United States v. Andrews ( 1999 )


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  •     [NOT FOR PUBLICATION   NOT TO BE CITED AS PRECEDENT]
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the First Circuit
    No. 98-1703
    UNITED STATES,
    Appellee,
    v.
    DEXTER J. ANDREWS,
    Defendant, Appellant.
    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
    FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
    [Hon. Joseph L. Tauro, U.S. District Judge]
    Before
    Selya, Circuit Judge,
    Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge,
    and Lipez, Circuit Judge.
    Robert E. Harvey, by appointment of the Court, and Dexter J.
    Andrews, on brief pro se, for appellant.
    Jennifer Zacks, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom
    Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief, for
    appellee.
    OCTOBER 14, 1999
    Per Curiam.  Defendant Dexter Andrews was convicted after
    a jury trial of possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of
    18 U.S.C.  922(g)(1).  He now appeals, challenging the district
    court's failure to: exclude a witness who had allegedly violated a
    sequestration order; grant a new trial due to allegedly improper
    comments in the prosecutor's closing argument; give a requested
    jury instruction; and depart downward from the sentencing
    guidelines.  Andrews has also filed pro se briefs raising arguments
    concerning his sentence and the court's procedure for conducting
    voir dire.  Finding no error, we affirm.
    Andrews, who had a prior criminal record including
    multiple Massachusetts felony convictions, was arrested after a
    police chase in the Mattapan section of Boston involving a car in
    which he was a passenger.  When the car stopped, Andrews fled on
    foot.  Three police officers testified that as Andrews exited the
    car two handguns fell from his waist.  Andrews, however, testified
    that he had never touched the guns and claimed that they belonged
    to the driver of the car, Lumumba Roberson.  The jury found Andrews
    guilty and he was sentenced to 210 months in prison.
    I.  Witness Sequestration
    On Andrews's motion the district court entered a
    sequestration order barring witnesses from the courtroom during the
    testimony of other witnesses.  At trial, Andrews testified that he
    had just been introduced to Roberson on the day in question and had
    never spoken to him before.  The government called a rebuttal
    witness, Officer Gregory Brown, who testified that he had seen
    Andrews and Roberson together on two occasions.  On cross-
    examination, Officer Brown admitted that he had previously spoken
    with his partner, Officer Craig Jones, about the fact that Officer
    Jones was to testify at Andrews's trial.  Officer Brown denied that
    Officer Jones had asked him to testify that he had seen Andrews
    with Roberson.
    Andrews argues that Officer Brown violated the court's
    sequestration order and that the court committed plain error by not
    excluding his testimony as a sanction for that violation.  We
    disagree.  There was no violation of the sequestration order.  The
    order requested by Andrews required only that Officer Brown not be
    in the courtroom to hear Officer Jones testify, see Fed. R. Evid.
    615, and he was not.  Andrews was free to request further
    restrictions covering out-of-court conversations between witnesses,
    but he did not do so.  He cannot complain now that Officer Brown
    violated an order that the court never entered and he never
    requested.  See United States v. Sepulveda, 
    15 F.3d 1161
    , 1176 (1st
    Cir. 1993).
    II.  Closing Argument
    Andrews argues that the district court erred in denying
    his post-trial motion for a new trial based on allegedly improper
    remarks in the prosecutor's closing argument.  Andrews objected to
    some of those remarks; the court sustained the objection, raised
    other objections sua sponte, and gave curative instructions.
    Because Andrews did not move for a mistrial or request further
    curative instructions in addition to those given by the court, we
    review only for plain error.  See United States v. Grabiec, 
    96 F.3d 549
    , 550 (1st Cir. 1996).
    Andrews contends first that statements by the prosecutor
    improperly suggested that Andrews had the burden to produce
    witnesses to rebut the government's evidence. The prosecutor's
    rebuttal argument included the following passage:
    [PROSECUTOR:] Where is Mr. Roberson?
    We don't know where Mr. Roberson is, but Mr.
    Roberson would not be expected to testify at
    this
    MR. COOPER: Objection, your Honor.
    THE COURT: No, sustained.  There's no
    evidence about that at all, that's improper
    argument. . . .
    I've got to   with respect to Mr.
    Roberson, you're to understand, as I told you
    before, that the defendant had no burden of
    producing Mr. Roberson, even if he knew where
    Mr. Roberson was.
    The defendant has no duty to bring in
    any evidence.  The fact that the defendant
    brings in one witness that happens to be
    himself doesn't mean he has to bring a second
    witness.
    The government, on the other hand, has
    the burden of convincing you beyond a
    reasonable doubt.  And so if the government
    wanted to bring Mr. Roberson in here, it was
    the government's burden to do so, not the
    defendant's.
    We agree with Andrews, and with the district court, that
    the prosecutor's reference to Roberson may have improperly
    suggested to the jury that Andrews had the burden to produce
    Roberson to rebut the government's case.  See United States v.
    Roberts, 
    119 F.3d 1006
    , 1015 (1st Cir. 1997).  In deciding whether
    a new trial was required, we may consider, inter alia, "whether the
    judge gave any curative instructions and the likely effect of such
    instructions . . . ."  United States v. Manning, 
    23 F.3d 570
    , 574
    (1st Cir. 1994).  Here, as the quoted portion of the transcript
    indicates, the court intervened promptly and forcefully, in a way
    that could have left no doubt in the jurors' minds that the burden
    of proof was solely the government's.  Because the curative
    instruction rendered the misconduct harmless, the court's failure
    to grant a new trial was not plain error.
    Andrews complains of improper burden-shifting in other
    portions of the prosecutor's closing.  We find none, and we note
    that those allegedly improper comments were also answered by strong
    instructions by the court that dissipated any possible prejudice.
    Andrews further argues that the prosecutor improperly
    vouched for the credibility of the government's witnesses when he
    said, "You had, on the other hand, three officers with absolutely
    no motive to come in here and tell you anything other than what
    they saw that night."  Improper vouching consists of placing the
    prestige of the government behind a witness by offering personal
    assurances about his credibility or indicating that facts outside
    the knowledge of the jury support the witness's credibility.  See
    United States v. Auch,
    187 F.3d 125
    , 130-31 (1st Cir. 1999).  Here
    the prosecutor did neither; instead, he merely referred to the
    witnesses' lack of motive to lie, which "falls within the accepted
    bounds and was entirely proper."  
    Id. at 131
    .`
    III.  Requested Jury Instruction
    Andrews argues that the court erred in failing to give
    his requested jury instruction on constructive possession.  There
    was no evidence, however, that generated constructive possession as
    an issue   the government alleged actual possession, and its
    principal witnesses testified that they saw Andrews in actual
    possession of the two guns.  A defendant is not entitled to an
    instruction that is not generated by the evidence.  See United
    States v. Fulmer, 
    108 F.3d 1486
    , 1495 (1st Cir. 1997).
    IV.  Downward Departure from Sentencing Guidelines
    Andrews argues that the district court erred in failing
    to depart downward from the sentencing guidelines.  Claiming that
    the court erroneously believed it had no authority to depart
    downward, he invokes the exception to the general rule that failure
    to depart is not reviewable on appeal.  See United States v.
    Mangos, 
    134 F.3d 460
    , 465 (1st Cir. 1998).  Andrews points to the
    court's statement at the sentencing hearing that "what I am going
    to do is sentence you to the minimum under the Guidelines of 210
    months.  I have no authority to do anything else."   Without
    significantly more evidence than Andrews cites, we will not find
    that a judge of vast experience in sentencing under the guidelines
    was ignorant of his authority to depart downward in an appropriate
    case.  Reading the judge's remark in context, we conclude that he
    was merely expressing his view that he could not depart downward in
    this case because there were no facts justifying such a departure.
    See United States v. Morrison, 
    46 F.3d 127
    , 130 (1st Cir. 1995)
    (coming to same conclusion when district court stated, "if I felt
    I had the authority to depart, I would").
    Andrews raises additional arguments relating to his
    sentencing in a pro se brief.  Those arguments are clearly without
    merit and we need not discuss them.
    V.  Defendant's Presence During Voir Dire at the Bench
    Andrews asserts in a pro se brief that the court
    committed reversible error by conducting individual voir dire of
    prospective jurors at the bench, with the prosecutor and defense
    attorney present, while Andrews remained seated at the counsel
    table.  We assume, without deciding, that Andrews had the right to
    be present at such a bench conference.  See Cardinal v. Gorczyk, 
    81 F.3d 18
    , 20 (2d Cir. 1996) (assuming that defendant had right to be
    present at bench voir dire, but finding waiver); United States v.
    Washington, 
    705 F.2d 489
    , 497 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam)
    (recognizing defendant's right to be present but finding error
    harmless).  Andrews, however, waived that right when neither he nor
    his attorney asserted it after the court explained that a marshal
    would have to accompany Andrews to the bench and sit nearby.  See
    United States v. Gagnon, 
    470 U.S. 522
    , 528-29 (1985) (per curiam)
    (defendant or counsel must affirmatively assert right to be present
    at conferences, and express "on the record" waiver not required);
    see also Washington, 
    705 F.2d at 497
     (because right is
    "infrequently exercised and usually delegated to counsel, unless a
    specific request is made for the defendant to participate at bench
    examinations of prospective jurors, such right shall be deemed to
    have been waived.").  The requirement that the marshal be present
    was a reasonable one and did not invalidate the waiver.  See United
    States v. Santiago-Lugo, 
    167 F.3d 81
    , 83-84 (1st Cir. 1999)
    (security arrangements, including placement of marshals in
    courtroom, within trial court's "broad discretion").
    Affirmed.