electors, and
    the number of votes received by each such person. The
    several persons, to the number of electors required
    to be chosen, who have received the highest number of
    votes so ascertained . . . shall . . . be deemed to
    be elected . . . .
    Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 118 (emphasis added).     Finally,
    section 148 provides:
    The persons chosen as presidential electors shall meet
    at the state house on the date fixed by federal law
    next following their election . . . and organize by
    the choice of a presiding officer and secretary. The
    state secretary shall call the meeting to order, call
    the roll of electors, and preside until a presiding
    officer shall be chosen.       The secretary of the
    electors shall keep a journal of their proceedings
    and deposit the same in the office of the state
    secretary, where it shall be recorded and filed.
    Id. § 148.
      As forty-seven other states plus the District of
    Columbia employ a version of it, the WTA system for appointing
    electors is the national norm.
    What makes the combined effect of this statutory scheme
    winner-take-all is that the political party of the candidate who
    wins the popular vote in Massachusetts (by a majority or even a
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    plurality)     claims     all   eleven      of    Massachusetts's       electors.
    Specifically,     since      Massachusetts       mandates    that     its   eleven
    electors vote for their party's candidate,2 see Mass. Gen. Laws
    ch. 53, § 8, winning the popular vote (regardless of the margin of
    victory) guarantees that all of Massachusetts's electoral votes go
    to that party's candidate, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54, § 118.
    By way of example, the Democratic candidate in the 2016
    presidential election, Hillary R. Clinton, received 60% of the
    votes (1,995,196 votes) in Massachusetts's statewide election and
    therefore took all eleven electors.                Meanwhile, now-President
    Donald J. Trump received 32.8% of the votes (1,090,893 votes) but
    took no electors.       The 7.2% of the votes cast for other candidates,
    such as the Libertarian candidate, Gary Johnson, similarly yielded
    no electoral votes.
    Richard    J.   Lyman,   William      F.   Weld,   and    Robert   D.
    Capodilupo      (together       "Appellants")       reside      and     vote    in
    Massachusetts.          Weld,     a   former       Republican       Governor    of
    Massachusetts, is currently a registered Libertarian.                   Lyman, a
    2   The intention behind this provision is to neutralize the
    infamous "faithless elector" problem, whereby electors vote
    independently of their sponsoring party's preference. See Baca
    v. Colo. Dep't of State, 
    935 F.3d 887
    (10th Cir. 2019), cert.
    granted, No. 19-518, 
    2020 WL 254162
    (U.S. Jan. 17, 2020) (reviewing
    the constitutionality of Colorado's law requiring its presidential
    electors to adhere to the mandate expressed in the state-wide
    popular vote when casting their ballots in the Electoral College).
    -6-
    former    senior     official   under       two   Republican    Governors   of
    Massachusetts (including Weld), and Capodilupo are both registered
    Republicans. Appellants have consistently voted for non-Democratic
    presidential       candidates   (i.e.,       Republican,     Libertarian,   or
    otherwise), and they intend to continue casting their ballots along
    such lines in future elections.             Their grievance stems from the
    observation that the Democratic candidate has won the popular vote
    in Massachusetts (and thus all its electors) in each of the last
    eight    presidential    elections.      Notably,     "the   same   phenomenon
    occurs in reverse in heavily Republican states . . . ."
    B.   Procedural Background
    On February 21, 2018, Appellants sued Charles D. Baker,
    the current Republican Governor of Massachusetts, and William
    Francis Galvin, the current Secretary of Massachusetts (together
    "the Commonwealth"), in their official capacities to challenge the
    constitutionality of the WTA system as applied in Massachusetts.3
    Appellants are careful to stipulate that their quarrel is not with
    3  On the same day, Appellants' counsel filed parallel lawsuits on
    behalf of voters in California, South Carolina, and Texas that
    challenge the constitutionality of the WTA systems as applied in
    those states. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott,
    
    951 F.3d 311
    (5th Cir. 2020); Baten v. McMaster, 
    374 F. Supp. 3d 563
    , 565-66 (D.S.C. 2019), appeal pending, No. 19-1297 (4th Cir.);
    Rodríguez v. Brown, No. 2:18-cv-001422, 
    2018 WL 6136140
    , at *2
    (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-56281 (9th
    Cir.).
    -7-
    the Electoral College itself, which they acknowledge is mandated
    by the Constitution.         In their complaint, Appellants allege two
    causes of action.      First, they asseverate that the WTA system
    "violates the 'one person, one vote' principle" enshrined in the
    Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (Count 1).
    Second, they assert that the WTA system "poses a severe burden" on
    their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to "associate and to
    effectively express their political preference through voting that
    is not outweighed by any legitimate state interest" (Count II).
    Appellants premise their equal protection claim on the
    notion that the "consequence" of the WTA system is that "votes for
    a losing presidential candidate are counted . . . only to be
    discarded when another candidate wins more votes . . . ."           Thus,
    they contend that "if an individual does not vote for the winning
    candidate in Massachusetts, that person's vote translates into no
    representation    in   the    state's   multi-member   Electoral   College
    delegation."     Appellants allege that this rises to the level of
    arbitrary and disparate treatment that undermines the precept of
    "one person, one vote."
    The essence of Appellants' associational rights claim is
    that by discarding their votes for President and thus "limiting
    [their] ability to express their political preferences," the WTA
    system "deprives" them of their "associational rights" simply
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    because   of    their    "political      association     and    expression     of
    political views at the ballot box."          By ensuring that Appellants'
    (and similarly situated voters') "voices are not heard," the WTA
    system    allegedly      incentivizes       presidential        candidates     to
    disproportionately       focus   their    campaigning     activities    in    key
    "'battleground' states" (e.g., Florida, North Carolina, Ohio, and
    Pennsylvania),    or     swing   states,    with    greater     potential     for
    positive electoral returns.           Relatedly, Appellants allege that
    this feature contributes to the increasing vulnerability of the
    American election system to outside influences, such as hacking
    orchestrated by foreign governments.
    In    their     prayer   for     relief,      Appellants    seek     a
    declaration of the WTA system's unconstitutionality as well as a
    corresponding    injunction      that     would    bar   Massachusetts       from
    implementing the WTA system for selecting electors, or any other
    constitutionally defective system, including the "selection by
    Congressional District vote," in which states conduct elections
    for individual electors in each of their congressional districts.
    Additionally, they ask the district court to "set reasonable
    deadlines for [Massachusetts] authorities to propose and then
    implement" a valid method of selecting electors.               If Massachusetts
    authorities fail to meet the deadlines, Appellants ask the district
    court to "order a proportional method of distributing Electors,
    -9-
    selecting a proportional number of Electors to each party, based
    on the number of votes each party's candidate receives statewide."
    On May 21, 2018, the Commonwealth moved to dismiss the
    complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of
    standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
    granted, respectively.       Following a hearing, on December 7, 2018,
    the district court granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss
    the complaint in its entirety.         Lyman v. Baker, 
    352 F. Supp. 3d 81
    , 92 (D. Mass. 2018).       On December 12, 2018, Appellants timely
    appealed.
    C.    The District Court's Opinion
    The district court allowed the Commonwealth's motion to
    dismiss Appellants' complaint because it found the WTA system to
    be    a   valid   exercise   of   Massachusetts's   authority   free   of
    constitutional defect.       
    Lyman, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 84
    .      The court
    predicated its dismissal on the interrelatedness of the Rule
    12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) inquiries in the context of the alleged
    constitutional violations.        Because of its view (and the parties'
    agreement) that the "injury-in-fact analysis overlaps with the
    merits of plaintiffs' constitutional claims," the district court
    proceeded directly to analyze the merits of the claims under the
    "well-established standard for Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)."
    Id. at 85.
    -10-
    As an initial matter, the court held that the Supreme
    Court's   summary     affirmance       in    Williams       v.    Va.     State    Bd.   of
    Elections, 
    288 F. Supp. 622
    (E.D. Va. 1968), aff'd, 
    393 U.S. 320
    (1969)    (per    curiam),    which      upheld      Virginia's         winner-take-all
    voting system against an equal protection challenge, is binding
    precedent    that     requires     the      dismissal       of    Appellants'       claims
    because it satisfied both prongs of the standard set forth in
    Mandel v. Bradley, 
    432 U.S. 173
    , 176 (1977) (stating that summary
    affirmances       "prevent    lower      courts      from        coming    to     opposite
    conclusions      on   the    precise     issues      presented       and    necessarily
    decided by those actions").              
    Lyman, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 85-86
    .
    Appellants       argued   that    Williams      is    not    controlling          because:
    (a) there are factual distinctions between the voting laws of
    Virginia and Massachusetts,4 and (b) "important doctrinal shifts"
    in voter dilution law have since "diminish[ed] its precedential
    value."
    Id. at 86-88.
           The court rejected these contentions.
    Next, the district court held that even if Williams did
    not control, Appellants' claims "would still fail for reasons that
    4  Appellants specifically pointed to the fact that unlike Virginia
    in Williams, Massachusetts does not list the names of the
    individual electors on its ballots, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 54,
    § 43, and it binds electors to vote for the chosen candidate by
    statute, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 53, § 8 (requiring presidential
    electors to "pledge . . . to vote for the candidate named in the
    filing").
    -11-
    substantially mirror those given by the three-judge panel in that
    case," which is to say that the WTA system does not violate the
    "one    person,   one    vote"   principle     because   it    does    not    treat
    Appellants' votes disparately or arbitrarily.
    Id. at 88-89.
    No matter the valid policy reasons for and against the WTA system,
    the district court concluded that the Constitution's concession of
    "plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the
    appointment of electors,"
    id. at 88
    (alteration in original)
    (quoting McPherson v. Blacker, 
    146 U.S. 1
    , 35 (1892), as well as
    its    endorsement    of   the   numerical     unfairness     implicit       in   the
    Electoral College, posed too great of an obstacle to Appellants'
    challenge    to   a     voting   scheme    that   does   not    "treat       voters
    differently" or "inherently favor or disfavor a particular group
    of voters,"
    id. at 89
    (citing 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 40
    ).                     Tying
    the analysis back to standing, the court concluded that Appellants
    had therefore failed to allege a legally cognizable harm under the
    Equal Protection Clause.
    Id. at 91
    .
    
    Turning to the Appellants' First Amendment claim, the
    district    court     rejected    the     argument   that     the     WTA    system
    "discard[s]" or "dilut[es]" the votes of minority party members by
    reason of those members' political views.
    Id. at 91
    (citing Vieth
    v. Jubelirer, 
    541 U.S. 267
    , 314 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
    Determining that "whatever disadvantage the losing party and its
    -12-
    members suffer is a function solely of their lack of electoral
    success," the court concluded that Appellants failed to "allege an
    associational burden for purposes of a First Amendment claim."
    Id. Again, the
    court reiterated that in the absence of a constitutional
    violation, there could be no legally cognizable harm for purposes
    of standing.
    Id. Because Appellants
       had    "failed   to    allege   legally
    cognizable injuries under the Equal Protection Clause or the First
    Amendment," the district court concluded that they had "also failed
    to allege an injury to a legally protected interest for the
    purposes of standing."
    Id. at 91
    . 
        After finding that Appellants
    had not suffered an injury-in-fact, the district court briefly
    turned its attention to the question of redressability.            Even if
    Appellants had suffered a cognizable injury, the court reasoned
    that their claims were ultimately "unredressable" because federal
    courts lack the constitutional power "to affirmatively dictate
    what type of elector-allocation system [a state] must use."
    Id. at 92.
      In   the   court's   view,   ordering   a   state   to   implement   a
    particular elector allocation system was inconsistent with the
    Constitution's delegation of such authority to the states and the
    Supreme Court's interpretation of that power as plenary.
    Id. (citing Bush
    v. Gore, 
    531 U.S. 98
    , 104 (2000)).           Accordingly, the
    district court stated that the relief Appellants sought could only
    -13-
    come from a change to Massachusetts state law or an amendment to
    the U.S. Constitution.
    Id. (citing Williams
    , 288 F. Supp. at 629,
    for the proposition that "any other proposed limitation on the
    selection by the State of its presidential electors would require
    Constitutional amendment").
    With this background in place, we begin our discussion
    of the issues.
    II.
    We review de novo the granting of a motion to dismiss
    for both lack of standing under Rule 12(b)(1) and failure to state
    a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).     See Blum v. Holder, 
    744 F.3d 790
    ,
    795 (1st Cir. 2014); Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm.,
    
    669 F.3d 50
    , 55 (1st Cir. 2012).       Although appellate review of a
    dismissal under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) are "conceptually
    distinct," we have stated that "the same basic principles apply in
    both situations."   
    Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 730-31
    (noting the
    "parallelism" between the approach we take as to the standard of
    review, burden of proof at the pleading stage, and posture towards
    the facts alleged in the complaint).     Thus, we need only articulate
    these principles once, and we do so under the well-established
    Rule 12(b)(6) standard.
    For the purposes of our review, we "isolate and ignore
    statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and
    -14-
    conclusions or merely rehash cause-of-action elements."                    
    Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55
    (citing Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 
    640 F.3d 1
    , 7, 12 (1st Cir. 2011) (discussing, among other cases,
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v.
    Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    (2007))); see also 
    Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731
    .   Second,    we     "take        the    complaint's       well-pled    (i.e.,
    non-conclusory,       non-speculative)         facts    as    true,   drawing    all
    reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they
    plausibly narrate a claim for relief."                  
    Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55
    (citing 
    Ocasio-Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12
    ); see also 
    Blum, 744 F.3d at 795
    .    "Plausible, of course, means something more than merely
    possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a
    'context-specific' job that compels us 'to draw on' our 'judicial
    experience and common sense.'"               
    Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55
    (quoting
    
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679
    ); see also 
    Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 730-31
    .
    Finally,   in   the    course    of    our    review,   "we    can    consider   (a)
    'implications from documents' attached to or fairly 'incorporated
    into the complaint,' (b) 'facts' susceptible to 'judicial notice,'
    and (c) 'concessions' in [the] plaintiff's 'response to the motion
    to dismiss.'"         
    Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55
    -56 (footnote omitted)
    (quoting Arturet-Vélez v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 
    429 F.3d 10
    ,
    13 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).
    After careful consideration, we find that Appellants
    -15-
    have, in fact, established standing to bring their equal protection
    and    associational       rights    claims      sufficient     to   survive   a
    Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.                However, we agree with the
    district court that Appellants' claims cannot survive dismissal
    under Rule 12(b)(6).            Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of
    Appellants' complaint.
    A.    Standing
    The parties first dispute whether the district court
    properly dismissed Appellants' claims for lack of standing under
    Rule 12(b)(1), centering their arguments on the injury-in-fact and
    redressability prongs of the well-established inquiry.                "Standing
    doctrine assures respect for the Constitution's limitation of
    '[t]he    judicial        Power'    to     'Cases'     and    'Controversies.'"
    
    Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731
    (alteration in original) (quoting
    U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1).              The core focus of the inquiry
    is "whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake
    in the outcome when the suit was filed."               Mass. v. U.S. Dep't of
    Health & Human Servs., 
    923 F.3d 209
    , 221 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting
    Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 
    554 U.S. 724
    , 734 (2008)).                  "The
    heartland of constitutional standing is composed of the familiar
    amalgam    of    injury    in    fact,    causation,    and   redressability."
    
    Hochendoner, 823 F.3d at 731
    (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 560-61 (1992)).
    -16-
    An injury-in-fact is the invasion of a legally protected
    interest that is both "concrete and particularized" and "actual or
    imminent," as opposed to "conjectural or hypothetical."                      
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    (internal quotation marks omitted).                Concreteness
    and particularity are two separate requirements.                See Spokeo, Inc.
    v. Robins, 
    136 S. Ct. 1540
    , 1545 (2016).           To be concrete, an injury
    must "actually exist"; it cannot be "abstract."
    Id. at 1548.
          For
    an injury to be "particularized," it must go beyond a "generalized
    grievance[]," DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 
    547 U.S. 332
    , 344,
    348 (2006) (citation omitted), to manifestly "affect the plaintiff
    in a personal and individual way," 
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    n.1.
    Injuries that are too "widely shared" or are "comparable to the
    common concern for obedience to law" may fall into the category of
    generalized grievances about the conduct of government.                      Becker
    v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 
    230 F.3d 381
    , 390 (1st Cir. 2000); see
    Lance v. Coffman, 
    549 U.S. 437
    , 442 (2007).
    Causation     is   established    by    demonstrating        a   causal
    connection "between the injury and the conduct complained of,"
    where the injury is "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged
    action of the defendant and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
    independent action of some third party not before the court."
    
    Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560
    -61 (alterations in original) (quoting Simon
    v.   E.   Ky.   Welfare   Rights   Org.,    
    426 U.S. 26
    ,    41-42   (1976)).
    -17-
    Finally, "it must be 'likely,' as opposed to merely 'speculative,'
    that the injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.'"
    Id. at 561
    (quoting 
    Simon, 426 U.S. at 38
    , 43).
    Appellants contest the district court's finding that
    they lack standing because they maintain that the WTA system
    inflicts sufficiently concrete and particularized injuries by
    unequally diluting the strength of their votes for non-Democratic
    presidential candidates and depriving them of their right of
    political association.         They also dispute the district court's
    findings about the "unredressability" of their claims because, in
    their view, the court plainly has the authority to declare the WTA
    system in Massachusetts unconstitutional and to enjoin its use
    without   requiring   the     adoption   of    a   proportional   allocation
    system, and because, in the alternative, the court may nevertheless
    opt to grant declaratory relief alone.
    In full disagreement, the Commonwealth maintains that
    Appellants cannot plausibly have suffered an injury to their
    legally protected voting or associational interests on account of
    the   challenged    WTA     system   because   Massachusetts's     power   to
    determine   its    method    of   appointing   presidential   electors     is
    plenary and the WTA system is devoid of constitutional infirmity.
    Moreover, in the Commonwealth's view, Appellants simply have not
    suffered a concrete and particularized injury because the winner-
    -18-
    take-all method applies to every voter who casts a ballot in
    presidential elections administered in Massachusetts and because
    Appellants cannot show that they have been prevented from voting
    for   the   presidential    candidates     of   their   choice.      Finally,
    inter alia, the Commonwealth contends that Appellants' claims are
    not redressable because even a favorable result would not impact
    the selection method in the forty-seven other states (plus the
    District of Columbia) that use a WTA method.
    We   hold    that   Appellants   have   plausibly     alleged   an
    invasion    of   their    constitutionally      protected   voting    rights
    sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.               While
    folding the injury-in-fact inquiry into the 12(b)(6) analysis has
    intuitive appeal where the alleged injury is a constitutional
    violation, it cannot be that a party only establishes Article III
    standing on a "one person, one vote" or associational rights claim
    by virtue of having successfully stated a claim for relief.
    "'[V]oters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as
    individuals have standing to sue' to remedy that disadvantage.
    Gill v. Whitford, 
    138 S. Ct. 1916
    , 1929 (2018) (quoting Baker v.
    Carr, 
    369 U.S. 186
    , 206 (1962)).           In fact, in Baker, considering
    Tennessee residents' claim that their state's redistricting plan
    violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court determined
    that "[i]t would not be necessary to decide whether appellants'
    -19-
    allegations of impairment of their votes by the 1901 appointment,
    will, ultimately, entitle them to any relief, in order to hold
    that they have standing to seek 
    it." 369 U.S. at 207-08
    .       The
    appellants in Baker had standing because they were "asserting a
    plain,   direct        and   adequate     interest    in   maintaining    the
    effectiveness     of    their   votes,"   and   not   merely   a   generalized
    grievance.
    Id. at 208
    (internal quotation marks omitted).             By the
    same token, Appellants here have at least plausibly alleged a
    sufficiently concrete and particularized injury-in-fact to survive
    a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss.          As alleged in their complaint,
    Appellants reside and vote in Massachusetts and their presidential
    candidates of choice (at least in the past eight elections) have
    not received a single electoral vote from Massachusetts because of
    the manner in which the WTA system allegedly dilutes the strength
    of their votes for non-Democratic candidates and deprives them of
    their right of political association.            The voter, after all, is
    presumptively the best person to bring a challenge to an alleged
    infringement of her constitutionally protected voting rights.             See
    Gray v. Sanders, 
    372 U.S. 368
    , 375 (1963) (stating that "any person
    whose right to vote is impaired has standing to sue" (citation
    omitted)).   We are also satisfied that Appellants have satisfied
    their burden of showing that the alleged injuries can be fairly
    traced to Massachusetts's use of the WTA system.
    -20-
    Finally,   the     alleged    injury      is    indeed    redressable.
    Although we surely cannot order Massachusetts to adopt any one
    particular    elector-selection         method   over       another,   it    is   well
    within the scope of our authority to rule on whether, in enacting
    the WTA system, Massachusetts has exercised its plenary power "in
    a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution."
    Williams v. Rhodes, 
    393 U.S. 23
    , 29 (1968); see also 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 24
    (holding that challenge to state's electoral
    allocation law did not present a political question).                        To that
    end, if a federal court declared Massachusetts's WTA system to be
    unconstitutional,       it    could    enjoin    its    use    without      requiring
    Massachusetts     to     adopt        Appellants'      preferred       proportional
    allocation system.       See Larson v. Valente, 
    456 U.S. 228
    , 243 n.15
    (1982) ("[A] plaintiff satisfies the redressability requirement
    when he shows that a favorable decision will relieve a discrete
    injury to himself.           He need not show that a favorable decision
    will relieve his every injury." (emphasis in original)).
    Importantly, a finding of standing here is consistent
    with the three-judge panel's decision in Williams, which resolved
    that the Virginia plaintiffs in that case (qualified voters from
    each congressional district) did "have the requisite standing" to
    challenge Virginia's winner-take-all system on equal protection
    grounds even though the panel ultimately rejected the claim on its
    -21-
    
    merits. 288 F. Supp. at 625
    .      We also note that none of the
    mirror-image suits filed in the Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits
    implicate the same standing issue, which seems to be because the
    defendants in those cases did not move to dismiss under Rule
    12(b)(1).     See League of United Latin Am. 
    Citizens, 951 F.3d at 314
    , 318 (affirming dismissal of claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds);
    
    Baten, 374 F. Supp. 3d at 565-66
    (dismissing claims on Rule
    12(b)(6) grounds); Rodríguez, 
    2018 WL 6136140
    , at *4 (dismissing
    claims on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds and declining to find that the
    claims presented nonjusticiable political questions mandating Rule
    12(b)(1) dismissal).       Even if the respective motions to dismiss
    in those cases did not raise the standing issue, the fact that
    none of the aforementioned courts raised it sua sponte can be given
    at least some weight.      See In re Olympic Mills Corp., 
    477 F.3d 1
    ,
    6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting the obligation "to inquire sua sponte
    into   our    [subject    matter]   jurisdiction"   (quoting   Doyle   v.
    Huntress, Inc., 
    419 F.3d 3
    , 6 (1st Cir. 2005))).
    Having established, contrary to the district court's
    determination,     that   Appellants   have   indeed   established     the
    requisite standing to survive the Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss,
    we proceed to assess their equal protection and associational
    rights claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
    -22-
    B.   "One Person, One Vote" Claim
    We begin by assessing whether Appellants' allegations
    plausibly support a claim that the WTA system violates the "one
    person, one vote" principle embedded in the Equal Protection Clause
    of the Fourteenth Amendment.       As an initial matter, Appellants
    challenge the district court's determination that the Supreme
    Court's summary affirmance in Williams is controlling.           Next,
    Appellants defend their equal protection claim by splitting it
    into two theories.    First, based on the contents of footnote 12
    in 
    Gray, 372 U.S. at 381
    n.125 -- which Appellants term the case's
    second, independent holding -- they argue that the WTA system
    discards their votes for a non-majority candidate at the first
    step of a two-step presidential election.      Second, they posit that
    the WTA system could alternatively be viewed as an at-large
    election   for   a   multimember    district    of   electors,   which
    unconstitutionally dilutes the strength of their votes.          As we
    will explain, we reject these contentions.
    5  Specifically, Appellants point to the language in footnote 12,
    which states that in the context of Georgia's county-unit system
    (which we will later describe in detail), "the weighting of the
    votes would continue, even if unit votes were allocated strictly
    in proportion to population" because the votes for the candidate
    who loses the county popular vote would be "worth nothing and
    [would] be[] counted only for the purpose of being discarded."
    
    Gray, 372 U.S. at 381
    n.12.
    -23-
    1.
    According     to    the     constitutional     blueprint   for
    implementing the Electoral College, the States alone (through
    their legislatures) possess the power to determine the manner of
    appointing presidential electors.          See U.S. Const. art. II, § 1,
    cl. 2;
    id. amend. XII.
          The text of the Elector Clause reads:
    "Each state shall appoint in such Manner as the Legislature thereof
    may direct, a Number of Electors equal to the whole Number of
    Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in
    the Congress . . . ."
    Id. art. II,
    § 1, cl. 2.        In interpreting
    the bounds of the Elector Clause, the Supreme Court has stated
    that "[t]he state legislature's power to select the manner for
    appointing electors is plenary."           
    Bush, 531 U.S. at 104
    (citing
    
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35
    ).    It is precisely for this reason that
    the Constitution does not prescribe or endorse any selection method
    in particular.   See 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 28
    ("The final result
    [of the constitutional convention] . . . reconciled contrariety of
    views by leaving it to the state legislatures to appoint directly
    by joint ballot or concurrent separate action, or through popular
    election by districts or by general ticket, or as otherwise might
    be directed."); see also
    id. at 27
    ("The constitution does not
    provide that the appointment of electors shall be by popular vote,
    nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a general ticket,
    -24-
    nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise
    can   alone    choose    the   electors.").   State    legislatures   have
    utilized a variety of appointment mechanisms since the framing of
    the Constitution, but in recent memory, "[h]istory has . . .
    favored the voter."       
    Bush, 531 U.S. at 104
    .6     Of course, the hand
    that giveth, also taketh away (if it so desires).         See id. (citing
    
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 35
    ) ("The State . . . after granting the
    franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the
    power to appoint electors.").7
    Plenary as a state legislature's power to dictate the
    manner of appointing presidential electors may be, it is not beyond
    judicial review.        On the contrary, it is "always subject to the
    6  Only Nebraska and Maine have adopted an alternative to the WTA
    system. They employ a hybrid version of district voting. See Me.
    Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A, § 805.2 (2020); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 32-714
    (2019). Under this modern iteration, the candidate who wins the
    statewide popular vote receives the two at-large electoral votes
    (i.e., the two votes each state is entitled to for its senatorial
    representation), and the candidate who wins a plurality of the
    votes in each congressional district receives one electoral vote
    for that district (i.e., two in Maine and three in Nebraska).
    7 For example, in advance of the 1800 presidential election, the
    Massachusetts legislature took back the appointment power from its
    citizens and picked the electors itself. See Neal R. Peirce, The
    People's President: The Electoral College in American History and
    the Direct-Vote Alternative 67 (1968).          Historically, the
    Massachusetts legislature experimented quite frequently before
    settling on the WTA system.        Between 1804 and 1820 alone,
    Massachusetts rotated through the general ticket system (1804), a
    joint ballot of the legislature (1808, 1816), and the congressional
    district system (1812, 1820), only to return to the general ticket
    system in 1824. See 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 32
    .
    -25-
    limitation that [it] may not be exercised in a way that violates
    other specific provisions of the Constitution."               
    Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 29
    ; see also 
    Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 626
    (noting that in order
    to pass muster, "the manner of appointment must itself be free of
    Constitutional infirmity").          The Equal Protection Clause of the
    Fourteenth Amendment is one such well-established limitation (the
    First Amendment is another, as we will explain later).                See 
    Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 29
    ("[N]o State can pass a law regulating elections
    that violates the Fourteenth Amendment[] . . . ."); Wesberry v.
    Sanders, 
    376 U.S. 1
    , 17-18 (1964) ("Our Constitution leaves no
    room for classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
    abridges [their] right [to vote].").
    The      Equal    Protection       Clause    guarantees     that     the
    government will not treat "those who are similarly situated"
    differently.     In re Subpoena to Witzel, 
    531 F.3d 113
    , 118 (1st Cir.
    2008); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State
    . . .   deny   to   any     person   within    its     jurisdiction    the    equal
    protection of the laws.").            In the context of voting rights,
    "[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State
    may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one
    person's vote over that of another."                 
    Bush, 531 U.S. at 104
    —05
    (citing Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 
    383 U.S. 663
    , 665 (1966)).8
    8   Importantly for our analysis, citizens do not have a "federal
    -26-
    In this manner, the Equal Protection Clause safeguards the "equal
    weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each
    voter."
    Id. at 104.
        This is the meaning of "one person,
    one vote," a steadfast democratic principle which the Supreme
    Court articulated in 
    Gray, 372 U.S. at 381
    .       At its core, the
    precept stands for the "idea that every voter is equal to every
    other voter in his State."
    Id. at 380.
        In other words, once
    states establish a geographical unit for electing a political
    representative, "all who participate in the election are to have
    an equal vote--whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever
    their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home
    may be in that geographical unit."
    Id. at 379;
    see also Burns v.
    Richardson, 
    384 U.S. 73
    , 88 (1966) (recognizing that electoral
    systems cannot be used to "cancel out the voting strength of racial
    or political elements of the population" (quoting Fortson v.
    Dorsey, 
    379 U.S. 433
    , 439 (1965))).
    One-person, one-vote jurisprudence thus requires states
    to "[e]nsure that each person's vote counts as much, insofar as it
    [i]s practicable, as any other person's."   Hadley v. Junior Coll.
    constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the
    United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a
    statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint
    members of the electoral college." 
    Bush, 531 U.S. at 104
    (citing
    U.S. Const. Art. II, § 1).
    -27-
    Dist. of Metro. Kan. City, 
    397 U.S. 50
    , 54 (1970).          "[T]he crucial
    consideration is the right of each qualified voter to participate
    on an equal footing in the election process."
    Id. at 55.
          As the
    Supreme Court has recognized, "[t]he right to vote can be affected
    by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition
    on casting a ballot."     Shaw v. Reno, 
    509 U.S. 630
    , 640-41 (1993)
    (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Allen v.
    State Bd. of Elections, 
    393 U.S. 544
    , 569 (1969)); see also
    Reynolds v. Sims, 
    377 U.S. 533
    , 555 (1964) ("[T]he right of
    suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight
    of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting
    the free exercise of the franchise.").         Along these lines, one's
    right to vote is impaired to an unconstitutional degree when the
    weight of one's vote is substantially diluted in comparison with
    the votes of citizens living elsewhere in the state.           See, e.g.,
    Moore v. Ogilvie, 
    394 U.S. 814
    , 819 (1969) ("The idea that one
    group can be granted greater voting strength than another is
    hostile to the one [person], one vote basis of our representative
    government.").    Therefore, now that Massachusetts has decided to
    let its citizens choose by ballot which presidential candidate
    Massachusetts    will   support   with   its    electoral    votes,     that
    balloting is subject to the "one person, one vote" principle
    -28-
    embedded   in   the    Equal    Protection    Clause   of   the     Fourteenth
    Amendment.
    2.
    Appellants' challenge to Massachusetts's WTA system for
    selecting presidential electors on equal protection grounds is not
    the first of its kind.         In Williams, Virginia voters challenged
    the Commonwealth of Virginia's use of an analogous WTA system known
    as the "unit rule."       
    See 288 F. Supp. at 624
    , 626 (considering
    "whether     Article   II,     Section    1   considered    alone    or   with
    Constitutional safeguards, permits the selection of the electors
    by a general election in which the entire electorate of the State
    may collectively vote at one time upon all of the electors").9
    After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court summarily affirmed
    the decision of the three-judge panel of the district court in a
    9  There is historical irony in the link between the challenges to
    Virginia's and Massachusetts's WTA systems.      As is now legend,
    after John Adams (of Massachusetts) defeated Thomas Jefferson (of
    Virginia) in the 1796 presidential election by a three-vote margin,
    Virginia switched from the district system (which it had used in
    the first three presidential elections) to the general ticket
    system (whereby electors are selected on a winner-take-all basis
    by a statewide popular vote) to ensure that all of its twenty-one
    electoral votes would go to a single party's candidate.         See
    Peirce, supra note 7, at 64-66; see also Letter from Thomas
    Jefferson to James Monroe (Jan. 12, 1800) in 9 The Works of Thomas
    Jefferson, 90 (Paul Leicester Ford, ed. 1904) ("[All agree that an
    election by districts would be best, if it could be general; but
    while [ten] states ch[oose] either by their legislatures or by a
    general ticket, it is folly [and] worse than folly for the
    other [six] not to do it.").
    -29-
    per    curiam    opinion     and   then    denied      a    motion    for   rehearing.
    See Williams, 
    393 U.S. 320
    , reh'g denied, 
    393 U.S. 1112
    (1969)
    (per curiam).         Given the clear overlap of issues, a citation to
    Williams would, in our view, decide the present case but for the
    fact    that    Williams     remains      good   law       as   a   one-line      summary
    affirmance by the Supreme Court instead of a merits opinion.                           We
    thus echo the district court in the case at hand: the Supreme
    Court's summary affirmance is not necessarily an endorsement of
    the three-judge panel's reasoning.               See 
    Lyman, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 86
    (citing 
    Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176
    ).              To that end, summary actions
    are meant to be understood as "applying principles established by
    prior decisions to the particular facts involved" and not as
    "breaking new ground."             
    Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176
    .              Nevertheless
    "[t]hey do prevent lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions
    on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those
    actions."       Id.; see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 
    460 U.S. 780
    , 784
    n.5 (1983).         For substantially the same reasons articulated by the
    district court below (with a few tweaks), we agree that Williams
    requires the dismissal of Appellants' equal protection claim at
    this stage.
    Williams     decides    the   core          equal    protection      issue
    presented      by    this   appeal:    whether    Massachusetts's           WTA    system
    -30-
    undermines the "one person, one vote" principle.10     The Williams
    plaintiffs were ten Virginia voters who shared the conviction that
    Virginia's unit rule undermined the original intent of the Elector
    Clause that electors ought to be chosen on a district-by-district
    basis like congressional representatives -- a sentiment which
    Appellants in this case share.    See 
    Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 625
    ;
    Opening Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 8, Lyman v. Baker,
    No. 18-2235 (1st Cir. Apr. 17, 2019) ("WTA, which in modern times
    makes the role of Electors purely ministerial, is inconsistent
    10  In the aforementioned parallel case, the Fifth Circuit held
    that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Williams required
    the dismissal of the appellants' equal protection challenge to
    Texas's WTA system, rejecting along the way all of the same
    arguments that Appellants make here as to why Williams does not
    control. See League of Latin Am. 
    Citizens, 951 F.3d at 314
    -317.
    Additionally, we note -- as the district court did -- that the
    Fourth and Ninth Circuits have also considered and rejected equal
    protection challenges to WTA systems.      See Williams v. North
    Carolina, No. 3:17-cv-00265, 
    2017 WL 4935858
    , at *1 (W.D.N.C. Oct.
    31, 2017) (rejecting challenge to North Carolina's WTA system as
    "decisively foreclosed by binding precedent"), aff'd sub nom.
    Williams v. N.C. State Bd. of Elections, 
    719 F. App'x 256
    (mem)
    (4th Cir. 2018); Conant v. Brown, 
    248 F. Supp. 3d 1014
    , 1025 (D.
    Or. 2017) (holding challenge to Oregon's WTA system to be defeated
    because "Williams is still good law"), aff'd, 
    726 F. App'x 611
    (9th Cir. 2018). Other lower courts have reached similar results
    too. See, e.g., Schweikert v. Herring, No. 16-cv-00072, 
    2016 WL 7046845
    , at *1 (W.D. Va. Dec. 2, 2016) (dismissing challenge to
    Virginia's WTA system because "[t]he precise issue contained in
    [the] complaint was . . . dismissed, and affirmed summarily" in
    Williams); Hitson v. Baggett, 
    446 F. Supp. 674
    , 676 (M.D. Ala.)
    (dismissing challenge to the "statewide and at-large features" of
    Alabama's WTA system), aff'd without opinion, 
    580 F.2d 1051
    (5th
    Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 1129
    (1979).
    -31-
    with [the original] design.").              Seeking declaratory and injunctive
    relief    --      just    as    Appellants      did    below --      they     challenged
    Virginia's WTA system vis-à-vis three causes of action, the second
    of   which     presented        the   precise      issue    raised    by    Appellants.
    
    Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 623-24
    .                     Specifically, the Williams
    plaintiffs alleged that "the general ticket method violates the
    'one-person, one-vote' principle of the Equal Protection Clause of
    the Fourteenth Amendment, i.e., the weight of each citizen's vote
    must be substantially equal to that of every other citizen."
    Id. at 624
    (citing 
    Gray, 372 U.S. at 381
    ).                     The district court noted
    that plaintiffs imputed unfairness to the plan "because it g[ave]
    the choice of all of the electors to the statewide plurality of
    those    voting     in    the    elections      --    'winner   take       all'    --   and
    accord[ed] no representation among the electors to the minority of
    the voters."
    Id. at 623.
    Deferential       to   the   Elector     Clause's      broad    grant     of
    authority to the States, the three-judge panel in Williams rejected
    the equal protection claim because it saw "nothing in [Virginia's]
    unit rule offensive to the Constitution."
    Id. at 627
    . 
             In fact,
    to reach its decision on the exact issue presented here, the
    district court considered some of the same "possible objectionable
    results"     of    the    WTA    system     that     Appellants      allege    in    their
    complaint.
    Id. Namely, this
    list included the risk of "minority
    -32-
    presidents"   (i.e.,     when   a   candidate      wins    a    majority    of   the
    electoral   votes   despite     losing     the    popular       vote),   and     most
    importantly, the "disenfranchisement defect" (i.e., that the unit
    system "extinguishes the voice" of up to "49 percent of a State's
    voters" by allowing "State majorities to speak for them").
    Id. Ultimately, the
    Williams court concluded:
    [I]t is difficult to equate the deprivations imposed
    by the unit rule with the denial of privileges
    outlawed by the one-person, one-vote doctrine or
    banned by Constitutional mandates of protection. In
    the selection of electors the rule does not in any
    way denigrate the power of one citizen's ballot and
    heighten   the    influence   of   another's    vote.
    Admittedly, once the electoral slate is chosen, it
    speaks only for the element with the largest number
    of votes. This is in a sense discrimination against
    the minority voters, but in a democratic society the
    majority must rule, unless the discrimination is
    invidious. No such evil has been made manifest here.
    Every citizen is offered equal suffrage and no
    deprivation of the franchise is suffered by anyone.
    Id. Appellants first
        argue        that     the    district      court
    erroneously    relied     on    Williams    in     dismissing       their      equal
    protection claim because Williams never addressed their exact
    "contention that WTA discards votes at the first step of a two-step
    election as condemned in Gray footnote 12."               Appellants emphasize
    the narrowness of the deference we ought to afford summary orders
    and propose that we only adhere to them when "the factual and legal
    issues presented" are "identical."           At the same time, Appellants
    -33-
    also maintain that the district court misunderstood their argument
    as "being rooted in . . . factual distinctions" between Virginia's
    and Massachusetts's WTA systems.   Although they maintain that the
    factual differences they alleged are not "meaningless," Appellants
    note that their more "basic point" is that their claim evades
    Williams's limited wingspan because it turns on "Gray's second
    holding in footnote 12," which neither the Williams court nor its
    plaintiffs endeavored to cite or distinguish.
    However, Williams did not, as Appellants assert, only
    consider the WTA system as "a one-step election for a state-level
    body."   In fact, the two-step election critique (i.e., that the
    WTA system causes individual votes to "lose their effect on the
    outcome at a preliminary stage in the counting," in the sense that
    those votes are not tallied when determining the winner on the
    national stage) made more than a mere cameo.    See 
    Williams, 288 F. Supp. at 627
    .    The court expressly weighed the issue, but it
    ultimately rejected the two-step critique because it was more
    persuaded by the notion that "[b]y voting, the minority party
    voters . . . set a figure which must be matched and exceeded by
    opposing voters before the State's electoral vote bloc is awarded
    to the opponent."
    Id. at 627
    (quoting Staff of S. Subcomm. on
    Const. Amends., 87th Cong., Memorandum on the Electoral College 23
    (Oct. 10, 1961)).    Along these lines, the applicability of the
    -34-
    decision in Gray, as well as other relevant "one person, one vote"
    cases, was directly at issue in Williams.        In fact, the core equal
    protection holding that "the general ticket does not come within
    the brand of [the one person, one vote] decisions" is a direct
    application of Gray's principles regarding the constitutionality
    of the unit rule.
    Id. at 626.
        Therefore, the absence in Williams
    of a citation to Gray's footnote 12, in our view, does not place
    Appellants'   case   outside   the    "precise   issues    presented   and
    necessarily decided" by the summary action.         
    Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176
    .
    Next, Appellants allege that Williams does not control
    the outcome of this case under their multimember district vote
    dilution theory either (i.e., that by turning the selection of
    Massachusetts's electors into an election for a eleven-member
    district, the WTA system dilutes the strength of Appellants' votes
    for non-majority party candidates).       In support, they assert that
    White v. Regester, 
    412 U.S. 755
    (1973), and Bush v. Gore, represent
    key doctrinal shifts in vote dilution law, which undermine the
    precedential force of Williams's summary order as applied to their
    "one person, one vote" claim.      For the following reasons, this too
    does not persuade.
    First,     the   comparison     with   White    is   inapposite.
    Appellants read White as giving "teeth to the principle that
    -35-
    at-large elections can violate the Fourteenth Amendment if they
    operate to dilute the influence of political minorities."                    Thus,
    without the benefit of cases like White, they argue, the Williams
    court could not have properly considered the potential for a voting
    system to dilute votes in an election for a multimember body.
    However, to characterize White as applying to the dilution of the
    voting strength of "political minorities" through the use of
    multimember districts is to misread its second holding, which
    stemmed   from    the    Court's    concern     that    "multimember      districts
    [were] being used invidiously to cancel out or minimize the voting
    strength of racial groups."              
    White, 412 U.S. at 765
    (emphasis
    added)    (citing      Whitcomb     v.   Chavis,       
    403 U.S. 124
      (1971)).
    Specifically, the court in White confronted the reapportionment
    plan for the Texas House of Representatives in Dallas and Bexar
    Counties, where African-American and Mexican-American communities
    had been "effectively excluded" or removed from "participation in
    the [political] process" in any "reliable and meaningful manner"
    for many years on end.
    Id. at 767,
    769.          In order "to bring
    [those] communit[ies] into the full stream of political life of
    the   county     and    State,"    drawing      single-member       districts   was
    "required to remedy 'the effects of past and present [racial]
    discrimination.'"
    Id. at 769.
            Appellants are not wrong that
    White, as well as the line of subsequent precedent to which they
    -36-
    cite,11 developed voting rights case law with respect to the use
    of multimember districts; however, they stretch reason too far in
    characterizing   those   cases   as   forming   a   doctrine   regarding
    diluting the voting strength of political minorities in general
    terms, when the clear focus of those cases was discrimination
    against racial minorities.       Thus, White does not undermine the
    precedential force of Williams.12
    11 See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 
    478 U.S. 30
    , 47 (1986); United
    States v. Blaine Cty., 
    363 F.3d 897
    , 916 (9th Cir. 2004); NAACP v.
    Gadsden Cty. Sch. Bd., 
    691 F.2d 978
    , 983 (11th Cir. 1982); Montes
    v. City of Yakima, 
    40 F. Supp. 3d 1377
    , 1414 (E.D. Wash. 2014);
    Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 
    636 F. Supp. 1113
    ,
    1135 (E.D. La. 1986), aff'd, 
    834 F.2d 496
    (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
    denied, 
    492 U.S. 905
    (1989).
    12  Appellants also take a related historical tack. At the time
    of its decision, the Williams court noted that Congress had
    "expressly   countenanced"   state-wide   at-large   elections   of
    congressional 
    representatives. 288 F. Supp. at 628
    .     However,
    Appellants submit that, motivated by the fear that Southern states
    would utilize multimember districts to dilute the voting strength
    of racial minorities (as exemplified by the Texas counties in
    White), Congress changed the law to require that states with two
    or more representatives use single-member districts. See 2 U.S.C.
    § 2c.   That change went into effect beginning with the ninety-
    first congress, which convened the year after Williams was decided.
    In our view, this does not alter the doctrinal landscape, for as
    the district court in the present case noted, "multimember
    districts are not per se unconstitutional." 
    White, 412 U.S. at 765
    . In any event, the court in Williams seemed to be acutely
    aware of this because, in the same breath that it acknowledged
    congressional approval of multimember districts at the time, it
    cited the aforementioned amendment as to future elections. 
    See 288 F. Supp. at 624
    . Moreover, what is true for the election of
    U.S. Representatives (a process over which Congress retains
    oversight per Article I, section 4), is not necessarily true for
    the appointment of presidential electors (a process over which, as
    previously discussed, Congress does not retain any oversight).
    -37-
    Second, turning to Bush, Appellants train their eyes on
    the    Williams     court's       "reliance    on     the        invidiousness     as     a
    prerequisite for an equal protection violation," which they argue
    has been "overcome by doctrinal developments."                            They ascribe
    particular meaning to the fact that in Bush, the Supreme Court
    found that Florida's recount procedures violated the "one person,
    one    vote"    principle    because    they    resulted          in    "arbitrary      and
    disparate treatment" of Florida citizens' votes without adding to
    that    finding      any     discussion       whatsoever           of    whether     such
    discrimination       was    invidious.         Thus,        in     Appellants'     view,
    "[b]ecause invidiousness is not a requirement of the present
    challenge it follows that Williams cannot have resolved [their]
    challenge based on a legal standard that no longer controls."                           In
    our estimation, this misses the mark for two reasons.
    First and foremost, we decline to read Bush, which
    expressly states that it is "limited to the present circumstances"
    (and fairly unique circumstances at 
    that), 531 U.S. at 109
    , beyond
    its facts as overturning Williams, especially because it does not
    expressly       discuss     the    selection     of     presidential         electors.
    See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 
    529 U.S. 1
    ,
    18 (2000)("[The Supreme Court] does not normally overturn, or so
    dramatically limit, earlier authority sub silentio . . . .").
    Next, we do not understand Bush to definitively alter
    -38-
    the doctrinal requirements of "one person, one vote" claims in
    every instance.       In Bush, Florida's court-ordered recount of
    ballots cast in the 2000 presidential election violated the Equal
    Protection   Clause    because    "the    standards    for   accepting   or
    rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to
    county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
    
    another." 531 U.S. at 106
    .        This lack of uniform "statewide
    standards for determining what is a legal vote" violated Florida's
    "obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the
    members of its electorate."
    Id. at 105,
    110.     In Bush, the absence
    of uniform standards indicated to the Court that there was no rhyme
    or reason for the arbitrary and disparate treatment of ballots,
    and therefore, an inquiry into invidiousness would have been out
    of place.
    In any event, while proving the invidiousness of an
    election system may not always be required to establish a valid
    equal protection claim, the Supreme Court has factored a showing
    of invidiousness into the prima facie case for violations of the
    Equal Protection Clause in the voting rights context both before
    Williams and after Bush.         See, e.g., Harris v. Ariz. Indep.
    Redistricting Comm'n, 
    136 S. Ct. 1301
    , 1307 (2016) ("[M]inor
    deviations from mathematical equality do not, by themselves, make
    out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under the
    -39-
    Fourteenth    Amendment    . .    .     ."   (citation     and   quotation     marks
    omitted)); Dusch v. Davis, 
    387 U.S. 112
    , 116 (1967) ("[T]he
    constitutional test under the Equal Protection Clause is whether
    there is an 'invidious' discrimination.").                      In our view, the
    larger point is that "invidiousness" and "arbitrary and disparate
    treatment" are simply not mutually exclusive means of establishing
    the prima facie case for "one person, one vote" violations.                     The
    Supreme Court itself (as the district court here rightly noted)
    has recognized as much.           See, e.g., Roman v. Sincock, 
    377 U.S. 695
    , 710 (1964) (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause
    requires     "faithful    adherence      to     a   plan   of    population-based
    representation," and that "minor deviations" are only permissible
    if   "free   from   any   taint    of    arbitrariness      or    discrimination"
    (emphasis added)); cf. Clements v. Fashing, 
    457 U.S. 957
    , 967
    (1982) ("Classification is the essence of all legislation, and
    only those classifications which are invidious, arbitrary, or
    irrational     offend     the      Equal       Protection        Clause   of     the
    Constitution." (emphasis added)).              Therefore, we do not read Bush
    as ushering in the sweeping change that Appellants assert would
    require us to put Williams aside.             Accordingly, we concur with the
    district court that the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in
    Williams controls the outcome of the case at hand and compels the
    dismissal of Appellants' equal protection claim.
    -40-
    3.
    Even if Williams were not binding, we would agree that
    Appellants still fail to state a "one person, one vote" claim as
    a matter of law.       Appellants' equal protection claim does not
    withstand scrutiny because the WTA system does not deny Appellants
    equal participation in the political process by, for example,
    unevenly counting their votes or favoring or disfavoring any
    particular set of voters.        Drawing from Gray, Appellants' first
    equal protection theory is that the WTA system severely burdens
    their right to an equally weighted vote by discarding their votes
    for   president   at   the   first   step    of     a    two-step    presidential
    election.     Appellants' second theory is that the WTA system
    unconstitutionally     dilutes   their      votes       even   if   viewed    as   an
    election for a multimember, state-level body of electors instead
    of the first step in a two-step presidential election.
    The allegations in the complaint do not demonstrate that
    the WTA system "by . . . arbitrary and disparate treatment,
    value[s] one person's vote over that of another," 
    Bush, 531 U.S. at 104
    -05, nor do Appellants plausibly allege that the WTA system
    infringes upon the right of voters "to participate on an equal
    footing in the election process," 
    Hadley, 397 U.S. at 55
    .                    The WTA
    system does not treat any particular group of Massachusetts voters
    differently at all -- it does not inherently favor or disfavor
    -41-
    voters from any particular group (political or otherwise).              In
    Massachusetts, registered voters cast their ballot for president
    and vice president vis-à-vis a slate of presidential electors on
    Election Day.     After the polls close, Massachusetts counts the
    votes, according each vote equal weight, and then awards its
    electors to the party whose candidate wins the highest number of
    votes.    That the candidate who loses the popular vote is entitled
    to zero electors (irrespective of his or her political party) does
    not in our view signify that the votes for that candidate have
    been rendered meaningless.     It merely indicates that the tally of
    votes for that candidate was surpassed by the tally for the winning
    candidate. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
    446 U.S. 55
    , 77
    n.24, 79 (1980) (holding that although the Equal Protection Clause
    does confer a "right to participate in elections on an equal basis
    with other qualified voters," it "does not entail a right to have
    one's     candidate    prevail"      or     "guarantee[]     proportional
    representation").
    Moreover, that one political party has prevailed in the
    past    eight   election   cycles   (or    thirty-two   years)   does   not
    necessarily signify the unequal treatment of political parties
    either.     A fuller picture of Massachusetts electoral history
    suggests that the Republican Party, for example, has enjoyed
    periods of sustained success at the ballot box in both presidential
    -42-
    and gubernatorial elections (the latter overlapping with the eight
    election cycles decried by Appellants).
    Thus,   we   find   no   difficulty   completing   the   logical
    progression articulated by the Supreme Court in McPherson, where
    it upheld Michigan's use of the congressional district system for
    appointing electors against a constitutional challenge (the first
    of its kind).       "If presidential electors are appointed by the
    legislatures, no discrimination is made; if they are elected in
    districts where each citizen has an equal right to vote, the same
    as any other citizen has, no discrimination is made."           
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 40
    .     Likewise, if presidential electors are appointed
    on a WTA basis, and every citizen has an equal right to vote, no
    discrimination is made.         Because that is plainly the case in
    Massachusetts, we do not disturb the ruling below on this point.
    Appellants do not allege any invidiousness about the WTA
    system in Massachusetts either.          While Appellants maintain that
    they need not allege invidiousness to state an equal protection
    claim, they nevertheless cite to historical evidence to illustrate
    that the origins of the WTA can be traced to the realpolitik
    between Republicans and Federalists in the early days of the
    republic.    That the initial design of the WTA system may have
    contemplated the consolidation of electoral power in the majority
    party at any given time does not necessarily make it invidiously
    -43-
    discriminatory.         The   United    States'   system    of    representative
    democracy     was     built   on   compromises     that    sought      to   promote
    geographic equality by way of numerical balancing acts like the
    Electoral College and equal representation in the Senate.                       We
    recognize      that    Appellants      do   not   challenge      the   "numerical
    inequality" that inheres in the Elector Clause vis-à-vis its
    interrelatedness with the Electoral College (which effectively
    gives highly populated states fewer electoral votes per capita
    than     sparsely      populated    states).      However,       we    note    this
    interconnectedness as a means of rejecting the contention that the
    origins of the WTA system irrevocably plague it with invidiousness.
    To begin, Appellants build their case on the assertion
    that    the   district     court    erroneously     ignored      Gray's     second,
    independent holding in rejecting their analogy to the two-step
    system that the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional in that
    case.    Gray involved a challenge to the Georgia Democratic Party's
    use of a county-unit system to conduct primaries for U.S. Senator
    and statewide offices, including for governor.               See 
    Gray, 372 U.S. at 370
    .    Under Georgia's variation -- which the state legislature
    had actually amended during the course of the litigation -- the
    primary was divided into two steps with two metrics: units and
    votes.    See
    id. at 372.
         Counties were allotted two units for the
    first 15,000 residents. See
    id. Counties then
    gained an additional
    -44-
    unit for each of the next intervals of 5,000, 10,000, and 15,000
    residents,    and     thereafter,    an    additional      two   units    for   each
    additional interval of 30,000 residents.                   See
    id. To win
    the
    nomination in the first leg, a candidate needed to receive a
    majority of both the county units and the popular vote (with a
    majority of the popular vote breaking a tie in unit votes).
    See
    id. However, the
    state held a second "run-off" primary if no
    candidate won both the majority of the units and popular votes.
    See
    id. To win
    in the second leg, a candidate simply needed to
    amass the highest number of units.               See
    id. Because the
    county-unit system "weight[ed] the rural
    vote more heavily than the urban vote and weight[ed] some small
    rural counties heavier than other larger rural counties," the
    Supreme    Court     struck   it    down    on     equal   protection     grounds.
    Id. at 379.
           In terms of the Equal Protection Clause, the Court
    held   that    the     transgression       was    geographic     discrimination:
    residents of the smallest rural counties had a disproportionally
    higher number of unit votes in comparison to their population.
    See
    id. Thus, drawing
    upon the "conception of political equality
    from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg
    Address,      to     the   Fifteenth,       Seventeenth,         and     Nineteenth
    Amendments," the Court gave body to the principle of "one person,
    one vote."
    Id. at 381
    .
    
    -45-
    Appellants        contend    that      the   district     court
    understandably latched onto this aspect of the holding in Gray at
    the expense of its second holding, which in Appellants' view, is
    of greater relevance to the outcome of their case.            Footnote 12
    of Gray states:
    The county unit system, even in its amended form
    . . . would allow the candidate winning the popular
    vote in the county to have the entire unit vote of
    that county. Hence the weighting of the votes would
    continue, even if unit votes were allocated strictly
    in proportion to population. Thus if a candidate won
    6,000 of 10,000 votes in a particular county, he would
    get the entire unit vote, the 4,000 other votes for a
    different candidate being worth nothing and being
    counted only for the purpose of being discarded.
    Id. at 381
    n.12.   To confirm the weight of the footnote, Appellants
    cite to the Supreme Court's statement in Gordon v. Lance, that "in
    Gray . . . we h[e]ld that the county-unit system would have been
    defective even if unit votes were allocated strictly in proportion
    to population."    
    403 U.S. 1
    , 4 (1971).
    Although    the    analogy   between    Georgia's   county-unit
    system and the WTA system has intuitive appeal, Gray does not in
    our view give wings to Appellants' claim.          We do not understand
    footnote 12 to invalidate the use of the unit rule in the context
    of selecting presidential electors.      After all, the Court in Gray
    was careful to offer something of a disclaimer that "analogies to
    the electoral college . . . and to other phases of the problems of
    representation in state or federal legislatures or conventions are
    -46-
    
    inapposite." 372 U.S. at 378
    (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
    Appellants implicitly hang their hats on the Court's subsequent
    comment that the Constitution's "validat[ion]" of the "inherent
    numerical inequality" in the Electoral College "implied nothing
    about the use of an analogous system by a State in a statewide
    election."
    Id. But that
    is precisely what separates Georgia's
    use of a county unit system in a statewide primary election from
    Massachusetts's use of the WTA system in the presidential election.
    Whatever the added effect of footnote 12, the core
    concern in Gray was that the county-unit system perpetuated a form
    of geographic discrimination within the state of Georgia that
    magnified the voice of rural voters.13    In other words, the equal
    protection violation stemmed from the observation that every voter
    in the Democratic primary was not "equal to every other voter in
    his State."
    Id. at 380.
      Moreover, even in recognizing the point
    raised in footnote 12 that Georgia's county unit system "would
    have been defective even if unit votes were allocated strictly in
    proportion to population," Gordon -- the case to which Appellants
    cite -- noted that the "defect" to which footnote 12 referred
    13 Although not explicitly phrased in such    terms, the underlying
    concern before the Court in Gray was          that the geographic
    discrimination in Georgia was particularly    invidious because the
    favored rural counties had significantly      lower populations of
    racial minorities than urban counties.
    -47-
    "continued to be geographic 
    discrimination." 403 U.S. at 4-5
    .
    This confirms that the discarding of the votes was never the core
    focus of the holding.       Rather, it was the disparate treatment that
    ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because the "[v]otes for the
    losing   candidates,"      as   Georgia   weighed      them,    "were   discarded
    solely because of the county where [they] were cast."
    Id. at 5.
    The   same   cannot   be   said   of    votes    for   losing     candidates   in
    Massachusetts.
    Massachusetts's WTA system is not materially analogous
    because the role of counties in Georgia and the role of states
    under the federal Constitution materially differ.                  Counties qua
    counties in Georgia did not have the power to select Georgia's
    governor.    Rather, the voters chose the governor by ballot; hence
    any attempt to use "two steps" to weight those votes differently
    raised equal protection issues.               States, by contrast, have the
    power to select the electors who vote for president.                    And under
    the Constitution, a state can decide for itself, without any
    plebiscite, whether to cast its full support behind a single
    candidate.     Massachusetts decided to do so.                 That left only a
    single decision for voters: which candidate?               On that decision,
    Massachusetts chose to turn to its voters, conducting a single,
    one-step electoral process just as it does to select a governor.
    In short, on the question assigned to voters in Massachusetts,
    -48-
    there is only a one-step vote, with no dilution.
    Moreover, the Constitution directly addresses this issue
    in a manner that shows no inkling of requiring a plebiscite.            For
    instance, in the event that the electoral vote is not decisive,
    the vote goes to the House of Representatives to break the tie in
    the Electoral College, with each state having one, winner-take-all
    vote.   See U.S. Const. amend. XII ("[I]n choosing the President,
    the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each
    state having one vote . . . .").          Furthermore, the very use of
    electoral    votes   itself   rejects   "one   person,   one   vote"   as   a
    requirement in the selection of electors unless one contends that
    electoral votes need be subdivided into fractions.               Thus, in
    Vermont, for example, even under Appellants' proposed method of
    voting, there will be "unequal" votes unless a candidate gets
    exactly zero or one third of the votes with the remainder all to
    the other.
    Accordingly, Appellants' two-step theory does not hold
    weight even factoring in the contents of footnote 12 in Gray.
    Moving to Appellants' second equal protection theory
    asserting vote dilution in a multimember district of electors, we
    find that it too fails to carry the day.         Appellants contend that
    even if viewed as a single-step election for a slate of electors,
    the WTA system severely burdens their Fourteenth Amendment rights
    -49-
    "by canceling out their votes for Electors through an at-large
    . . . election that systematically ensures zero representation in
    Massachusetts' Electoral College delegation."
    Their argument is premised on the original intent that
    the Electoral College would function as a deliberative body.
    See 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 36
    ("[I]t was supposed that the electors
    would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the
    selection   of   the   chief   executive,   but   . . . .   the   original
    expectation may be said to have been frustrated.").         By this logic,
    Massachusetts denies equal representation to the citizens who vote
    for minority party candidates because the WTA system ensures that
    they will not be represented by any electors in the Electoral
    College.    Appellants thus argue, relying on 
    Burns, 384 U.S. at 88
    ,
    that the WTA system "'cancel[s] out the voting strength' of
    minority voters in order to consolidate power in the hands of the
    plurality."
    There is no question that multimember apportionment
    schemes can violate the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause if
    (by design or impact) they dilute the voting strength of "political
    elements of the voting population."         
    Burns, 384 U.S. at 88
    ; see
    also 
    Allen, 393 U.S. at 569
    .14      However, the use of a WTA system
    14  Functionally, multimember districts are those in which the
    people   elect  multiple  candidates   to  represent a  single
    consolidated district based on a plurality voting system.
    -50-
    does not necessarily render a multimember apportionment scheme
    unconstitutional.     In Whitcomb v. Chavis, for example, the Supreme
    Court considered an equal protection challenge to Indiana's use of
    multimember districts for its state general assembly elections
    amidst criticism of, inter alia, "their winner-take-all 
    aspects." 403 U.S. at 158-59
    .   However,    the    Supreme   Court   ultimately
    rejected the argument that use of such multimember districts, which
    were decided by plurality vote, violated the Equal Protection
    Clause "simply because the supporters of losing candidates have no
    legislative seats assigned to them."
    Id. at 160;
    see also
    id. at 154-55
    ("The mere fact that one interest group . . . has found
    itself outvoted and without legislative seats . . . provides no
    basis for invoking constitutional remedies where . . . there is no
    indication that this segment of the population is being denied
    access to the political system.").
    We see a useful parallel to the impact of the WTA system
    in Massachusetts.     If the WTA system could indeed be characterized
    as a multimember district -- which we are not certain that it can,
    given the largely ministerial role of electors today -- voters for
    minority candidates do not suffer a violation of their equal
    protection rights simply because their preferred candidate did not
    See 
    Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 134
    n.11, 160.
    -51-
    prevail after having an equal and fair opportunity to compete in
    the statewide election.          Thus, while Appellants are "[a]rguably
    . . . without representation since the [candidates] they voted for
    have been defeated," that is the nature of the "head-on races
    between candidates of two or more parties" that defines "typical
    American legislative elections."
    Id. at 153.
         In that sense, the
    WTA system is no different from any other election system decided
    by plurality voting.      We do not say that votes cast for the losing
    candidate in any other such election are discarded because the
    winner belongs to a different political party or because those who
    voted for the losing candidate disapprove of the winner's political
    agenda.     Thus,   to    the    extent     that    Appellants    challenge    the
    validity    of   plurality      voting    in    general   through     their   equal
    protection claim, they do not prevail.
    Whitcomb,     of     course,        recognizes     that   multimember
    districts    "may    be      subject       to     challenge"     under    certain
    circumstances of vote dilution.
    Id. at 143
    (citing 
    Fortson, 379 U.S. at 439
    ).     The Court added to its holding that the "tendency"
    of a multimember district to have such an effect "is enhanced when
    the district is large and elects a substantial proportion of the
    seats in either house of a bicameral legislature . . . or if it
    lacks provision for at-large candidates running from particular
    geographical subdistricts."
    Id. at 143
    -44 (citing Burns, 384 U.S.
    -52-
    at 88).      Appellants submit that the use of the WTA system in
    Massachusetts aptly illustrates the "dilutive characteristics"
    that were absent in Whitcomb. Under their analogy, Massachusetts's
    unicameral body of eleven electors is the "district," and since
    one hundred percent ("a substantial proportion") of "the seats,"
    or electors, are awarded to the party whose candidate wins the
    popular vote, the dilutive effect is at its peak.               However, this
    parallel is based on a strained reading of the holding in Whitcomb,
    which stands for the proposition that multimember districts only
    prompt equal protection claims when "conceived or operated as
    purposeful     devices    to   further    racial     . . .   discrimination."
    
    Whitcomb, 403 U.S. at 160
    (emphasis added).                  And as we have
    explained, Appellants do not allege such invidiousness behind the
    WTA system in Massachusetts.
    Additionally, Appellants hypothesize that since it would
    be unconstitutional for Massachusetts to provide for the election
    of its state senators using a single-slate, at-large WTA election
    (because it would result in single-party rule), it is therefore
    unconstitutional         to    adopt     the   WTA     system    to   appoint
    Massachusetts's slate of electors.             This analogy does not quite
    pan out, as presidential electors are not a comparable body of
    representatives, especially now that the Electoral College has
    effectively lost its deliberative character.
    -53-
    Finally, as previously explained, any comparison to
    White is inapposite.    While "political elements" are certainly a
    protected class in the voting rights context, White was concerned
    with an altogether different form of deep-seeded exclusion of
    racial   minorities   from   equal   participation   in    the    political
    process that extended temporally far beyond the eight election
    cycles to which Appellants point in their complaint.             Therefore,
    Appellants do not adequately state a claim under a multimember
    district theory either.
    Accordingly, we affirm the district court's ruling that
    Appellants have failed to state a "one person, one vote" equal
    protection claim.
    C.   Associational Rights Claim
    We turn our attention to whether Appellants' allegations
    plausibly support a claim that the WTA system violates their
    associational rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
    At the core, Appellants allege that the Massachusetts WTA system
    severely   (and   unconstitutionally)    burdens   their   associational
    rights by "discarding" or "diluting" their votes as minority party
    members in a manner that ensures that they get no voice in the
    Electoral College.     Because the right to freedom of association
    does not entitle citizens to electoral success, we agree with the
    -54-
    district court that Appellants' complaint does not allege an
    associational burden.
    Together, the First and Fourteenth Amendment operate to
    protect "[t]he freedom of association."          Tashjian v. Republican
    Party of Conn., 
    479 U.S. 208
    , 214 (1986); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
    Patterson, 
    357 U.S. 449
    , 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that
    freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs
    and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the
    Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
    freedom of speech.").      This protection includes the rights of
    citizens to "form political parties for the advancement of common
    political goals and ideas" as well as the rights of parties to
    self-determine   their   organizational       structure    and   to   select
    candidates.   Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 
    520 U.S. 351
    ,
    357, 363 (1997); see also Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 
    530 U.S. 567
    , 574-75 (2000) ("Representative democracy in any populous unit
    of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to
    band together in promoting among the electorate candidates who
    espouse their political views."); 
    Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214-15
    .
    To that end, because voters express their preferences at the ballot
    box, see 
    Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787-88
    , associational freedom
    necessarily   includes   "the   right    to   cast   an   effective   vote."
    Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 
    980 F.2d 943
    , 960 (4th Cir.
    -55-
    1992); cf. 
    Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 30
    (noting the overlap between "the
    right of individuals to associate for the advancement of political
    beliefs, and the right of qualified voters . . . to cast their
    votes   effectively"    in    the    context    of   an    equal      protection
    challenge).
    No bright line rule exists to aid our inquiry.             Instead,
    to decide whether a state election law violates the aforementioned
    associational rights, we employ a balancing test that weighs the
    "'character and magnitude' of the burden the State's rule imposes
    on those rights against the interests the State contends justify
    that burden, and [then] consider the extent to which the State's
    concerns make the burden necessary."            
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358
    (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 
    504 U.S. 428
    , 434 (1992)).                 We apply
    strict scrutiny to a state election law that severely burdens a
    plaintiff's     associational      rights,   meaning      that   it     must    be
    "narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest."
    Id. By contrast,
    "[l]esser burdens . . . trigger less exacting review."
    Id.; see 
    Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788
    ("[T]he state's important
    regulatory     interests     are    generally    sufficient        to    justify
    reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.").15
    15 Because (as we will explain) we have determined that there is
    no burden at all to Appellants' associational rights, we need not
    decide between the various tiers of scrutiny.
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    We proceed to Appellants' claim that the WTA system
    burdens their associational rights because it "ensur[es] that
    [their] votes, and any associational efforts, can have no effect
    on the national election."                First and foremost, we echo the
    district court's determination that the WTA system simply does not
    burden Appellants' associational rights because it merely "sets
    the stakes" but "does not help or hurt one group's chances of
    winning the Commonwealth's electors."               
    Lyman, 352 F. Supp. 3d at 91
    .    That one's candidate of choice does not prevail at the ballot
    box    simply    does    not   translate     into   an   associational    rights
    violation.       See Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emps., Local 1315, 
    441 U.S. 463
    , 464-65 (1979) ("The First Amendment right to associate
    and to advocate 'provides no guarantee that a speech will persuade
    or that advocacy will be effective.'" (quoting Hanover Twp. Fed'n
    of    Teachers    v.    Hanover   Cmty.    Sch.   Corp.,   
    457 F.2d 456
    ,   461
    (1972))); 
    Martin, 980 F.2d at 960
    ("The First Amendment guarantees
    the right to participate in the political process.                  It does not
    guarantee political success.").             The fact that the loser of the
    popular vote is not entitled to electors does not make that
    candidate's voters "unequal participant[s] in the decisions of the
    body politic."         Complaint at 14, Lyman v. Baker, 
    352 F. Supp. 3d 81
    (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-10327) (quoting Whitford v. Gill,
    
    218 F. Supp. 3d 837
    , 883 (W.D. Wis. 2016)).                It is thus no burden
    -57-
    to Appellants' right of "partisan political organization" that
    their    candidates    of    choice    are      not   entitled    to    any   of
    Massachusetts's electors even if they only lose the general ticket
    by a margin of a single vote.         
    Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214
    .
    Elections are hard-fought political battles won by the
    power of persuasion.        See 
    Schatz, 669 F.3d at 52
    (observing that
    the electoral process "sometimes has the feel of a contact sport,
    with    candidates,   political    organizations,       and    others   trading
    rhetorical jabs and sound-bite attacks in hopes of landing a
    knockout blow at the polls").          The WTA system raises the stakes
    of victory, but it does not deprive any group of Massachusetts
    voters of "an equal opportunity to win votes" during the statewide
    election.    
    Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31
    .         It would be troublesome indeed
    if, like Ohio's ballot access measure in Rhodes, Massachusetts's
    WTA system imposed signature requirements that made it "virtually
    impossible" for a political party to slot their candidate onto the
    statewide ballot.
    Id. at 24-25.
            That, however, is not the case
    in Massachusetts, which offers the candidates whom Appellants
    support the "equal opportunity to win votes."                 
    Rhodes, 393 U.S. at 31
    .    Indeed, Appellants cannot and have not alleged that the
    WTA system restricts their ability to express their political
    preferences in Massachusetts by keeping their preferred candidates
    off the ballot.       See 
    Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786-88
    .            Appellants'
    -58-
    preferred    candidates   did   appear   on   the   ballot   in   the   2016
    presidential election and Appellants allege that they exercised
    their right to vote (the alleged harm being that their votes were
    effectively "discarded" by virtue of the WTA system).
    Instead, Appellants assert that the WTA system has the
    effect of "distorting the political process" in such a manner that
    severely     burdens   their    associational       rights   because     it
    "incentivizes candidates to ignore Massachusetts . . . and its
    [political] minority voters in each election cycle," which in turn
    exposes the national election system to foreign interference as
    well.     Having contextualized Massachusetts's use of the WTA system
    vis-à-vis the Electoral College as being in line with the national
    norm, it would not be sensible now to deem it the culprit for the
    outsized influence that a handful of swing states exert on the
    presidential election (whether because of the date of their primary
    elections or the opportunity they offer to capture electoral
    votes).     We cannot opine here on the policy arguments for and
    against this intersection between the WTA system and the Electoral
    College.     Moreover, Appellants do not allege that the WTA system
    burdens the associational rights of the political parties to which
    they belong to determine their organizational structure, engage in
    political activities, or select their leaders (in Massachusetts).
    See 
    Timmons, 520 U.S. at 357-58
    .
    -59-
    Lastly, we note that in the course of its analysis, the
    district    court   turned    to   the    Supreme     Court's    gerrymandering
    jurisprudence because it sheds some light on how to assess the
    "character and magnitude" of the burden imposed by state election
    law   on   associational     freedoms. 16      For    these   purposes,   it    is
    particularly troubling "when a State purposely 'subject[s] a group
    of voters or their party to disfavored treatment.'"               Gill, 138 S.
    Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (alteration
    in    original)   (quoting    
    Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314
      (Kennedy,     J.,
    concurring)).
    Appellants contend that the district court incorrectly
    dismissed their claim on the basis that the WTA system does not
    purposely burden their associational rights by reason of their
    views.     The Commonwealth, for its part, suggests that the district
    court drew the parallel to gerrymandering as a means of "observing
    that the winner-take-all system is a neutral rule, the application
    of which does not turn on the viewpoint of a particular individual,
    group, or party."       While intent (i.e., purpose) may not be a
    16 We also note the potential limitations of this comparison after
    Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Supreme Court held partisan
    gerrymandering to be a non-justiciable political question
    (at least in the context of plaintiffs' equal protection and First
    Amendment claims). 
    139 S. Ct. 2484
    , 2498-2502, 2504-05 (2019).
    By contrast, Elector Clause claims are justiciable. See 
    McPherson, 146 U.S. at 23-25
    .
    -60-
    required element of an associational rights claim, we tend to agree
    with the Commonwealth that the larger point is that the WTA system
    is a rule of neutral and even-handed application that does not
    burden the associational rights of any voter or party by reason of
    their views.
    Therefore, Appellants have not sufficiently alleged that
    the WTA system burdens their associational freedom.     Even if we
    were pressed to find that some burden resulted, it is surely not
    severe, and its "character and magnitude" is too slight to exert
    any significant force in the relevant balancing test that cannot
    be overcome by any regulatory interest of Massachusetts.
    III.
    In conclusion, even though Appellants do have standing
    to bring their claims, we agree with the district court that they
    have failed to state a claim for relief for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes
    under either of their constitutional theories.     Accordingly, we
    affirm the district court's dismissal of both claims.
    Affirmed.
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