United States v. Rose , 802 F.3d 114 ( 2015 )

United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
Nos. 13-1525
13-1683
13-2420
13-2460
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
RUSSELL C. ROSE;
KELVIN FRYE,
Defendants, Appellants.
APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Nathaniel M. Gorton, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Howard, Chief Judge,
Torruella and Kayatta, Circuit Judges.
Rosemary Curran Scapicchio for appellant Kelvin Frye.
Jamesa J. Drake and Drake Law, LLC, for appellant Russell C.
Rose
Kirby A. Heller, Attorney, Appellate Section, Criminal
Division, U.S. Department of Justice, with whom Carmen M. Ortiz,
United States Attorney, James E. Arnold and David J. D'Addio,
Assistant United States Attorneys, District of Massachusetts,
Leslie R. Caldwell, Assistant Attorney General, and David A.
O'Neil, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, were on brief, for appellee.
September 18, 2015
HOWARD, Chief Judge. Russell Rose and Kelvin Frye appeal
convictions stemming from their respective roles in a Cape Cod
based drug-distribution conspiracy. Their claims challenge
several aspects of the proceedings below. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
I.
We begin with a brief overview of the case, saving a
detailed recitation of the facts for the applicable analytical
section below. We present the facts in an objective manner. See
United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2015).
The government charged Rose, Frye, and fourteen others
with conspiring to distribute, and to possess with intent to
distribute, cocaine and heroin. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1),
841(b)(1)(B). The conspiracy was alleged to have lasted from
approximately March 2008 until November 2010, and Rose and Frye
were purportedly leaders in it.
The government's investigation into Rose and Frye picked
up steam in mid-2010, and the two were ultimately arrested,
indicted, and tried. At trial, the government relied on the
testimony of the case agent (Agent Timothy Quinn), recordings of
wiretapped phone calls between the co-conspirators, and testimony
from co-conspirators Delrico Graham and Stefan Pina. The
prosecution also introduced physical evidence, including
contraband discovered at Rose's residence.
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A jury ultimately convicted both Rose and Frye on the
drug-conspiracy charge, and the judge sentenced each of them to
twenty-five years in prison. This timely appeal followed.
II.
After carefully considering each of the defendants'
contentions and extensively reviewing the record, we find four
arguments to be worthy of discussion; the remainder lack arguable
merit. We therefore limit our focus to: (1) the defendants'
complaints respecting the government's wiretapping of their
phones; (2) Rose and Frye's arguments concerning Agent Quinn's
testimony; (3) Rose's challenge to the search of his home; and (4)
both defendants' sentencing challenges grounded on Alleyne v.
United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
A. Wiretaps
At trial, the government relied heavily on the tapes of
intercepted phone calls between the co-conspirators. Both
defendants argue that the phone wiretaps that produced the tapes
were unnecessary and were therefore improperly authorized.
1. Background
Nearly two years into the government's investigation,
agents requested permission to intercept calls to or from the
telephones of Frye and Michael Andrews (another co-conspirator).
To support that request, Agent Quinn submitted an 89-page affidavit
that detailed the alleged criminal activities of Frye and Andrews,
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the sources of information that led to that background knowledge,
and details of the investigation itself. The affidavit
specifically enumerated the prior, unsuccessful use of various
other investigative methods, including: physical surveillance;
review of prison tapes; use of confidential informants; use of pen
registers, trap and trace devices, and toll records; execution of
search warrants; use of grand jury subpoenas; interviews;
intelligence from undercover agents; and examinations of discarded
trash. Agent Quinn also explained why the government believed
that there was probable cause for intercepting the calls.
Agent Quinn eventually filed six additional, analogous
requests targeting phones belonging to Frye, Graham, and Rose.
Although each affidavit was extensive in its own right, each also
incorporated the facts from the previously submitted requests. As
in the initial application, Agent Quinn meticulously described the
prior investigative techniques and then explained why the phone
intercepts were necessary. Based on these descriptions, the
warrant judge (Saris, C.J., D. Mass.), authorized each wiretap.
Prior to trial, the defendants moved to suppress the
wiretaps, see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c), and the court denied the
motion. At trial, recordings of several of the calls were played,
with a significant number capturing these defendants (along with
other co-conspirators) discussing, albeit in code, their plans to
purchase or sell drugs.
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2. Discussion
Our inquiry is guided by Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, which
governs the rules for federal telephone wiretaps. The law requires
an officer to obtain judicial preclearance before instituting a
wiretap by filing "a full and complete statement as to whether or
not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or
why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or
to be too dangerous." Id. at § 2518(1)(c). This aptly-named
"necessity" prong requires the government to have "made a
reasonable, good faith effort to run the gamut of normal
investigative procedures before resorting to means so intrusive as
electronic interception of telephone calls." United States v.
Cartagena, 593 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted).
When a defendant challenges on appeal a court's
"necessity" determination, we ask whether "the facts set forth in
the application were minimally adequate to support the
determination that was made." United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Likewise, when a defendant asserts that the requesting
officer omitted critical information from the affidavit that would
have otherwise altered the court's necessity analysis, we only
consider "whether, had the omitted information been included,
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there would still have been a 'minimally adequate' basis for
determining that the wiretap was necessary." Burgos-Montes, 786
F.3d at 103.
Rose and Frye begin with a broad attack on Agent Quinn's
affidavit. They argue that Quinn withheld critical information
from the judge when applying for the wiretaps, namely, that the
government had placed a GPS tracking device on Frye's car.
Although Agent Quinn theorized about the possible,
future use of a GPS-tracking device, he was far from Goldfinch-
ian in the level of detail he provided about his actual, past
reliance on it. Nonetheless, he did adequately explain why the
telephone intercepts would have still been necessary even if the
officers were to utilize a tracker in the future. That explanation
clarified why a GPS-tracking device was inferior to a telephone
intercept and why the GPS-device was insufficient for this
investigation. For instance, Quinn wrote that "there is a
significant risk that any GPS device[] would be discovered," and
that such devices "provide no information about who (if anyone)
[an individual] is meeting with, why he [or she] traveled to a
particular location, and what happened once he [or she] was there."
More specifically, Agent Quinn, aware from a wiretapped call that
an individual had previously informed Frye to check his car for a
"tracker," noted that "Frye (or at least one of his associates) is
well aware of this law enforcement technique."
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Agent Quinn's reasoning equally explains why the
wiretaps were necessary, even given the government's actual use of
the GPS device. Indeed, if Agent Quinn had written his statements
in the past tense, rather than as a hypothetical, the judge's
necessity inquiry would have remained exactly the same. If
anything, the failure to put more information about the GPS tracker
actually undersold the probable cause that existed to support the
application. We ultimately "find no reason to conclude that the
inclusion of [more information respecting past use of the GPS
tracker] would have prevented the judge from deciding that a
wiretap should [have been] issued." Cartagena, 593 F.3d at 111.
After that broad pitch, Rose specifically narrows in on
wiretap applications #4 (Graham's phone) and #7 (Rose's phone).
He notes that Agent Quinn's proffered justification for tapping
phone #4 was to discover the "source of supply" of the drug
conspiracy. Tapping phone #7, meanwhile, was allegedly necessary
in order to learn more information about another co-conspirator,
"Papa Doc." But, Rose says, these justifications were overly
broad, and the applications sought information that the government
already possessed.
The central flaw in Rose's argument is that he
incorrectly assumes that any "partial success of the
investigation" eliminates the need for further evidence. United
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States v. Cao, 471 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2006).1 As Agent Quinn
persuasively demonstrated, however -- and in sufficient detail,
despite Rose's protestations otherwise -- the government was still
seeking a wealth of information at the time that it submitted the
wiretap applications. Further, Agent Quinn adequately described
why any other investigative technique would not yield the evidence
obtainable by a wiretap.
For example, Quinn noted that "although agents have
observed Graham in the presence of Rose and Frye on multiple
occasions, I know very little about the nature of his relationship
with them." As for "Papa Doc," Agent Quinn wrote that "my
information about Papa Doc is quite limited, as I do not know his
true identity," and that he was unaware of the amount of product
that came from "Papa Doc." He also indicated that the wiretaps
could provide information as to how the conspirators obtained the
drugs, the role that each individual played in the conspiracy, and
the "means, and methods of the operation of the conspiracy." As
Agent Quinn wrote,
I believe that Graham, who has served as
Rose's narcotics courier and has been
intercepted discussing distribution
quantities of cocaine with Frye . . . [will
assist] investigators [to] obtain a more
1 Indeed, such a rule would make little sense. An affiant
seeking a wiretap is required to establish probable cause. In
order to do so, one would expect for other investigative techniques
to have been somewhat successful at the time of the wiretap
application.
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detailed understanding of Graham's role [and]
to identify more fully the members of the
conspiracy, its methods and manners of
operations, sources of supply, associates,
customers, and illicit profits.
These detailed representations to the court were minimally
adequate to support the warrant-judge's decision.2
Ultimately, given Agent Quinn's extensive declarations,
combined with the deferential standard of review applicable to
this wiretap challenge, we are satisfied that no error occurred.
B. Overview Testimony
Frye and Rose next contend that the government
improperly utilized Agent Quinn as an "overview witness," that is,
he allegedly provided a broad summary of the government's entire
case and discussed evidence not then in the record.
Frye advances two other arguments that fall within the
2
penumbra of this challenge. First, he challenges the use of the
GPS tracking device itself under the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (finding that
such an investigative technique constitutes a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes). As in United States v. Sparks, however, the
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule would apply to this
pre-Jones use of a GPS tracker. 711 F.3d 58, 62 (1st Cir. 2013)
(concluding that before Jones, it was reasonable for an officer to
believe that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to investigations
of vehicles on public ways). Second, Frye asserts that a Franks
hearing was required to investigate Agent Quinn's decision to omit
information about the past use of the GPS tracker in his wiretap
application. Given the dearth of evidence reflecting an
intentional or reckless omission, no clear error existed in the
denial of that request. See United States v. Hicks, 575 F.3d 130,
138 (1st Cir. 2009).
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1. Background
The government's central witness was Agent Quinn. The
government called him on the third day of trial, and his testimony
described activities covering the entire length of the conspiracy.
Most notably, he spent a significant period of time testifying
about the taped phone calls between the co-conspirators.
To lay a proper foundation, Agent Quinn first explained
how the phone wiretaps operated logistically. He then clarified
the role that he played in reviewing the calls and testified that
he heard nearly 90% of the calls in real time. From this
experience, Agent Quinn said that he became familiar with the
voices of the key players in the conspiracy, along with the terms
that they used. He also noted that he was conversant in the drug-
distribution "lingo" from prior investigations.
His testimony developed a consistent rhythm. After the
prosecutor played a tape recording of an intercepted call between
co-conspirators, Agent Quinn would answer questions respecting
what he heard. As calls were played, Agent Quinn noted whom he
believed was talking and then described his understanding of the
discussion's context. In doing so, he defined his understanding
of terms such as "the shop," "a ball," "half a rope," "brown," and
"tuck or swallow" -- all common nomenclature in this and other
drug conspiracies.
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The defendants fastidiously preserved their objections
to this testimony and moved for a mistrial. The district court
overruled their objections and denied the motion.
2. Discussion
We review the district court's rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Vázquez-Rivera, 665 F.3d 351, 357
(1st Cir. 2011) (evidentiary rulings); United States v. Freeman,
208 F.3d 332, 339 (1st Cir. 2000) (denial of a motion for a
mistrial).
Both Rose and Frye argue that Agent Quinn's testimony
essentially "link[ed] together the testimony provided by law
enforcement and other non-cooperating witnesses and two
cooperating witnesses." In the defendants' view, Agent Quinn
"placed an imprimatur of veracity" on the other witnesses'
statements. Compounding all of this, they say, was that his
testimony "was presented early during trial to describe the
government's theory of the case."
We have consistently admonished against the use of an
"overview witness" by the government. Such a witness is typically
"a government agent who testifies as one of the prosecution's first
witnesses and, as the term implies, provides an overview or roadmap
of the prosecution's case to come." United States v. Etienne, 772
F.3d 907, 913 (1st Cir. 2014); see, e.g., United States v. Meises,
645 F.3d 5, 13-18 (1st Cir. 2011) United States v. Flores-de-
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Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 20-26 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Casas,
356 F.3d 104, 117-21 (1st Cir. 2004). An overview witness is
generally problematic as he or she may influence the jury's
determination of facts or credibility assessments not yet in
evidence; he or she may also provide testimony differing from what
is to come; and the jury may place greater weight on the witness's
testimony since it "has the imprimatur of the government."
Etienne, 772 F.3d at 913 (internal citation omitted).
Overview testimony customarily contains "conclusory
statements that are not based on the witness' personal knowledge,
and which are unreliable because they often consist of inadmissible
hearsay evidence," rather than testimony that is "squarely based
on [a witness'] personal knowledge." United States v. Díaz-Arias,
717 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013). Where an officer testifies
exclusively about his or her role in an investigation and speaks
only to information about which he or she has first-hand knowledge,
the testimony is generally (barring a different evidentiary issue)
permissible. See id. (noting that such testimony is admissible
since it is not the type of broad, overarching discussion about
"the results of a criminal investigation, usually including
aspects" the agent did not participate in) (internal citation
omitted); see also United States v. Rosado-Pérez, 605 F.3d 48, 55
(1st Cir. 2010).
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We do not find Agent Quinn's testimony (which, it should
be noted, occurred on the third of seven days of trial, and thus
was not the first testimony that the jury heard) to be overview
testimony, let alone improper overview testimony. Agent Quinn
testified exclusively from his personal knowledge, and he based
his statements on his familiarity with the investigation and his
exposure to the voices on the calls. Indeed, he first testified
that he had heard 90% of the calls as they came in and, as a
result, became intimately familiar with the voices and terms that
were used. While his testimony may have canvassed the entire
breadth of the conspiracy, he limited his discussion to his
specific role in the investigation and his first-hand
understanding of the events. That Agent Quinn was actually
involved throughout the entire investigation, and thus was able to
provide such detail about it, is simply not a reason to re-
characterize his statements as inappropriate overview testimony.
See United States v. Laureano-Pérez, -- F.3d --, 2015 WL 4577763
at *15 (1st Cir. July 30, 2015) ("Appropriate testimony does not
become improper overview testimony just because one law
enforcement official was present throughout the entire
investigation and is then called to walk the jury through the
investigation from beginning to end."). Nor, we note, did he vouch
for other witness' credibility, discuss evidence not yet in the
record, or provide testimony that would otherwise raise red flags
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in this context. See, e.g, Etienne, 772 F.3d at 913; Meises, 645
F.3d at 15.
Finding nothing to give us concern, we need go no further
to reject this challenge.3
C. Search of Rose's Home
We next turn to Rose's argument that officers
impermissibly searched the curtilage of his home, and that the
government then obtained a warrant for that property based solely
on the search.
1. Background
On November 16, 2010, Rose and Frye were overheard on a
wiretapped call discussing a plan to purchase two kilograms of
cocaine from "Papa Doc." Rose and Frye then met at a pharmacy
where Frye gave Rose $28,000 for the deal. Rose subsequently drove
home and arranged for Omay Ford (another co-conspirator) to pick
up the drugs. Later in the day, Ford drove to a gas station near
Rose's residence and waited for roughly twenty-five minutes until
3 The parties, particularly Rose, also appear to make a
slightly distinct though overlapping argument. They suggest that
Agent Quinn's testimony violated Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and
702 because he both lacked personal knowledge and because his
testimony did not aid the jury. As noted, however, Agent Quinn
testified exclusively from his personal knowledge. Moreover, his
testimony plainly assisted the jury in that it helped to place a
significant number of calls into context. The district court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence. See Díaz-
Arias, 717 F.3d at 11-15.
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an Acura SUV parked next to him. Ford approached the SUV, leaned
in, and appeared to retrieve something.
Government agents were surveilling Ford and followed him
to Rose's home. After Ford entered the residence, agents, led by
Detective Brian Cohoon, took up a perimeter around the house.
Detective Cohoon crouched near the front door and peered through
its glass. After observing for a period of time, Detective Cohoon
saw Rose carrying a stack of cash. Cohoon thus approached the
door, knocked, and announced, "Police, can you open the door?"
Rose responded by screaming, closing the blinds, grabbing several
items, and running upstairs with Ford. Believing that Rose and
Ford were about to destroy contraband, the officers entered the
home. They then arrested Rose and Ford before securing the scene.
The following day, Agent Quinn obtained and executed a
search warrant for the home. That search yielded roughly two
kilograms of cocaine, 440 grams of marijuana, and more than $75,000
in cash.
Rose moved to suppress the fruits of the search.
Although the district court perfunctorily stated that the officers
entered the property in "bad faith," it nonetheless denied the
motion. It held that the agents' entry on November 16 was
justified by exigent circumstances, and that the warrant obtained
on the 17th was saved by the independent source doctrine.
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2. Discussion
We review legal questions underpinning the denial of the
motion to suppress de novo and any factual findings for clear
error. United States v. Silva, 554 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2009).
Rose highlights two alleged errors in the district
court's decision. First, he focuses on the night of November 16
and argues that the officer's presence on the curtilage of the
property constituted an impermissible search. He then contends
that the district court failed to consider the effect of this
illegal activity on the alleged exigent circumstances that
followed. Second, Rose argues that this impermissible search was
the primary impetus for the search warrant the following day and,
accordingly, tainted any physical evidence obtained from that
search.
As we explain, we are not able to definitively resolve
the legal merits of Rose's argument. Even assuming that Rose is
correct in his assertion of error, however, any error was
ultimately harmless. To reach that end point, we briefly examine
the two relevant exceptions to the exclusionary rule: the exigent
circumstances and independent source doctrines. We begin with the
former.
The exclusionary rule is inapplicable where "'the
exigencies of the situation' make the needs of law enforcement so
compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable
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under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394
(1978) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456
(1948)). A recent case in which the Supreme Court applied this
doctrine was Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). There,
officers approached a residence with the intent to knock on a door
and chat with the inhabitants. Id. at 1854. However, the officers
believed that they heard the defendants destroying evidence, and
thus entered the property. Id. The Court held that the exigent
circumstances doctrine applied since, inter alia, in approaching
the door and knocking, the officers did nothing more than any
ordinary citizen had a right to do. Id. at 1862.
Here, the district court relied on King when applying
the exigent circumstances doctrine. But the district court appears
not to have addressed the threshold issue of whether the officers
"violat[ed] the Fourth Amendment," id. at 1858, by conducting a
search around the curtilage of Rose's home and, if so, whether
that violation sparked the exigent circumstances. The outcome of
that threshold inquiry depends on "whether the officer's conduct
was . . . objectively reasonable," that is, "whether the officers
had an implied license to enter" the curtilage and then station
themselves around the house. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409,
1417 (2012). If not, and if "their behavior objectively reveal[ed]
a purpose to conduct a search, which is not what anyone would think
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he [or she] had license to do," id. at 1417, then their presence
on the property was impermissible.
This record leaves us unable to determine precisely what
the officers were doing when they entered the property on the
evening of November 16. The district court briefly noted that the
officers entered the property in "bad faith"; a conclusory
statement without any predicate factual findings, and one that is
not dispositive as to whether the officers' presence violated the
Constitution. See King, 131 S. Ct. at 1859. Other than that
single statement, the district court did not find any additional
facts that shed light on the length of time that the officers
surveilled before knocking on the door, or that described the
officers' intent, or that otherwise established the officers'
precise movements. Simply stated, we do not know whether the
officers observed Rose's incriminating actions because they were
waiting to approach the suspects until they had proof of
contraband, or whether the officers were just positioning
themselves around the property in anticipation of a knock and talk.
See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 ("[The Fourth Amendment] would be
of little practical value if the State's agents could stand in a
home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity;
the right to retreat would be significantly diminished if the
police could enter a man's property to observe his repose from
just outside the front window"); see also King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858
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("The exigent circumstances rule justifies a warrantless search
when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable
in the same sense."); cf. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-
40 (1990).
Given that absence of factual findings on the issue of
lawful presence, we proceed under the assumption that the officers'
entry on November 16 was improper. As such, we next ask whether
the search warrant obtained the following day was thereby tainted.
As the district court noted, that claim hinges on whether the
warrant was obtained independently of any impermissible police
conduct and thus saved by the independent source doctrine. To
evaluate an independent source claim, we ask whether "the agents'
decision to seek the warrant was prompted by what they had seen
during the initial [illegal] entry." United States v. Dessesaure,
429 F.3d 359, 369 (1st Cir. 2005) (quoting Murray v. United States,
487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988). That subjective inquiry thus turns on
whether the particular officer would have still sought the warrant
absent the unlawfully-obtained information. "In making [that]
factual determination . . . the district court is not bound by
after-the-fact assurances of [the officer's] intent, but instead
must assess the totality of the attendant circumstances to
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ascertain whether those assurances appear implausible." Id.
internal quotation marks omitted).4
In this case, the district court concluded that the
independent source doctrine applied. It noted that "the evidence
Agent Quinn marshaled in support of the search warrant application
came from sources wholly unconnected with the entry and was known
to the agents well before the initial entry." While that
observation is true enough, it reveals little about Agent Quinn's
subjective intent. That is, there was no finding that Agent Quinn
would have sought the warrant irrespective of the November 16
search.
As we see it, the record (specifically Agent Quinn's
declarations in the wiretap applications that he would seek a
warrant for Rose's residence as soon as drugs were connected to
his house) "provide[s] [some] support for the Government's
position. Murray, 487 U.S. at 543. But, as the Supreme Court
reminded in Murray, "it is the function of the District Court
rather than the Court of Appeals to determine the facts." Id.
This is true even where a court of appeals could theoretically
4In addition to the subjective prong of the analysis, we
examine whether "information obtained during the entry was
presented to the Magistrate and affected his [or her] decision to
issue the warrant." Id. at 365 (quoting Murray, 487 U.S. at 542).
This aspect of the analysis is "wholly objective." Id. On this
factor, our review of the warrant application leaves little doubt
that the independent information was sufficient to support the
judge's decision to issue the warrant.
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cobble together varying aspects of the record to infer the
officer's subjective intent. See id. (concluding that while the
district court found that one could "perhaps infer from [the facts]
that the agents who made the entry already planned to obtain the
'critical evidence through a warrant-authorized search' it was not
strong enough for the court of appeals to find the fact on its
own); see also United States v. Wright, 493 F.App'x 265, 271-72
(3d Cir. 2012); cf. United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64,
78 (1st Cir. 2015). Thus, even if we were inclined to say that
the district court would likely have found an intent to seek the
warrant given the court's ultimate adoption of the independent
source doctrine, the absence of such a finding hinders our ability
to conclusively rule on this challenge.
As noted, however, remand is not necessarily required
even were we to credit the defendant's arguments. Instead, we
must ask whether the "government can prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the [putative] error complained of did not contribute
to the verdict obtained." United States v. Green, 698 F.3d 48,
53-54 (1st Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In this case, the government referred to the
potentially-tainted physical evidence in its opening and closing
arguments. But, such evidence played a minimal role in the larger
context of the government's case. We are therefore confident that
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the remaining evidence was so overwhelming that, even if this
evidence should have been excluded, its inclusion did not affect
the verdicts. A brief summary shows why.
The government presented compelling evidence reflecting
the length and breadth of the conspiracy, along with the specific
role that each defendant played. That evidence begins with the
detailed testimony of two eyewitnesses, co-conspirators Pina and
Graham.
Graham testified that he agreed to, and did, distribute
both cocaine and heroin with Rose and Frye. Indeed, Graham
discussed a number of occasions on which he delivered drugs
directly to both defendants, and to occasions when he saw both
individuals with large quantities of cocaine. He indicated that
he had known Frye for twelve years, transported cocaine on his
behalf, and was often paid in cocaine for his services. He also
discussed a specific instance in which he had transported cocaine
from Rhode Island to a condominium where Frye and Rose were waiting
for the delivery. Finally, he identified Ford as Rose's supplier.
For his part, Pina testified in significant detail about
times in which he had obtained drugs for Frye. He further
testified that he received an "eight-ball" of heroin from Rose and
Frye. Significantly, he discussed an instance when Rose and Frye
came to his house and obtained a kilo of cocaine, then pressed it,
blended it, cut it up, and bagged it for sale.
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Crucially, the government's case did not rest on the
admittedly sufficient, but arguably always open to challenge,
testimony of cooperating witnesses. Rather, that testimony was
corroborated and repeatedly reinforced by the vivid portrait of
defendants painted in their recorded conversations and surveilled
actions, as well as the physical contraband unconnected with the
challenged search or its arguable fruits. This evidence easily
established four central events that formed the heart of the
government's case.
First, the government introduced evidence that on the
evening of September 19, 2010, Rose was in contact with his seller,
Omay Ford. Rose then sent Graham to pick up a kilogram of cocaine
from Ford. Graham subsequently did so and then delivered the drugs
to Rose. Rose, however, was displeased with the product. He thus
ordered Graham to return the bag because the product was "no good."
He also paid Graham for these services in cocaine that was, in
contrast to the cocaine obtained from Ford, described as "banging."
Second, the government established that on September 21,
2010, Frye and Pina attempted to mail a package of heroine to
Anthony Vaughn. Frye and Pina went to a pharmacy and purchased an
item in which to hide the drugs. Frye then arranged for an
associate to mail the package, but a postal inspector recovered
the package mid-transport. The inspector found nearly 10 grams of
heroin inside of the package.
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The government also highlighted an event from later that
same month in which Frye and Pina were awaiting a delivery of
cocaine. Law enforcement had been surveilling the van making the
delivery. A state trooper pulled the van over for a driving
violation, searched the vehicle, and discovered nearly 200 grams
of heroin. The co-conspirators were later overheard during
wiretapped conversations discussing this event.5
The final, central event, previously discussed, occurred
just before the putatively illegal search on November 16. The
government established that before the officers even entered
Rose's property, Rose and Frye had agreed to purchase two kilograms
of cocaine for $28,000. The two then took multiple overt steps -
- most notably, transferring money from one individual to the other
-- to accomplish that goal.
On the whole, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury would have convicted these two defendants even if the
evidence recovered from the search of Rose's home was improperly
admitted. The challenged evidence was cumulative; there was
already sufficient testimony and physical evidence respecting both
5Even defendant's use of code words of the "trade" (itself
an inculpatory behavior) did not conceal the probative force of
their conversations. Thus, for example, in describing the truck
that was pulled over and what was found in the truck, Adalberto
Graciani said to Frye, "Ah, estimate about 40, 40,000 I think in
heroin, and -- I mean, $40,000 worth in the streets and she he --
they was sayin."
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the conspiracy itself and the vast quantity of drugs flowing
through it. Nor, given all of this other evidence, do we think
that the brief mention of the physical contraband during arguments
at trial affected the result.6 Thus, questions about the legality
of the officers' conduct in entering Rose's home on November 16,
2010, are not sufficient to disrupt the convictions.
D. Alleyne
This brings us to the defendants' sentences. Rose and
Frye argue that the district court, rather than the jury, made
certain drug-quantity findings, and that the court then imposed a
6 Early in its opening statement to the jury, the government
did appear to emphasize the physical evidence. But, the
prosecutor's reference to the items seized on November 16 quickly
transitioned into a discussion of the events and evidence that led
to the government's search that day. Indeed, of the nearly thirty
minute opening statement, the government spent roughly five
minutes discussing the events of the 16th. Only about one minute
of that time discussed the physical contraband.
The closing argument even more plainly manifests the minimal
role that the physical contraband played in the case. The
government began its closing argument by reminding the jury of the
evidence that it had heard. The prosecutor specifically referenced
the taped phone calls and the live testimony, while only obliquely
referring to "all of the exhibits." Following this, the government
discussed the events of November 16 and emphasized that Rose and
Frye's actions on that day were sufficient by themselves for the
jury to find the two guilty. In making that argument, the
government again focused on the phone calls and the events leading
up to the search; not the physical evidence. In total, the
government spent roughly one third of its thirty-three minute
closing argument on the events of November 16. Of that time, it
devoted about one minute to the physical contraband. Although the
government thereafter referred to the physical evidence (including
contraband independent of the events of November 16), it simply
did so sporadically and as icing on an already-baked cake.
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statutory mandated sentence based on those findings, in violation
of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013).
1. Background
At sentencing, the district court determined by a
preponderance of the evidence that Rose was responsible for at
least 9 grams of cocaine, 20 grams of heroin, and 1.77 kilograms
of marijuana. Those quantities subjected Rose to a mandatory
minimum sentence of 20 years, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)&(B) & 846,
although neither the court nor the parties mentioned that mandatory
minimum at sentencing. In contrast to the 240-month statutory
minimum, calculations pursuant to the sentencing guidelines
resulted in a recommended 360-month to life incarcerative
sentence. The district court, finding that the guidelines range
was inflated, imposed a below-guidelines sentence of 300 months.
Likewise, the court concluded that Frye was responsible
for 14 kilograms of cocaine and 923.05 grams of heroin, which also
subjected him to a 20-year mandatory minimum. At Frye's sentencing
hearing, the district court noted in passing that this mandatory
minimum applied. Like Rose, Frye's guidelines range was 360 months
to life. The court, relying on the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), varied below the guidelines range and also sentenced
Frye to 300 months in prison.
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2. Discussion
Typically, we review de novo whether a sentence was
improper under Alleyne. See Etienne, 772 F.3d at 922. But
unpreserved claims of Alleyne error, such as those here, are
reviewed for plain error. United States v. Harakaly, 734 F.3d 88,
94 (1st Cir. 2013); see United States v. Ramos-González, 775 F.3d
483, 499 (1st Cir. 2015) (plain error requires a showing of an
error that "was clear or obvious, and that it both affected [the
defendant's] substantial rights and seriously impaired the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.").7
The government states that "[t]he district court
violated Alleyne by concluding that Rose [and Frye were] subject
to a mandatory minimum based on judge-found drug quantities."
Despite that apparent concession, we question whether any Alleyne
error actually occurred. See Etienne, 772 F.3d at 922 ("Although
the parties agree an Alleyne error occurred, their stipulation on
this question of law is of no import."). In United States v.
7 Rose concedes that he did not preserve his Alleyne claim
and thus plain error review applies. Frye, by contrast, goes to
some length to show that he preserved the issue. Yet, in the
district court below, he objected only to "the quantities set forth
in the PSR and request[ed] an evidentiary hearing on the issue of
quantity." He did not argue that the jury, rather than the court,
was required to make the drug quantity determination beyond a
reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Frye has not preserved the precise
claim that he now asserts. See United States v. Samboy, 433 F.3d
154, 161 (1st Cir. 2005).
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Ramírez-Negrón, we noted that "failing to prove an individualized
drug quantity is an Alleyne error only in cases in which the
defendant has been convicted and sentenced under the aggravated
version of the statute -- that is, where an enhanced mandatory
minimum applies." 751 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir. 2014) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). With respect to
one of the defendants in that case, we concluded that "[t]he record
provides no evidence that the district court made any findings to
trigger a . . . mandatory minimum; rather, it shows that the court
imposed a Guidelines sentence." Id. at 50. We found it relevant
that "neither the judge nor either party at sentencing even
mentioned that a mandatory minimum was under consideration . . . .
Instead, the sentence was based only on Guidelines consideration."
Id.
The record here -- other than a brief reference to the
mandatory minimum in Frye's case -- is quite similar. For both
defendants, the court exclusively based its sentence on the
guidelines, and thus seemed to avoid sentencing the defendants
under the aggravated statutory provisions. Indeed, when
discussing the drug-quantity findings, the court framed the
question as one that solely affected the guidelines inquiry. The
court stated that it would "use that [its findings] as [to] the
number of kilos to establish the base offense level." Utilizing
that base offense level, and the factors referenced in 18 U.S.C.
- 29 -
§ 3553(a), the court then imposed sentences based purely on
guidelines considerations. While the court's single reference to
the mandatory minimum perhaps makes Frye's case a bit closer, we
are nonetheless inclined to say that Alleyne was not implicated
here. See United States v. Lanza-Vázquez, ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL
5042806, at *14 (1st Cir. Aug. 27, 2015) ("Although the district
court in this case made a passing reference that the amount of
drugs 'is the minimum pursuant to the statutory minimum,' its
actual sentencing decision was based purely on Guidelines
considerations and the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a).").
Either way, neither party can establish the necessary
prejudice to sustain their claim. Following Alleyne, we have
repeatedly emphasized that no prejudice exists when "it can fairly
be said . . . that the assigned error did not contribute to the
result of which appellant complains," and "[i]n drug cases,
overwhelming evidence of the requisite drug types and quantities
generally serves as a proxy for determining whether the Alleyne
error contributed to the result." United States v. Morris, 784
F.3d 870, 874 (1st Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted); see also Ramírez-Negrón, 751 F.3d at 51 n.8.
In this case, the government established that both
defendants were individually responsible for conspiring to
distribute more than five kilograms of controlled substances (even
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excluding the drugs found at Rose's residence). Some of the
evidence to establish drug quantity presented at trial included:
Rose and Frye's agreement to purchase two kilograms of cocaine on
November 16 (irrespective of the legality of the seizure of those
drugs); Graham's testimony that he transported a kilogram of
cocaine for Frye "every three weeks, two a month, every month" for
a year; Pina and Graham's testimony that they observed both Rose
and Frye "pressing, cutting, and bagging" kilograms of cocaine for
distribution; Graham's testimony that he was paid in cocaine by
Rose and picked up approximately one kilogram of cocaine from Rose
"plenty" of times; Graham's testimony that Rose ordered him to
return a kilogram of cocaine because it was "no good"; Graham's
testimony that he met Ford on four to five occasions at Rose's
residence to transport cocaine; testimony relating to 200 grams of
heroin that Frye was expecting for delivery; and testimony from
another co-conspirator, Bonnie Bearse, that Rose stashed
significant quantities of cocaine at her house. Given this
overwhelming evidence, the defendants cannot establish plain error
justifying relief.8
8 Frye also argues that the district court impermissibly
utilized a prior offense (conspiring to provide contraband to a
federal inmate, 18 U.S.C. § 371) to move him into the grasp of the
guidelines' career offender provision. Although the statute
pertaining to his prior conviction was divisible, he argues that
the district court failed to engage in the appropriate analysis to
determine whether the prior offense was actually a drug crime.
See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2283 (2013);
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III.
Finding no reason to disturb the convictions or
sentences, we affirm.
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 19 (2005). We need not
determine if an error occurred, since any mistake was harmless.
First, the career offender classification had no impact on Frye's
base offense level. Second, while the offense did move Frye's
criminal history from category V to category VI, that designation
ultimately had no impact on the guidelines recommendation, which
ultimately drove the district court's sentencing decision.
Indeed, given the severity of the offense, the guidelines still
recommended 360 months to life, irrespective of Frye's criminal
history. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. 8.
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