United States v. Santana ( 1996 )


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  • July 22, 1996         [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
    No. 95-1229
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    ANGEL SANTANA,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
    [Hon. Jos  Antonio Fust , U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Torruella, Chief Judge,
    Coffin, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Cyr, Circuit Judge.
    Thomas R. Lincoln, with whom Law Offices of Thomas R. Lincoln was
    on brief for appellant.
    Juan A. Pedrosa, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Guillermo Gil, United States Attorney, Jos  A. Quiles-Espinosa, Senior
    Litigation Counsel, and Nelson P rez-Sosa, Assistant United States
    Attorney, were on brief for appellee.
    Per  Curiam.    Angel   Santana,  one  of  twenty-three
    Per  Curiam.
    defendants involved  in an extensive drug  trafficking operation,
    claims  that the  government  failed to  comply  with their  plea
    agreement  by  refusing  to  request  a "substantial  assistance"
    departure at  sentencing.  See  18 U.S.C.    3551 and  U.S.S.G.
    5K1.1.  We find no error.
    Santana  pled guilty  to  conspiracy  to  possess  with
    intent to distribute in excess of 2,300 kilograms of cocaine. See
    21 U.S.C.    841(a)(1), 846.  The plea agreement required Santana
    to   cooperate   in  the   government's  investigation   of  drug
    trafficking,  drug-related  murders,  firearms  trafficking,  and
    other criminal  violations, and to continue  to provide complete,
    truthful  and accurate  information and  testimony on  an ongoing
    basis.   In return, the  government agreed to  request a downward
    departure for "substantial assistance."
    Santana contended below that  he complied with the plea
    agreement  by  providing information  which  the  government used
    against his codefendants,  and by  testifying at the  trial of  a
    codefendant.   Thus, he argued, the government acted in bad faith
    by  refusing to  request a  downward departure.   The  government
    responded, and  the district court agreed,  that Santana breached
    the  plea agreement by failing  to disclose, inter  alia, all his
    knowledge about  the drug-related murders, thereby  relieving the
    government of  its contingent obligation.   See United  States v.
    Santiago-Gonzalez, 
    66 F.3d 3
    , 7 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v.
    Tilley,  
    964 F.2d 66
    , 70  (1st  Cir.  1992);  United States  v.
    2
    Gonzalez-Sanchez, 
    825 F.2d 572
    , 578 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 
    484 U.S. 989
     (1987).
    We review the  district court's factual findings  under
    the "clear error" standard, United States v. Clark, 
    55 F.3d 9
    , 11
    (1st  Cir.  1995), but  conduct de  novo  review of  its ultimate
    finding  that   the  plea  agreement  was  not  breached  by  the
    government.   See  
    id. at 11
    ;  United States v.  Atwood, 
    963 F.2d 476
    , 478  (1st Cir. 1992).  There is ample record support for the
    district  court ruling  that the  government reasonably  regarded
    Santana's  failure to  disclose  all he  knew about  drug-related
    murders,  among other matters, as a material breach of their plea
    agreement.   As Santana failed  to fulfill  a material  condition
    precedent to the government's  obligation to recommend a downward
    departure for substantial assistance, the government was under no
    obligation to do so.
    Affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    3