Lopez-Rosario v. Programa Seasonal Head Start ( 2021 )


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  •                Not for publication in West's Federal Reporter
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 17-1435
    ALJADI LÓPEZ-ROSARIO; MARGIE TORRES-MONTALVO; CONJUGAL
    RELATIONSHIP LÓPEZ-TORRES; ALJADIE LÓPEZ-TORRES,
    Plaintiffs, Appellants,
    v.
    PROGRAMA SEASONAL HEAD START/EARLY HEAD START DE LA
    DIÓCESIS DE MAYAGÜEZ, INC.; MYRNA CARRERO; BOARD OF
    DIRECTORS OF PROGRAMA SEASONAL HEAD START/EARLY HEAD START
    DE LA DIÓCESIS DE MAYAGÜEZ, INC.,
    Defendants, Appellees.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Howard, Chief Judge,
    Thompson and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
    Eugenio W.A. Géigel-Simounet, with whom Géigel-Simounet Law
    Offices C.S.P. was on brief, for appellants.
    Jesús R. Morales Cordero, with whom Bufete Morales Cordero,
    C.S.P. was on brief, for appellees.
    March 4, 2021
    HOWARD, Chief Judge.     In this action under the Age
    Discrimination in Employment Act, 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
    , Aljadi
    López-Rosario ("López"),1 alleges that his employer discriminated
    against him on the basis of age.       The district court granted the
    employer's motion for summary judgment, and López now seeks our
    review of that decision.      We affirm.
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Given the district court's thorough recounting of the
    facts, López-Rosario v. Programa Seasonal Head Start/Early Head
    Start de la Diócesis de Mayaguez, 
    245 F. Supp. 3d 360
    , 365 (D.P.R.
    2017), we offer here only the essential background. In 2002, López
    began working at Centro de Desarrollo Familiar Seasonal Head
    Start/Early Head Start Diócesis de Mayagüez Inc. ("Programa").
    Programa is a not-for-profit corporation that relies on federal
    funds to operate "Head Start Program" pre-school care centers for
    low-income    children.      Employment    documents   signed    by   López
    described his position at Programa as a "Driver/Handyman."              In
    that position, López was responsible for transporting the young
    participants     and      their   relatives;    he     also     had    some
    responsibilities related to minor repairs. Programa had a separate
    1 The other named plaintiffs - Margie Torres-Montalvo and
    Aljadie López-Torres - are López's spouse and son, respectively.
    Since their claim rests entirely on their relationship with López,
    their claims rise and fall with López's claim.
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    position titled "Handyman," which was focused on repair work at
    Programa's facilities.
    In 2013, the Head Start Office of the United States
    Department of Health and Human Services notified Programa that,
    due to a general lack of funding, there would be a reduction in
    the assignment of funds that had already been approved for that
    fiscal year.   Programa lost more than five percent of its budget
    (approximately $155,654).    Programa adopted a number of austerity
    measures, including eliminating all transportation services that
    were not provided in collaboration with other funding sources.           As
    such, Programa reduced the working hours and pay of the two
    occupants of the Driver/Handyman position - López and Harry Muñoz.
    López protested verbally and his lawyer sent a letter
    requesting reconsideration.        López's request moved through the
    internal grievance processes at Programa.          Meanwhile, for the rest
    of the fiscal year 2013, López continued working under the new
    reduced schedule.     Programa's budget during 2014 turned out to be
    the same as the reduced 2013 budget.                In February 2014, as
    typically happened, Programa distributed new annual employment
    contracts for that year.      The employment contract presented to
    López maintained the reduced work hours.           He declined to sign it,
    and that ended his employment with Programa.
    In April 2014, López filed a discrimination charge with
    the   Puerto   Rico   Department    of     Labor    and   Human   Resources
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    Antidiscrimination Unit.     When that agency issued him a "Right to
    Sue" letter, he initiated this federal court action asserting his
    claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").
    After the discovery period, Programa moved for summary judgment.
    The district court granted the motion.    López timely appealed that
    decision.2
    II. LEGAL STANDARDS
    We review summary judgment decisions de novo. See Aetna,
    Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 
    712 F.3d 51
    , 53-54 (1st Cir. 2013).        Our
    task on appeal is to assess whether the non-moving party presented
    a genuine question of material fact warranting a trial.          See
    Flovac, Inc. v. Airvac, Inc., 
    817 F.3d 849
    , 853 (1st Cir. 2016).
    During that assessment, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor
    of the non-moving party, but we disregard unsupported speculation
    and conclusory allegations.     See McGrath v. Tavares, 
    757 F.3d 20
    ,
    25 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Alicea v. Machete Music, 
    744 F.3d 773
    ,
    778 (1st Cir. 2014)).     In the end, if the record is devoid of a
    genuine issue of material fact, then the grant of summary judgment
    was proper and we will affirm.      See Tobin v. Fed. Express Corp.,
    
    775 F.3d 448
    , 450–51 (1st Cir. 2014).
    2 While there were other named defendants      in the district
    court, López expressly limited this appeal to the   grant of summary
    judgment in favor of Programa. Thus, the grant of   summary judgment
    in favor of the Board of Directors and Myrna         Carrero is not
    affected by this appeal.
    - 4 -
    III. ANALYSIS
    The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating against
    employees on the basis of age.     
    29 U.S.C. § 623
    (a)(1); see Hoffman
    v. Applicators Sales & Serv., Inc., 
    439 F.3d 9
    , 17 (1st Cir. 2006).
    Having brought only indirect evidence of discrimination, López
    must rely on the burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell
    Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
     (1973). See Del Valle-Santana
    v. Servicios Legales de P.R., Inc., 
    804 F.3d 127
    , 129-30 (1st Cir.
    2015).   That   framework   begins     by    placing   the   burden     on   the
    plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination by
    showing that (1) he was at least forty years of age; (2) his work
    met his employer's expectations; (3) his employer took an adverse
    action against him; and (4) his employer treated similarly situated
    younger employees differently with respect to the adverse action.
    
    Id. at 129
    .
    Although     López     has     satisfied      three      of    these
    requirements,   the   district   court      properly   concluded    that     his
    failure on the fourth prong entitled Programa to summary judgment.
    The opinion issued by the district court is sound, and we adopt
    its reasoning; we add only a few points of emphasis.
    To begin, we easily conclude that López's showing on the
    first and third prongs of the prima facie case were sufficient:
    Programa conceded below that López was over forty years of age at
    the time of the challenged action and that the reduction in hours
    - 5 -
    and pay constituted an adverse employment action.3                 As to the
    second prong, López succeeded in raising a triable issue as to
    whether     his    work   performance      met     Programa's      legitimate
    expectations. Evidence in the record established that López worked
    for Programa for approximately twelve years, and for the last two
    years López did not receive any warnings.              Moreover, Programa
    offered López an opportunity to renew his employment in the 2014
    fiscal year, a meaningful indication that Programa considered his
    performance at least sufficiently satisfactory to keep working
    there.
    At the summary judgment stage, evidence of this kind
    suffices.    See, e.g., Meléndez v. Autogermana, Inc., 
    622 F.3d 46
    ,
    51 (1st Cir. 2010) (pointing to the plaintiff's ten years with the
    employer and receipt of awards as evidence that was "minimally
    sufficient to show that there was a triable issue as to his ability
    to   meet   [his   employer's]   legitimate      expectations");    Vélez   v.
    Thermo King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 
    585 F.3d 441
    , 448 (1st Cir. 2009)
    (noting that a "long record of employment" contributed to an
    adequate showing regarding work performance).            In reaching this
    conclusion, we are guided by our prior acknowledgments that "an
    employee's burden at the prima facie stage is not particularly
    3Given our conclusion that the reduction in hours satisfied
    the adverse employment action prong, there is no need to analyze
    whether other actions amounted to a constructive discharge, as
    López urges.
    - 6 -
    onerous."    Meléndez, 
    622 F.3d 46
    , 51 (citing Benoit v. Tech. Mfg.
    Corp., 
    331 F.3d 166
    , 173 (1st Cir. 2003)).
    López's success ends there, however, because he did not
    establish a genuine issue of material fact on the fourth prong of
    his prima facie case of discrimination.           López did not produce
    evidence that Programa failed to "treat age neutrally" when it
    reduced work hours for its drivers.           Brennan v. GTE Gov't Sys.
    Corp., 
    150 F.3d 21
    , 26 (1st Cir. 1998).         López attempted to point
    to the experience of two of his co-workers: Harry Muñoz and Angel
    Ruiz.    However, neither of these two individuals are satisfactory
    comparators.
    We explain, starting with Muñoz.           Although Muñoz held
    the same Driver/Handyman position as López, Muñoz's hours and pay
    were reduced alongside López's hours and pay.             Since Muñoz and
    López received the very same treatment, Muñoz's experience does
    not help López establish a triable issue as to whether Programa
    treated individuals of different ages differently in reducing
    hours.    See, e.g., Marcano–Rivera v. Pueblo Int'l., Inc., 
    232 F.3d 245
    , 252 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiff failed to
    establish that similarly situated employees without disabilities
    were    treated   differently   where   the   record   revealed   that   all
    employees in the relevant position received the same adverse
    employment action).
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    López's reliance on Ruiz as a comparator also hits a
    dead end, though for a different reason: the record does not
    support the claim that López and Ruiz were similarly situated
    employees.   First, the summary judgment record illustrates that
    their positions at Programa were meaningfully distinct.                While
    López worked as a Driver/Handyman, Ruiz worked as a Handyman.
    Despite   what   those    titles   might   superficially    suggest,     the
    difference in the positions was not semantic nor was it created
    after the fact for the purposes of litigation.               Handyman and
    Driver/Handyman were listed separately in Programa's internal
    documents, and those documents describe those positions as having
    substantially different responsibilities.         Pursuant to the job
    descriptions,    the     Driver/Handyman   position   was     focused     on
    transporting preschool, infant, and toddler participants.                The
    Handyman position was focused on maintenance, repairs, and other
    forms of manual labor in the facilities.         The Handyman position
    required skills in carpentry, masonry, plumbing, and electricity;
    by contrast, the Driver/Handyman position required driving-related
    licenses and courses, as well as the ability to relate to children.
    Positions that have markedly different focuses, responsibilities,
    and   qualifications      are   insufficient   comparison     points     for
    disparate treatment claims; that remains true even if the positions
    have a narrow degree of overlap.       See Goncalves v. Plymouth Cty.
    Sheriff's Dep't, 
    659 F.3d 101
    , 106 (1st Cir.               2011)   (quoting
    - 8 -
    Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador Resort & Country Club, 
    218 F.3d 1
    ,   5    (1st   Cir.   2000))   (explaining   that   in   employment
    discrimination cases, "[s]imilarly situated candidates must share
    'roughly equivalent qualifications to perform substantially the
    same work'").
    There are additional gaps in López's case for surviving
    summary judgment.         For example, López also failed to produce
    evidence showing that Ruiz and López had similar performance levels
    and disciplinary records.         See, e.g., Adamson v. Walgreens Co.,
    
    750 F.3d 73
    , 82 (1st Cir. 2014) (affirming grant of defendant's
    motion for summary judgment where there was no evidentiary showing
    that plaintiff and other employees had the same disciplinary
    record).        In the end, López's failure to present a similarly
    situated employee who was treated differently prevents him from
    establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.
    Where, as in this case, "the plaintiff has failed to
    limn a prima facie case, the inference of discrimination never
    arises, and the employer's motion for summary judgment will be
    granted."       Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 
    950 F.2d 816
    , 824 (1st Cir.
    1991) (citing Menard v. First Sec. Servs. Corp., 
    848 F.2d 281
    ,
    285–87 (1st Cir. 1988)).        Accordingly, we end our analysis here.
    Affirmed.    Each side to bear its own costs of appeal.
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