King v. United States ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 16-1621
SEAN KING,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
[Hon. Paul J. Barbadoro, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Torruella, Lynch, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
Judith H. Mizner, Federal Public Defender Office, on brief
for petitioner.
Seth R. Aframe, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Scott W. Murray, United States Attorney, on brief for respondent.
July 10, 2020
TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Sean King ("King")
is currently serving a 300-month sentence in federal prison for
several offenses including bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a), as well as the use of a firearm during a crime of
violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Presently,
King petitions for leave to file a second or successive motion
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to challenge anew his § 924(c) conviction
and sentence in the district court. His case presents the single
issue of whether § 2113(a) bank robbery qualifies as a crime of
violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), which is known as the
statute's "force clause." Specifically, King argues that § 2113(a)
bank robbery is not a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s force
clause because it is an indivisible statute setting forth a single
offense that may be violated by alternative means (i.e., by
robbery, extortion, or burglary), which do not necessarily "ha[ve]
as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another." 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(3)(A).
Because we determine that § 2113(a) bank robbery is
instead a divisible statute setting forth distinct offenses with
alternative elements, and because under the modified categorical
approach, King's offense of conviction is undoubtedly a crime of
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violence under § 924(c)'s force clause, we decline to grant King
the requested second or successive § 2255 relief.
I. Background
In 2006, King stood trial on a six-count superseding
indictment that charged him with: conspiracy to commit robbery, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count One); robbery of a credit
union, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (Count Two); possession
and brandishing of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence
(based on his firearm) and the same offense without brandishing
(based on his co-conspirator's firearm), in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (Counts Three and Four); and interstate
possession and transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312-13 (Counts Five and Six).1 The
jury convicted King on all six counts, and the district court
sentenced him to 360 months' imprisonment. On direct appeal, we
affirmed King's sentence and all of his convictions except on Count
Four (the § 924(c)(3) charge predicated on his co-conspirator's
firearm). See United States v. King, 554 F.3d 177, 181, 182 (1st
Cir. 2009) (vacating "the conviction and sentence as to count four,
1 A full recitation of the facts underlying King's convictions
can be found in our opinion dismissing his direct appeal.
See United States v. King, 554 F.3d 177, 178-80 (1st Cir. 2009).
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including the associated $100 special assessment" as
"duplicative").
On April 22, 2010, King filed a pro se motion to vacate
his sentence for the remaining convictions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
alleging inter alia, unlawful seizure and improper submission of
evidence by the Government, ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial and on direct appeal, and bias on the part of the district
court judge. On June 2, 2011, King and the Government filed an
agreement for an amended sentence of twenty-five years'
imprisonment (300 months), according to which King withdrew his
motion and waived the right to challenge the amended sentence on
direct appeal and collateral attack, except for any "collateral
challenge based on new legal principles enunciated . . . in
Supreme Court or First Circuit case law decided after the date of
this Plea Agreement that have retroactive effect." The district
court accepted the agreement and resentenced King to 300 months'
imprisonment.
Four years later, the Supreme Court decided Johnson v.
United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (Johnson II), which
held that the "residual clause" of the Armed Career Criminal Act
("ACCA") -- which defines a "violent felony" as "otherwise
involv[ing] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another," 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) -- was
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"unconstitutionally vague." Based on Johnson II, King applied for
leave to file a second or successive motion under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h)(2). In relevant part, he argued that his remaining
§ 924(c)(3) conviction (Count Three) and sentence could no longer
stand because the § 924(c) residual clause mimics the
unconstitutionally vague ACCA residual clause, and his § 2113(a)
bank robbery conviction (the predicate crime of violence) does not
fit the § 924(c) force clause definition of a crime of violence.
See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). Because we had already held that
§ 2113(a) is categorically a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(A), see, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 873 F.3d 388,
390 n.2 (1st Cir. 2017) ("Because we find that [federal bank
robbery] qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)'s force
clause, we need not address [his] challenge to the
constitutionality of the residual clause."), we ordered King to
show cause for "why relief should not be denied" with respect to
his contention that § 2113(a) is not a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(A). On October 29, 2018, King responded by laying the
groundwork for his core contention: § 2113(a) bank robbery is not
categorically a crime of violence under the force clause in
§ 924(c)(3)(A) because, as drafted, the federal bank robbery
statute creates an indivisible, overbroad offense that may be
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committed by alternative means, which do not involve the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.
On June 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided United States
v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2336 (2019), which effectively extended
Johnson II's void-for-vagueness holding to the residual clause in
the definition of a crime of violence in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B),
the more pertinent holding for King's purposes. Following that
decision, on October 28, 2019, we ordered the parties to file
supplemental briefs "address[ing] fully all issues relevant to
[King's] challenge to his § 924(c) conviction under Johnson II and
related precedent, including the impact of the Supreme Court's
recent decision in [Davis]," emphasizing that the parties should
principally confront "the divisibility/overbreadth arguments set
out in [King's] response to the order to show cause." Our decision
follows the parties' responses.
II. Discussion
A. Legal Standard
"Like other federal prisoners seeking to file 'second or
successive' habeas petitions, [King] must obtain certification
from a court of appeals before presenting [a] petition[] to the
district court." Evans-García v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 237
(1st Cir. 2014) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)). Absent "newly
discovered evidence," our decision to certify turns on "whether
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the petition 'contain[s] . . . a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court
that was previously unavailable.'" Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2)). "[A] prima facie showing at the
certification stage is a 'sufficient showing of possible merit to
warrant a fuller explanation by the district court.'" Id.
(quoting Rodríguez v. Superintendent, Bay State Corr. Ctr., 139
F.3d 270, 273 (1st Cir. 1998)). "The question . . . is not whether
the petition has merit, but instead 'whether it appears reasonably
likely' that the petition satisfies the gatekeeping requirements
for filing a second or successive petition." Pakala v. United
States, 804 F.3d 139, 139 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting Evans-García,
744 F.3d at 237).
At the same time, we have observed that "despite its
superficially lenient language, the [prima facie] standard erects
a high hurdle." Moore v. United States, 871 F.3d 72, 78 (1st
Cir. 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Rodríguez, 139 F.3d
at 273). Indeed, even where a petitioner successfully identifies
"a new rule of constitutional law that has been made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court and that was
previously unavailable," id. at 79-80, we must then "consider the
mixed question of whether 'the petitioner's identified
constitutional rule . . . appl[ies] to the petitioner's
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situation,'" id. at 80 (alterations in original) (quoting
Evans-García, 744 F.3d at 240). "If it is 'clear as a matter of
law, and without the need to consider contested evidence' that it
does not," we will deny the application. Id. (quoting Evans-García,
744 F.3d at 240).
Here, the Government concedes that Davis has announced
a new rule of constitutional law that both applies retroactively
and was previously unavailable. The operative analysis thus turns
on whether King has made the requisite prima facie showing that
the rule applies to his case. As we will explain, King fails to
satisfy this habeas gatekeeping standard.
B. Relevant Statutes
We begin with a brief review of the statutory provisions
at issue. "Section 924(c) makes it a crime for 'any person [to],
during and in relation to any crime of violence . . . use[] or
carr[y] a firearm, or [to], in furtherance of any such crime,
possess[] a firearm[.]'" United States v. Cruz-Rivera, 904 F.3d
63, 65 (1st Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)). Section 924(c) then offers two definitions for
the term "crime of violence":
an offense that is a felony and (A) has as an element
the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force against the person or property of another, or
(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk
that physical force against the person or property of
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another may be used in the course of committing the
offense.
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), (B) (emphasis added). The first clause
is known as the "force clause." See Cruz-Rivera, 904 F.3d at 65
(citing United States v. Rose, 896 F.3d 104, 106 (1st Cir. 2018)).
The second is the so-called "residual clause," see id., which as
we have explained, the Supreme Court invalidated in Davis. Thus,
to qualify as a crime of violence per § 924(c), an offense must
now satisfy the definition of the statute's force clause. With
respect to the force clause, the Supreme Court has made clear that
"'physical force' means violent force -- that is, force capable of
causing physical pain or injury to another person." Johnson v.
United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010) (Johnson I).
Section 2113(a) bank robbery is the predicate crime of
violence for King's § 924(c) conviction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
In full, this federal bank robbery statute provides:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation,
takes or attempts to take, from the person or presence
of another, or obtains or attempts to obtain by
extortion any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control,
management, or possession of, any bank, credit union,
or any savings and loan association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any bank, credit
union, or any savings and loan association, or any
building used in whole or in part as a bank, credit
union, or as a savings and loan association, with
intent to commit in such bank, credit union, or in
such savings and loan association, or building, or
part thereof, so used, any felony affecting such
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bank, credit union, or such savings and loan
association and in violation of any statute of the
United States, or any larceny--
Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than twenty years, or both.
Id. Here, the parties train their eyes on the "taking" (robbery),
"extortion" (extortion), and "entering" (burglary) clauses of the
statute in their dispute as to whether these clauses constitute
alternative means of committing a single offense or alternative
elements of distinct offenses.
C. Crime of Violence Analysis
Because qualification as a crime of violence is a complex
and formulaic question of law, we lay out in detail the procedures
that guide our analysis. To determine whether the offense
described in § 2113(a) qualifies as a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(A), we must first decide whether the criminal statute
of the predicate offense is indivisible or divisible. See United
States v. Faust, 853 F.3d 39, 51-52 (1st Cir. 2017). An
indivisible statute contains a single set of elements that may
"enumerate[] various factual means of commi[ssion]." Mathis v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2249 (2016). By contrast, a
divisible statute "sets out one or more elements of the offense in
the alternative -- for example, stating that burglary involves
entry into a building or an automobile." Descamps v. United
States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).
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We employ the categorical approach to dissect
indivisible statutes, under which "we consider the elements of the
crime of conviction, not the facts of how it was committed, and
assess whether violent force is an element of the crime."
Cruz-Rivera, 904 F.3d at 66 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 848
F.3d 476, 491 (1st Cir. 2017)). If "the minimum criminal conduct
necessary to sustain a conviction" involves the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, then the offense qualifies as a crime of
violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). Aguiar v. Gonzáles, 438 F.3d 86,
89 (1st Cir. 2006) (quoting Chery v. Ashcroft, 347 F.3d 404, 407
(2d Cir. 2003)). On the other hand, when a statute is divisible,
and when some of the alternative elements require the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force while others do
not, then we employ the so-called "modified" categorical approach.
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Under this approach, we look to a
specific subset of materials, including the indictment and jury
instructions, to determine which of the enumerated alternatives
within the statute constituted the actual crime of conviction.
See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249. Under the modified categorical
approach, if the crime of conviction involves the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another, then the offense qualifies as a crime of
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violence under § 924(c)'s force clause. See Faust, 853 F.3d
at 52.
Accordingly, when we confront "a statute that lists
alternatives, [we] must first determine 'whether [the statute's]
listed items are elements or means'" before we can decide whether
to apply the categorical or modified categorical approach. Id.
(quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256). In general, "[a]n element
is a 'constituent part[] of a crime's legal definition' that a
jury must find to be true to convict the defendant." United States
v. Butler, 949 F.3d 230, 234 (5th Cir. 2020) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2248). Means, by
contrast, are the different ways that a single element of a crime
may be committed; and unlike elements, the government need not
prove a particular means to obtain a conviction (any of the listed
means will do). See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.
Determining whether alternatives within a criminal
statute are elements or means "need not be difficult," Faust, 853
F.3d at 52 (citing Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256), so long as we
follow the rules of thumb outlined by the Supreme Court, see
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256-57. First, "the statute on its face
may resolve the issue." Id. at 2256. Indeed, the text and
structure of the statute itself will often serve as the primary
authority on whether an alternative is an element or a means. See
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Butler, 949 F.3d at 234; see also United States v. Vidal-Reyes,
562 F.3d 43, 50 (1st Cir. 2009) ("In interpreting the meaning of
the statute, our analysis begins with the statute's text."). For
example, "[i]f statutory alternatives carry different punishments,
then . . . they must be elements." Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256
(citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
"Conversely, if a statutory list is drafted to offer 'illustrative
examples,' then it includes only a crime's means of commission."
Id. (quoting United States v. Howard, 742 F.3d 1334, 1348 (11th
Cir. 2014)). And in some cases, "a statute may itself identify
which things must be charged (and so are elements) and which need
not be (and so are means)." Id.
Second, courts may look to precedent interpreting the
statute. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256. "If a precedential
. . . court decision makes clear that a statute's alternative
phrasing simply lists 'alternative [means] of committing one
offense,' such that 'a jury need not agree' on which alternative
[means] the defendant committed in order to sustain a conviction,
then the statute is not divisible." United States v. Gundy, 842
F.3d 1156, 1163 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at
2256). Certainly, "[w]hen a ruling of that kind exists, a [court]
need only follow what it says." Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256.
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Tracking this framework, King contends that § 2113(a)
bank robbery is not a crime of violence. His argument proceeds
in two parts. First, he says, § 2113(a) bank robbery is
indivisible, setting forth separate means of commission (i.e., by
force or violence, intimidation, extortion, or burglary), and
therefore we must apply the categorical approach. And second,
according to King, applying the categorical approach, § 2113(a)
bank robbery does not qualify as a crime of violence because it is
overbroad, meaning that the "least culpable conduct" that the
statute penalizes (i.e., extortion and burglary) does not have as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical
force. Because we find that § 2113(a) is divisible and that,
under the modified categorical approach, King's offense of
conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, we need not attend to
the second thrust of King's argument in holding that he has failed
to make the requisite prima facie showing for second or successive
habeas relief.
1.
The divisibility of § 2113(a) is a question of first
impression for our circuit. As previously mentioned, we have
already held "that federal bank robbery" as defined in § 2113(a)
is categorically a crime of violence "under the force clause of
§ 924(c)(3)." Hunter, 873 F.3d at 390. In so holding, we relied
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on United States v. Ellison, 866 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2017), in
which we held that bank robbery "by force and violence, or by
intimidation" under § 2113(a) constituted a crime of violence for
the purposes of the career-offender provisions of the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). However, we did
not have occasion in either case to address directly whether
§ 2113(a) is a divisible statute containing alternative elements,
or an indivisible statute containing a single set of elements which
may be satisfied by alternative means.2 See United States v.
Goodridge, 392 F. Supp. 3d 159, 177 (D. Mass. 2019).
King offers two theories for why § 2113(a) is
indivisible. His central argument is that the robbery and extortion
clauses in the first paragraph of § 2113(a) denote "alternative
means of committing one, indivisible offense and [are] not
2 This is because in Ellison,
[t]he parties agree[d] that § 2113(a) sets forth as a
separate offense 'by force and violence, or by
intimidation, tak[ing], or attempt[ing] to take, from
the person or presence of another . . . any property
or money or any other thing of value belonging to, or
in the care, custody, control, management, or
possession of, any bank, credit union, or any savings
and loan association,' and that [the defendant] was
convicted of this offense.
866 F.3d at 35. Likewise, in Hunter, we held only that violating
§ 2113(a) "by intimidation" constitutes a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(A). See 873 F.3d at 390.
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alternative elements of separate offenses." In other words, King
submits that taking (or attempting to take) anything of value from
a bank either "by force and violence," "by intimidation," or "by
extortion" are three distinct and "equally serious" means of
committing the single crime of bank robbery See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a). He bases this contention primarily on his observations
that structurally, these distinct ways of violating the statute
all carry "the same, single penalty," and textually, "[t]here are
no semicolons separating the disjunctive phrases within the first
paragraph." In support of his indivisibility argument, King also
points out that we have previously referred to these components of
§ 2113(a) as "ways" or "means" (as opposed to elements) in two
decisions: United States v. Almeida, 710 F.3d 437, 440 (1st Cir.
2013) (stating that "[§] 2113(a) can be violated in two distinct
ways: (1) bank robbery, which involves taking or attempting to
take from a bank by force, intimidation, or extortion; and (2)
bank burglary . . . .") (emphasis added); and Ellison, 866 F.3d at
36 n.2 (stating that § 2113(a) "includes both 'by force and
violence, or intimidation' and 'by extortion' as separate means of
committing the offense") (emphasis added). Lastly, King submits
that his reading aligns with the legislative history of § 2113(a)
because, when Congress amended the statute in 1986 by adding the
extortion language, it aimed to overrule a series of cases holding
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that the Hobbs Act was the appropriate mechanism for prosecuting
bank extortion federally as opposed to § 2113(a). King contends
that Congress's addition of extortion language by amendment
(instead of creating a new provision altogether) was intended to
demonstrate that it already recognized extortion "as an available
theory of prosecution inherent in § 2113(a) as originally
enacted."
Singing to a similar tune, King argues that the robbery
and burglary clauses "are also alternative means of committing the
single offense proscribed in § 2113(a)." According to King, this
is so because: "the statute does not explicitly define its clauses
as alternative elements of different offenses"; "both clauses are
contained in the same [subsection] and they carry the same penalty"
(as opposed to the separate offenses listed in § 2113(b), which
carry different penalties from those listed in § 2113(a)); and we
have previously referred to bank burglary as a "distinct way[]" of
violating § 2113(a) in Almeida, 710 F.3d at 440. King also adds
that any ambiguity as to the divisibility of these clauses should
prompt us to invoke the rule of lenity in his favor. On balance,
neither of King's theories is persuasive. We address each in
turn.
As we have explained, to determine whether the robbery,
extortion, and burglary clauses in § 2113(a) represent alternative
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means as opposed to alternative elements, we begin with the text
of the statute. See Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256-57; Vidal-Reyes,
562 F.3d at 50. King correctly observes that § 2113(a) does not
divide the disjunctive list of taking by force or violence,
intimidation, or extortion with semicolons, which indeed can be
used as syntactical markers of alternative elements. However, the
fact that the language "or obtains or attempts to obtain"
immediately precedes the phrase "by extortion" (as opposed to
"takes, or attempts to take," which relates to the "by force or
violence" and "intimidation") nevertheless suggests that extortion
is not an alternative means of commission. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).
By distinguishing between "take" and "obtain," the syntax of the
first paragraph of § 2113(a) "tracks the common law differences
between the offenses of robbery (a taking against the victim's
will) and extortion (obtaining with the victim's consent)."
United States v. Vidrine, No. 2:95-cr-482, 2017 WL 3822651, at *7
(E.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2017); see also Ocasio v. United States, 136
S. Ct. 1423, 1435 (2016). Indeed, such a linguistic distinction
makes sense, as "robbery and extortion are distinct crimes which
may be committed in ways that do not overlap." Vidrine, 2017 WL
3822651, at *7; see also United States v. Harris, 916 F.3d 948,
955-56 (11th Cir. 2019) (tracing the history of robbery and
extortion and explaining their differences (citing inter alia
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Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law, §§ 20.3-20.4 (6th ed.
2017))).
Additionally, the legislative history behind the 1986
amendment of § 2113(a) cuts against King's interpretation.
Congress's intent in adding the extortion language was to resolve
a circuit split as to whether the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1591, or
§ 2113(a) was the preferred channel for prosecuting extortion of
federally insured banks in favor of § 2113(a). See H.R. Rep.
99-797, 33 ("The [U.S. House] Committee [on the Judiciary] intends
[through Section 51 of the bill] to overrule those cases holding
that only the Hobbs Act applies, and those cases holding that both
the Hobbs Act and 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) apply, in order to make 18
U.S.C. § 2113(a) the exclusive provision for prosecuting bank
extortion."). Hobbs Act robbery and extortion have generally been
treated as separate offenses. See Ocasio, 136 S. Ct. at 1432
(describing "Hobbs Act extortion" as its own "substantive
offense"); Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 263-65 (1992)
(recognizing a distinction between Hobbs Act robbery and extortion
by separating out the offense of extortion "under color of official
right" for elemental analysis). This substantive distinction has
prompted several courts to determine that the Hobbs Act is
divisible between robbery and extortion. See United States v.
Gooch, 850 F.3d 285, 291 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v.
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O'Connor, 874 F.3d 1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 2017); see also United
States v. Hancock, 168 F. Supp. 3d 817, 821 (D. Md. 2016) (finding
that "the Hobbs Act is divisible as there are two or more
alternative sets of elements" en route to the court's conclusion
that Hobbs Act robbery is a crime of violence under § 924
(c)(3)(A)). Thus, we merely track Congress's intent as expressed
through the 1986 amendment by extending that same treatment to
§ 2113(a) robbery and extortion.
Lastly, we are further persuaded by the fact that our
sister circuits have concluded that the robbery and extortion
clauses of § 2113(a) constitute alternative elements rather than
alternative means. See United States v. Evans, 924 F.3d 21, 28
(2d Cir. 2019) (citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in United
States v. Watson, 881 F.3d 782 (9th Cir. 2018), to hold that
§ 2113(a) bank robbery is categorically a "violent felony" under
the ACCA's force clause); Watson, 881 F.3d at 786 (holding that
§ 2113(a) is a crime of violence under § 924(c)'s force clause
because "[it] does not contain one indivisible offense" and
"[i]nstead, it contains at least two separate offenses, bank
robbery and bank extortion"); see also In re Jones, No. 16-14106,
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 23578, at *12 (11th Cir. July 27, 2016)
(holding that armed bank robbery in violation of § 2113(a)
qualifies as a § 924(c)(3)(A) crime of violence notwithstanding
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the extortion clause because "[e]xtorting money from a bank
. . . clearly constitutes a separate crime that is not 'armed bank
robbery'").
Therefore, we do not agree with King that the robbery
and extortion clauses denote alternative means of committing a
single, indivisible offense. Rather, it is clear from "the
relevant text as well as the structure and context of the
enactment," Pedraza v. Shell Oil Co., 942 F.2d 48, 51 (1st Cir.
1991), that robbery and extortion under § 2113(a) are alternative
elements of distinct offenses.3
Similarly, we conclude that the robbery and burglary
clauses of § 2113(a) describe "different crimes, not . . .
different methods of committing one offense, and are therefore
divisible." Goodridge, 392 F. Supp. 3d at 178 (internal quotation
marks omitted). To begin, the text and structure of the statute
3 King points out that in a footnote in Ellison, we referred to
"'by force and violence, or intimidation' and 'by extortion' as
separate means of [violating § 2113(a)]." 866 F.3d at 36 n.2
(emphasis added). However, our analysis in that case was limited
solely to the question of "whether this offense -- violating
§ 2113(a) by 'force and violence, or intimidation' -- qualifies as
a crime of violence under the force clause of the career offender
guideline." Id. at 35 (emphasis added). As such, although King
urges to the contrary, our use of the phrase "separate means" in
Ellison did not mean that § 2113(a) is indivisible. We raised the
separateness of the extortion clause merely to highlight the fact
that although Black's Law Dictionary includes extortion in the
definition of intimidation, the defendant made no argument that
§ 2113(a) intimidation included extortion. See id. at 36 n.2.
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itself is the strongest evidence supporting divisibility.
See Butler, 949 F.3d at 235. The definitions of bank robbery and
bank burglary are separated into distinct paragraphs by both a
semicolon and the word "or."4 Indeed, several other circuits have
observed that, even though it carries the same statutory penalty
as the robbery clause, the burglary clause clearly sets forth an
alternative set of elements rather than an alternative means of
commission. 5 See id. at 235-36 (holding that defendant was
properly sentenced under the ACCA because (1) § 2113(a) is
divisible with respect to bank robbery and burglary, and (2) the
crime of conviction was bank robbery by intimidation, which
qualifies as an ACCA violent felony); United States v. McGuire,
678 F. App'x 643, 645 n.4 (10th Cir. 2017) ("Section 2113(a)
4 This detracts nothing from our finding that the absence of these
syntactical markers in the first paragraph does not necessarily
mean that "by extortion" is an alternative means of committing
bank robbery.
5 King also attempts to equate our characterization of bank
burglary in Almeida as a "distinct way[]" of violating § 2113(a)
with the proposition that bank burglary is simply a means of
violating the statute. The attempt is unavailing. In Almeida,
we did not address the divisibility of § 2113(a); rather, we made
clear "that our reasoning is limited to the question of what
conduct a court may consider in determining the 'most appropriate'
guideline pursuant to application note 1 to [U.S.S.G.] § 1B1.2."
See 710 F.3d at 443. Contextually, the "distinct way" language
is thus also compatible with our present understanding that the
statute contains alternative elements of distinct offenses as
opposed to alternative means of committing a single offense.
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includes at least two sets of divisible elements . . . ."); United
States v. McBride, 826 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir. 2016); see also
Kucinski v. United States, No. 16-cv-201, 2016 WL 4444736, at *2
n.3 (D.N.H. Aug. 23, 2016) ("It is clear that the 'entering'
portion of § 2113(a) sets forth a distinct set of elements, and is
divisible under Descamps.").
Thus, we reject King's argument that § 2113(a) is
indivisible between the robbery and burglary clauses of the
statute. We now turn to the force clause analysis.
2.
Because we conclude that § 2113(a) is a divisible statute
setting forth alternative elements, we employ the modified
categorical approach to determine the offense of conviction, and
whether that offense qualifies as a crime of violence under
§ 924(c)(3)(A). See Descamps, 570 U.S. at 257. Pursuant to that
approach, we may consider the indictment and jury instructions
from King's case to identify the crime of conviction. See Mathis,
136 S. Ct. at 2256. Here, the superseding indictment charged that
King "knowingly, intentionally and unlawfully took by force,
violence and intimidation money belonging to" a credit union, and
these were the very same elements listed in the jury instructions.
This is sufficient to establish that King's offense of conviction
was bank robbery, or the taking of money from a credit union "by
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violence or force, or by intimidation," 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), as
opposed to by extortion or burglary. And as our precedent already
makes clear, § 2113(a) bank robbery qualifies as a crime of
violence under § 924(c)'s force clause.6 See Hunter, 873 F.3d at
390. Thus, the rule of constitutional law announced in Johnson
II and its progeny, including Davis, does not provide relief for
King.
Accordingly, King falls far short of the "high hurdle"
that must be met for this Court to grant the requested second or
successive habeas relief. See Moore, 871 F.3d at 78.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we decline to certify King's
application for leave to file a second or successive motion under
18 U.S.C. § 2255.
DENIED.
6 Because we have determined that § 2113(a) is a divisible statute
and confirmed that the crime of conviction is a crime of violence
under § 924(c)(3)'s force clause, we do not address King's
arguments as to whether the least culpable conduct criminalized by
§ 2113(a) -- extortion and burglary -- involve the use, attempted
use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or
property of another.
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