Sorreda Transport, LLC v. US Dept of Transportation ( 2020 )


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  •             United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 20-1125
    SORREDA TRANSPORT, LLC,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; UNITED STATES,
    Respondents.
    PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF THE
    FEDERAL MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
    Before*
    Lynch, Circuit Judge,
    and Saris,** District Judge.
    Keith A. Mathews and Associated Attorneys of New England on
    brief for petitioner.
    Joy   K.  Park,   Senior  Trial   Attorney,  Department   of
    Transportation, Heather Eilers-Bowser, Chief Counsel, Charles J.
    Fromm, Deputy Chief Counsel, Sue Lawless, Assistant Chief Counsel
    for Litigation, Cynthia Campise, Trial Attorney, Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration, Steven G. Bradbury, General
    Counsel, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel for Litigation
    and Enforcement, and Peter J. Plocki, Deputy Assistant General
    Counsel for Litigation and Enforcement, on brief for respondents.
    *  While this case was submitted to a panel that included
    Judge Torruella, he did not participate in the issuance of the
    panel's opinion. The remaining two panelists therefore issued the
    opinion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
    **   Of the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.
    November 9, 2020
    LYNCH,   Circuit     Judge.      Sorreda        Transport,     LLC
    ("Sorreda") challenges a final decision of the Federal Motor
    Carrier Safety Administration ("the FMCSA"), an agency within the
    United States Department of Transportation that regulates the
    trucking industry in the United States.            The FMCSA determined that
    Sorreda's business safety rating is "unsatisfactory."                  Sorreda
    argues that the FMCSA's investigation and resulting decision was
    arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act
    ("the APA"), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), and so the agency's decision
    should be set aside.          The FMCSA's findings are supported by
    substantial evidence and its determination that Sorreda's business
    safety   rating     was    unsatisfactory    was    neither    arbitrary     nor
    capricious under the applicable regulations.             We deny the petition
    for review.
    I.
    Sorreda is a small, interstate trucking company owned by
    Evangeline Sebor and located in Bedford, New Hampshire.                   In May
    2019, the FMCSA initiated a compliance review of Sorreda after
    receiving two complaints through its consumer complaint database.
    The   FMCSA    completed    its   investigation     in   August   2019,    which
    included a two-day investigation at Sorreda's place of business
    and additional requests and subpoenas for records.                In September
    2019, the FMCSA issued a notice informing Sorreda of its proposed
    unsatisfactory rating, which resulted from an acute violation in
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    one safety factor (General) and critical violations in two other
    safety factors (Driver and Operational).
    Specifically, the FMCSA investigators found that (1)
    Sorreda had falsified a road test for one of its drivers (General),
    see 49 C.F.R. §§ 390.35, 391.51(a), (2) it had not obtained several
    drivers' motor vehicle records within the timeframe required by
    regulation       and   had     failed     to    maintain      medical     examiner's
    certificates in several of its drivers' qualification files as
    required by regulation (Driver), see
    id. § 391.51(a), (b)(2),
    (b)(7), and (3) it had failed to maintain and to retain accurate
    and true time records for several of its drivers and had failed to
    install an electronic logging device to record those entries as
    required    by    regulation     (Operational).          See
    id. §§ 395.1(e), 395.8(a).
        The critical violations as to the second and third
    safety factors resulted in unsatisfactory safety ratings for those
    two factors, and unsatisfactory safety ratings in two factors
    automatically results in an overall unsatisfactory safety rating.
    Id. § 385 app.
    B.III.A(b).              A motor carrier with a final safety
    rating of unsatisfactory is prohibited from operating a commercial
    motor vehicle in interstate or intrastate commerce unless it takes
    corrective       action   to    improve    its      overall    safety     rating    to
    conditional      or    satisfactory      or    it   successfully        appeals    its
    proposed unsatisfactory rating through an administrative review
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    with   the    FMCSA.       See   49     U.S.C.   § 31144(c),   (e);   49   C.F.R.
    §§ 385.13(a), 385.15, 385.17.
    Sorreda chose not to take immediate corrective action
    and instead appealed the proposed unsatisfactory rating to the
    FMCSA.    In November 2019, the FMCSA issued a final order denying
    Sorreda's petition for administrative review and concluding that
    Sorreda had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the FMCSA had erred in assigning it an unsatisfactory rating.
    Sorreda filed a timely petition for review in this Court
    pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2342(3)(A), 2343-44.
    II.
    A "court must uphold a decision of the FMCSA unless it
    is 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
    not in accordance with law.'"             Darrell Andrews Trucking, Inc. v.
    Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 
    296 F.3d 1120
    , 1124 (D.C. Cir.
    2002) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)); cf. Flock v. U.S. Dep't of
    Transp., 
    840 F.3d 49
    , 54-55 (1st Cir. 2016).              "The scope of review
    under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court
    is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency."                 Motor
    Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
    Co., 
    463 U.S. 29
    , 43 (1983); see also
    id. ("[T]he agency must
    examine      the     relevant    data     and    articulate    a   satisfactory
    explanation        for   its   action    including   a   'rational    connection
    between the facts found and the choice made.'" (quoting Burlington
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    Truck Lines v. United States, 
    371 U.S. 156
    , 168 (1962))).                    We
    accept an agency's findings so long as they are supported by
    substantial evidence in the record as a whole.               See Vieques Air
    Link, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 
    437 F.3d 102
    , 104 (1st Cir. 2006)
    ("[W]e 'accept the findings and inferences drawn by the ALJ,
    whatever they may be, unless they are irrational,' and respect his
    or her 'prerogative in the first instance to . . . make credibility
    assessments     . . . ."   (all   but    first   alteration     in   original)
    (quoting Bath Iron Works Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Lab., 
    336 F.3d 51
    ,
    56 (1st Cir. 2003))); see also 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E).
    Sorreda first argues that the FMCSA inappropriately
    found that Sorreda had failed to obtain and to maintain motor
    vehicle records in several of its drivers' qualification files.
    Sorreda concedes, however, that it did not obtain the required
    motor vehicle records and place them in the driver qualification
    files for at least two of its drivers within the thirty-day period
    required   by    regulation.       See     49    C.F.R.     §§ 391.23(a)-(b),
    391.51(a), (b)(2).
    Furthermore,     the   agency   was    correct    that    the   plain
    language of the "good faith" exception to the motor vehicle record
    requirement does not apply to Sorreda's situation because the motor
    vehicle records for the two drivers at issue did in fact exist and
    were eventually received by Sorreda, just not within the timeframe
    set by regulation.     See
    id. § 391.23(b) (providing
    that "[i]f no
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    motor vehicle record is received from the State or States required
    to submit this response, the motor carrier must document a good
    faith effort to obtain such information, and certify that no record
    exists for that driver in that State or States" (emphasis added)).
    It does not matter that the agency chose to charge Sorreda with a
    critical violation (§ 391.51(b)(2)) rather than a lesser available
    non-critical violation (§ 391.23(b)).   Placing the motor vehicle
    record in and maintaining the motor vehicle record in the driver's
    qualification file are separate regulatory requirements, and we
    typically do not question the agency's enforcement discretion.
    See Heckler v. Chaney, 
    470 U.S. 821
    , 831 (1985) ("[A]n agency's
    decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or
    criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's
    absolute discretion."); Mass. Pub. Interest Rsch. Grp., Inc. v.
    U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm'n, 
    852 F.2d 9
    , 19 (1st Cir. 1988); see
    also 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (providing that "agency action . . .
    committed to agency discretion by law" is unreviewable under the
    APA).
    Sorreda next argues that the FMCSA acted arbitrarily in
    finding that Sorreda had failed to maintain the required medical
    examiner's certificates in several of its drivers' qualification
    files.   See 49 C.F.R. § 391.51(a), (b)(7).    It argues that the
    agency erred in crediting the FMCSA investigators' version of
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    events rather than Sorreda's.1 We respect the agency's credibility
    determination and conclude that it is supported by substantial
    evidence in the record.         Both investigators attested that medical
    examiner's certificates were missing from several of the drivers'
    physical qualification files that Sebor had provided.                      They also
    attested   that,       while    Sebor      had   shown    the   investigators     an
    unauthenticated        photograph       of   one   of     the   driver's     medical
    examiner's certificates on her cell phone, she at no time during
    the   compliance       review   mentioned        she    maintained    that    driver
    qualification information electronically.                 They further attested
    that they requested copies of the medical examiner's certificates
    from Sebor and she never provided them.                  The failure to provide
    evidence   at    the    time    of   the     compliance    review    that    Sorreda
    maintained      medical    examiner's        certificates       in   the    drivers'
    qualification files was sufficient to find that it had violated
    § 391.51(b)(7).2
    1   The investigators state that they had requested the
    missing medical examiner's certificates but never received them,
    while Sorreda asserts that Sebor had offered to provide copies of
    the missing medical examiner's certificates to the investigators
    but they refused the offer.
    2   It is irrelevant that Sorreda submitted the medical
    examiner's certificates as part of its administrative appeal of
    the FMCSA's decision because that does not prove they were
    maintained in the drivers' qualification files at the time of the
    compliance review.
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    Finally, Sorreda argues that the FMCSA arbitrarily found
    it had violated 49 C.F.R. § 395.8(a)(1)(i) by failing to install
    or requiring drivers to record their duty status on an electronic
    logging device.      Sorreda argues that it was exempt from this
    requirement under the "short-haul exemption."           See
    id. § 395.1(e). To
    qualify for this exemption from § 395.8, the motor carrier must
    satisfy    several   requirements,     including        "maintain[ing]   and
    retain[ing] for a period of 6 months accurate and true time records
    showing" the drivers' hours of duty.
    Id. § 395.1(e)(2)(v). During
    the compliance review, FMCSA investigators examined a sample of
    sixty driver time records and found that all sixty time records
    were not true and accurate.       These records pertained to three
    drivers.    On appeal the FMCSA considered only the twenty-four
    violations related to one driver, Matthew White, whom Sorreda fired
    for violation of various policies after only three months of
    employment.   Because these twenty-four violations constituted at
    least ten percent of the sixty documents reviewed, the FMCSA found
    they were sufficient to establish a "pattern of noncompliance"
    with § 395.8(a)(1)(i), resulting in an "unsatisfactory" rating.
    See
    id. § 385 app.
    B.II(g)–(h), B.II.C(b) (defining "pattern of
    noncompliance with a critical regulation").              The FMCSA did not
    address the accuracy of the other two drivers' records.
    Sorreda   concedes   that   one   of   its    drivers   submitted
    inaccurate records of his duty status numerous times, which was
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    sufficient to find that Sorreda did not qualify for the short-haul
    exemption and so was required to have its drivers record their
    duty status on an electronic logging device.         Sorreda cannot avoid
    its obligation to comply with the FMCSA's safety regulations by
    shifting the blame to its employee for its noncompliance.            See In
    re Berg Grain & Produce, Inc., Docket No. FMCSA-2010-0278, 
    2015 WL 6848568
    , at *3-4 (Nov. 5, 2015).       Nor does it matter that the FMCSA
    could have charged Sorreda with a different regulatory violation
    for "mak[ing] a false report in connection with a duty status."
    49 C.F.R. § 395.8(e).    Sorreda still violated § 395.8(a)(1)(i) and
    this enforcement decision was within the agency's discretion.           See
    
    Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831
    ; Mass. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 
    Inc., 852 F.2d at 19
    .
    The FMCSA's findings and conclusions are supported by
    substantial   evidence   in   the    record   and   its   decision   denying
    Sorreda's petition for review is not arbitrary or capricious.3
    Petition for review denied.
    3    This does not mean that Sorreda's business is shut down
    permanently. It can still rectify the identified deficiencies in
    its safety standards and request a change in its safety rating at
    any time pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 385.17.
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