Gomes v. Silva ( 2020 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 19-1656
JOSEPH GOMES,
Petitioner, Appellant,
v.
STEVEN SILVA, Superintendent,
Massachusetts Correctional Institution-Souza Baranowski,
Respondent, Appellee.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. F. Dennis Saylor, IV, Chief U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Stahl, and Kayatta,
Circuit Judges.
Charles Allan Hope, with whom Cunha & Holcomb, P.C. was on
brief, for appellant.
Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Bureau, Appeals Division, with whom Maura Healey, Attorney General
of Massachusetts, was on brief, for appellee.
May 1, 2020
STAHL, Circuit Judge. Following a jury trial in the
Suffolk County Superior Court, Joseph Gomes was convicted of one
count of first-degree murder and several counts of lesser offenses
in relation to a February 2007 shooting that occurred in the
Roxbury area of Boston, Massachusetts. For the murder conviction,
he received the mandatory sentence of life without parole. Gomes
appealed his convictions, and the Supreme Judicial Court for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("SJC") ultimately upheld them. See
Commonwealth v. Gomes, 61 N.E.3d 441 (Mass. 2016) ("Gomes I").
Gomes subsequently petitioned the District Court for the District
of Massachusetts for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. He advanced two claims: that the evidence presented at
his trial was legally insufficient to support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that he knowingly participated in the shooting
with an intent to kill; and that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by admitting into evidence certain items found
at an apartment building owned by his parents in violation of his
due process rights. In June 2019, the district court denied the
petition but subsequently granted a certificate of appealability.
Gomes timely appealed. We affirm under the highly deferential
standard prescribed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act ("AEDPA") for federal habeas review of state criminal
convictions.
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I. Background
A. Factual History
"[W]hen we consider a state conviction on habeas review,
we presume the state court's factual findings to be correct."
Dorisca v. Marchilli, 941 F.3d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting
Hensley v. Roden, 755 F.3d 724, 727 (1st Cir. 2014)); see 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(1). We draw the following essential facts from the
opinion of the SJC. See Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 444-46.
In February 2007, several members of the Gomes and
DaSilva families lived in an apartment building on Langdon Street
in Roxbury. The building was owned by petitioner Gomes's parents,
who lived in an apartment on the second floor. Anthony DaSilva
("Anthony"), Gomes's nephew, lived in an apartment on the first
floor. Gomes did not live in the building at that time.
On the morning of February 13, 2007, as Anthony walked
out of his home toward his car, he noticed a black Buick automobile
stopped at the intersection of George Street and Langdon Street.
The Buick moved slowly down George Street as the driver, David
Evans, watched Anthony. Soon after, Anthony, then sitting in his
car, saw the same Buick make a fast turn onto Langdon Street.
Anthony circled the block, and the Buick followed. He returned
to the Langdon Street apartment building and parked his car. He
ran into the building with his father, who had been standing by
the building's door. They both heard gunshots being fired. A
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neighbor also heard the shots and, looking out of her window, saw
a man chase the Buick and fire several shots at it before running
to the Langdon Street apartment building. Later that day, Evans,
who had rented the Buick, returned it to the rental agency with
damage to a tire consistent with gunfire; a mechanic who eventually
repaired the Buick found a bullet and provided it to the police.
After returning the Buick, Evans rented a silver Nissan Maxima
automobile with New Hampshire license plates.
Boston police officers arrived at the Langdon Street
apartment building shortly after 9:00 a.m. Gomes arrived there
within the next fifteen minutes. He was met by the police
officers, who allowed him to enter the building to check on his
parents. Around 10:00 a.m., Gomes became upset and argumentative
with the police and was escorted out of the building in handcuffs.
He was released and permitted to leave shortly after. Gomes drove
away in a rented silver Chevrolet Impala automobile with New
Hampshire license plates.
Based on the report that the gunman had run into the
Langdon Street apartment building, police officers cleared the
building of all residents. In the process, four young men were
discovered in the common basement of the building, arrested, and
charged with breaking and entering. One of the men matched the
neighbor's description of the man who had fired shots at the Buick.
The police secured the building while they waited for a search
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warrant. During that time, no residents were permitted to return
to their apartments, and while waiting, members of the Gomes and
DaSilva families stayed in their cars. Sometime in the afternoon,
Gomes's brother-in-law and one or more police officers observed
Evans's rented Maxima drive by the building.
Around 6:00 p.m. that evening, Gomes drove his Impala
quickly down Roxbury's Maywood Street, where Evans lived. He
stopped the vehicle abruptly when he reached a group of seven men
who were then standing on a porch and sidewalk near where the
Maxima was parked, across the street from Evans's house.
After the Impala stopped, two shooters fired several
gunshots at the standing men from its open front and rear
passenger-side windows. When the shooting ceased, the car, with
Gomes driving, sped off toward Blue Hill Avenue. Within minutes,
Boston police officers responded to the scene. One of the attacked
men, Fausto Sanchez, had been shot in the lower back. He was
transported to a hospital, where he arrived in cardiac arrest and
was pronounced dead soon after. The cause of his death was blood
loss due to the gunshot wound. Among the remaining men, Roberto
Ramos-Santiago sustained multiple gunshot wounds, Joel Perez was
shot in the right calf, and Maurice Cundiff fractured his arm while
fleeing the gunfire. Perez told an officer that the shooters were
in a gray, four-door, newer-model Chevrolet Impala, and that
description was broadcast over the police radio.
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Two guns had been used in the shooting -- a .38 revolver
and a .380 semiautomatic pistol.1 Neither of those guns were
recovered by the police. However, the police did recover one
spent .380-caliber shell casing in front of the Maywood Street
house and one .38-caliber bullet from the kitchen floor of a home
on nearby Savin Street; the bullet had entered the kitchen through
a rear window that faced Maywood Street. Meanwhile, shortly after
6:00 p.m., a detective driving to the Maywood Street scene observed
an Impala that matched the description given by Perez. Gomes was
driving the Impala, and Emmanuel DaSilva ("Emmanuel") -- Anthony's
cousin -- was in the front seat. The detective stopped the
vehicle. Gomes and Emmanuel were taken into police custody, and
the Impala was towed to the police station. Officers searched the
Impala pursuant to a warrant and discovered six spent .380-caliber
shell casings on the front passenger side -- two on the seat and
four on the floor. There was also a piece missing from the
passenger-side mirror. Ballistics testing showed that the spent
.380-caliber shell casing found on Maywood Street and the six
.380-caliber shell casings found inside the Impala had been fired
from the same .380-caliber gun. In addition, the .38-caliber
1As the SJC noted, "[a]ccording to a Boston police
ballistics expert, .380 caliber ammunition and .38 caliber
ammunition are not interchangeable; a .380 caliber cartridge is
designed to be used in a semiautomatic pistol, while a .38 caliber
cartridge is designed to be used in a revolver." Gomes I, 61
N.E.3d at 446 n.6.
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bullet found in the kitchen of the house on Savin Street and a
.38-caliber bullet that was recovered from Ramos-Santiago's arm
had been fired from the same .38-caliber gun.
Around 10:00 p.m., the police obtained the search
warrant that they were awaiting and searched the Langdon Street
apartment building. In the first-floor apartment, police found
mail dated May 2006 that was addressed to Gomes, two bags of
marijuana, two electronic scales, and $7447 in cash that was hidden
in the headboard of a bed. In the basement, police found personal
papers, some of which belonged to Gomes, crack cocaine, marijuana,
$545 in cash, a red, hooded sweatshirt, a .25-caliber firearm and
a .22-caliber firearm, each loaded with six rounds of ammunition,
a nine-millimeter firearm loaded with eight rounds of ammunition,
and a .380-caliber Mauser semiautomatic firearm containing no
ammunition. Subsequently, ballistics determined that the Mauser
had fired the bullet that was recovered from Evans's rented Buick
and had ejected the five .380-caliber shell casings found by police
outside the Langdon Street apartment building.
B. Procedural History
On May 2, 2007, a Suffolk County grand jury returned
indictments charging Gomes with one count of murder in the first
degree; six counts of armed assault with intent to murder; one
count of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon; one
count of aggravated assault and battery by means of a dangerous
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weapon; four counts of assault by means of a dangerous weapon; two
counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; and one count of
unlawful possession of ammunition.2
A jury trial was held in the Suffolk County Superior
Court from November 9 to December 13, 2010. The Commonwealth of
Massachusetts's ("Commonwealth") theory was that Gomes was a joint
venturer3 with Emmanuel in committing the Maywood Street shooting
to retaliate against Evans for pursuing Anthony and thereby causing
the police occupation of the Langdon Street apartment building.
Over Gomes's objection, the trial court allowed into evidence the
items seized by the police from the apartment building. At the
close of the Commonwealth's case, Gomes moved for a required
finding of not guilty, which was denied. Gomes renewed his motion
at the close of evidence, and it was again denied.
On December 13, 2010, the jury convicted Gomes of one
count of murder in the first degree; four counts of armed assault
with intent to murder; one count of assault and battery by means
2 Gomes was also charged as a habitual offender in eight
of the counts. These enhancements were dismissed after trial, and
prior to trial, a nolle prosequi was entered for the unlawful
possession of a firearm and ammunition charges. Gomes was not
charged with any offenses in connection with the drugs and firearms
found in the building.
3 "A joint venturer is 'one who aids, commands, counsels,
or encourages commission of a crime while sharing with the
principal the mental state required for the crime.'" Commonwealth
v. Semedo, 921 N.E.2d 57, 65 (Mass. 2010) (quoting Commonwealth v.
Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Mass. 1979)).
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of a dangerous weapon; one count of aggravated assault and battery
by means of a dangerous weapon; and two counts of assault by means
of a dangerous weapon. On December 22, Gomes received the
mandatory sentence of life without parole for the first-degree
murder conviction. He was also sentenced to seventeen to eighteen
years in prison, to be served from and after the life sentence,
for his conviction of armed assault with intent to murder
Ramos-Santiago, and to shorter, concurrent sentences on the
remaining counts.
Gomes subsequently appealed to the SJC, arguing, inter
alia, that his due process rights were violated because he was
convicted on insufficient evidence, and that the trial judge
committed prejudicial error in admitting the evidence obtained
from the Langdon Street apartment building. On October 26, 2016,
the SJC affirmed Gomes's convictions. Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 455.
The SJC determined that the trial evidence was sufficient to permit
a rational jury to infer that Gomes knowingly participated in the
shooting and had or shared an intent to kill, and that the trial
court's admission into evidence of the items seized from the
Langdon Street apartment building was not erroneous. Id. at
447-51. On November 4, Gomes petitioned the SJC for a rehearing,
which was denied on December 1, 2016.
On January 26, 2018, Gomes petitioned the District Court
for the District of Massachusetts for a writ of habeas corpus
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. On June 20, 2019, the district
court denied the petition. However, on June 26, the district
court granted a certificate of appealability. This timely appeal
followed.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court's denial of a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Linton v. Saba, 812 F.3d
112, 121 (1st Cir. 2016). "Under the 'peculiarly deferential
standards' of the [AEDPA], 'error by a state court, without more,
is not enough to warrant federal habeas relief.'" Bebo v.
Medeiros, 906 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Cronin v.
Comm'r of Prob., 783 F.3d 47, 50 (1st Cir. 2015)), cert. denied,
139 S. Ct. 1203 (2019). Habeas relief under the AEDPA
shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings
unless the adjudication of the claim --
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). An adjudication is "on the merits," and thus
entitled to deference under § 2254(d), "if there is a decision
finally resolving the parties' claims, with res judicata effect,
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that is based on the substance of the claim advanced, rather than
on a procedural, or other, ground." Linton, 812 F.3d at 122
(quoting Yeboah-Sefah v. Ficco, 556 F.3d 53, 66 (1st Cir. 2009)).
Gomes brings his claims pursuant to § 2254(d)(1).4 To
ascertain "clearly established Federal law" under that provision,
we review "the Supreme Court's holdings, as opposed to dicta, at
the time the state court rendered its decision." Id. (quoting
Hensley, 755 F.3d at 730-31). "An unreasonable application occurs
when 'the state court identifies the correct governing legal rule
. . . but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular
state prisoner's case.'" Bebo, 906 F.3d at 134 (alteration in
original) (quoting White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 425 (2014)).
"For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), 'an unreasonable application of
federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal
law.'" Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (quoting
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).5 To merit a writ
4 Although Gomes does not identify the prong of § 2254(d)
under which he brings his claims, we have recognized that
"[i]nferences, characterizations of the facts, and mixed fact/law
conclusions are more appropriately analyzed under the
'unreasonable application' prong of section 2254(d)(1)." Ouber
v. Guarino, 293 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2002). In contrast, "the
special prophylaxis of section 2254(d)(2) applies only to
determinations of 'basic, primary, or historical facts.'" Id.
(quoting Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2001)).
5 On the other hand, a state court's decision is
"contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court
"'applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth' by
the Supreme Court or 'confronts a set of facts that are materially
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of habeas corpus, a petitioner must show that "the state court's
ruling on the claim . . . was so lacking in justification that
there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing
law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Id. at
103. The state court's ruling "may be objectively reasonable even
if the federal habeas court, exercising its independent judgment,
would have reached a different conclusion." Lyons v. Brady, 666
F.3d 51, 54 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Rashad v. Walsh, 300 F.3d 27,
35 (1st Cir. 2002)).
Because the SJC adjudicated Gomes's claims on the
merits, we apply this highly deferential standard. See Linton,
812 F.3d at 123. Reviewing the claims in turn, we ultimately
conclude that both fail.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Gomes first claims that the SJC unreasonably sustained
his conviction for first-degree murder as a joint venturer because
the trial evidence was insufficient to support a jury finding
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly participated in the
shooting and had or shared an intent to kill. He contends that
indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme Court] and
nevertheless arrives at a result different from [its] precedent.'"
Linton, 812 F.3d at 122 (alterations in original) (quoting Hensley,
755 F.3d at 731). Gomes appears to argue only that the challenged
elements of the SJC's decision were "unreasonable application[s]"
of clearly established federal law and not that they were "contrary
to" it.
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this insufficiency violated his constitutional due process right
to be convicted only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of a crime. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)
("[T]he Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] protects
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.").
The clearly established federal law governing direct
review of sufficiency claims is provided by Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). See Linton, 812 F.3d at 123. Jackson
requires a reviewing court to ask "the relevant question [of]
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 443
U.S. at 319. Further, a criminal conviction may be supported by
circumstantial evidence alone. Id. at 324-25; see Magraw v.
Roden, 743 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2014) ("[U]nder Jackson, direct
evidence is not necessary to sustain a conviction. . . . This
principle is even more firmly established in connection with the
deferential approach to state-court decisionmaking that federal
habeas review demands." (citation omitted)).
A federal court reviewing a habeas petition that raises
a sufficiency claim under Jackson must apply a "twice-deferential
standard." Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 43 (2012).
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Specifically, on habeas review, we may not overturn an underlying
state court decision rejecting a sufficiency challenge unless the
decision is "objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Cavazos v.
Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 2 (2011)). Thus, we ask "whether the state
courts' ruling that the evidence is constitutionally sufficient
was itself 'unreasonable.'" Winfield v. O'Brien, 775 F.3d 1, 8
(1st Cir. 2014) (quoting § 2254(d)(1)). "'Unreasonable' in this
context means that the decision 'evinces some increment of
incorrectness beyond mere error.'" Id. (quoting Leftwich v.
Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 2008)).
With these principles in mind, we consider the SJC's
rejection of Gomes's sufficiency challenge. Under Massachusetts
law,
[t]o succeed on a theory of deliberately premeditated
murder as a joint venturer . . . the Commonwealth was
required to prove that [Gomes] was "(1) present at the
scene of the crime, (2) with knowledge that another
intends to commit the crime or with intent to commit a
crime, and (3) by agreement, [was] willing and available
to help the other if necessary."
Commonwealth v. Zanetti, 910 N.E.2d 869, 875 (Mass. 2009) (third
alteration in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Green, 652 N.E.2d
572, 578 (Mass. 1995)), overruled in part on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Britt, 987 N.E.2d 558 (Mass. 2013). Further, the
Commonwealth needed to prove that Gomes "shared the mental state
or intent for deliberately premeditated murder, which is malice,
and, in particular, an intent to kill." Id. On direct review of
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Gomes's conviction, the SJC explained that it would "determine
whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, 'was sufficient to persuade a rational jury beyond
a reasonable doubt of the existence of every element of the
crime[s] charged.'" Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 447 (alteration in
original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Lao, 824 N.E.2d 821, 829 (Mass.
2005)).6 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the SJC determined that:
[A] reasonable jury could find that [Gomes] . . . was
motivated by anger at the events that resulted from
Evans's actions . . . that [Gomes] was the driver of
the Impala that sped down Maywood Street . . . and
stopped the vehicle directly parallel to the group of
young men standing near where Evans's Maxima was parked;
that [Gomes] remained stopped at that location while
multiple shots were fired from two different weapons at
the group of young men; that when the shooting ceased,
[Gomes] sped off, quickly removing the shooters from the
scene; and that the shell casings located in [Gomes's]
vehicle were consistent with at least one casing found
at the scene.
Id. at 448. The SJC concluded that the evidence "was more than
6 The Massachusetts standard cited by the SJC is
consistent with Jackson and is thus entitled to the same deference
under § 2254(d)(1). See Linton, 812 F.3d at 122 ("[A] state-court
adjudication of an issue framed in terms of state law is
nonetheless entitled to deference under section 2254(d)(1) as long
as the state and federal issues are for all practical purposes
synonymous and the state standard is at least as protective of the
defendant's rights as its federal counterpart." (alteration in
original) (quoting Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426 (1st
Cir. 2009))); Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370, 374-75
(Mass. 1979) (concluding that this standard conforms to the federal
constitutional requirement announced in Jackson, 443 U.S. at
318-19).
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sufficient to permit a reasonable fact finder to infer that
[Gomes] knowingly participated in the shooting incident and had
or shared an intent to kill." Id. In support, the SJC cited
several precedential cases standing for the proposition that the
requisite knowledge and intent under a joint venture theory may
be inferred from certain actions undertaken by a defendant. Id.
(citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 661 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Mass. 1996)
(holding, on direct review of first-degree murder conviction, that
"[j]oint venture may be proved by circumstantial evidence,
including evidence of flight together"); Commonwealth v. Giang,
524 N.E.2d 383, 386 (Mass. 1988) (holding that knowing and
intentional participation in principals' crime may be inferred
where defendant drives getaway vehicle); Commonwealth v. Cintron,
759 N.E.2d 700, 707 (Mass. 2001) (holding that defendant's intent
to kill and knowing participation could be inferred where
defendant knew of prior violent history between brother and
victim, chased victim alongside brother, and encouraged brother
to shoot victim), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Commonwealth v. Hart, 914 N.E.2d 904 (Mass. 2009); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Mass. 1979) (holding, on direct
review of first-degree murder conviction, that "[t]he jury may
infer the requisite mental state from the defendant's knowledge
of the circumstances and subsequent participation in the
offense")).
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Gomes presents a tripartite argument that the SJC's
determination was unreasonable. He first contends that it was
unreasonable for the SJC to rely on the post-facto discovery of
the shell casings in his rented vehicle that matched one found at
the scene of the shooting to support an inference that he was
aware, prior to the shooting, that his passengers were armed and
intended violence.
We reject this argument. The fact of the shell casings
being present in Gomes's rented vehicle was only one factor that
the SJC listed before stating that the collective evidence
permitted a reasonable factfinder to infer that Gomes had the
requisite intent to kill and knowledge of the shooting. The mere
inclusion of that fact, even if it does not speak to knowledge
and intent prior to the shooting, does not "evince[] some
increment of incorrectness beyond mere error" in the SJC's
determination. Winfield, 775 F.3d at 8 (quoting Leftwich, 532
F.3d at 23).
Gomes next argues that the SJC's sufficiency
determination was unreasonable because there was no other evidence
from which a rational jury could infer that he had prior knowledge
of and intent to join a shooting. He submits that the evidence
may have allowed a rational jury to infer that he was searching
for Evans, but not that he was aware or intended that the search
would morph into a fatal shooting targeting a group of people that
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did not include Evans.
This contention is unpersuasive. On habeas review of
a state-court conviction for evidentiary sufficiency, we "may not
freely reweigh competing inferences but must accept those
reasonable inferences that are most compatible with the jury's
verdict." Magraw, 743 F.3d at 7. Here, the SJC reasonably
concluded that a rational jury, viewing the collective evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, could infer that
Gomes was motivated by anger at Evans and that accordingly, as
the driver of the vehicle from which the shooting emanated who
kept the car stopped throughout the shooting before speeding off,
he knowingly participated in the shooting and had or shared an
intent to kill.
Finally, Gomes argues that the SJC unreasonably relied
on Williams, 661 N.E.2d 617, and Giang, 524 N.E.2d 383, in
determining that a rational jury could infer his prior knowledge
of the shooting from the fact that he quickly drove the car from
the scene of the shooting. He contends that Williams is
distinguishable from this case because it involved a defendant
fleeing on foot with the principal, and that Giang is
distinguishable because the defendant in that case waited in a
getaway vehicle for the fleeing principals to enter before driving
off.
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This argument too fails. Williams, 661 N.E.2d at 625,
and Giang, 524 N.E.2d at 386, hold that the knowledge and intent
necessary to convict on a theory of joint venture may be inferred
from concerted action between the defendant and a principal,
specifically, joint flight from the scene of the crime. The SJC
was not objectively unreasonable in determining that this relevant
precedent supported its conclusion that a reasonable factfinder
could have inferred that Gomes -- who drove to the scene of the
shooting, waited there while it occurred, and then quickly sped
off with the shooter or shooters in tow -- knowingly participated
in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill.7
Accordingly, the SJC was not objectively unreasonable in
determining that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to permit a rational factfinder
to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Gomes knowingly
participated in the shooting and had or shared an intent to kill
7
Attempting to neutralize the fact of joint flight,
Gomes asserts that the more probable inference is that he was
surprised by the shooting but could not order the shooters to exit
his vehicle until he had driven off and recovered from his
surprise. We decline this invitation to elevate a conflicting
inference over the reasonable inference, credited by the SJC and
more compatible with the verdict, that Gomes knew of the shooting
beforehand and had or shared an intent to kill. See Magraw, 743
F.3d at 7; Linton, 812 F.3d at 123 ("[A] federal habeas corpus
court faced with a record . . . that supports conflicting
inferences must presume . . . that the trier of fact resolved any
such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that
resolution." (alterations in original) (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S.
at 326)).
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as necessary to sustain his conviction for first-degree murder as
a joint venturer. Gomes's first claim to habeas relief therefore
fails.
C. Admission of Evidence Allegedly in Violation of Due Process
Gomes next claims that the SJC unreasonably determined
that the trial court's admission into evidence of certain items,
including money, drugs, and guns, recovered from the Langdon Street
apartment building did not constitute error. He argues that the
admission denied him his constitutional due process right to a
fair trial. This claim is unavailing.
An erroneous evidentiary ruling that results in a
fundamentally unfair trial in state court may violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and merit a federal
writ of habeas corpus. See Lyons, 666 F.3d at 55-56; Coningford
v. Rhode Island, 640 F.3d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 2011); see also
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). Such relief is
elusive, as the Supreme Court has "defined the category of
infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' very narrowly."
Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990). To warrant
habeas relief, "the state court's application of state law must be
'so arbitrary or capricious as to constitute an independent due
process . . . violation.'" Coningford, 640 F.3d at 484 (quoting
Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). That is, for there
"[t]o be a constitutional violation, [the] state evidentiary error
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must so infuse the trial with inflammatory prejudice that it
renders a fair trial impossible." Lyons, 666 F.3d at 56 (quoting
Petrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F.3d 41, 44 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005)).
Minding these tenets, we turn to the SJC's rejection of
Gomes's argument that the trial court's admission of the challenged
evidence was prejudicial error. Under Massachusetts law,
"evidence of uncharged criminal acts or other misbehavior is not
admissible to show a defendant's bad character or propensity to
commit the charged crime, but may be admissible if relevant for
other purposes such as 'common scheme, pattern of operation,
absence of accident or mistake, identity, intent or motive.'"
Commonwealth v. Dwyer, 859 N.E.2d 400, 407 (Mass. 2006) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Marshall, 749 N.E.2d 147, 155 (Mass. 2001)). In
Gomes's case, the SJC explained that:
The trial judge admitted the evidence challenged by
[Gomes] for the limited purpose of proving [Gomes's]
knowledge, motive, or intent. The evidence was relevant
with respect to all three of these issues, where the
Commonwealth's theory was that [Gomes] (and Emmanuel),
based on loyalty to family and friends, sought to
retaliate against Evans for Evans's pursuit of Anthony
and the family members' subsequent disruption and loss
of valuable items (the cash, guns, and drugs in the
basement) due to police action . . . . This evidence
provided a possible explanation for [Gomes's] clear
agitation about the presence of the police in his
family's apartment building and more directly showed the
extent of the loss to [Gomes's] family members and
friends, which may have fueled [Gomes's] desire to
retaliate over and above Evans's threatening conduct
toward Anthony.
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Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 449 (citing Commonwealth v. DaSilva, 27
N.E.3d 383, 391 (Mass. 2015) (holding that evidence of uncharged
conduct may be relevant to show motive to retaliate)). In response
to Gomes's argument that the connection between him and the
evidence was attenuated, the SJC reasoned that "the link between
the over-all inconvenience to [Gomes's] family and his alleged
motivation to commit the crime was certainly strong enough to
satisfy the threshold requirement of relevance." Id. at 449
(citing Commonwealth v. Ashley, 694 N.E.2d 862, 866 (Mass. 1998)
("There is no requirement that evidence [of motive] be conclusive
in order to be admissible." (alteration in original))).
The SJC did, however, comment on factors that diminished
the probative value of the challenged evidence, such as that Gomes
"did not live on Langdon Street, and was not present when the
incident involving Evans and Anthony took place," and that he "was
not charged with any crimes related to the items seized from the
two apartments." Id. at 450. The SJC also observed that the
evidence presented the possibility of prejudicially "paint[ing]
[Gomes] generally as a violent man connected to a violent family
and involved in a life of crime" and "being used improperly by the
jury as evidence of bad character and criminal propensity." Id.
Deeming "[t]he question whether the evidence was more
prejudicial than probative" to be "close," the SJC "recognize[d]
that the trial judge is in the best position, and consequently
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possesses substantial discretion, to resolve the question." Id.
(citing L.L. v. Commonwealth, 20 N.E.3d 930, 943 n.27 (Mass. 2014)
(holding that abuse of discretion occurs only where "the judge
made 'a clear error of judgment in weighing' the factors relevant
to the decision . . . such that the decision falls outside the
range of reasonable alternatives" (citation omitted))). The SJC
ultimately concluded that there was no error in the admission of
the challenged evidence, "[p]articularly in light of the judge's
instruction, given during trial when the evidence was admitted and
repeated in his final jury charge, that the evidence was offered
for a limited purpose and the jury were not to consider the
evidence for the purpose of 'criminal propensity' or 'bad
character.'" Id.8
Gomes does not present, and we do not find, any "clearly
established" Supreme Court precedent holding that the admission of
nearly prejudicial but ultimately probative and relevant evidence
of uncharged criminal activity accompanied by a proper limiting
instruction violates due process rights.9 "The absence of an on-
8The SJC further noted that "even assuming that the
evidence should not have been admitted, the admission would likely
not qualify as prejudicial error warranting reversal, given the
strength of the evidence that [Gomes] knowingly participated in
the Maywood Steet shooting incident with the requisite intent to
kill." Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 450 n.17.
9The closest that the Supreme Court apparently has come
to addressing this type of claim was to "expressly decline[] to
determine 'whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause
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point pronouncement from the Supreme Court leaves hanging by the
slimmest of threads the petitioner's claim that the state court's
admission of the [challenged] evidence can be deemed an
unreasonable application of the broader fair-trial principle."
Coningford, 640 F.3d at 485. Thus, Gomes summarily argues that
the admission of this evidence infused the trial with inflammatory
prejudice and deprived him of a fair trial. See Lyons, 666 F.3d
at 56.
We reject this argument. Reviewing the trial court's
ruling, the SJC carefully reasoned in accordance with
Massachusetts and federal law that the challenged evidence was
relevant and that the trial judge was best positioned to determine
whether its probative value outweighed its potential prejudicial
effect. See Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 449-50. The SJC's affirmance
of the trial court's decision, "whether or not an unarguably
correct evidentiary ruling, was well within the universe of
plausible evidentiary rulings." Coningford, 640 F.3d at 485.
The SJC also reasonably determined that the trial
court's limiting instruction that the jury consider the challenged
evidence for a circumscribed purpose, and not for the purposes of
"criminal personality" or "bad character," weighed against a
[of the Fourteenth Amendment] if it permitted the use of "prior
crimes" evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime.'"
Coningford, 640 F.3d at 484-85 (quoting Estelle, 502 U.S. at 75
n.5).
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finding of prejudicial error. See Gomes I, 61 N.E.3d at 450;
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 740 (1993) ("[It is] the
almost invariable assumption of the law that jurors follow their
instructions." (alteration in original) (quoting Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987))). Accordingly, the SJC
implicitly concluded that Gomes's trial was not infused with
inflammatory prejudice in violation of constitutional due process.
See Lyons, 666 F.3d at 57 (finding that the SJC made such an
implicit conclusion under similar circumstances). Gomes does not
now challenge the efficacy of that limiting instruction. Overall,
Gomes fails to establish that the SJC's ruling on his claim was
"so lacking in justification that there was an error well
understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility
for fairminded disagreement." Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.
The SJC did not unreasonably apply clearly established
federal law in determining that the trial court did not commit
prejudicial error in admitting the challenged evidence and that
Gomes's trial was not unfair in violation of constitutional due
process. Gomes's second claim to habeas relief thus fails.
III. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court's denial of the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus.
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