United States v. Spinks ( 2023 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 21-1796
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
QUINTON SPINKS, a/k/a Travis, a/k/a Trav, a/k/a Q,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MAINE
[Hon. John A. Woodcock, Jr., U.S. District Judge]
Before
Kayatta, Gelpí, and Montecalvo,
Circuit Judges.
Eamonn R. C. Hart, with whom BRANN & ISAACSON was on brief,
for appellant.
Lindsay B. Feinberg, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Darcie N. McElwee, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
appellee.
March 23, 2023
MONTECALVO, Circuit Judge. Quinton Spinks ("Spinks")
appeals a 115-month sentence imposed by the district court upon
his guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and heroin, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(C). Spinks
asserts that he may challenge the procedural reasonableness of the
sentence, despite an appellate waiver in his plea agreement,
because the waiver does not apply. After careful review, we find
the appellate waiver applies, barring Spinks's challenge to his
sentence. Accordingly, we dismiss his appeal.
I. Background
Because this sentencing appeal follows a guilty plea,
"we glean the [following] relevant facts from the plea agreement,
the undisputed sections of the presentence investigation report
[], and the transcripts of [the] change-of-plea and sentencing
hearings." United States v. Ubiles-Rosario, 867 F.3d 277, 280 n.2
(1st Cir. 2017).
Between approximately November 2016 and September 2017,
Spinks was involved in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and
heroin throughout central Maine. The conspiracy involved Spinks
and his co-conspirators travelling to Rochester, New York, to pick
up drugs and transporting them to central Maine for distribution.
In January 2017, as this conspiracy was occurring, Spinks sold two
bags of crack cocaine to an undercover law enforcement officer in
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Batavia, New York, and was subsequently arrested and convicted in
state court. Then, in July 2018, Spinks was arrested on the
federal charges at issue in this case. In July 2019, following an
indictment, Spinks pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute cocaine base and
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and
841(b)(1)(C). As part of Spinks's plea agreement, he agreed to
the following in a section titled "Appeal Waivers":
Defendant is aware that Title 18, United
States Code, Section 3742 affords a defendant
the right to appeal the sentence imposed.
Knowing that, Defendant waives the right to
appeal the following:
A. Defendant's guilty plea and any other
aspect of Defendant's conviction in the
above-captioned case; and
B. A sentence of imprisonment that does
not exceed 125 months.
Defendant's waiver of his right to appeal
shall not apply to appeals based on a right
that has been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable to
cases on collateral review.
At the change-of-plea hearing, the district court
explained the rights that Spinks was waiving by pleading guilty
and inquired into Spinks's understanding of the plea agreement and
the consequences of his plea:
THE COURT: In light of all that I've just
explained to you, all the rights that you have
that you're waiving or giving up by pleading
guilty, do you still choose to plead guilty to
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the charge contained in Count 1 of the
indictment?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
. . .
THE COURT: The [plea agreement] has your
signature on it or what purports to be your
signature on it. Do you see your signature on
the paperwork?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that your signature?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you read the [plea agreement]
before you signed it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you have a chance to consult
with [your counsel] about the significance of
the [plea agreement] before you signed it?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Did you understand what you were
signing?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
. . .
THE COURT: In signing the [plea agreement],
did you intend to agree to all its terms and
conditions?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
The district court then called attention to the waiver provisions,
asking:
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THE COURT: Now, you may recall that a little
while ago, I told you your right to appeal
your conviction was going to be limited
because you were pleading guilty. Do you
remember that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: However, under the terms of this
agreement, and, again, these agreements are
usually upheld as a matter of law, you are
waiving or giving up any right to challenge
the legality of your guilty plea and your
conviction in a higher court. Do you
understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: This goes on to say that you waive
the right to appeal a sentence of imprisonment
that does not exceed 125 months.
Now, unlike your right to appeal your
conviction, you would have, but for the terms
of this agreement, a right to appeal any
sentence that I imposed. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: However, under the terms of this
agreement, and, again, these agreements are
usually upheld as a matter of law, if I impose
a sentence of 125 months or less, you will
have no right to appeal that sentence to a
higher court. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: That means, for all intents and
purposes, if I impose a sentence of 125 months
or less, I will be the only judge to review
the legality of that sentence. Do you
understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
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Ahead of sentencing, the Probation Office prepared the
presentence investigation report ("PSR"), which stated that
Spinks's base offense level was thirty and that Spinks was subject
to a two-level dangerous weapon enhancement, a two-level criminal
livelihood enhancement, a four-level "organizer or leader"
enhancement, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of thirty-five.
The PSR treated Spinks's 2017 New York state court conviction not
as relevant conduct but as a discrete sale separate from the
conspiracy at issue in this case. Consequently, Spinks's criminal
history score added up to eleven, resulting in a criminal history
category of five. As a result, the PSR calculated Spinks's
guidelines sentencing range as 262 to 327 months, which was then
capped at the statutorily authorized maximum term of imprisonment
of 240 months.
Spinks objected to the PSR's guidelines sentencing range
calculation, challenging the determinations on the applicable base
offense level and criminal history score. At sentencing, the
district court addressed Spinks's objections. The court concluded
that a base offense level of twenty-four applied. The district
court also held that Spinks was subject to a two-level dangerous
weapon enhancement, a three-level "supervisor or manager"
enhancement, and a three-level reduction for acceptance of
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responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of twenty-six,
which was nine levels lower than the PSR recommended.
As to Spinks's objection to the criminal history
category calculation, he argued that his 2017 conviction for the
sale of crack cocaine in Batavia, New York, should be considered
relevant conduct for this case rather than as a separate
conviction. Spinks explained that a relevant conduct
determination would put him into a lower criminal history category
and thus lower his guidelines sentencing range. The district court
overruled the objection and, after considering a government
concession, placed Spinks in criminal history category four, one
category level lower than the PSR recommended.
Subsequently, the district court calculated the
guidelines sentencing range as 92 to 115 months, as opposed to the
range of 78 to 97 months that Spinks argued for with his objection,
and imposed a sentence of 115-months imprisonment. Spinks then
timely filed this appeal.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Spinks contends that, as a threshold issue,
his appellate waiver does not apply because the plea agreement's
language does not bar a procedural reasonableness challenge. As
a result, Spinks maintains that he is permitted to bring this
appeal arguing that the district court erred in rejecting his
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objection characterizing the 2017 New York state court conviction
as relevant conduct.
In the alternative, Spinks claims that even if the
appellate waiver's language does bar this appeal, he was not
informed of that fact and thus did not enter the appeal waiver
knowingly. Spinks contends that enforcing an inadequately
explained appellate waiver would be a miscarriage of justice.
We begin with the initial question of whether Spinks's
appeal is barred by the language of the waiver contained in his
plea agreement.
A. The Plea Agreement's Language
Spinks's primary argument is not that the appellate
waiver is invalid, but rather that its language is limited in scope
and does not cover this appeal. We review the language of the
waiver and "rely on basic contract interpretation principles,
construing the agreement where possible to give effect to every
term and phrase, and construing any ambiguities in favor of
allowing the appeal to proceed[.]" United States v.
Santiago-Burgos, 750 F.3d 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal
citations omitted). In doing so, we must carefully consider the
scope of the waiver because "[e]ven a knowing and voluntary appeal
waiver only precludes appeals that fall within its scope." United
States v. McCoy, 508 F.3d 74, 77 (1st Cir. 2007).
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The plea agreement states that "Defendant waives the
right to appeal . . . [a] sentence of imprisonment that does not
exceed 125 months." Spinks focuses on the phrase "a sentence of
imprisonment" and argues that waiving an appeal to "a sentence"
does not bar a procedural reasonableness challenge. He claims
that the government would have included a waiver to "the manner in
which the sentence was determined" if the appellate waiver was
meant to bar an appeal challenging the guidelines sentencing range
calculation. He points to the omission of this language as
evidence that this appeal does not fall within the appellate
waiver's limited scope. Spinks maintains that while the language
used in the waiver here, referring to "a sentence," may prevent
him from bringing a substantive reasonableness challenge to the
sentence length itself, it does not prevent him from appealing the
district court's decisions made in calculating that sentence
length.
This argument is unavailing. Appellate review of a
sentence "involves a two-step pavane." United States v.
Miranda-Díaz, 942 F.3d 33, 39 (1st Cir. 2019). First, we examine
"any claims of procedural error. If the sentence passes procedural
muster, we then examine any challenge to its substantive
reasonableness." Id. (internal citation omitted). It should
therefore be clear that waiving appellate review of "a sentence"
must be read as waiving claims of both procedural and substantive
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error in sentencing. Here, the text of the appellate waiver is
clear and unambiguous; if the sentence imposed is less than 125
months, any appellate review right is waived. Thus, despite
Spinks's argument to the contrary, because he was sentenced to
less than 125 months imprisonment, there is no space reserved in
the waiver for a procedural reasonableness challenge.
Nor are we willing to dictate specific language that the
government must utilize in its plea agreements. To further his
argument, Spinks points out that, in a Criminal Resource Manual,
the Department of Justice has provided sample appellate review
waiver language stating: "the defendant knowingly waives the right
to appeal any sentence within the maximum provided in the
statute(s) of conviction (or the manner in which that sentence was
determined)." See U.S. Dep't of Just., Criminal Resource Manual § 626, ¶
2, https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-626-plea-
agreements-and-sentencing-appeal-waivers-discussion-law (last updated
Jan. 22, 2020). However, "[w]aivers of appeal vary considerably
in their language and the scope of the waiver is simply a matter
of what the parties agreed to in the particular case." McCoy, 508
F.3d at 77. The only condition contemplated by the waiver in this
case was whether the sentence was more or less than 125 months.
As such, there is no reason to read in any additional conditions
nor will we "conjure up an ambiguity in a plea agreement where
none legitimately exists." United States v. Arroyo-Blas, 783 F.3d
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361, 365 (1st Cir. 2015) (cleaned up) (quoting United States v.
Anderson, 921 F.2d 335, 338 (1st Cir. 1990)); see also United
States v. Edelen, 539 F.3d 83, 86 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that
where the only condition of an appellate waiver is the duration of
the sentence, defendant's knowledge of which "offense level or
corresponding [guidelines sentencing range is] applicable to his
case [is] not a condition of the waiver.").
Nonetheless, to buttress his contention, Spinks argues
that the scope of the appellate waiver could not include the
district court's guidelines sentencing range calculation because
it had not been calculated at the time he signed the plea
agreement. Thus, Spinks argues that he could not have waived a
challenge to a calculation that had not yet been made. However,
knowledge of which offense level or what resulting guidelines
sentencing range would apply to his case was not a condition of
the waiver. Indeed, Spinks was specifically told by the district
court at the change-of-plea hearing that the guidelines sentencing
range had not been determined yet and was warned that even if the
court "impose[d] a sentence more severe than the one called for by
the guideline, you will still not be permitted to withdraw your
guilty plea." After hearing this warning, Spinks confirmed that
he understood.
We have previously stated that if a defendant wanted to
know how the Probation Office would treat his past convictions, he
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could have requested that information before he signed the plea
agreement. See United States v. Donath, 616 F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir.
2010). Spinks, however, did not establish any such condition to
his plea agreement, and we have long held that "[w]hen enforcing
the appellate waiver, we stress that both sides are obligated to
live by the bargain they made." Id. at 84; see Edelen, 539 F.3d
at 86-87 ("The fact that [a defendant] considers unjust the
application of the . . . enhancement does not invalidate the
waiver, nor would the fact that he did not know the enhancement
was applicable."). Thus, even though Spinks had no opportunity to
review the applicable guidelines sentencing range before he signed
the plea agreement, Spinks remains bound by the unambiguous
language of the appellate waiver.
In any event, Spinks's appeal argument is constructed to
reduce his sentence, which is a situation barred by the waiver.
While Spinks may be unsatisfied with the guidelines sentencing
range calculation, "[i]f the mere fact that a defendant has
arguments he could potentially invoke on appeal were allowed to
invalidate a waiver, then appellate waivers would become
meaningless." Edelen, 539 F.3d at 87.
Here, the district court imposed a sentence of 115
months, coming in under the limit set in the plea agreement and
thus barring any appeal by Spinks.
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B. The Plea Agreement's Validity
In the alternative, Spinks argues that even if the waiver
is construed to bar an appeal, the waiver was not entered into
knowingly and thus enforcing it would constitute a miscarriage of
justice. These contentions are governed by the Teeter framework,
see United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 2001), which
finds appellate waivers presumptively valid "so long as (1) the
agreement clearly delineates the waiver's scope; (2) the district
court specifically inquired about the waiver at the plea hearing;
and (3) denial of the right to appeal would not constitute a
miscarriage of justice." United States v. Goodman, 971 F.3d 16,
21 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Betancourt-Pérez, 833
F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2016)).
Spinks argues that if the waiver's scope is clearly
delineated to bar a procedural reasonableness challenge, then the
second and third Teeter factors are not satisfied because the
district court failed to explain the waiver's full effect.
Specifically, Spinks maintains that the district court failed to
inform him that the waiver encompassed challenges to the guidelines
sentencing range calculation, which Spinks argues was required in
order for him to have knowingly assented to the waiver. But we
have established no requirement that the district court must
"drill[] down to lay bare what kinds of claims would be barred by
[an appellate] waiver." United States v. Staveley, 43 F.4th 9, 15
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(1st Cir. 2022). In fact, the "district court [is] entitled to
rely on the defendant's representations that he was satisfied with
his counsel's handiwork, that he had reviewed the terms of the
plea agreement with his counsel, and that he understood all of
those terms." Id.And, as the record reflects, the district court
questioned Spinks thoroughly at the change-of-plea hearing to
ensure that he understood his plea agreement. The district court
confirmed that Spinks had consulted his counsel about the
significance of the agreement, that he understood it, that he had
signed it voluntarily, and that he intended to agree to all its
terms and conditions. Spinks responded affirmatively to each of
the district court's questions, denoting his full understanding of
the agreement. Yet, the district court went further and explained
that Spinks was "waiving or giving up any right to challenge the
legality of [his] guilty plea and [his] conviction in a higher
court." The court emphasized that Spinks's agreement meant that
"for all intents and purposes, if I impose a sentence of 125 months
or less, I will be the only judge to review the legality of that
sentence." Spinks again confirmed his understanding.
The district court then discussed the guidelines
sentencing range and the court's obligation to calculate the
sentence under the applicable guidelines sentencing range. The
court added:
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I can't determine the advisory guideline
sentence until after I've read a presentence
report that the probation office will prepare
and until I've given your lawyer and the
prosecutor an opportunity to challenge the
facts in the report.
After I determine what advisory guideline
applies to your case, I still have the
authority to impose a sentence that is more
severe, or it could be less severe, than the
sentence called for by the advisory guideline.
Do you understand?
Spinks replied, "Yes, sir." Given the extensive questioning, it
is unlikely that Spinks came away from the change-of-plea hearing
believing that he had somehow reserved his right to challenge the
guidelines sentencing range calculation. Indeed, Spinks's own
comments at the end of his sentencing hearing reflect his
understanding that he had given up that right. After the district
court explained the appellate waiver once more, Spinks stated that
he understood the appellate waiver but also lamented the fact that
"now I've waived my rights, all my rights."
Having determined the threshold issue that the appellate
waiver bars Spinks's appeal, we need not consider the merits of
his procedural reasonableness challenge regarding whether his
prior conviction should have been considered relevant conduct to
this case.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss Spinks's appeal.
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